Reason and Emotion in the Ethics of Self‐Restraint

In this essay I argue that Reinhold Niebuhr's ethics of self‐restraint, though promising, is based on an incomplete and imprecise moral psychology. Although Niebuhr claims that reason cannot provide a sufficient grounding to motivate self‐restraint, he does not disclose which human capacity might serve this purpose. I suggest that we can address this oversight by strengthening Niebuhr's tentative embrace of David Hume, and by developing a concept of the emotions in order to explain how human beings can cultivate a stable inclination to self‐restraint. This project is informed by and in the service of feminist critiques of Niebuhr and social concerns.     

Robots and the Sacred in Science and Science Fiction: Theological Implications of Artificial Intelligence

In science-fiction literature and film, human beings simultaneously feel fear and allure in the presence of intelligent machines, an experience that approximates the numinous experience as described in 1917 by Rudolph Otto. Otto believed that two chief elements characterize the numinous experience: the mysterium tremendum and the fascinans. Briefly, the mysterium tremendum is the fear of God's wholly other nature and the fascinans is the allure of God's saving grace. Science-fiction representations of robots and artificially intelligent computers follow this logic of threatening otherness and soteriological promise. Science fiction offers empirical support for Anne Foerst's claim that human beings experience fear and fascination in the presence of advanced robots from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology AI Lab. The human reaction to intelligent machines shows that human beings in many respects have elevated those machines to divine status. This machine apotheosis, an interesting cultural event for the history of religions, may—despite Foerst's rosy interpretation—threaten traditional Christian theologies.     

The RNA World and Divine Action in and Through Quantum Mechanics

ABSTRACT

Life emerged on Earth approximately 4.1 billion years ago. Current scholarship on the origin of life supports the RNA world scenario, although controversy still goes on. This article examines the origin issue in light of a divine action theory proposed by Robert J. Russell. Although the author himself has not much considered the issue in light of the divine action, the article is still fruitful in the sense that the origin of life issue is now incorporated into the dialogue with divine action, and also that Russell’s divine action theory can be reconsidered in a new context.     

Science and Constraint: The Role of Science within Theology

Abstract : The conversation between theology and science has accomplished much, yet the question of how to determine the limits of such dialogue—and whether there are limits at all—remains open. Key questions involve the degree to which science should constrain theology and the manner in which theology can influence science. Arthur Peacocke and Robert J. Russell provide sample methods by which theology can engage science. Peacocke's method emphasizes the influence of science on theology, while Russell's focuses on theology's influence on science. Both emphases will be required for theology's continued engagement with science.     

True self-love and true self-sacrifice

A philosophical assessment of Richard Dawkins’ The God Delusion, exposing some errors of reasoning that undermine part of the foundation of his atheism. Distinctions between theism, atheism and agnosticism are also provided and explored for their significance to Dawkins’ argument.     

浅谈情绪智力与人工智能中的感情计算

基于情绪智力是加工、处理情绪及情绪信息的能力,而人工智能中的感情计算是要赋予计算机与人互动过程中情感信息的加工能力,人脑处理情绪信息的能力与电脑处理情绪信息的能力可以进行类比。近几年来,人工智能专家已经认识到情绪智力在感情计算中的重要作用和意义,把人类识别和表达情感的能力赋予计算机,开发了具有部分感情能力的计算机。新一代感情计算机的研发和应用依赖于人工智能专家与心理学家之间的密切合作,两者的研究成果可以相互借鉴和互补     

医疗人工智能研究的风险评估及应对

医疗人工智能研发机构在开展疾病辅助诊断、治疗、预测、管理等研发活动时,需结合不同的技术特点及研究规律进行充分的风险评估并有效应对风险,包括：健康数据驱动研究应该特别关注算法技术可靠性、高质量数据以及信息保护等方面的风险;评价医学人工智能干预措施的临床试验应该关注治疗安全性以及责任归属等方面的风险;评价医学人工智能效果与对社会影响的研究应该关注评价指标、方法与结果的可靠性等。只有研发各方在早期识别出可能会对个体、机构、社会等产生的风险,并做好相应的风险防控,才能促进人工智能技术在医学领域的健康发展。

     

Rehabilitating AI: Argument Loci and the Case for Artificial Intelligence

This article examines argument structures and strategies in pro and con argumentation about the possibility of human-level artificial intelligence (AI) in the near term future. It examines renewed controversy about strong AI that originated in a prominent 1999 book and continued at major conferences and in periodicals, media commentary, and Web-based discussions through 2002. It will be argued that the book made use of implicit, anticipatory refutation to reverse prevailing value hierarchies related to AI. Drawing on Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's (1969) study of refutational argument, this study considers points of contact between opposing arguments that emerged in opposing loci, dissociations, and casuistic reasoning. In particular, it shows how perceptions of AI were reframed and rehabilitated through metaphorical language, reversal of the philosophical pair artificial/natural, appeals to the paradigm case, and use of the loci of quantity and essence. Furthermore, examining responses to the book in subsequent arguments indicates the topoi characteristic of the rhetoric of technology advocacy.     

医疗领域中人工智能应用的可解释性困境与治理

人工智能在医疗领域的应用,推动了医疗事业的发展,但人工智能作为新生事物,其可解释性成为医疗领域面临的重大挑战,导致人工智能难以有效在医疗领域广泛应用。阐述了增强人工智能在医疗领域可解释性的原因,浅析人工智能在医疗领域中的可解释性困境,指出提高医疗领域人工智能可解释性的要求,以避免出现医疗事故定责不清、医疗数据隐私泄露、诊疗决策与患者信任相悖、患者医疗公平上的困境等诸多问题。为提高医疗领域中人工智能的可解释性,提出了健全医疗事故法律问责机制、培养医疗数据伦理观、加强医疗监督治理、防止医疗人工智能歧视等路径,以便推动人工智能在医疗领域的深入发展。

     

人工智能时代增强技术的实践挑战与应对策略

科学技术的发展将颠覆人类已有的认知常态,使人类面临重要的转折。人类增强技术对于科技伦理、自由主义以及公平正义的挑战,使得人与技术之间的关系发生了质的转变,给人类社会的发展带来了某种不确定性和风险性。对于人类增强技术的研发需要进行差异化管理,即遵循差别原则;在实践应用层面上需要充分考虑安全性的问题,也就是要遵循安全原则;在立法层面上需要对人类增强技术进行相应的技术立法,从而为增强技术的发展和实践应用提供良好的法律环境。

     

Creating in Our Own Image: Artificial Intelligence and the Image of God

There is remarkable convergence between twentieth-century interpretations of the image of God ( imago Dei ), what it means for human beings to be created in God's image, and approaches toward creating in our own image in the field of artificial intelligence (AI). Both fields have viewed the intersection between God and humanity or humanity and computers in terms of either (1) a property or set of properties such as intelligence, (2) the functions we engage in or are capable of, or (3) the relationships we establish and maintain. Each of these three approaches reflects a different understanding of what stands at the core of our humanity. Functional and relational approaches were common in the late twentieth century, with a functional understanding the one most accepted by society at large. A relational view, however, gives new insights into human dignity in a computer age as well as new approaches to AI research.     

负责任创新中医疗人工智能应用技术的伦理审视

负责任创新是目前探讨人工智能技术在医疗领域应用的重要理论,也是引导医疗人工智能应用技术向善发展的理想图景,其基本结构主要包括预测、反思、协商、反应四个维度。当前,医疗人工智能应用技术受技术“黑箱特质”的影响,暴露了其在安全、隐私、道德、分配等方面的伦理风险,桎梏了其应用于医疗事业的广阔前景。面对医疗人工智能应用技术的伦理困境,从其技术研发、设计、应用、跟踪等全过程分析嵌入负责任创新四维度模型,能够有效缓解医疗人工智能应用技术在实践中存在的伦理风险,从而真正实现其为人类健康的精准赋能。

     

人工智能医学教育应用研究的国际图景与趋势

运用文献计量学方法,基于近10年来Web of Science（WoS）数据库中的人工智能医学教育应用研究相关文献,开展关联、聚类、突变等可视化分析,探究国际人工智能医学教育应用研究现状、研究热点和发展趋势,发现机器人辅助手术培训、智能评价反馈系统和智能虚拟仿真系统是国际人工智能医学教育的研究热点,其研究演进遵循从标准化到个性化、从实体空间到虚实融合、从关注独立思考到人机协同决策这一脉络,以期为我国人工智能医学教育研究工作者提供参考和情报支持。

     

Intelligence research at the interface between differential and cognitive psychology: Prospects and proposals

There seems to be widespread agreement among theoreticians and methodologists alike that new approaches to studying intelligence should somehow combine the differential and cognitive (information-processing) approaches that have been used in the past, and that the combination should somehow enable the investigator to isolate components of intelligence that are elementary (at some level of analysis). Researchers disagree, however, as to how the differential and cognitive approaches should be combined, and consequently, in how elementary components of intelligence should be isolated and in what they are. How does an investigator choose from among the multiple paths available for theory and research? In this article, I propose some guidelines that may help investigators make informed choices. The article is divided into three major parts. In the first, I propose guidelines for choosing from among various methodologies for studying intelligence, and then describe briefly at least some of the methods that meet (or come close to meeting) these guidelines. In the second part, I propose guidelines for the specification of subtheories (and eventually, full-fledged theories) of intelligence, and illustrate how these guidelines can be met. Finally, I describe the direction in which I believe our subtheories and methods should lead us.     

Equilibrium and Harmony of Emotional Conflicts in Cooperation: Between Chinese Traditional Culture and Modern Artificial Intelligence

Equilibrium and harmony elevate human emotions like pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy to the highest ontological level. We are puppets of our emotions and feelings, without the possibility of parole. By implanting complex emotional reactions in the operating system of sex robots, we have created a virtual relationship that mimics human intimacy. In this way, a thing—in this case, a machine—takes on human characteristics. This could be called the humanization of things. Not only can things be humanized, humans can also be reified. If, by imitating neural networks and deep learning, intelligent robots are to make great strides in their ability to think, they may come into the possession of emotions and feelings. In traditional Chinese culture, equilibrium and harmony form the highest and most pervasive principle, value, and morality for nature, society, and life. The state of equilibrium (zhong 中 ) and harmony (he 和 ) is the fundamental root from which springs the world and the universal path that it must pursue. When we view emotional equilibrium and harmony in light of the theoretical doctrine of harmony and cooperation, the emotional lives of humans and machines are integrated and combined with the state of equilibrium and harmony to achieve the greatest good. Moreover, this can resolve all kinds of crises amid the emotions and feelings of humanoids created by humans, notably by leveraging the outstanding intelligence of humans to maintain the emotions of humanoids in a state of equilibrium and harmony. To this end, we must perform regulatory actions in several aspects. First, we must modulate emotions and feelings. Second, we must achieve a state of equilibrium, which can put all things in the right positions, allowing them to be nourished and flourish. Third, we must strive for mutual empathy between humans and machines, which can pave the way for collaborative creation in harmony, as well as their integration, camaraderie, emotional understanding, mutual respect and harmonious love.     

Embodied AI, Creation, and Cog

This is a reply to comments on my paper Cog, a Humanoid Robot, and the Questions of the Image of God ; one was written by Mary Gerhart and Allan Melvin Russell, and another one by Helmut Reich. I will start with the suggested analogy of the relationship between God and us and the one between us and the humanoid robot Cog and will show why this analogy is not helpful for the dialogue between theology and artificial intelligence (AI). Such a dialogue can succeed only if both our fascination for humanoids and our fear of them are equally accepted. Any avoidance of these emotions, as well as any rejection of the possibility that Cog might one day be humanlike, destroy the dialogue. The interpretation of both scientific theories and religious metaphors as stories replaces seemingly "rational" arguments with the confession of the respective commitments to a body of stories and opens up a space for exchange and friendship between AI-researchers and theologians—an option that usually remains closed.     

Verbs,time, and modality

In the first part of this paper it is argued that Vendler's classification of verbs into aspectual categories, called activities, accomplishments, achievements, and states, is better seen as classifying the meanings of sentences, and a recursive scheme for describing the aspectual character of sentences is presented. In the second part, this scheme is applied to the discussion of the epistemic and deontic meanings of the modal verbs must, will, and may. In particular, the relation between the “future” and “nonfuture” senses of epistemic will is examined.     

人工智能自然语言处理临床应用的伦理研究

在高风险的医疗场域中,自然语言处理技术中的语言区隔和技术内在设计缺陷可能对诊疗行为和医疗体系带来严重风险,其语言区隔阻碍了不同群体的医疗伦理公正,技术自身的“黑箱”性质与不可解释性可能导致错诊误诊等问题,同时技术的过度使用破坏了医疗场域中的伦理关系,危及人类在技术及其应用中的主体性地位。为防止自然语言处理技术在临床应用中可能出现不良的伦理后果,我们需要发扬人的主观能动性主导自然语言技术的发展,依据自然语言处理协会公布的道德规范框架和行为准则,评估当前的应用现状,建构和提供一个有温度有弹性的伦理模型和行动指南。

     

Durable partial reinforcement effects and social dominance in the rat

Following partial reinforcement (PRF) or consistent reinforcement (CRF) of an approach response in a straight runway and experimental extinction, rats were given the arena food-dominance test in Experiment 1 and both the arena test and the tunnel-dominance test in Experiment 2. PRF subjects were dominant in the tunnel test, but subordinate in the arena test, regardless of which dominance test was given first. These durable and pervasive effects of partial reinforcement training can be interpreted in terms of frustration theory.     

Nihilism,Nietzsche and the Doppelganger Problem

Nihilism, Nietzsche and the Doppelganger Problem Was Nietzsche a nihilist? Yes, because, like J. L. Mackie, he was an error-theorist about morality, including the elitist morality to which he himself subscribed. But he was variously a diagnostician, an opponent and a survivor of certain other kinds of nihilism. Schacht argues that Nietzsche cannot have been an error theorist, since meta-ethical nihilism is inconsistent with the moral commitment that Nietzsche displayed. Schacht’s exegetical argument parallels the substantive argument (advocated in recent years by Wright and Blackburn) that Mackie’s error theory can’t be true because if it were, we would have to give up morality or give up moralizing. I answer this argument with a little bit of help from Nietzsche. I then pose a problem, the Doppelganger Problem, for the meta-ethical nihilism that I attribute to Mackie and Nietzsche. (If A is a moral proposition then not-A is a moral proposition: hence not all moral propositions can be false.) I solve the problem by reformulating the error theory and also deal with a variant of the problem, the Reinforced Doppelganger, glancing at a famous paper of Ronald Dworkin’s. Thus, whatever its demerits, the error theory, is not self-refuting, nor does it require us to give up morality.