On some early objections to Bohm's theory

Recent literature on Bohm's alternative to mainstream quantum mechanics may create the misleading impression that, except for perfunctory dismissals, the theory was ignored by the physics community in the years immediately following its proposal. As a matter of fact, Einstein, Pauli, and Heisenberg all published criticisms of Bohm's theory, explaining their reasons for not accepting the theory. These criticisms will be discussed and evaluated in this article.     

Brentano's theory of intentionality

Chapters Five through Nine of Book Two of Brentano's 1874 Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint were republished in 1911 with a substantive Appendix of Brentano's remarks. In the Appendix Brentano makes a significant addition to his theory of intentionality. In particular, he introduces new modes within the mode of presentation itself. These new modes are needed to account for our thinking about anything in a relational structure (in recto and in obliquo modes) and for our thoughts about time (the temporal mode). I want to suggest that in the end Brentano simply takes relations to be different kinds of modes.     

On some common objections to a behavioral approach to psychological categories

This paper addresses several objections that have been leveled against a behavioral approach to psychological categories. It reconstructs and critically assesses (a) the so-called causal objection; (b) alleged counterexamples whereby one can exhibit the typical behaviors associated with a psychological phenomenon without exhibiting the latter, including Lewis’ “perfect actor” case and Kirk’s “zombie”; (c) alleged counterexamples whereby organisms can exemplify psychological phenomena without exhibiting any behavior associated with them, including Armstrong’s imagined brain in a vat, Putnam’s “super-super-spartans” scenario, and related cases; and (d) the holistic objection. Mistaken assumptions in each of these objections are pinpointed. The paper starts with a brief characterization of behaviorism about psychological categories and a summary of the particular version thereof supported here, which draws upon Ryle and Skinner, among others.     

论康德的政治哲学

康德的"永久和平"(der ewige Friede)概念是其政治哲学的核心.在康德之前,马基亚维里、格劳秀斯、普芬道夫、博丹、霍布斯这些近代政治哲学和国际法学的奠基人都对永久和平的理想不屑一顾.只有圣·皮埃尔神甫的《欧洲永久和平的方案》和卢梭的和平观念构成了康德"永久和平"概念的直接源头.在《永久和平论》中,康德从自由的实践理性原则出发,并提出,共和国家的自由联盟是永久和平的基础,并给出了一整套关于世界公民权利的"世界公民主义"(Cosmopolitanism),给出了今天人们称之为"自由主义的国际主义"的哲学论证.这个思想对哈贝马斯和罗尔斯这些当代政治哲学家的思想产生了很大影响.     

论马克思对康德自由概念的感性证明

自由是贯穿整个西方文化的价值目标,是主体之为主体的根据,它发展到德国古典哲学时期已经取得了巨大成果,康德和马克思的自由观就宛如德国近代自由思想的两个点:康德自由概念的核心是自由意志,并且它是纯粹理性的唯一事实,但对它的证明始终是个问题;马克思对康德的"自由"进行了感性证明。     

Kant's Theory of Value: On Allen Wood's Kant's Ethical Thought

Karl Ameriks has recently devoted an entire volume to defending what he calls "orthodox" Kantianism against what he judges to be the "errors" of such post-Kantian idealists as K. L. Reinhold and J. G. Fichte and to exposing what he claims is the frequently unnoticed but always deleterious influence of post-Kantianism upon certain prominent strands of contemporary philosophy. In response, this paper challenges Ameriks' interpretation of Kantianism itself and of the "post-Kantian project", as well as his construal of transcendental idealism. This is followed by some remarks concerning Reinhold's and Fichte's actual "arguments" for transcendental idealism and a rejection of Ameriks' characterizations of the same. Ameriks' interpretation of "the primacy of the practical" within Fichte's philosophy is also analyzed and criticized, as are his unsubstantiated claims concerning the powerful "indirect" influence of the writings of Reinhold and Fichte upon contemporary philosophy.     

Reason unbound: Kant's theory of regulative principles

It is an essential part of Kant's conception of regulative principles and ideas that those principles and ideas are in a certain sense indeterminate. The relevant sense of indeterminacy is cashed out in a section in the Antinomies where Kant says that the regress of conditions of experience forms not a “regressus in infinitum” but a “regressus in indefinitum.” The mathematics that Kant appears to rely on in making this distinction turns out to be problematic, as Jonathan Bennett showed long ago. But I suggest that despite this, there is another mathematically legitimate way to make Kant's point, one enunciated by, among others, Michael Dummett. This reading is corroborated, I suggest, by Kant's conception of reason as a radically open‐ended endeavor.     

Ability-based objections to no-best-world arguments

In the space of possible worlds, there might be a best possible world (a uniquely best world or a world tied for best with some other worlds). Or, instead, for every possible world, there might be a better possible world. Suppose that the latter is true, i.e., that there is no best world. Many have thought that there is then an argument against the existence of God, i.e., the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect being; we will call such arguments no-best-world arguments. In this paper, we discuss ability-based objections to such arguments; an ability-based objection to a no-best world argument claims that the argument fails because one or more of its premises conflict with a plausible principle connecting the applicability of some type of moral evaluation to the agent’s possession of a relevant ability. In particular, we formulate and evaluate an important new ability-based objection to the most promising no-best world argument.     

略谈康德伦理学的几个问题——兼与宁新昌、许平二位先生商榷

宁新昌、许平二位先生的<张载康德伦理思想的相异与相通>一文在曲解康德的道德、义务的基础上,把二律背反归结为康德的阶级软弱性和非此即彼的思维方式.实际上,康德的道德、义务和相应的中文含义不同,二律背反既不是康德奉人的思想,也和其阶级软弱性或非此即彼的思雏方式无关.相反,正是因为康德在一定程度上超越了阶级软弱性等经验对象和非此即彼的思维方式,才发现并试图解决二律背反.