A conceptual and theoretical analysis of evaluative conditioning

Evaluative conditioning is best defined as an effect, that is, as a change in the valence of a stimulus that results from pairing the stimulus with another stimulus. This definition has several advantages that are made explicit in this paper. One of the advantages is that it clarifies that evaluative conditioning can be due to multiple processes. Therefore, the conditions under which evaluative conditioning is observed can depend on the processes that underlie a particular manifestation of evaluative conditioning. This could explain why there are so many conflicting results about the conditions under which evaluative conditioning can be found. Future research should adopt a meta-conditional approach that focuses not only on whether a certain condition is crucial for obtaining evaluative conditioning but should also examine when a certain condition is crucial.     

Collective memory: conceptual foundations and theoretical approaches

In order to outline the conceptual landscape that frames discussions of collective memory, three oppositions are proposed: collective memory versus collective remembering; history versus collective memory; and individual memory versus collective remembering. From this perspective collective remembering is viewed as an active process that often involves contention and contestation among people rather than a static body of knowledge that they possess. Collective remembering is also viewed as privileging identity formation and contestation over the sort of objective representation of the past that is the aspiration of formal historical analysis. And finally, while collective remembering involves individual minds, it also suggests something more in the form of socially situated individuals, a claim that can usefully be formulated in terms of how members of a groups share a common set of cultural tools (e.g., narrative forms) and similar content.     

Over-valued ideas: a conceptual analysis

Over-valued ideas are truly a neglected area of psychopathology with few experimental studies published. There is a different emphasis in the USA and Europe regarding their definition. For authors in the USA an over-valued idea has become shorthand for 'poor insight' in the middle of a continuum of obsessional doubts to delusional certainty. Compared to negative thoughts, obsessions and delusions, they are often more resistant to any treatment. A better understanding of over-valued ideas is required if advances are to be made in therapy and for the development of appropriate measures to evaluate the efficacy of novel treatments. A cognitive behavioural model of over-valued ideas is presented which draws upon the philosophical distinction between beliefs and values. It is argued that over-valued ideas are associated with idealised values, which have developed into such an over-riding importance, that they totally define the 'self' or identity of the individual. Idealised values are also characterised by the rigidity with which they are held. Such patients are unable to adapt to different circumstances and ignore the consequences of acting on their value. This analysis leads to a discussion of predictions that can be tested and various strategies that can be used in cognitive behaviour therapy.     

Indigenous, cultural, and cross-cultural psychology: A theoretical, conceptual, and epistemological analysis

This paper compares indigenous, cultural, and cross-cultural psychology by examining their theoretical, conceptual, and epistemological foundations. They have been influenced by the three research traditions in psychology: (1) universalist, (2) contextualist, and (3) integrationist approaches. The goal of the universalist approach is to test and verify universality of existing psychological theories. Cultural psychologists, in contrast, point out that presumed universals are actually Western impositions and not universals. They affirm the contextualist approach and argue that every culture possesses its own unique characteristics, and they should be understood from within the culture. Integrationists argue that search for universals should include the content and context of culture, and they reject absolute universalism and relativism. In cross-cultural psychology, two integrationist approaches can be identified: the derived etic approach (Berry, 1980) and the indigenous psychologies approach (Kim, Park, & Park, 1999). In the derived etic approach, researchers adapt and integrate existing theories to fit local knowledge. Indigenization as articulated by Sinha (1997) represents this approach. In the indigenous psychologies approach, the primary goal is to understand how people think, feel, and behave in a particular context. It advocates a bottom-up model-building paradigm that examines the generative capabilities of human beings. Detailed analysis of the indigenous psychologies approach is provided.     

Understanding team adaptation: a conceptual analysis and model

This endeavor provides a multidisciplinary, multilevel, and multiphasic conceptualization of team adaptation with theoretical roots in the cognitive, human factors, and industrial-organizational psychology literature. Team adaptation and the emergent nature of adaptive team performance are defined from a multilevel, theoretical standpoint. An input-throughput-output model is advanced to illustrate a series of phases unfolding over time that constitute the core processes and emergent states underlying adaptive team performance and contributing to team adaptation. The cross-level mixed-determinants model highlights team adaptation in a nomological network of lawful relations. Testable propositions, practical implications, and directions for further research in this area are also advanced.     

Just teasing: a conceptual analysis and empirical review

Drawing on E. Goffman's concepts of face and strategic interaction, the authors define a tease as a playful provocation in which one person comments on something relevant to the target. This approach encompasses the diverse behaviors labeled teasing, clarifies previous ambiguities, differentiates teasing from related practices, and suggests how teasing can lead to hostile or affiliative outcomes. The authors then integrate studies of the content of teasing. Studies indicate that norm violations and conflict prompt teasing. With development, children tease in playful ways, particularly around the ages of 11 and 12 years, and understand and enjoy teasing more. Finally, consistent with hypotheses concerning contextual variation in face concerns, teasing is more frequent and hostile when initiated by high-status and familiar others and men, although gender differences are smaller than assumed. The authors conclude by discussing how teasing varies according to individual differences and culture.     

Special section on theoretical models and conceptual analyses: second installment

The Journal of Applied Psychology's call for theoretical models and conceptual analyses brought a terrific response. The first set of articles accepted in response to the call appeared in the December 2004 issue. This installment contains the second set of articles.     

Recurrence in major depression: a conceptual analysis

Theory and research on major depression have increasingly assumed a recurrent and chronic disease model. Yet not all people who become depressed suffer recurrences, suggesting that depression is also an acute, time-limited condition. However, few if any risk indicators are available to forecast which of the initially depressed will or will not recur. This prognostic impasse may be a result of problems in conceptualizing the nature of recurrence in depression. In the current paper we first provide a conceptual analysis of the assumptions and theoretical systems that presently structure thinking on recurrence. This analysis reveals key concerns that have distorted views about the long-term course of depression. Second, as a consequence of these theoretical problems we suggest that investigative attention has been biased toward recurrent forms of depression and away from acute, time-limited conditions. Third, an analysis of how these theoretical problems have influenced research practices reveals that an essential comparison group has been omitted from research on recurrence: people with a single lifetime episode of depression. We suggest that this startling omission may explain why so few predictors of recurrence have as yet been found. Finally, we examine the reasons for this oversight, document the validity of depression as an acute, time-limited disorder, and provide suggestions for future research with the goal of discovering early risk indicators for recurrent depression.     

Professional ethics and collective professional autonomy: a conceptual analysis

In the first section, it is argued that a professional activity involves systematic knowledge and proficiency, a form of continuous improvement of the related bodies of knowledge and proficiency, as well as two levels of understanding: a local one, which is the ability to justify and explain professional acts, and a global one, which involves a conception of the whole profession and its ethical principles. The second section is devoted to a conceptual analysis of professional ethics. It is argued that it consists of a general conception of professionality, a particular conception of the profession under consideration, and a conception of the normative requirements made by the societal envelope of the professional activity, in particular basic norms of democracy. The third section draws conclusions with respect to the nature and limits of professional autonomy. It is shown that such autonomy is much more restricted than its apparent extent. Examples from engineering and other professions are provided.     

Employee commitment and motivation: a conceptual analysis and integrative model

Theorists and researchers interested in employee commitment and motivation have not made optimal use of each other's work. Commitment researchers seldom address the motivational processes through which commitment affects behavior, and motivation researchers have not recognized important distinctions in the forms, foci, and bases of commitment. To encourage greater cross-fertilization, the authors present an integrative framework in which commitment is presented as one of several energizing forces for motivated behavior. E. A. Locke's (1997) model of the work motivation process and J. P. Meyer and L. Herscovitch's (2001) model of workplace commitments serve as the foundation for the development of this new framework. To facilitate the merger, a new concept, goal regulation, is derived from self-determination theory (E. L. Deci & R. M. Ryan, 1985) and regulatory focus theory (E. I. Higgins, 1997). By including goal regulation, it is acknowledged that motivated behavior can be accompanied by different mindsets that have particularly important implications for the explanation and prediction of discretionary work behavior.     

Wavelet analysis of neuroelectric waveforms: a conceptual tutorial

This paper presents a nontechnical, conceptually oriented introduction to wavelet analysis and its application to neuroelectric waveforms such as the EEG and event related potentials (ERP). Wavelet analysis refers to a growing class of signal processing techniques and transforms that use wavelets and wavelet packets to decompose and manipulate time-varying, nonstationary signals. Neuroelectric waveforms fall into this category of signals because they typically have frequency content that varies as a function of time and recording site. Wavelet techniques can optimize the analysis of such signals by providing excellent joint time-frequency resolution. The ability of wavelet analysis to accurately resolve neuroelectric waveforms into specific time and frequency components leads to several analysis applications. Some of these applications are time-varying filtering for denoising single trial ERPs, EEG spike and spindle detection, ERP component separation and measurement, hearing-threshold estimation via auditory brainstem evoked response measurements, isolation of specific EEG and ERP rhythms, scale-specific topographic analysis, and dense-sensor array data compression. The present tutorial describes the basic concepts of wavelet analysis that underlie these and other applications. In addition, the application of a recently developed method of custom designing Meyer wavelets to match the waveshapes of particular neuroelectric waveforms is illustrated. Matched wavelets are physiologically sensible pattern analyzers for EEG and ERP waveforms and their superior performance is illustrated with real data examples.     

Defining disease beyond conceptual analysis: an analysis of conceptual analysis in philosophy of medicine

Conceptual analysis of health and disease is portrayed as consisting in the confrontation of a set of criteria—a “definition”—with a set of cases, called instances of either “health” or “disease.” Apart from logical counter-arguments, there is no other way to refute an opponent’s definition than by providing counter-cases. As resorting to intensional stipulation (stipulation of meaning) is not forbidden, several contenders can therefore be deemed to have succeeded. This implies that conceptual analysis alone is not likely to decide between naturalism and normativism. An alternative to this approach would be to examine whether the concept of disease can be naturalized.     

Mathematics and conceptual analysis

Gödel argued that intuition has an important role to play in mathematical epistemology, and despite the infamy of his own position, this opinion still has much to recommend it. Intuitions and folk platitudes play a central role in philosophical enquiry too, and have recently been elevated to a central position in one project for understanding philosophical methodology: the so-called ‘Canberra Plan’. This philosophical role for intuitions suggests an analogous epistemology for some fundamental parts of mathematics, which casts a number of themes in recent philosophy of mathematics (concerning a priority and fictionalism, for example) in revealing new light.     

Prototypes and conceptual analysis

In this paper, I explore the implications of recent empirical research on concept representation for the philosophical enterprise of conceptual analysis. I argue that conceptual analysis, as it is commonly practiced, is committed to certain assumptions about the nature of our intuitive categorization judgments. I then try to show how these assumptions clash with contemporary accounts of concept representation in cognitive psychology. After entertaining an objection to my argument, I close by considering ways in which conceptual analysis might be altered to accord better with the empirical work.Thanks are due to John Bickle, Marian David, Terence Horgan, Stephen Stich, John Tienson, Paul Weithman and an anonymous referee for several helpful comments and suggestions. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at Central Michigan University, The University of Memphis, The University of Mississipi and The Second International Conference on Cognitive Science at San Sebastian, Spain. A great deal of useful feedback was provided by these audiences.     

Teenage pregnancy: a theoretical analysis of a social problem

This paper begins by contrasting the two basic ways of defining a social problem (i.e., as a "problem" in society or of society). The implications of these two definitions are discussed within the context of the various approaches which have emerged from each. A typology is then developed which allows these divergent approaches to be synthesized into three broad categories (Social Disorganizational, Social Definitional, and Social Organizational). This typology helps to further clarify the implications of isolating certain noxious conditions (whether personal or social) and conceptualizing them as social problems. These implications for the emergence, scope, and possible solution to the problem of teenage pregnancy are discussed. The paper concludes with a theoretical critique that leaves little room for optimism about the piecemeal solutions to teenage pregnancy offered by either the social disorganizational or the social definitional approaches, yet it recognizes the unlikely prospects that the holistic solution is likely to be adopted soon. The paper thus concludes that this problem is likely to be with us for some time to come, and the best that we can hope to do is to treat the symptoms.     

Personal control and stress and coping processes: a theoretical analysis

Laboratory and field research indicates that the relationships between personal control and stress, coping, and adaptational outcomes are more complex than was once assumed. Believing that an event is controllable does not always lead to a reduction in stress or to a positive outcome, and believing that an event is uncontrollable does not always lead to an increase in stress or to a negative outcome. These complex relationships involving control are examined in the context of Lazarus's cognitive theory of stress and coping. The first part of the article elaborates this theory and shows how two forms of control, generalized beliefs about control and situational appraisals of control, fit into the overall model. Situational appraisals of control are explored in this section, including the question, Control over what? which must be addressed in order to explain some of the perplexing findings. The second part of the article draws on the theoretical formulation of stress and coping to examine three important issues: (a) how believing one has control in a stressful transaction can heighten threat, (b) the relationship between control and coping, and (c) pathways through which control can affect the adaptational outcomes of stressful encounters.     

Habitual Virtuous Actions and Automaticity

Dual process theorists in psychology maintain that the mind’s workings can be explained in terms of conscious or controlled processes and automatic processes. Automatic processes are largely nonconscious, that is, triggered by environmental stimuli without the agent’s conscious awareness or deliberation. Automaticity researchers contend that even higher level habitual social behaviors can be nonconsciously primed. This article brings work on automaticity to bear on our understanding of habitual virtuous actions. After examining a recent intuitive account of habitual actions and habitual virtuous actions, the author offers her own explanation in terms of goal-dependent automaticity. This form of automaticity provides an account of habitual virtuous actions that explains the sense in which these actions are rational, that is, done for reasons. Habitual virtuous actions are rational in the sense of being purposive or goal-directed and are essentially linked with the agent’s psychological states. Unlike deliberative virtuous actions, the agent’s reasons for habitual virtuous actions are not present to her conscious awareness at the time of acting.