David Miller on Immigration Policy and Nationality

abstract   David Miller's recent statement of the case for restrictive immigration policies can plausibly be construed as an application of a 'liberal nationalist' position. The paper first addresses Miller's critique of distributive justice arguments for open borders, which relies on nationality as determinative of the scope of distributive justice and as giving rise to national collective responsibility. Three interpretations of his main positive reason for restricting immigration, which concerns the importance of a shared public culture, are then discussed: culture as having valuable social functions, as a context of choice, and as an object of self-determination. The paper assesses the plausibility of Miller's nationalist arguments, and concludes that they are either implausible or peculiarly weak compared to other considerations in favour of restrictions. Several of the arguments may alternatively be construed as non-nationalist, and it is argued that Miller's arguments are more plausible when considered as such. The broader implication is that, even if the concern with nationality is relevant and legitimate in other areas of politics, it is, perhaps surprisingly, either inappropriate or insignificant in relation to immigration policy.     

The Ground of Self-determination

The Journal of Ethics - This paper addresses the justice of national self-determination claims and defends a right to self-determination rendered as both a primary right, meaning that it does not...     

The Global Scope of Justice

In this paper, I examine the question of the scope of justice, in a not unusual distributive, egalitarian, and universalistic framework. Part I outlines some central features of the egalitarian theory of justice I am proposing. According to such a conception, justice is – at least prima facie – immediately universal, and therefore global. It does not morally recognize any judicial boundaries or limits. Part II examines whether, even from a universalistic perspective, there are moral or pragmatic grounds for rejecting or limiting the global scope of justice. In particular, I scrutinize five universalistic objections: (1) the principle of "moral division of labor"; (2) the connection between cooperation and distributive justice; (3) the primacy of democracy; (4) the dangers of a world state; and (5) political-pragmatic reasons. I intend to show that these objections cannot undermine the strong normative claims of global justice. At the most, political-pragmatic reasons speak in favor of initially striving for somewhat less, in order to receive more general backing.     

On Equal Citizenship and Public Reason: Reply to Critics

In writing Equal Citizenship and Public Reason, we aimed to show that political liberalism is a feminist liberalism. To that end, we develop and defend a particular understanding of the commitments of political liberalism. Then, we argue that certain laws and policies are needed to protect and secure the interests of persons as free and equal citizens. We focus on the laws and policies that we think are necessary for gender justice. In particular, we apply our view to the contexts of prostitution law, family and marriage law, state support for caregivers, and religious exemptions from generally applicable laws. In this article, we consider some of the challenges made by the thoughtful critics who are part of this symposium. In particular, we address: why the collective enterprise view of liberal democracy requires shared reasons for the justification of certain laws and policies; how we understand substantive equality and why our understanding of substantive equality does not commit us to a comprehensive doctrine; how we avoid defending a particular political conception of justice in showing that political liberalism is a feminist liberalism; and how it is that, given justice pluralism, public reasons can provide stability for the right reasons.     

Justice,Collective Self-Determination,and the Ethics of Immigration Control

This article brings Gillian Brock and Alex Sager's recently published books into conversation with my book, Immigration and Democracy. It begins with a summary of the main normative arguments of my book to set the stage for critical engagement with Brock and Sager's books. While I agree with Brock's Justice for People on the Move that state power must be justified to both insiders and outsiders, I think she gives too little weight to the value of collective self-determination. I distinguish between justice and collective self-determination and argue that each is an important component of legitimacy. Sager's Against Borders focuses on immigration enforcement and contends that violence is inherent in border controls. Every legal system is backed by the threat of the use of force; the question is whether the use of force by state agents is justified. In contrast to Sager, I argue that the proper response to the injustices of current immigration enforcement is reform, not abolition, of the immigration system.     

Two kinds of potentiality: a critique of McGinn on the ethics of abortion

In Moral Literacy, or How to Do the Right Thing , Colin McGinn proposes a consequentialist solution to the abortion dilemma. McGinn interprets moral rights and moral interests as attributable only to actually sentient beings by virtue of their ability to experience pleasure or pain. McGinn argues against the moral rights of potentially conscious human fetuses, on the grounds that the unjoined ova and spermatazoa of any fertile men and women are also potentially sentient, but we do not generally suppose that unjoined human genetic germ plasm has moral rights. I argue that McGinn's reply equivocates between two different senses of 'potential sentience'. I distinguish between strong and weak potentiality, or between naturally probable potentiality and merely logically possible potentiality . I agree that it is reasonable to deny that a weak or merely logically possible potentially sentient fetus that would result from any unjoined ovum and sperm has a moral right to life. But I claim that this fact does not diminish the plausibility of extending a moral right or potential moral right to life to a naturally probable potentially sentient fetus, which we have good reason to believe will actually become sentient in the natural course of things if nothing is done to prevent its normal development. I conclude that it is not merely the potentiality, but the strong potentiality of a healthy, normally developing fetus that is soon to acquire sentience, moral interests, and, on McGinn's own terms, a moral right to life, that continues to sustain the abortion contro-versy, even among those who also want respect a woman's moral right to reproductive self-determination.     

Selecting Talented Migrants: Majority and Minority Perspectives

Many countries seek to specifically attract talented migrants in order to match the needs of national economies. In addition to the well-known intergroup antagonism between natives and immigrants, such immigration policies targeting talented migrants imply differentiation within the immigrant group, using normative criteria to distinguish desirable and economically useful immigrants from undesirable ones. Based on European Social Survey data (Round 7, N = 9856) comprised of national citizens from six multinational countries, we show that national majorities support individualized, “cherry picking” immigration policies to a greater degree than historical national minorities and that this support is associated with national majorities' stronger sense of identification with the country and its individualistic norms. We thereby conceptualize a novel facet of multiculturalism based on individual justice principles that is rarely at the forefront of research on immigration and multiculturalism.     

What is the Right to Exclude Immigrants?

It is normally taken for granted that states have a right to control immigration into their territory. When immigration is raised as a normative issue two questions become salient, one about what the right to exclude is, and one about whether and how it might be justified. This paper considers the first question. The paper starts by noting that standard debates about immigration have not addressed what the right to exclude is. Standard debates about immigration furthermore tend to result either in fairly strong cases for open borders or in denials that considerations of justice apply to immigration at all, which results in state discretion positions. This state of debate is both theoretically unsatisfactory and normatively implausible. The paper therefore explores an alternative approach to the right to exclude immigrants from the perspective of recent debates about the territorial rights of states. The right to exclude claimed by states is analysed and it is shown to differ both conceptually and normatively from rights to impose political authority within a territory. The paper finally indicates how this analysis might broaden the focus of debates about immigration and suggest alternative regimes of migration regulation the possibility of which is obscured by traditional justice approaches.     

THE DEONTOLOGICAL DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACY: AN ARGUMENT FROM GROUP RIGHTS

Abstract: Democracy is regularly heralded as the only form of government that treats political subjects as free and equal citizens. On closer examination, however, it becomes apparent that democracy unavoidably restricts individual freedom, and it is not the only way to treat all citizens equally. In light of these observations, we argue that the non-instrumental reasons to support democratic governance stem, not from considerations of individual freedom or equality, but instead from the importance of respecting group self-determination. If this is correct, it implies that a state may choose democracy, but its right to self-determination means that it is also free, in principle, to decide in favor of some nondemocratic alternative.     

Against Global Egalitarianism

This article attacks the view that global justice should be understood in terms of a global principle of equality. The principle mainly discussed is global equality of opportunity – the idea that people of similar talent and motivation should have equivalent opportunity sets no matter to which society they belong. I argue first that in a culturally plural world we have no neutral way of measuring opportunity sets. I then suggest that the most commonly offered defences of global egalitarianism – the cosmopolitan claim that human lives have equal value, the argument that a persons nationality is a morally arbitrary characteristic, and the more empirical claim that relationships among fellow-nationals are no longer special in a way that matters for justice – are all defective. If we fall back on the idea of equality as a default principle, then we have to recognize that pursuing global equality of opportunity systematically would leave no space for national self-determination. Finally, I ask whether global inequality might be objectionable for reasons independent of justice, and argue that the main reason for concern is the inequalities of power that are likely to emerge in a radically unequal world.I am very grateful to Gillian Brock and Kok-Chor Tan for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.     

Indirect cosmopolitan education: on the contribution of national education to attitudes towards foreigners

ABSTRACT

Many rich countries are witnessing the rise of xenophobic political parties. The opposition to immigration and global redistributive policies is high. How can we pursue global justice in such non-ideal circumstances? Whatever the way we want to pursue global justice, it seems that a change in the political ethos of citizens from rich countries will be necessary. They must come to internalize some genuine concern for foreigners and relativize national identities. Can education contribute to the promotion of such cosmopolitan ethos? An overtly cosmopolitan educational agenda is not likely to be endorsed in these societies where national ties and national priority may be considered fully legitimate by the majority. Nevertheless, this paper argues, some more achievable educational aims may have desirable cosmopolitan spillover effects although it is not their primary purpose. Decentration, empathy, critical thinking, understanding of social reality and social mix can be defended as necessary for a better domestic society. Yet these aims also make the widespread development of a cosmopolitan ethos more likely. This paper thus considers the arguments that can be made for these educational aims and their potential effects on citizens’ attitudes towards foreigners. Then, it discusses a possible tension with another aspect of national civic education: national integration.     

Citizenship for children: By soil,by blood,or by paternalism?

Do states have a right to exclude prospective immigrants as they see fit? According to statists the answer is a qualified yes. For these authors, self-determining political communities have a prima facie right to exclude, which can be overridden by the claims of vulnerable groups such as refugees and children born in the state’s territory. However, there is a concern in the literature that statists have not yet developed a theory that can protect children born in the territory from being excluded from the political community. For if the self-determining political community has the right to decide who should form the self in the first place, then that right should count against both newcomers by immigration and newcomers by birth. Or so the concern goes. In this essay, I defend statism against this line of criticism and provide a liberal justification for the inclusion of children born within the state’s borders. My account leads to some surprising implication for citizenship law, as well as immigration arrangements in the area of asylum and unauthorized immigration.     

Why Care about Being an Agent?

The question ‘Why care about being an agent?’ asks for reasons to be something that appears to be non-optional. But perhaps it is closer to the question ‘Why be moral?’; or so I shall argue. Here the constitutivist answer—that we cannot help but have this aim—seems to be the best answer available. I suggest that, regardless of whether constitutivism is true, it is an incomplete answer. I argue that we should instead answer the question by looking at our evaluative commitments to the exercise of our other capacities for which being a full-blown agent is a necessary condition. Thus, the only kind of reason available is hypothetical rather than categorical. The status of this reason may seem to undermine the importance of this answer. I show, however, that it both achieves much of what we want when we cite categorical reasons and highlights why agency is valuable.     

More Royalist Than the King? Immigration Policy Attitudes Among Naturalized Citizens

Social psychological research has analyzed immigration attitudes mostly from the perspective of natives without an immigrant background. Nevertheless, an increasing number of migrants obtain national citizenship and take a stance towards immigration policies. By studying immigration policy attitudes reported by naturalized citizens, this article develops a dual-pathway model of immigrant political incorporation featuring pathways of either absorption or transformation. Based on a unique sample of immigrants who just accomplished the naturalization procedure (N = 566), we investigate participants' preferences for permissive or restrictive immigration policies as a function of their naturalization motives and expectations about how immigrants should acculturate in the receiving society (i.e., acculturation orientations). Our findings provide evidence for both processes of political absorption and transformation. On the one hand, belongingness motives underlying naturalization were connected to orientations towards host culture adoption, which in turn predicted support for restrictive immigration policies. On the other hand, instrumental motives were connected to orientations towards heritage culture maintenance, which in turn predicted support for permissive immigration policies. To conclude, we discuss the social psychological dynamics involved in the transition from national outsiders to national insiders and highlight the effects of naturalization on power relations between national majority and immigrant minority groups.     

Not in My Backyard! Authoritarianism,Social Dominance Orientation,and Support for Strict Immigration Policies at Home and Abroad

Many controversial immigration policies have recently emerged across the United States and abroad. We explore the role of national context in shaping support for such policies. Specifically, we examine whether the extent to which ideological attitudes—Right‐Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO)—predict policy support is moderated by the national context of the policy. Across three studies, United States citizens read about a controversial immigration policy affecting either their own country (United States) or a foreign country (Israel or Singapore) and indicated their support for the policy. Results reveal that SDO predicts policy support, regardless of its national context; this effect is mediated by perceived competition. Conversely, RWA predicts policy support only if the policy affects domestic immigration; this effect is mediated by perceptions of cultural threat. Consistent with prior research, the present findings highlight the role of perceived cultural threat to one's ingroup and perceived competition in shaping attitudes toward immigration and shed light on some of the motivations underlying the recent rise in popularity of strict immigration policies.     

Water Crisis Adaptation: Defending a Strong Right Against Displacement from the Home

This essay defends a strong right against displacement as part of a basic individual right to secure access to one’s home. The analysis is purposefully situated within the difficult context of climate change adaptation policies. Under increasing environmental pressures, especially regarding water security, there are weighty reasons motivating the forced displacement of persons—to safeguard water resources or prevent water-related disasters. Even in these pressing circumstances, I argue, individuals have weighty rights to secure access to their homes. I explain how the home provides a functional context for conditions of autonomous agency. Being coerced from the home disrupts and subverts the conditions necessary for autonomous processes. I conclude by suggesting that the right to the home could be a foundational element of territorial rights.     

Disaggregating immigration policy: The politics of skilled labor recruitment in the U.S.

Gary P. Freeman and David K. Hill argue that the U.S. system of multiple visa categories and the often distorting business interests behind these, point to a far from rational economic construction of policy. They indicate the difficulties of reform, even in the absence of strongly organized public opposition, and the degree to which path-dependence seems to determine overall outcomes in the policy process. Curiously, the authors suggest that highly skilled migration policy in the U.S. is a wholly self-contained national affair. National politics, rather than global economic pressures, drive the twists and turns of U.S. immigration policies, with key roles being played by high tech employers, professional associations, pro and anti-immigrant organizations, and even associations of immigration lawyers. There appears to be little space in their accounts for the kind of global legal/institutional influences signaled by WTO reforms or by the importance of global multinationals. Freeman and Hill offer useful analytical frameworks to differentiate between distinct forms of migration by technical workers, and the often contradictory state policies and the politics linked to them.     

Reverse migration,brain drain and global justice

This paper contributes to the discussion of the ethics of brain drain against the background of the book Debating Brain Drain co-authored by Gillian Brock and Michael Blake. Whereas Gillian Brock argued in this book that a plausible response of global justice would, under certain conditions, permit that developing countries impose taxes or demand compulsory service from their professionals who emigrate, Michael Blake rejects such claims in his defence of the right to emigrate. Extending this debate to the context of reverse immigration, I attempt in this paper to establish if the arguments provided by both scholars are capable of accounting for the cogency or otherwise of preference in reverse immigration. My proposal is that the arguments provided by both Brock and Blake require further contextualisation to make them capable of deciding the question of preference in reverse immigration.