Descartes's Theory of Distinction

In the first part of this paper I explore the relations among distinctness, separability, number, and non-identity. I argue that Descartes believes plurality in things themselves arises from distinction, so that things distinct in any of the three ways are not identical. The only exception concerns universals which, considered in things themselves, are identical to particulars. I also argue that to be distinct is to be separable. Things distinct by reason are separable only in thought by means of ideas not clear and distinct. In the second part I argue that the notion of separability in Descartes's account of real distinction between mind and body is subject to five different interpretations. I claim that the heart of Cartesian dualism concerns the separability of the attributes thought and extension. It does not require that mind and body are separable in the sense that each can exist without the other existing.     

Pavlov and the mind-body problem

I. P. Pavlov claimed that the mind-body problem would ultimately be resolved by empirical methods, rather than by rational arguments. A committed monist, Pavlov was confronted by dualism in the case of an hysterical person. Under normal conditions, her body's left side was insensitive to pain, but when she was hypnotized, there was a reversal of her sensitivity to pain, with the right side becoming insensitive. Pavlov acknowledged that the divergence between stimulation and response suggested dualism, yet condemned his disciple G.P. Zelenyî as well as Charles S. Sherrington, for their dualistic tendencies. Pavlov's continuous adherence to monism is attributed to the influence of popular scientific books that he read during his adolescence. The books maintained that science was based upon monism. Pavlov proposed that by introducing the concept of emotions, an hysterical person's condition could be explained within the framework of his theory of higher nervous activity, thereby obviating the need to change his paradigm.     

Problems with the Garber-Dear Theory of the Disappearance of Descartes's Method

Philosophical Studies -     

Jefferson and Adams on the mind-body problem

Amidst the voluminous correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and John Adams are several letters pertaining to the material basis of mental life. These reveal in a most suggestive way the substantial differences between them. Well informed on prevailing scientific and philosophical perspectives, Jefferson and Adams used the issue to express their positions on the nature and limits of knowledge, the relative authority of scientific methods and speculations, and the larger question of human perfectibility. At the same time, their exchanges illuminate the prevailing and divergent perspectives on human psychology adopted by major leaders of thought in the New World.     

Some aspects of eloquence in Descartes's works

In Descartes's philosophy, communicating scientific and philosophical truth does not represent a problem that can be traced back to humanistic rhetoric, meant as the art of persuasion. Descartes states his belief in the eloquence of reason: a clear, precise, and adequately expressed thought cannot fail to convince the listener. This is the measure of the distance between the level of truth and the level of opinion. However, the moment of confrontation with the public is also the very moment when the truth of the new knowledge enters into conflict with other, different conceptions. Education and history influence communication with the result that the distinction between intellectual conviction and persuasion becomes less straightforward. Rational eloquence, as Descartes is well aware, must be articulated in such a way as to avoid any possible language equivocation and to adopt exposition strategies ensuring effective access to readers. The aim of this paper is to illustrate some aspects of this tension as expressed by the writer Descartes with reference to a number of texts (from the Regulae to the Meditationes) that were essential for the elaboration and dissemination of his philosophy.     

On the notion of effectiveness

This paper focuses on two notions of effectiveness which are not treated in detail elsewhere. Unlike the standard computability notion, which is a property of functions themselves, both notions of effectiveness are properties of interpreted linguistic presentations of functions. It is shown that effectiveness is epistemically at least as basic as computability in the sense that decisions about computability normally involve judgments concerning effectiveness. There are many occurrences of the present notions in the writings of logicians; moreover, consideration of these notions can contribute to the clarification and, perhaps, solution of various philosophical problems, confusions and disputes.     

Extending the notion of affordance

Post-Gibson attempts to set out a definition of affordance generally agree that this notion can be understood as a property of the environment with salience for an organism’s behavior. According to this view, some scholars advocate the idea that affordances are dispositional properties of physical objects that, given suitable circumstances, necessarily actualize related actions. This paper aims at assessing this statement in light of a theory of affordance perception. After years of discontinuity between strands of empirical and theoretical research, the time is ripe for addressing the question of whether the dispositional interpretation of affordance is in accordance with some recent evidence from cognitive science and neuroscience. Following this line, I clarify that there are some cases of affordance-related effects that neither require the actualization of an action, nor the presence of an action-related property bearer in the environment, and that the identification of affordance with physical properties provides only a partial explanation of the wide range of affordance-related effects. Accordingly, I argue in favor of a more general account of affordance perception based on the ability to directly detect perceptual patterns in the environment.     

Reconsidering the Value of Equality

Some people believe that the equality of people's well-being makes an outcome better, other things being constant. Call this Telic Egalitarianism. In this paper I will propose a new interpretation of Telic Egalitarianism, and compare it with the interpretation that is proposed by Derek Parfit 1995 Parfit, Derek. 1995. Equality or Priority? University of Kansas: Lindley Lecture. Reprinted in Clayton and Williams [2000: 81–125] [Google Scholar] and widely accepted by many philosophers. I will argue that my proposed interpretation is more plausible than Parfit's. One of the virtues in my interpretation is that it shows his Levelling Down Objection does not undermine Telic Egalitarianism. I also believe that my interpretation better explains the important similarity and difference between Telic Egalitarianism and his proposed Priority View.