Representing metarepresentations: Is there Theory of Mind-specific cognition?

What cognitive mechanisms underlie Theory of Mind? Some infer domain-specific Theory of Mind cognition based the pattern of children diagnosed with autism failing the False Belief test but passing the False Photograph test. However, we argue that the False Belief test entails various task demands the False Photograph task does not, including the necessity to represent a higher-order representation (a metarepresentation), thus confounding the inference of domain-specificity. Instead, a general difficulty that affects representations of metarepresentations might account for the seeming domain-specific failure. Here we find that False-Belief failing False-Photograph passing children fail the Meta Photograph test, a new photograph-domain test that requires subjects to represent a metarepresentation. We conclude that people who fail the False Belief test but pass the False Photograph test do not necessarily have a content-specific Theory of Mind deficit. Instead, the general ability to represent representations and metarepresentations might underlie Theory of Mind.     

Patterns of semantic memory impairment in Mild Cognitive Impairment

Although the semantic memory impairment has been largely documented in Alzheimer's disease, little is known about semantic memory in the preclinical phase of the disease (Mild Cognitive Impairment). The purpose of this study was to document the nature of semantic breakdown using a battery of tests assessing different aspects of conceptual knowledge: knowledge about common objects, famous people and famous public events. Results indicate that all domains of semantic memory were impaired in MCI individuals but knowledge about famous people and famous events was affected to a greater extent than knowledge about objects. This pattern of results suggests that conceptual entities with distinctive and unique properties may be more prone to semantic breakdown in MCI. In summary, results of this study support the view that genuine semantic deficits are present in MCI. It could be useful to investigate the etiological outcome of patients failing or succeeding at such tests.     

Infants' tracking of objects and collections

Recent research suggests that infants' understanding of the physical world is more complex and adult-like than previously believed. One of the most impressive discoveries has been infants' ability to reason about medium-sized, material objects. They are able to individuate objects in a scene, and to enumerate and reason about them. This article reports a series of experiments investigating 8-month-old infants' ability to reason about collections of objects. Experiment 1 shows a sharp contrast between infants' understanding of single objects versus collections. While infants detected the discontinuous ('Magical') disappearance of a single object, they did not detect the Magical Disappearance of a non-cohesive pile of objects. Experiments 2-4 found that infants' difficulty remained even when the distinct identity of each object in the collection was emphasized, but could be overcome if infants (a) first saw the individual objects clearly separated from each other prior to their being placed together in a pile, or (b) had prior experience with the objects making up the collection. Our findings suggest that infants' expectations about object behavior are highly specific regarding the entities they are applied to. They do not automatically apply to any and all portions of matter within the visual field. Both the behavior of an entity, and infants' prior experience play roles in determining whether infants will treat that entity as an object.     

幼儿心理理论与情绪理解发展及关系的研究

本研究采用横断设计,以北京市某幼儿园大、中、小班共98名幼儿为被试,通过对其心理理论、情绪理解及语言能力的测试,考察幼儿心理理论和情绪理解的发展状况以及二者之间的关系。研究结果表明：(1)幼儿的心理理论和情绪理解在3～5岁期间发生了巨大的变化,在5岁的时候大多数的幼儿已经基本上具备了心理理论和情绪理解的能力,4岁是幼儿心理理论和情绪理解能力发展的关键年龄;(2)幼儿的心理理论和情绪理解的相关显著,即使在控制了语言和年龄的影响后,心理理论能力仍然和情绪理解能力在总体上相关显著;(3)在排除了语言和年龄的影响后,对他人错误信念的理解能力和情绪观点采择能力的相关也仍然显著。     

Consequences of schematism

In his (2001a) and in some related papers, Tim Crane has maintained that intentional objects are schematic entities, in the sense that, insofar as being an intentional object is not a genuine metaphysical category, qua objects of thought intentional objects have no particular nature. This approach to intentionalia is the metaphysical counterpart of the later Husserl's ontological approach to the same entities, according to which qua objects of thought intentionalia are indifferent to existence. But to buy a metaphysically deflationary approach does not mean to buy an ontologically deflationary approach, according to which we have to accept all the intentional objects there apparently are. Being metaphysically deflationary on intentionalia rather means that from the ontological point of view one must really allow only for those intentionalia for which one is entitled to say that there are such things; typically, for which an ontological proof is available. From metaphysical schematism plus conditional, or partial, ontological committment to intentionalia, further interesting consequences follow. First, this theoretical combination allows one to deal with the ‘too-many entities’ problem (may one fail to accept an ontological proof for an entity of a given kind if she thinks that the entity we would have to be committed to is an entity of another kind?). Second, it allows one to deal with the ‘genuinely true report’ problem (how is it that if we exercise mindreading with respect to a somehow deluded person, we want our reports to come out as really, not merely fictionally, true?).     

The effect of causal knowledge on judgments of the likelihood of unknown features

People frequently infer unknown aspects of an entity based on their knowledge about that entity. The current study reports a novel phenomenon, an inductive bias people have in making such inferences. Upon learning that one symptom causes another in a person, both undergraduate students (Experiment 1) and clinicians (Experiment 2) judged that an unknown feature associated with the cause-symptom was more likely to be present in that person than an unknown feature associated with the effect-symptom. Thus, these findings suggest a specific mechanism in which causal explanations influence one’s representation of and inferences about an entity. Implications for clinical reasoning and associative models of conceptual knowledge are discussed.     

The EPR-Experiment and Free Process Theory

As part of the ‘creation-discovery’ interpretation of quantum mechanics Diederik Aerts presented a setting with macroscopical coincidence experiments designed to exhibit significant conceptual analogies between portions of stuff and quantum compound entities in a singlet state in Einstein—Podolsky—Rosen/Bell-experiments (EPR-experiments). One important claim of the creation-discovery view is that the singlet state describes an entity that does not have a definite position in space and thus ‘does not exist in space’. ‘Free Process Theory’ is a recent proposal by Johanna Seibt of an integrated ontology, i.e., of an ontology suitable for the interpretation of theories of the macrophysical and microphysical domain (quantum field theory). The framework of free process theory allows us to show systematically the relevant analogies and disanalogies between Aerts' experiment and EPR-experiments. From free process ontology it also follows quite naturally that the quantum compound entity described by the singlet state ‘does not exist in space.’     

Threat in dreams: an adaptation?

Revonsuo's influential Threat Simulation Theory (TST) predicts that people exposed to survival threats will have more threat dreams, and evince enhanced responses to dream threats, compared to those living in relatively safe conditions. Participants in a high crime area (South Africa: n=208) differed significantly from participants in a low crime area (Wales, UK: n=116) in having greater recent exposure to a life-threatening event (chi([1,N=186])(2)=14.84, p<.00012). Contrary to TST's predictions, the SA participants reported significantly fewer threat dreams (chi([1,N=287])(2)=6.11, p<.0134), and did not differ from the Welsh participants in responses to dream threats (Fisher's Exact test, p=.2478). Overall, the incidence of threat in dreams was extremely low-less than 20% of dreams featured realistic survival threats. Escape from dream threats occurred in less than 2% of dreams. We conclude that this evidence contradicts key aspects of TST.     

The director task: A test of Theory-of-Mind use or selective attention?

Over two decades, the director task has increasingly been employed as a test of the use of Theory of Mind in communication, first in psycholinguistics and more recently in social cognition research. A new version of this task was designed to test two independent hypotheses. First, optimal performance in the director task, as established by the standard metrics of interference, is possible by using selective attention alone, and not necessarily Theory of Mind. Second, pragmatic measures of Theory-of-Mind use can reveal that people actively represent the director’s mental states, contrary to recent claims that they only use domain-general cognitive processes to perform this task. The results of this study support both hypotheses and provide a new interactive paradigm to reliably test Theory-of-Mind use in referential communication.     

I think,therefore I am? Examining conceptions of the self,soul, and mind

In order to delineate among conceptions of the self, soul, and mind, participants reported where they believe these entities are located in the body and provided definitions of each entity. Results indicated that most people consider the self, soul, and mind localized in specific regions in the body. In contrast to previous research, however, some participants reported that the self is not centralized in one location. Participants tended to locate the self and mind in the head and the soul in the chest. The self and mind were commonly defined in mental terms and the soul as one’s essence. These results suggest that people tend to distinguish the soul from the mind, both in how they define each entity and where they locate them in the body. Although some people locate the soul in the same region as the self, most people more closely align the mind with the self.     

执行功能与心理理论关系的元分析:抑制控制和灵活转换的作用

心理理论的发展对个体社会化具有重要意义。研究通过元分析的方法,表明执行功能能够有效预测个体心理理论的发展水平(r=0.37,p0.001),且具有跨文化和跨人群的稳定性;同时,在个体的毕生发展中,执行功能均与心理理论存在显著相关,证明了执行功能的表达说;但在不同的发展阶段(Q1=411.75,p10.001,df1=90;Q2=219.49,p20.001,df2=50),心理理论的发展会受到执行功能不同成分的影响:0~3岁时抑制控制起关键作用;3~12岁时,心理理论受到抑制控制和灵活转换的共同影响;青春期阶段,灵活转换的作用明显;而到了成年期,抑制控制与灵活转换均会对心理理论产生积极影响。     

Children’s Demonstrative Comprehension and the Role of Non-linguistic Cognitive Abilities: A Cross-Linguistic Study

Previous studies have shown that young children often fail to comprehend demonstratives correctly when they are uttered by a speaker whose perspective is different from children’s own, and instead tend to interpret them with respect to their own perspective (e.g., Webb and Abrahamson in J Child Lang 3(3):349–367, 1976); Clark and Sengul in J Child Lang 5(3):457–475, 1978). In the current study, we examined children’s comprehension of demonstratives in English (this and that) and Mandarin Chinese (zhe and na) in order to test the hypothesis that children’s non-adult-like demonstrative comprehension is related to their still-developing non-linguistic cognitive abilities supporting perspective-taking, including Theory of Mind and Executive Function. Testing 3 to 6-year-old children on a set of demonstrative comprehension tasks and assessments of Theory of Mind and Executive Function, our findings revealed that children’s successful demonstrative comprehension is related to their development of Theory of Mind and Executive Function, for both of the language groups. These findings suggest that the development of deictic expressions like demonstratives may be related to the development of non-linguistic cognitive abilities, regardless of the language that the children are acquiring.     

Nietzsche on the Nature of the Unconscious

Abstract

This paper argues that Nietzsche develops a novel and compelling account of the distinction between conscious and unconscious mental states: he argues that conscious mental states are those with conceptual content, whereas unconscious mental states are those with nonconceptual content. I show that Nietzsche’s puzzling claim that consciousness is ‘superficial’ and ‘falsifying’ can be given a straightforward explanation if we accept this understanding of the conscious/unconscious distinction. I originally defended this view in my ‘Nietzsche’s Theory of Mind: Consciousness and Conceptualization’ (2005, European Journal of Philosophy 13: 1–31); since then, the view has come under criticism on several fronts. Brian Leiter and others suggest that there is not enough textual evidence for the view. In addition, Leiter, Mattia Riccardi and Tsarina Doyle argue that, rather than aligning the conscious/unconscious distinction with the conceptual/nonconceptual distinction, Nietzsche endorses a higher-order thought model of consciousness. Riccardi also objects that Nietzsche must treat some unconscious mental states as conceptual. In this essay, I defend the interpretation in light of these objections. I provide new textual evidence for the interpretation, show that Nietzsche extracted aspects of the view from Schopenhauer’s work on consciousness, consider the possibility that Nietzsche endorses a higher-order thought theory, and respond to Riccardi’s objection.     

Towards a semantics for the artifactual theory of fiction and beyond

In her book Fiction and Metaphysics (1999) Amie Thomasson, influenced by the work of Roman Ingarden, develops a phenomenological approach to fictional entities in order to explain how non-fictional entities can be referred to intrafictionally and transfictionally, for example in the context of literary interpretation. As our starting point we take Thomasson’s realist theory of literary fictional objects, according to which such objects actually exist, albeit as abstract and artifactual entities. Thomasson’s approach relies heavily on the notion of ontological dependence, but its precise semantics has not yet been developed. Moreover, the modal approach to the notion of ontological dependence underlying the Artifactual Theory has recently been contested by several scholars. The main aims of this paper are (i) to develop a semantic approach to the notion of ontological dependence in the context of the Artifactual Theory of fiction, and in so doing bridge a number of philosophical and logical gaps; (ii) to generalize Thomasson’s categorial theory of ontological dependence by reconstructing ontological categories of entities purely in terms of different structures of ontological dependence, rather than in terms of the basic kinds of entities the categorical entities depend on.     

Cognitive aspects of mental activity during sleep.

Upon nighttime experimental awakening of 27 subjects in four sleep conditions (sleep onset early; sleep onset late; Stage 2; and rapid eye movement, REM, sleep), 108 dream reports and their association reports were collected. Dream reports were analyzed for length (temporal units) and content categories (continuity; implausibility; presence of the dreamer [i.e., "the self"], a setting, characters). Associations were classified as episodic, abstract self-referred, and semantic memories. The two sets of results tend to show a basic homogeneity among mentation reports in the four sleep conditions considered. These findings are interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that the same cognitive mechanisms operate, at different levels of engagement, in dream generation rather than the hypothesis of multiple dream-generation systems dependent upon the physiological characteristics of the various sleep stages.     

Construing in a crowd: The effects of social crowding on mental construal

How does social crowdedness shape the way people mentally represent objects in the environment? Building on research suggesting that motivational intensity can serve to influence the span of conceptual scope, we demonstrate that individuals in socially crowded environments tend to rely on concrete low-level construals, while those in less crowded environments utilize more abstract high-level construals. We further demonstrate that these effects are mediated by a social crowding induced avoidance motivation, and are moderated by the composition of the crowd.     

The informational value of dreams and associations

The manifest dream has usually been the object of study by researchers, while psychotherapists mainly have paid attention to the latent content of the dream, reached through free associations. The question is which aspects of the dream, manifest content or associations, yield information about the dreamer's psychic life. In the present study it is suggested that the manifest dream to a large extent maintains thematic continuity with the dreamer's associations. However, with regard to emotions, there is no clear overlap between the information contained in the manifest dream and in its associations. The associations make the dream into the dreamer's own personal dream. Associating to a dream changes strangers into known people in the life of the dreamer. The dreamer comes to recognize aspects of himself or herself in these people. In associations, the dreamers portray themselves as more responsible of emotions, while they in dreams rather ascribe emotions to others, and they themselves become objects of these emotions. The author argues for the value of both the manifest dream in its own right and the enhanced experiental closeness afforded by the dreamer's associations.     

The emergence of children's causal explanations and theories: evidence from everyday conversation

This research examines the content of explanations that 4 English-speaking children gave or asked for in everyday conversations recorded from 2 1/2 to 5 years of age. Analyses of nearly 5,000 codable explanations (identified by markers like why or because) focused on the entity targeted for explanation (e.g., person, animal, object), the explanatory mode of causal reasoning (e.g., psychological, physical), and interrelations between these elements. Children's explanations focused on varied entities (animals, objects, and persons) and incorporated diverse modes (psychological, physical, social-conventional, and even biological reasoning). Children's pairings of entities with explanatory modes suggest appropriately constrained yet flexible causal reasoning. These data are consistent with the hypothesis that young children draw on several complementary causal-explanatory theories to make sense of real-life events.     

Mathematics. A Science of Patterns?

The present article aims at showing that it is possible to construct a realist philosophy of mathematics which commits one neither to dream the dreams of Platonism nor to reduce the word 'realism' to mere noise.It is argued that mathematics is a science of patterns, where patterns are not objects (or properties of objects), but aspects, or aspects of aspects, etc. of objects. (The notion of aspect originates from ideas sketched by Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations.)The philosophical importance of this contribution is mainly in the successfulness of the attempt made to justify a view of mathematics which, holding on to a Tarskian/Aristotelian conception of mathematical truth, does not involve the postulation of entities which are beyond the bounds of experience.     

Getting over "the problem of other minds": communication in context

Theories of communication often assume that communication has a single, essential form or telos, the culmination of a one-track developmental process where precursors eventually give rise to the real thing. At one time, this essence of communication was identified with linguistic competence, whereas now it is largely defined in terms of "Theory of Mind." But the fundamental problem with "Theory of Mind" is the very problem it pretends to solve: "the problem of other minds."That problem, as formulated, is insoluble, even with the aid of theory or innate modules. In this article, we reject the superficial depth psychology of "Theory of Mind" in favour of a breadth psychology based on context.