The Dead Baby

The ghosts of Nazi history haunted my work with a German patient. The burnt landscape of the unresolved tragedy between Nazis and Jews saturated our work with transgenerational excess of unspeakable violence. My patient came to discover that she has not been able to avoid reenacting a horrific cycle of crime and punishment. Together we struggled to maintain solidarity and narrate history despite a pull towards reenacting an international tribune. The case brings to the fore the challenge of maintaining an ongoing analytic space and subjective sovereignty when powerful collective issues flood the field. When such a space is created, psychoanalytic work has the potential to join the forces that mend history.     

Research on Dead Infants

This paper examines the ethicalproblems that arise when research is carriedout after autopsy on dead infants. It comparesthe right of parents against that of the publicinterest in matters of research on dead minors. The basis for the respect that is widelyaccorded to the body of a dead person isexamined and is shown to ground the parentalinterest. A discussion of the nature of thefamily suggests that `informed consent' is notthe best term to apply to the process ofparental consultation. Some reasons areprovided against using this term in the contextin which bereaved parents are consulted aboutautopsy and research on their dead infants. Itis suggested that a term such as `authorize'might better apply to this situation.     

How the Dead Live

This paper maintains (following Yougrau 1987; 2000 and Hinchliff 1996) that the dead and other former existents count as examples of non-existent objects. If the dead number among the things there are, a further question arises: what is it to be dead—how should the state of being dead be characterised? It is argued that this state should be characterised negatively: the dead are not persons, philosophers etc. They lack any of the (intrinsic) qualities they had while they lived. The only facts involving the dead are facts about the relations they stand in—including the relations they bear to the qualities they formerly instantiated, and the intentional relations they stand in to us. Given an appropriate conception of qualities the dead can be said to be quality-less objects: bare particulars. The ‘Bare Particular Theory’ of individuals, it is argued, is coherent if and only if it concedes that the bare particulars it allows for don’t exist. The account of the dead and other former existents as bare particulars does justice to the misfortune of death, and points the way to a general theory of nonexistent objects.     

Waking the Dead Therapist

The treatment of persons with dissociative adaptations is often filled with the stirring and emergence of intense affective states. Often bereft of words, these affective states remain to be articulated by either patient or analyst, as best they can tolerate. I present a case to illustrate the ongoing struggle in a countertransference analysis of unbidden and initially uncontrollable sleepiness in the analyst as a pathway toward greater understanding of intense affects in both patient and analyst. The benefits and risks of disclosing the analyst's subjective experience is explored.     

What We Owe the Dead

abstract   My aim in this paper is to argue that we have at least some obligations to the dead. After briefly considering some previous (unsuccessful) attempts to establish such obligations, I offer a reductio argument which establishes at least some obligations to the dead. Following this, the surprising extent of these obligations (given a few roughly Kantian assumptions) is considered. I then argue that there are and must be some significant limitations on the duties of the living in relation to the dead. My aim in this paper is not to sort out how we should deal with all of the particular cases in which the question of obligations to the dead emerge — in archaeological digs, research involving the newly dead, the execution of wills, or the fulfilment of last requests — but I will attempt to lay some groundwork for the future assessment of these questions.     

Our Obligation to the Dead

Can we have a real obligation to the dead, just as we do to the living, or is such a notion merely sentimental or metaphorical? Starting with the example of making a promise, I try to show that we can, since the dead, as well as the living, can have interests, not least because the notion of a person is, in part, a moral construction. ‘The dead’, then, are not merely dead, but particular dead persons, members of something like the sort of ‘transgenerational community’ proposed by Avner de–Shalit. More generally, I argue, we have an obligation to the dead that goes beyond the particularities of promise–making, on account of their role in having made us who we are. I then suggest, though only embryonically, that such obligations may appropriately be discharged by remembering the dead, who they were and what they did. Finally, I consider some possible objections.     

Missing,Presumed Not Dead

Philosophia - In this paper, I argue that if we have reason to believe that an immaterial soul exists, then (absent evidence to the contrary) it should be presumed to be immortal. The conclusion is...     

Personal Identity and Dead People

Philosophical Studies -     

Dumb Beasts and Dead Philosophers

Tharae history of argument and explanation especially in the mathematical and biomedical sciences and arts. 3 vols. 2456 pp., ills. Duckworth, London, 1994, £180 ISBN 0–7156–2439–3     

Past Desires and the Dead

I examine an argument that appears to take us from Parfit’s [Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1984)] thesis that we have no reason to fulfil desires we no longer care about to the conclusion that the effect of posthumous events on our desires is a matter of indifference (the post-mortem thesis). I suspect that many of Parfit’s readers, including Vorobej [Philosophical Studies 90 (1998) 305], think that he is committed to (something like) this reasoning, and that Parfit must therefore give up the post-mortem thesis. However, as it turns out, the argument is subtly equivocal and does not commit Parfit to the post-mortem thesis. I close with some doubts about Parfit’s case for his indifference thesis.     

Archaeology and Respect for the Dead

abstract Contemporary archaeologists commonly acknowledge moral responsibilities to the descendants of the subjects whose remains they disturb. There has been comparatively little reflection within the professional community on whether they have duties to the dead themselves. I argue that doing wrong to the dead is not reducible to harming their successors; that there are ways in which archaeologists can wrong the dead qua the living persons they once were; and that nevertheless this may not have such radical implications for the practice of archaeology as might first be imagined.     

Dead People and the All-Affected Principle

Discussions of the all-affected principle as a solution to the boundary problem – how do we specify the group making democratic decisions? – have focused extensively on future people. We have yet to focus on dead people, however. This article tries to bridge this gap by arguing that the all-affected principle – i.e. the all actually affected interests principle – entails inclusion of dead people. This is true because dead people can be harmed or legally affected, and this is sufficient for having a claim to democratic inclusion. The last part of the article discusses where this leaves the all-affected principle in the quest for the proper boundary principle, including a discussion of possible institutional solutions to the enfranchisement of dead people.     

Mourning the Dead,Following the Living

In this paper I take up the ambivalence we rightly feel toward leaders by examining the relationship between charismatic authority and moral exemplarity. Drawing on the social theory of Max Weber, and in dialogue with a case study of an anti‐militarism movement called the SOA (School of Americas) Watch, I demonstrate that through a “politics of sacrifice” leaders synchronize their own stories with those of communally recognized exemplars and act in ways that evidence a solidarity in the suffering of those exemplars thereby generating their charismatic authority. While performing crucial strategic, motivational, and pedagogical roles, this charisma also introduces problematic temptations to authoritarianism that short‐circuit the practical reasoning that exemplars supposedly help to form. In the end this leaves our sense of ambivalence intact. What is needed, I argue, are practices of critique that reopen the distance between leader and follower and thus allow the possibility of practical reason.