RACE, IDEOLOGY, AND IDEAL THEORY

Abstract: Philosophers who have addressed the problems of enduring racial injustice have been suspicious of the role played by ideal theory in ethics and political philosophy generally, and in contemporary liberal political philosophy in particular. The theoretical marginalization of race in the work of Rawls has led some to charge that ideal theory is at the very least unhelpful in understanding one of the most significant forms of contemporary injustice, and is at worst ideological in the pejorative sense. To explore these concerns, I formulate five related criticisms of ideal theory and examine each as it would be applied to Rawls's political philosophy. My thesis is that the strongest criticisms—namely, that ideal theory is essentially ideological and cannot provide adequate grounds for justifying race-conscious, equality-securing measures—ultimately miss the mark. But other criticisms of ideal theory are more plausible, and most plausibly directed to an area of Rawls's thought often ignored in discussions of liberalism and race, namely, his account of citizenship and public reasoning.     

The pattern theory of self in artificial general intelligence: A theoretical framework for modeling self in biologically inspired cognitive architectures

In an attempt to provide a unified account for a vast literature discussing a multiplicity of selves, Gallagher (2013) has proposed a pattern theory of self. Subsequent discussion on this account has led to a concern that the pattern theory, as originally presented, stands as a mere list of aspects that fails to explain how they are related in real-time. We suggest that one way to address these criticisms, and further develop the pattern theory of self is by exploring how it can be used to aid research on self in artificial general intelligence, especially in the context of biologically inspired cognitive architectures. We furthermore propose a conceptual implementation for actualizing such research in regards to the LIDA (Learning Intelligent Decision Agent) cognitive model.     

Transfer and non-transfer successive incentive contrast effects in the rat

Recent evidence concerning successive incentive contrast suggests the occurrence of both positive and negative contrast effects under both non-transfer and transfer conditions. There are three types of explanation for these contrast effects, based on frustration theory, sequential theory and adaptation level theory (perceptual accounts). One of the critical experiments favouring perceptual accounts, Collier and Marx (1959), is subject to a number of methodological criticisms. This experiment was repeated, with modifications to take account of these criticisms, and extended to include transfer, as well as non-transfer, conditions. There was no evidence of contrast. In a further experiment using Collier and Marx's procedure with lever pressing and panel pushing, positive and negative, transfer and non-transfer effects were found using Noyes pellets rather than sucrose as reward. It is suggested that these results contribute some support to perceptual accounts of incentive contrast, although no present theory is entirely satisfactory.     

How not to be a metaethical naturalist –Jesse Prinz on the emotional construction of morals

This paper is an analysis of the performance of one reading of Charles Taylor's general criticisms of naturalist accounts of morality (excluding the issue of moral realism) when measured against a specific naturalist account, in this case J.L. Mackie's moral theory. It is argued that Taylor's criticisms, read in this way, fail to find purchase, despite his singling out of Mackie's theory as a prime example of a theory that exhibits the flaws Taylor believes are inherent in this kind of approach to moral theory. This points the supporter of Taylor's position towards an alternative reading of his challenge to naturalist accounts of morality.     

Passionate Yearning Theory as a Theory of Meaning in Life

In this paper, I offer an original account of meaning in life, which I call the passionate yearning theory. Within the framework of the passionate yearning theory, meaning is understood as the intrinsically derived yearning, and passionate striving, for something (an ideal, or a state of affairs) that possesses some plausible objective claim to truth or facticity, which makes it worth pursuing for its own sake. To properly delineate the view, I present the various criteria that serve as the foundation for the passionate yearning view. These include the truth/facticity criterion, the lack of immorality, intrinsic subjectivity, passion, yearning and striving. I then show how these criteria coalesce into the passionate yearning theory and how exactly the theory works. Finally, I motivate the passionate yearning theory by addressing some possible criticisms and objections that can be raised against the view and also differentiate it from similar competing views.

     

The functionalist theory of stratification: Two decades of controversy

The author examines the 1945 and 1948 versions of the Davis‐Moore functionalist theory of stratification. The analysis explores the basic postulates, assumptions, and logical articulation of the theory and isolates its distinctively functionalist components. This is followed by a historical account of the major criticisms leveled at the theory. The critics have succeeded in showing the fallacious and tautologous character of the functionalist components, thus, in effect, destroying the theory as a theory. Despite this destruction, various portions of the Davis‐Moore theory are shown to be usable, to contain valuable insights, and to be capable of further development.     

Field’s logic of truth

T. M. Scanlon’s buck-passing account of value (BPA) has been subjected to a barrage of criticisms. Recently, to be helpful to BPA, Roger Crisp has suggested that a number of these criticisms can be met if one makes some revisions to BPA. In this paper, I argue that if advocates of the buck-passing account accepted these revisions, they would effectively be giving up the buck-passing account as it is typically understood, that is, as an account concerned with the conceptual priority of reasons or the right vis-à-vis value or the good. I conclude by addressing some of the broader implications of my arguments for the current debate about the buck-passing account of value.     

The return of the Sophists

The author argues against a foundational epistemology and thus sides with the Greek Sophists. He shows that the search for foundations of knowledge and truth is the outcome of a referential theory of language. He finds that Nietzsche and Saussure pioneered attacks on and substitutions for this theory. Wittgenstein, Derrida and Rorty, inter alia, continued this trend. The author discusses the criticisms and theories of these philosophers and finds that he agrees with their criticisms and many of their positive moves but that he cannot accept their social relativism because it cannot account for inter- and transcultural understanding and the regulative role of truth. He looks for a theory of language and truth which will also comply with these requirements.     

Intentions are mental states

Richard Scheer has recently argued against what he calls the ‘mental state’ theory of intentions. He argues that versions of this theory fail to account for various characteristics of intention. In this essay we reply to Scheer's criticisms and argue that intentions are mental states.     

Kant’s Virtue as Strength

The revival of virtue ethics has been accompanied by an increasing interest in Kant’s theory of virtue. Many scholars claim that virtue plays an important role in Kant’s moral theory. However, some worries and disagreements have arisen within the camp of contemporary virtue ethics concerning the Kantian concept of virtue. Some scholars have pointed out that Kantian virtue is at best nothing more than Aristotelian continence, that is, strength of will in the face of contrary emotions and appetites, and hence not a real virtue. In response to these criticisms and worries concerning Kant’s concept of virtue, this paper examines the question of whether Kant’s account of virtue is only a reformulation of Aristotle’s idea of continence. My analysis focuses on Kant’s concept of inner freedom, his ideas about latitude in the imperfect duties of virtue, and his notion of the perfection of virtue. I thus attempt to provide some evidence of the significant differences between Aristotelian continence and Kant’s virtue as strength. Then I explore the significance of Kant’s virtue as strength. Finally, I argue that Kant’s virtue as strength not only is not Aristotle’s idea of continence but also is located at a much higher level, that is, the state of inner freedom and the mental attitude of a human being’s soul.     

Instantiation as Partial Identity: Replies to Critics

One of the advantages of my account in the essay “Instantiation as Partial Identity” was capturing the contingency of instantiation—something David Armstrong gave up in his experiment with a similar view. What made the contingency possible for me was my own non-standard account of identity, complete with the apparatus of counts and aspects. The need remains to lift some obscurity from the account in order to display its virtues to greater advantage. To that end, I propose to respond to those who have grappled with it in print. There are various criticisms by commentators: that it is rendered absurd by the transitivity of identity, that it makes instantiation necessary instead of contingent, that it is unclear what counts are, that aspects are simply tropes, that my view does not capture multiple location, that I make an unclear reference to a theory of composition as identity, that the account suffers from problems with polyadicity, and that it is not a realist account of universals after all. I give responses to these objections.     

The Mental Model Theory of Conditionals: A Reply to Guy Politzer

This paper replies to Politzer’s (2007) criticisms of the mental model theory of conditionals. It argues that the theory provides a correct account of negation of conditionals, that it does not provide a truth-functional account of their meaning, though it predicts that certain interpretations of conditionals yield acceptable versions of the ‘paradoxes’ of material implication, and that it postulates three main strategies for estimating the probabilities of conditionals.     

A Defense and Critical Appraisal of Sosaesque Virtue Epistemology

This paper attempts three things. The first is a defense and the rest is a critical appraisal of a crucial notion involved in the defense. First, it argues that John Turri’s criticisms of Ernest Sosa’s virtue epistemological account of knowledge that it fails to rule out Gettier cases rest on a misconstrual of the “because of clause” which Sosa employs. Turri overlooks the notion of “success manifests competence” which is central to understand the “because of” clause. Thus, the position of Sosa is defended from the criticisms of Turri. Secondly, it critically examines the notion of “success manifests competence” which is a crucial notion in Sosa’s account. It argues, unlike what Sosa seems to hold, some of the conditions which Sosa provides for “success manifests competence” are not necessary. It also clarifies, by agreeing with Sosa, that the conditions he provides are not sufficient for “success manifests competence.” Thirdly, it briefly argues that Sosa’s occasional insistence that complete competence should be present in the case of success manifests competence brings in certain internal tension in the account of Sosa. Thus, the paper defends Sosa’s position from the criticisms of Turri; but it also clarifies Sosa’s account as well as raises some criticisms to it.

     

Critical review: Richard B. Brandt,A Theory of the Good and the Right

Conclusion To sum up. Doubts can be raised about cognitive psychoterapy. The charge of utopianism may apply in part. And a few quibbles are possible about other points. This hardly detracts from the enormous achievement of the book, which really sets a new standard for the subject, in my opinion. Brandt makes abundantly clear the importance and usefulness of trying to state issues in neutral nonmoral terminology in a way that permits them to be answered but also allows one to understand why one might be interested in the answers. He shows how psychological theory can be applied in philosophy in unsuspected ways. He greatly advances our understanding of the sorts of criticisms that actions are subject to, and therefore advances our understanding of practical reasons. He provides an excellent account of what a morality is. He raises an important issue about desire satisfaction versions of utilitarianism and presents a plausible theory concerning the measurement of a group's total happiness.The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979.     

The teleological stance: Past,present, and future

We review the support for, and criticisms of, the teleological stance theory, often described as a foundation for goal‐directed action understanding early in life. A major point of contention in the literature has been how teleological processes and assumptions of rationality are represented and understood in infancy, and this debate has been largely centered on three paradigms. Visual habituation studies assess infant's abilities to retrospectively assess teleological processes; the presence of such processes is supported by the literature. Rational imitation is a phenomenon that has been questioned both theoretically and empirically, and there is currently little support for this concept in the literature. The involvement of teleological processes in action prediction is unclear. To date, the ontology of teleological processes remains unspecified. To remedy this, we present a new action‐based theory of teleological processes (here referred to as the embodied account of teleological processes), based on the development of goal‐directed reaching with its origin during the fetal period and continuous development over the first few months of life.     

Neurodynamics of time consciousness: An extensionalist explanation of apparent motion and the specious present via reentrant oscillatory multiplexing

This paper situates an original model of reentrant oscillatory multiplexing within the philosophy of time consciousness to argue for an extensionalist theory of the specious present. I develop a detailed differential latency model of apparent motion to show how the ordinality of experiential content is isomorphic to the ordinality of relevant brain processes. I argue that the theory presented has resources to account for other key features of the specious present, including the representational discreteness between successive conscious moments as well as the phenomenological continuity between them. This work not only shows the plausibility of an extensionalist philosophical theory, it also illustrates the utility of differential latency views in squaring temporal illusions with empirically supported neurodynamics.     

Wavelength Theory of Colour Strikes Back: The Return of the Physical

There have been a number of criticisms, based on visual processes, of the Australian view that colour is an objective property of the world. These criticisms have led to subjective theories about colour. These visual processes (metamers, retinex theory, opponent processes, simultaneous contrast, colour constancy, subjective colours) have been examined and it is suggested that they do not carry their supposed critical weight against an objective theory. In particular, it is argued that metamers don't occur in nature and primate colour vision evolved without metamers. Thus normal colour vision occurs without the problem of metamers. This argument, in conjunction with evidence against the critical roles of opponent processes and retinex theory in colour vision, is taken to suggest that colour can be given a photon energy/wavelengthrealism explanation. This proposal allows an account of the many microstructural bases of colour generation put forward by Nassau (1983). It is argued that neither disjunctive realism or reflectance realism are adequate objective explanations of colour.     

Dynamics of the attentional control of word retrieval: analyses of response time distributions

Since W. Wundt (1904) and H. J. Watt (1906), researchers have found no agreement on how goals direct word retrieval. A prevailing associative account (E. K. Miller & J. D. Cohen, 2001) holds that goals bias association strength, which determines retrieval latency and whether irrelevant words interfere. A symbolic account (A. Roelofs, 2003) holds that goals enable retrieval rules and predicts no strict dependence of interference on latency. Here, 3 chronometric experiments in which the role of relative retrieval latency was investigated through distributional analyses, following Watt, are reported. Participants verbally categorized picture-word pairs that were semantically related or unrelated, or they categorized single pictures or words. The pairs yielded semantic latency effects in both word and picture categorizing, although single words were categorized slower than single pictures. Semantic effects occurred in word categorizing even when postexposure of the pictures compensated for the difference in categorizing latency. Vincentile and ex-Gaussian analyses revealed that the semantic effects occurred throughout the latency distributions, excluding goal neglect as the cause of the effects. The results were interpreted as most consistent with the symbolic account, which was corroborated by computer simulations.     

The suppression model remains unsound: A reply to Deutsch

In the present issue, we critically review the influentialsuppression model of the octave illusion (Chambers, Mattingley, & Moss, 2004). In a rejoinder to our article, Deutsch (2004b) defends the utility of the suppression model. Here, we respond to Deutsch’s arguments, many of which are based on criticisms of our recent experimental report (Chambers, Mattingley, & Moss, 2002). We argue that Deutsch’s criticisms of this previous investigation are unfounded and that her defense of the suppression model fails to account for the most important weaknesses of this theory. We conclude that the suppression model remains inadequate as an explanation of the octave illusion.