Temporal Metaphysics in Z-Land

John Perry has argued that language, thought and experience often contain unarticulated constituents. I argue that this idea holds the key to explaining away the intuitive appeal of the A-theory of time and the endurance theory of persistence. The A-theory has seemed intuitively appealing because the nature of temporal experience makes it natural for us to use one-place predicates like past to deal with what are really two-place relations, one of whose constituents is unarticulated. The endurance view can be treated in a similar way; the temporal boundaries of temporal parts of objects are unarticulated in experience and this makes it seem that the very same entity exists at different times.     

A New Problem for the A-theory of Time

I offer a new approach to the increasingly convoluted debate between the A- and B-theories of time (the 'tensed' and 'tenseless' theories). It is often assumed that the B-theory faces more difficulties than the A-theory in explaining the apparently tensed features of temporal experience. I argue that the A-theory cannot explain these features at all, because on any physicalist or supervenience theory of the mind, in which the nature of experience is fixed by the physical state of the world, the tensed properties of time posited by the A-theory could play no role in shaping temporal experience. It follows that the A-theory is false; even a priori arguments for it fail, because they still require the tensed vocabulary which is used to describe temporal experience.     

Replies to Deng,Lee, and Skow

This paper is a contribution to a book symposium on my book Experiencing Time. I reply to comments on the book by Natalja Deng, Geoffrey Lee and Bradford Skow. Although several chapters of the book are discussed, the main focus of my reply is on Chapters 2 and 6. In Chapter 2 I argue that the putative mind-independent passage of time could not be experienced, and from this I develop an argument against the A-theory of time. In Chapter 6 I offer one part of an explanation of why we are disposed to think that time passes, relating to the supposedly ‘dynamic’ quality of experienced change. Deng, Lee, and Skow’s comments help me to clarify several issues, add some new thoughts, and make a new distinction that was needed, and I acknowledge, as I did in the book, that certain arguments in Chapter 6 are not conclusive; but I otherwise concede very little regarding the main claims and arguments defended in the book.     

Inconsistency in the A-Theory

This paper presents a new argument against A-theories of time. A-theorists hold that there is an objective now (present moment) and an objective flow of time, the latter constituted by the movement of the objective now through time. A-theorists therefore want to draw different pictures of reality—showing the objective now in different positions—depending upon the time at which the picture is drawn. In this paper it is argued that the times at which the different pictures are drawn may be taken to be normal times or hypertimes. If they are normal times then the A-theory is inconsistent, or else collapses to the B-theory—and appealing to primitive tense operators will not help A-theorists avoid this conclusion. If the times are hypertimes then the A-theory is consistent, but deeply problematic none the less.     

Time Will Fly During Future Fun (But Drag Until Then)

Consumers’ lives are filled with scheduled events—both positive and negative. The current research examines how the valence of future scheduled events colors consumers’ temporal judgments in relation to such events: the time until their onset, the time during the events, and the time until their offset. We propose that the lay theory espousing “time flies when you’re having fun” leads consumers to judge that positive (vs. negative) future events of equivalent objective distance and duration are farther away and shorter. Operating in tandem, these elements produce two novel phenomena: (a) The end of positive and negative events can feel similarly far from the present, and (b) The beginning and end of positive events can feel similarly far from the present, whereby, in some circumstances, the event’s duration is effectively eliminated in the mind’s eye. Four studies provide evidence for these predictions, informing future directions regarding prospective time perception.     

A-Theory for B-Theorists

I attempt to characterize the A-theory of time in such a way as to avoid certain standard objections to it, like those derived from McTaggart's paradox. These objections often arise from conflation of the A-theory with other doctrines which are not entailed by it, but which happen to be held by individual A-theorists. In my view, the A-theory is most defensible when combined with a certain analysis of tense (which I call 'the counterfactual theory of tense'), and with realism about the past and future.     

The Effects of Life Events Inventory

There has been some disagreement in the literature regarding the wisdom of including negative and positive life events in life event scales. However, underlying much of this discussion has been the assumption that the negativity or positivity of various events may be denoted a priori. The present study investigated the relative desirability and impact of 66 life events rewritten to suit the culture of the samples used. In addition, the effect of recency of occurrence of these events was explored. Results clearly indicated that some apparently negative life events were experienced as desirable by some participants, and that some apparently positive events were experienced as undesirable by several participants. Differences in response patterns according to age, gender, anxiety level, and type of presenting problem were also examined. The implications of these findings for assessment in clinical and research situations are discussed.     

Negative life events and symptoms of depression and anxiety: stress causation and/or stress generation

Background and Objectives: Stressful life events are known to contribute to development of depression; however, it is possible this link is bidirectional. The present study examined whether such stress generation effects are greater than the effects of stressful life events on depression, and whether stress generation is also evident with anxiety. Design: Participants were two large age cohorts (N = 732 aged 44 years; N = 705 aged 63 years) from the West of Scotland Twenty-07 study. Methods: Stressful life events, depression, and anxiety symptoms were measured twice five years apart. Cross-lagged panel analysis examined the mutual influences of stressful life events on depression and on anxiety over time. Results: Life events predicted later depressive symptomatology (p = .01), but the depression predicting life events relationship was less strong (p = .06), whereas earlier anxiety predicted life events five years later (p = .001). There was evidence of sex differences in the extent to which life events predicted later anxiety. Conclusions: This study provides evidence of stress causation for depression and weaker evidence for stress generation. In contrast, there was strong evidence of stress generation for anxiety but weaker evidence for stress causation, and that differed for men and women.     

The predictive validity of belief in future occurrence

Prospection is associated, in varying degrees, with a sense that imagined events will (or will not) happen in the future—referred to as belief in future occurrence. The present research investigated to what extent this belief is justified and predicts the actual occurrence of events in the future. In two studies, participants rated their belief in the future occurrence of events imagined to happen in the coming month (Study 1) or week (Study 2), and the actual occurrence of events was then assessed. Results showed that the odds of event occurrence were about 2 times higher with an increase of 1 unit on the belief scale. Belief was particularly pronounced for temporally close events and was largely determined by the congruence of events with autobiographical knowledge. These results suggest that belief in future occurrence has some truth value and may inform decisions and actions.     

An editorial statement

Phenomena that are unanticipated or based on something unanticipated are often neglected by sociologists. ‘Astonishment’ is selected for analysis as one of the phenomena that are frequently based on unanticipated events. Especially when unanticipated events occur together with certain other social factors, astonishment is a likely reaction. Astonishment is further analysed in terms of some basic elements of social action: The reaction may be a means (especially of social control), it may be a conscious end in action, and it may be a condition in action.     

Leaders as eponyms: Individual and situational determinants of ruler eminence

The eponymic theory of leadership maintains that the eminence of rulers depends on their utility as historical labels without regard for their personal attributes. The explanatory scope of this interpretation was tested, for methodological reasons, on a sample of 342 European hereditary monarchs. In support of eponymic theory: (a) About two-thirds of the variance in leader eminence can be ascribed to the number of significant events occurring during the leader's tenure in office; (b) events with positive and negative social valence carry approximately equal and positive weight; (c) events over which the leader exerts considerable control have about the same weight as those over which personal control is virtually nonexistent; and (d) the effects of epochcentric bias and reign span are mediated by the number of significant events. But qualifying eponymic theory: (a) Eminence is not determined solely by the event tabulations (e.g., leader frame is a J-curve function of intelligence and a U-curve function of morality); (b) the number of events is not exclusively accounted for by reign span; and (c) reign span is not solely a function of life span (e.g., reign span is a positive linear function of assessed leadership). The results endorse a form of the theory in which some provision is made for intellectual and personality factors.     

The Lucretian Puzzle and the Nature of Time

If a person’s death is bad for him for the reason that he would have otherwise been intrinsically better off, as the Deprivation Approach says, does it not follow that his prenatal nonexistence is bad for him as well? Recently, it has been suggested that the “A-theory” of time can be used to support a negative answer to this question. In this paper, I raise some problems for this approach.     

Actions as Events

We present a theory of actions based on a theory of events in branching time, in which “particular” or “token” actions are taken to be sets of transitions from their initial states to the outcomes. We also present a simple theory of composition of events by which composite events can be formed out of other events. Various kinds of actions, including instantaneous group actions and sequential group actions, are introduced by way of composition, and an extended stit theory of agency is proposed, in which the stit operators are combined or equipped with reified group actions.     

Qualitative meta-analysis of insight events in psychotherapy

Purpose: This study reports on a qualitative meta-analysis examining the phenomenon of insight into psychotherapy. Method: Studies (n?=?7, covering 15 insight events of 15 clients) were selected that examined significant events in psychotherapy leading to insight using session recordings and Interpersonal Process Recall interviews with clients and therapists. A conceptual organization of the data using a matrix grid consisting of three domains according to data origin (client process, therapist process, and their interaction) and three domains according to events’ sequence (context, event and key intervention, and impact) was established. Results: Key processes were identified that lead to insight events in psychotherapy. Two distinct types of events according to their main impacts as reported by the clients were identified: Painful/Poignant Insight where clients realized something that was painful, often evoking feelings of sadness or undifferentiated upset containing sadness and hurt; and Self-Asserting/Empowering Insight that led to an impact characterized by a sense of self-assertion and empowerment on the client’s part. A reasonably good alliance and vulnerability on the client’s part represent the context for insight events as does the client’s quest for self-understanding. The therapists’ key interventions in the event leading to poignant/painful insight contain either empathic reflection or collaborative interpretation. In empowerment/self-assertive insight events the therapists offer supportive, validating reframing promoting positive experience. In both types of events the therapist and the client work on consolidating insight. In some events, therapists emphasized cognitive or problem solution focused impacts, while clients emphasized emotional impacts. Some events contained emotional avoidance on the part of the client or therapist thus not realizing the full potential of the event.     

Beyond “Beyond A- and B-time”

This Article critically discusses Clifford Williams’ claim that the A-theory and B-theory of time are indistinguishable. I examine three considerations adduced by Williams to support his claim that the concept of time essentially includes transition as well as extension, and argue that, despite its prima facie plausibility, the claim has not been adequately justified. Williams therefore begs the question against the B-theorist, who denies that transition is essential. By Williams’ own lights, he ought to deny that the B-theory is a (realist) theory of time; and thus his claim that A-time and B-time do not differ significantly should be rejected.

Journal of Counseling & Development (JCD) and Counseling's Interwoven Nature: Achieving a More Complete Understanding of the Present Through “Historization” (Musings of an Exiting Editor—An Editorial Postscript)

In this brief opinion piece, the author retraces the relationship of JCD and the history of counseling to isolate essential elements of counseling's unique approach. The author contends that to overlook the role of past events and past contributors deprives one of a more complete professional understanding of counseling, because each passing moment is largely a creation of those past events that possess a dynamic, systemic nature that has become actualized in present time.     

Exposure to Traumatic Events and PTSD in a Postconflict and Disaster-Prone Area

The present study examines lifetime exposure to traumatic events and the rate of PTSD among university students living in a postconflict and disaster-prone area. Two self-report questionnaires, namely the Life Events Checklist and a PTSD screening tool, were used in the study. PTSD was found in 21% of respondents. Approximately 96% of the respondents have been exposed to traumatic events during their lifetime. Both genders have the same rate of PTSD (p?=?0.9) and exposure to traumatic events (p?=?0.327). Findings suggest that lifetime exposures to traumatic events are high among students living in this region.