Is transference the ‘total situation’?

This paper examines through the detailed explication of analytic material the author's experience of a psychoanalytic and a Jungian way of understanding the interactions between him and his patient. This comparative approach considers where the differences lie with respect to timing and content of interpretations and where the differences are essentially tactical rather than theoretical.     

‘Who am I?’

The dreams and existential questions of those, who came into being in order to replace a dead person, pivot around a central cry: ‘Who am I?’ If conceived, born or designated as a replacement child, such an individual may suffer—even as an adult—from a rarely recognized unconscious confusion of identity, compounded by grief and survivors’ guilt. From before the child is born, the archetypal forces of death and life are joined in a fateful constellation; the soul of the replacement child bears the shadow of death from the very beginning of life. Hope for the replacement child lies in an emergence of true self as soul recreates original life. Analysis can help the replacement child experience a ‘rebirth into true life’, not as ‘the one who returned’, but as a psychologically newborn individual; the path of individuation countering the replacement child‘s identification with the dead. Jungian analysis offers unique concepts for understanding and healing the replacement child; C.G. Jung himself was born after two stillborn babies and an infant that lived only five days.     

Why ‘spiritism’?

Some of the early representatives of psychoanalysis had a lifelong interest in certain ‘occult’ phenomena. Although several theories were born for the purpose of understanding the interest of Sigmund Freud, Carl Gustav Jung or Sándor Ferenczi in spiritualism and related phenomena, interpreters usually ignore the changing cultural meaning and significance of modern occult practices like spiritualism. The aim of the present essay is to outline the cultural and historical aspects of spiritualism and spiritism in Hungary, and thus to shed new light on the involvement of Ferenczi – and other Hungarian psychoanalysts like Géza Róheim, István Hollós, and Mihály Bálint – in spiritualism and spiritism. The connections between spiritualism and the Budapest School of Psychoanalysis will be discussed, highlighting the cultural and scientific significance of Hungarian spiritualism and spiritism in the evolution of psychoanalysis. Taking into account the relative lack of the scientific research in the field of spiritism in Hungary, it can be pointed out that Ferenczi undertook a pioneering role in Hungarian psychical research.     

Whither ‘TRS’?

Books reviewed in this article:
Willi Braun and Russell T. McCutcheon (eds), Guide to the Study of Religion
J'annine Jobling and Ian Markham (eds), Theological Liberalism, Creative and Critical     

The Holy Spirit in the Trinitarian Communion: ‘Love’ and ‘Gift'?

Christians in the West often have become so accustomed to naming the Holy Spirit ‘Love’ and ‘Gift’ – or at least to associating the Holy Spirit particularly with these two dynamisms – that it can come as a surprise that Scripture nowhere explicitly names the Holy Spirit either ‘love’ or ‘gift’. Indeed, as Hans Urs von Balthasar points out, the Spirit is much more clearly associated with truth, knowledge and power. How then does Augustine arrive at the view that the Holy Spirit should be named ‘Love’ and ‘Gift'? I examine and evaluate the complex exegetical steps by which Augustine draws out these names.     

‘What works?’ Response to the paper by James Astor

Abstract :  A personal account of an analysis with Michael Fordham and subsequent conversations with James Astor. A number of themes are developed concerning the expression of feeling, use of language, and the relevance of aesthetic values to the practice and reporting of analysis.     

How Should We Study Generational ‘Changes’—Or Should We? A Critical Examination of the Evidence for ‘Generation Me’

In this essay, we discuss some of the issues that are involved when making inferences about birth cohorts and we describe some of our work that has caused us to question the strength of the evidence for so-called 'Generation Me' effects. In particular, we describe our analyses from the Monitoring the Future project using self-esteem and respond to criticisms of our work. At this point, we believe that there is insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the personalities and self-beliefs of today's young people are dramatically different from previous generations of American youth.     

Is speech learning ‘gated’ by the social brain?

I advance the hypothesis that the earliest phases of language acquisition -- the developmental transition from an initial universal state of language processing to one that is language-specific -- requires social interaction. Relating human language learning to a broader set of neurobiological cases of communicative development, I argue that the social brain 'gates' the computational mechanisms involved in human language learning.     

A Rose by Any Other Name? From ‘Christian Doctrine’ to ‘Systematic Theology’

Christian thought is uniquely resistant to systematization, yet over the centuries has produced remarkable systematic accounts of Christian truth, including those of the patristic and medieval eras before Christian theology became systematically self-conscious in modernity. The more recent fate of the notion of system is traced in Schleiermacher, Hegel and Kierkegaard, and an argument advanced that systematic theology is the expression of personal skill learned in community, and its unity and integrity are aesthetic and moral as much as rationalistic.     

What are ‘Universalizable Interests’?

Many of Habermas's critical commentators agree that Discourse Ethics fails as a theory of the validity of moral norms and only succeeds as a theory of the democratic legitimacy of socio-political norms. The reason they give is that the moral principle (U) is too restrictive to count as a necessary condition of the validity of norms. Other commentators more sympathetic to his project want to abandon principle (U) and remodel Discourse Ethics without it. Still others want to downplay the role of universalizing moral discourse and to make more of Habermas's less demanding, though still somewhat vague, conception of ethical discourse. Against this chorus of critical voices Habermas maintains that his conception of moral discourse and the moral principle (U) are central to Discourse Ethics in general, and to the normative heart of his political theory in particular. The conflict may have arisen in part because the concept of a 'universalizable interest' which is central to Habermas's understanding of moral discourse and of the moral principle (U) remains opaque even after nearly two decades of critical debate. Actually Habermas's concept of interest is pretty obscure too. But the obscurity surrounding the concept of interest is not the source of the confusion. For our present purposes we can simply stipulate that an interest is a reason to want. The notion of reason rests loosely on the notion of a need, and the concepts of need and desire are take left deliberately vague. The source of the current confusion lies in the notion of universalizability that is in play. Once we pay due attention to the conditions of the universalizability of interests contained in Habermas's formulation of the moral principle (U), we can distinguish between a weaker and a stronger version of the principle. I argue that only the weaker version is defensible. But I also want to show that Habermas is tempted into defending the stronger version, and to explain why he does so.     

‘What works?’ Therapeutic experience with grieving clients

This paper poses questions about the nature of the therapeutic process in general. Using a holistic and integrative perspective, the author argues that therapy has been influenced by considerations of therapist expertise, techniques aimed at solving problems, and a paternalistic model of doing things to the client. The paper proposes a contrasting approach involving a shared, conversational experience with clients which respects personal autonomy and encourages creative solutions. Throughout the whole paper weaves the underlying theme of unresolved grief, reflecting the author's philosophy that loss is a covert agenda for many people seeking therapeutic help. The author's thesis is that in defining the emotions associated with unresolved grief, exploring the contexts in which the losses occurred, and investigating future options and directions, therapeutic change can be effected. Finally, a quandary that therapy as conversation presents is addressed: how can we research our dialogue to ensure effective outcomes?     

‘Does class count?’ Social class and counselling

This article explores the importance attached to social class by experienced practitioners taking part in a co‐operative inquiry group. A review of the literature from the last thirty years indicates that there is very little research on class in relation to counselling and psychotherapy reported in the UK. Both authors position themselves as coming from working class origins. Nine co‐researchers from both middle and working class origins joined the group. Eight meetings took place over a period of nine months. Extracts from the group's discussions are represented and integrated with ‘presentational knowing’ drawn from contemporary culture, including poetry and popular music. This study suggests that social class is a neglected aspect of diversity in the counselling field. Implications of the study have relevance for the language of counselling and psychotherapy and class based values; social class and its impact on initial education; and ongoing counselling practice and access to therapy for working class people.     

‘SEEKE TRUE RELIGION. OH,WHERE?’

We precipitately express opinions about religion without reflecting critically on our conception of it, and may blame it for conduct that the religious traditions themselves judge unbecoming. A distinction can be drawn between the raw, natural self of the untrained person and the well‐tempered demeanour of a spiritually developed person. Such a distinction drives the appropriation of religious beliefs and can survive their demise. ‘Religious belief’ is not to be conflated with Abrahamic notions of ‘belief in God’ and ‘faith’. There are other versions of transcendence and other psycho‐dramas. One possible form of transcendence is available within the moral life of human beings.     

Is there a ‘psychosomatogenic’ family?*

Review of the literature revealed two family theories of psychosomatic illness: the ‘enmeshed’ family of Minuchin and the family with affect disturbances. We interviewed twelve families, each containing a child with eczema. Most, but not all, of the families do fit in with one or other or both of the proposed interactional patterns, but the theory of a single family type, the ‘psychosomatogenic family’, is not supported. This complements the studies of individuals where specificity hypotheses have proved oversimplified.     

‘Kierkegaard’: A Reasonable Fideist?

The task I set myself is to identify whether Climacus is an extreme or moderate fideist, and to go on to evaluate how convincing or persuasive I find Climacus' position. Separating metaphysical and epistemological fideism, I spend the first section of the article denying that Climacus is a 'metaphysical fideist'. This involves looking at the notion of 'truth as subjectivity'. I will claim that in expounding this notorious maxim Climacus can be seen as expressing something almost trivially obvious and/or something substantially wrong. I will further argue that even the obvious version of the maxim needs to be heavily qualified before it can be a sufficient account of 'religious truth'.
In the second section of the article I argue that Climacus should be understood as a moderate fideist, who considers that reason should assent to its own limitations. Although I will approve of reason-exhausting projects, I will complain that the paradox which is supposed to so exhaust my reason does not perplex me in the relevant sense.     

‘Sluts’ or ‘Sleazy Little Animals’?: Young People's Difficulties with Carrying and Using Condoms

Qualitative data from a Western Australian study of sexual behaviour in young people were used to describe difficulties experienced in carrying and using condoms. Both men and women were concerned for their sexual reputation if they carried condoms, although this was more of a problem for the women than the men. However, these fears were not matched by the attitudes of the opposite gender: in general, there was less negativity about condom-carrying than was feared. Many of those who described using condoms had experienced condom failure and other difficulties, and it appeared that they were unfamiliar with the correct way to use condoms. It is suggested that many of these barriers to condom use can be removed with appropriate education and information strategies.