Why not find out whether religious beliefs predict surgical outcomes? If they do, why not find out why? Reply to Freedland (2004).

In this reply to K. E. Freedland's (see record 2004-13299-002) comments on R. J. Contrada et al. (see record 2004-13299-001), it is shown that the statistical issues he raised, and his preferred interpretation of the findings, were adequately addressed in the original article. It is argued that methodological limitations also were fully characterized and do not differ in kind from those of biomedical studies. Other issues discussed include the merits of focusing on distal versus proximal causation, plausibility of explanatory mechanisms for health effects of religious involvement, and potential practical applications that do not require manipulation of religious involvement. The article is concluded by commenting on subtle aspects of discourse that may unnecessarily polarize discussions of possible physical health effects of religious involvement.     

Why do people factor?

This is a very simple explanation of factor analysis primarily for the factorial layman. The interpretation of factors and the comparisons of various factor solutions are illustrated with a hypothetical example so designed that the reader can visualize all the relationships in a two-dimensional graph.     

为什么信风水

解放后以政府行为破除封建迷信,收效甚大,风水术士消声匿迹,虽存遗老,残喘不死,亦蜇伏待毙,不敢蠢动。“文化大革命”期间,世态混乱,真伪颠倒,封建迷信喜得邪风,死灰复燃。风水之术沉渣泛起。近十几年风水迷信,实得贪官青睐,闹腾得很风光,其为害很大,必须严加惩治,不应姑息。现在需要分析哪些人相信风水,为什么这些人相信风水,找出原因方可下虎狼药。     

Why Parfit did not go far enough

Parfit has argued for the revolutionary thesis that personal identity does not matter in ordinary survival, only the R-relation does. “Reconciliationists,” such as Lewis, have tried to stop this revolution, arguing that both personal identity and the R-relation matter. The disagreement has been between those who hold that only the R-relation matters and those who hold that, in addition, personal identity matters. But there is a third option. I argue that Parfit is right that personal identity does not matter but he is wrong that the R-relation matters, and the reconciliationists are wrong to think both matter since neither does.     

Why academic women do not revolt

Low perceptions of sex discrimination among full-time women faculty interviewed at a multicampus northeastern university in a major metropolitan area are explained and compared with statistical data documenting inequities in salary, promotion, rank, and tenure. Structural reasons for the misperceptions are offered, such as concentration in lowest ranks, pluralistic ignorance, merit myths, and cooptation. Data are generalizable because similar patterns prevail at most educational institutions. The study highlights the irony of the way women perceive their status and their own documentation of the day-to-day inequities which cumulatively result in the statistical patterns now accepted by the United States Supreme Court as prima facie evidence of sex discrimination. Solving status inequalities requires strong social networks among women, according to the author. Affirmative action recommendations are outlined to close the gap between women faculty and administrators without resorting to the courts.     

Why do they do it? Affective motivators in adolescents' decisions to participate in risk behaviours

Affective motivators have been targeted in many theories as playing a critical role in adolescents' decisions to participate in a variety of risky behaviours that may have life-altering consequences. In this study, we examined the role of several of these affective motivators across low and high experience groups to determine their perceived influence on the desire to participate in each of five risky behaviours (drinking alcohol, using drugs, having sex, smoking cigarettes, and skipping school). The affective motivators included those that: (a) promote risky behaviours by enhancing pleasant affective states (sensation seeking, social/emotional), (b) promote risky behaviours by reducing or avoiding negative affective states (negative emotions, tension reduction), and (c) deter risky behaviours by avoiding anticipated regret (e.g. of harming future). Results showed that the perceived motivational strength of the affective goals differed substantially between low and high experience groups and across the different risky behaviours. Adolescents with less experience were much more focused on avoiding the negative affective consequences associated with regretting unfavourable future outcomes. In contrast, adolescents with more experience participating in a risky behaviour held stronger beliefs that participation in the behaviour could both enhance positive and reduce negative affective states. We describe how the perceived importance of these motives varies across the risky behaviours, and offer insights into the likely motivational changes that occur as an adolescent moves from no experience to chronic experience engaging in risky behaviours.     

Partitioning default effects: why people choose not to choose

Default options exert an influence in areas as varied as retirement program design, organ donation policy, and consumer choice. Past research has offered potential reasons why no-action defaults matter: (a) effort, (b) implied endorsement, and (c) reference dependence. The first two of these explanations have been experimentally demonstrated, but the latter has received far less attention. In three experiments we produce default effects and demonstrate that reference dependence can play a major role in their effectiveness. We find that the queries formulated by defaults can produce differences in constructed preferences and further that manipulating queries can also mitigate default effects. The experimental context involves two environmentally consequential alternatives: cheap, inefficient incandescent light bulbs, and expensive, efficient compact fluorescent bulbs. Within this context we also measure the impact of each potential rationale for a default effect.     

Why anamorphoses look as they do: an experimental study

The aim of this research was to understand why anamorphic images break up until they are unrecognizable when the observer's eye moves away from the regularization point. An experimental device was set up allowing the anamorphic deformation of images, consisting of a rotating screen on which figures were projected. The point from which subjects observed the screen was far from the projecting point. The projected figures lengthened equally when the screen rotated either clockwise or counterclockwise. On the other hand, the perceptual result was the opposite: in the former case, a rigid figure was seen rotating around its own vertical axis; in the latter case, the same figure was seen elongating or shortening in a non-rigid manner, without rotating. Since we were in a projective condition, the invariance of the cross-ratio was maintained. Therefore, we were in a situation of non-rigidity, in spite of the invariance of the cross-ratio. Three stimuli, white on a black background, were used in experiment 1. They were a segment, three aligned points, and four aligned points. Subjects had to rotate the screen at will and stop it at the point when they saw the transformation of movement from rigid rotation to non-rigid elongation. The results showed that: (i) in spite of being a projective invariant, the cross-ratio is not always a perceptual invariant too; (ii) the threshold screen position between the two motions was located at the position where the modifications of the solid angle subtended to the stimulus assumed a different trend from that of a sinusoid. Two stimuli were used in experiment 2: a continuous segment and one intersected by four vertical lines. The aim was the same as for experiment 1, but subjects had to repeat it from five different points of observation. The results showed that: (1) there was no significant difference depending on type of stimulus, indicating that the computability of the cross-ratio is not a necessary condition for the execution of the task; (2) the more the observer moved away from the projection axis, the more evident the distortion of the stimulus appeared, in accordance with what happens when observing an anamorphosis; (3) when the metamorphosis from rigid motion to elastic motion was seen the visual angle subtended to the stimulus was constant for all distances from the projection axis, in accordance with the hypothesis of rigidity.     

Only because I love you: why people make and why they break promises in romantic relationships

People make and break promises frequently in interpersonal relationships. In this article, we investigate the processes leading up to making promises and the processes involved in keeping them. Across 4 studies, we demonstrate that people who had the most positive relationship feelings and who were most motivated to be responsive to the partner's needs made bigger promises than did other people but were not any better at keeping them. Instead, promisers' self-regulation skills, such as trait conscientiousness, predicted the extent to which promises were kept or broken. In a causal test of our hypotheses, participants who were focused on their feelings for their partner promised more, whereas participants who generated a plan of self-regulation followed through more on their promises. Thus, people were making promises for very different reasons (positive relationship feelings, responsiveness motivation) than what made them keep these promises (self-regulation skills). Ironically, then, those who are most motivated to be responsive may be most likely to break their romantic promises, as they are making ambitious commitments they will later be unable to keep.     

Why young people do not kill themselves: the reasons for living inventory for adolescents

Assessed the reliability, validity, and predictive power of a new measure, the Reasons for Living Inventory for Adolescents (RFL-A; Osman et al., 1998). A group of 206 (101 boys and 105 girls) adolescent psychiatric inpatients completed the RFL-A, Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory for Adolescents (Butcher et al., 1992), and a packet of self-report measures. Additional information about the patients including diagnosis and suicide status were obtained from their medical records. It was determined that the RFL-A is a valid and reliable measure of adolescent suicide risk potential. Additionally, the RFL-A possesses better predictive power than the Beck Hopelessness Scale (Beck, Weissman, Lester, & Trexler, 1974). A discussion of the clinical and research utility of the RFL-A is included along with suggestions for future research.     

Why physicians should not do ethics consults

Increasing complexities facing physicians negotiating the bedside decision continue to fuel the debate over who is the appropriate party to offer ethics consults, should one be needed, during the decision-making process. Some very good arguments have been put forth on behalf of clinical ethicists as being the proper and best party to engage in ethics consultations. However, serious questions remain about the role of the clinical ethicist and his ability to provide the necessary level of objectivity called for in an ethics consult. I argue that the clinician's professional psyche, or mode of thinking as a professional, leaves him little room to maneuver as an objective and detached third party ethics consultant. Several factors are cited and discussed that greatly influence the analyses applied to a case problem by physicians. The most formidable of these factors are habits and the practice of defensive medicine. I conclude that clinical ethicists are less suited for the overall tasks required of an objective consultant in medical cases that appear to involve insurmountable ethical issues.     

The analyst in action: An individual account of what Jungians do and why they do it1

This paper describes some similarities and differences between contemporary approaches to analysis as practised by ‘Freudians’ and ‘Jungians’ in London today. It aims to contribute to mutual understanding between different schools of analysis by showing how the analyst’s interventions can only be understood in terms of the theoretical context from which they arise (cf. ‘the analyst’s preconscious’, as discussed by Hamilton [1996] ). A discussion of five key themes of Jungian theory is followed by an account of clinical work with a patient who enacted her inner world through the use of material objects brought to the consulting room, presenting difficult technical dilemmas concerning boundaries and enactment. The paper aims to shows how these Jungian themes influenced the analyst’s response, particularly in relation to ideas of symbolic transformation, the unknowable nature of unconscious processes and the purposive orientation of the self towards wholeness and integration.     

Self‐help strategies to reduce emotional distress: What do people do and why? A qualitative study

Background: Some people with psychological distress do not seek professional help but opt instead for self‐help strategies to reduce their symptoms. Little is known about these strategies. Aim: To investigate which self‐help approaches might be employed to reduce the effects of emotional distress, and the reasons for these choices. Method: Semi‐structured interviews with 11 clerical employees generated data analysed using grounded theory. Findings: Managing distress is a complex and multi‐dimensional process unique to each individual. The use of self‐help options is determined by the interconnection between the person's core beliefs, their social networks, and ideas about coping. Such beliefs may hinder help‐seeking. People tend to engage in activities that are familiar to them already, rather than attempt new ones. The purpose of self‐help strategies is to distract the person from their problems and to contribute to physical and mental well‐being. Implications for practice are discussed.     

Metaphors do not use associations between concepts,they are used to create them

Does the interpretability and aptness of a metaphor depend on prior existing associative relations between the metaphor topic and vehicle? Lexical decision latencies for pairs of words drawn from apt, comprehensible metaphors were no faster than latencies for randomly paired words. In contrast, lexical decision latencies for associatively related word pairs were faster than latencies for randomly paired words. These data suggest that good metaphors do not use preexisting associations to achieve their effects. Instead, we argue tht people use metaphors to create new relations between concepts. Implications for a theory of metaphor comprehension are discussed.     

Recurrent involuntary imagery in people who stutter and people who do not stutter

Objective

To compare intrusive memories in groups of people who do (PWS), and who do not (PWNS), stutter.

Method

Twenty-one participants who stuttered and 21 matched controls were given a semi-structured interview which explored imagery in speaking situations. The data were analyzed using a Content Analysis approach. Other outcome measures were the Beck Anxiety Inventory, the Beck Depression Inventory, the Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, PTSD, Symptom Scale: Self-Report Version.

Results

Significantly more stuttering participants than control participants indicated both recurrent imagery and associated memories. Content Analysis revealed themes of disfluency, anxiety, negative social evaluation, self-focus and pressure to speak that were common to both groups’ reports. Additional themes of helplessness, shame, sadness and frustration were found only in the images and memories of the stuttering group. No group differences were evident for the number of sensory modalities involved in images and memories, or for ratings of their vividness or strength of associated emotions, or on self-reports of depression, anxiety and trauma.

Conclusions

Recurrent imagery about events in childhood is a potent factor in the memories of PWS. It is worth modifying interventions that have been successfully applied for treating social anxiety for use with people who stutter.Educational objectives: After reading this article, participants will be able to: (a) identify the role of intrusive memories in psychiatric disorders and stuttering; (b) investigate how DSM criteria can be employed with people who stutter; (c) employ anxiety instruments used for assessing psychiatric disorders for stuttering; (d) distinguish between the intrusive memories experienced by people who stutter, and people who do not stutter; (e) apply treatments for intrusive memories in psychiatric disorders to work with people who stutter.