共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Bernhard Hommel 《Cognitive processing》2005,6(1):3-14
Perceptual processes play a central role in the planning and control of human voluntary action. Indeed, planning an action is a sensorimotor process operating on sensorimotor units, a process that is based on anticipations of perceptual action effects. I discuss how the underlying sensorimotor units emerge, and how they can be employed to tailor action plans to the goals at hand. I also discuss how even a single action can induce sensorimotor binding, how intentionally implemented short-term associations between stimuli and responses become autonomous, how feature overlap between stimulus events and actions makes them compatible, and why action plans are necessarily incomplete.
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Bernhard HommelEmail: |
2.
Thomas Spitzley 《Erkenntnis》2009,71(1):73-88
The topic of this article is the dependency or, maybe, the interdependency of rationality and self-knowledge. Here two questions
may be distinguished, viz. (1) whether being rational is a necessary condition for a creature to have self-knowledge, and
(2) whether having self-knowledge is a necessary condition for a creature to be rational. After a brief explication of what
I mean by self-knowledge, I deal with the first question. There I defend the Davidsonian position, according to which rationality
is, indeed, a necessary condition for self-knowledge. In addition, I distinguish two aspects of rationality which I call basic
and local rationality. After that I concentrate on the second question for the remaining larger part of this article. Here
I proceed in two stages: first I examine whether self-knowledge is necessary for basic rationality, and then whether it is
necessary for local rationality.
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Thomas SpitzleyEmail: |
3.
Melissa Frankel 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):409-413
This is a response to Stavroula Glezakos’ commentary on my paper, in which I address three main points: (1) whether Berkeley
is entitled to argue via inference to the best explanation, (2) whether Berkeley’s likeness principle might be too strict,
and (3) whether the texts support my reading.
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Melissa FrankelEmail: |
4.
Evan Selinger 《Human Studies》2008,31(1):27-41
Recent debates about the Grameen Bank’s microlending practices depict participating female borrowers as having fundamentally
empowering or disempowering experiences. I argue that this discursive framework may be too reductive: it can conceal how technique
and technology simultaneously facilitate relations of dependence and independence; and it can diminish our capacity to understand
and assess innovative development initiatives.
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Evan SelingerEmail: |
5.
Jakub Čapek 《Philosophia》2008,36(4):453-463
The first part of this essay is basically historical. It introduces the explanation–understanding divide, focusing in particular
on the general–unique distinction. The second part is more philosophical and it presents two different claims on action. In
the first place, I will try to say what it means to understand an action. Secondly, we will focus on the explanation of action
as it is seen in some explanatory sciences. I will try to argue that in some cases these sciences commit what I call an “external
contradiction”.
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Jakub ČapekEmail: |
6.
Jason Kawall 《Philosophia》2006,34(2):153-156
In my “Promising and Supererogation” I argue that one cannot fulfill promises to perform supererogatory actions (such as “I hereby promise to perform one supererogatory action every month”). In a response to my paper, David Heyd argues that there is an alternative solution to the problem I raise. While I agree with much that Heyd says about the examples he discusses, his proposed solution involves a crucial alteration of the problem; his proposed solution does not solve the problem I present.
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Jason KawallEmail: |
7.
Jessica Brown 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(3):397-405
In my remarks, I discuss Sosa's attempt to deal with the sceptical threat posed by dreaming. Sosa explores two replies to
the problem of dreaming scepticism. First, he argues that, on the imagination model of dreaming, dreaming does not threaten
the safety of our beliefs. Second, he argues that knowledge does not require safety, but a weaker condition which is not threatened
by dreaming skepticism. I raise questions about both elements of his reply.
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Jessica BrownEmail: |
8.
Ira Newman 《Philosophia》2008,36(1):43-54
Philosophers have often applied a distinctively epistemic framework to the question of how moral knowledge can be derived
from fictional literature, by considering how true propositions, or their argumentative support, can be the cognitive fruits
of reading works of fiction. I offer an alternative approach. I focus not on whether readers fail to assent to the truth of
a proposition or fail to provide it rational support. Instead, I focus on how readers fail to accord a truth (which they already
accept) adequate importance in their web of beliefs about living a good human life. This is a form of ignorance, but in the
form of neglect, or failure to pay proper regard – which is one sense of the term ‘forgetfulness’. I argue that works of fictional
literature may, at times, stimulate audience members to overcome their own particular forms of forgetfulness in this respect.
And I use Tolstoy’s The Death of Ivan Ilyich as a case in point.
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Ira NewmanEmail: |
9.
Rommetveit K 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2008,29(2):103-120
In this article I consider some central aspects of the naturalist philosophy of science and science and technology studies
in dealing with the contested status of technoscience in medicine. Focusing on the concepts of realism and representation,
I argue that theories of science-as-practice in naturalist philosophy of science should expand their scope so as to reflect
more thoroughly on the social and political context of technoscience. I develop a hermeneutic of technomedical objects in
order to highlight the internal connectedness between social action, material agency, and the actions of scientific communities.
The framework thus developed is used to re-consider the genomic turn in medicine. Pointing to the discrepancies between socially
dominant representations of genomic technology and the actual interventions brought about through those technologies, I raise
the question of how and where to address problems of theory and policy.
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Kjetil RommetveitEmail: |
10.
Stewart Cohen 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):121-125
I raise several objections to Sosa’s account of knowledge as aptness. I argue that aptness is neither necessary nor sufficient
for knowledge. I also raise some objection to Sosa’s treatment of dreaming skepticism.
相似文献
Stewart CohenEmail: |
11.
Per Sandin 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):153-167
This paper discusses the application of the supreme emergency doctrine from just-war theory to non-antagonistic threats. Two
versions of the doctrine are considered: Michael Walzer’s communitarian version and Brian Orend’s prudential one. I investigate
first whether the doctrines are applicable to non-antagonistic threats, and second whether they are defensible. I argue that
a version of Walzer’s doctrine seems to be applicable to non-antagonistic threats, but that it is very doubtful whether the
doctrine is defensible. I also argue that Orend’s version of the doctrine is applicable to non-antagonistic threats, but that
his account is not defensible, regardless of whether the threats are antagonistic or not.
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Per SandinEmail: |
12.
13.
Associative accounts of goal-directed action, developed in the fields of human ideomotor action and that of animal learning,
can capture cognitive belief-desire psychology of human decision-making. Whereas outcome-response accounts can account for
the fact that the thought of a goal can call to mind the action that has previously procured this goal, response-outcome accounts
capture decision-making processes that start out with the consideration of possible response alternatives followed only in
the second instance by evaluation of their consequences. We argue that while the outcome-response mechanism plays a crucial
role in response priming effects, the response-outcome mechanism is particularly important for action selection on the basis
of current needs and desires. We therefore develop an integrative account that encapsulates these two routes of action selection
within the framework of the associative-cybernetic model. This model has the additional benefit of providing mechanisms for
the incentive modulation of goal-directed action and for the development of behavioural autonomy, and therefore provides a
promising account of the multi-faceted process of animal as well as human instrumental decision-making.
相似文献
Sanne de WitEmail: |
14.
Frank Arntzenius 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(2):277-297
I argue that standard decision theories, namely causal decision theory and evidential decision theory, both are unsatisfactory.
I devise a new decision theory, from which, under certain conditions, standard game theory can be derived.
相似文献
Frank ArntzeniusEmail: |
15.
In this introduction we discuss the motivation behind the workshop “Towards a New Epistemology of Mathematics” of which this
special issue constitutes the proceedings. We elaborate on historical and empirical aspects of the desired new epistemology,
connect it to the public image of mathematics, and give a summary and an introduction to the contributions to this issue.
相似文献
Bernd BuldtEmail: |
Benedikt L?we (Corresponding author)Email: |
Thomas MüllerEmail: |
16.
Emotional expressions of moral value 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Julie Tannenbaum 《Philosophical Studies》2007,132(1):43-57
In “Moral Luck” Bernard Williams describes a lorry driver who, through no fault of his own, runs over a child, and feels “agent-regret.”
I believe that the driver’s feeling is moral since the thought associated with this feeling is a negative moral evaluation
of his action. I demonstrate that his action is not morally inadequate with respect his moral obligations. However, I show
that his negative evaluation is nevertheless justified since he acted in way that does not live up to his moral values. I
then use this distinctive negative moral evaluation to distinguish agent-regret from guilt and mere regret.
相似文献
Julie TannenbaumEmail: |
17.
Victoria Sutton 《Science and engineering ethics》2009,15(3):303-309
In the United States a rapidly increasing regulatory burden for life scientists has led to questions of whether the increased
burden resulting from the Select Agent Program has had adverse effects on scientific advances. Attention has focussed on the
regulatory “fit” of the Program and ways in which its design could be improved. An international framework convention to address
common concerns about biosecurity and biosafety is a logical next step.
相似文献
Victoria SuttonEmail: |
18.
Michael Nelson 《Philosophical Studies》2007,133(3):455-471
I discuss Stalnaker’s views on modality. In particular, his views on actualism, anti-essentialism, counterpart theory, and
the Barcan formulas.
相似文献
Michael NelsonEmail: |
19.
Andrei A. Buckareff 《Philosophia》2006,34(2):143-152
Sharon Ryan has recently argued that if one has compatibilist intuitions about free action, then one should reject the claim that agents cannot exercise direct voluntary control over coming to believe. In this paper I argue that the differences between beliefs and actions make the expectation of direct voluntary control over coming to believe unreasonable. So Ryan's theory of doxastic agency is untenable.
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Andrei A. BuckareffEmail: Phone: +1-716-3533623 |
20.
Derk Pereboom 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):21-33
In this article I develop several responses to my co-authors of Four Views on Free Will. In reply to Manuel Vargas, I suggest
a way to clarify his claim that our concepts of free will and moral responsibility should be revised, and I question whether
he really proposes to revise the notion of basic desert at stake in the debate. In response to Robert Kane, I examine the
role the rejection of Frankfurt-style arguments has in his position, and whether his criticism of my version of this argument
is sound. In reply to John Fischer, I argue that the reasons-responsiveness central to his account of moral responsibility
is not best characterized counterfactually, and I provide a suggestion for revision.
相似文献
Derk PereboomEmail: |