The philosophical cap of Yegor Fjodorovič or becoming Belinskij

The impact of Hegelian philosophy on Belinskij’s thinking and especially on his self-understanding did not end with his well-known and ostentatious anti-Hegelian tirades. By focusing on Belinskij’s tormented early years in Petersburg, after he had supposedly reneged on his “reconciliation with reality,” this paper will attempt to show how the continued conceptual evolution of Belinskij’s Hegelian thinking was intimately interrelated with his personal striving for self-realization. Ultimately, Hegelian ideas not only allowed Belinskij to affirm a unique sense of self as the subject of a not-yet-world-historical nation, they also served as the crucial theoretical framework that would finally allow Belinskij to conceptualize the essential, organic connection between Russian literature and Russian life, as evidenced in his monumental eleven-part study on Pushkin.     

On the Hegelian roots of Lukács’s theory of realism

This article attempts two things. First, it aims to reassess the literary criticism that Georg Lukács produced in the 1930s while he was living in the Soviet Union in light of his earlier, and much-esteemed, The theory of the novel. Second, in order to carry out this reassessment, it examines the place of Hegelian aesthetics in Lukács’s theorization of realism in the 1930s criticism, in relation both to contemporary Soviet writings on the subject and to his own earlier, ostensibly Hegelian work. I argue that, at least in terms of the place of art in the historical dialectic, the later work is more consistent with Hegelian philosophy than The theory of the novel.     

On the Persistence of the Genealogical in Contemporary Theology

There is a persistence of genealogical discourse in a certain strand of contemporary theology. Opting for the genealogical shapes the theological task of remembrance and engagement with the historical tradition in important, but also problematic, ways. In this article I discuss how genealogical discourse was appropriated by theology, and then uncover its implicit assumptions and tendencies. Analysing some encounters between theological genealogies and various Hegelian thinkers, I draw a contrast between Nietzschean genealogy and Hegelian ‘phenomenology’. This comparison brings to light some fundamental ways in which the genealogical might distort theological writing and practice.     

The Neo‐Hegelian Theory of Freedom and the Limits of Emancipation

This paper critically evaluates what it identifies as ‘the institutional theory of freedom’ developed within recent neo‐Hegelian philosophy (by Robert Pippin and, in a different way, Axel Honneth). While acknowledging the gains made against the Kantian theory of autonomy as detachment it is argued that the institutional theory ultimately undermines the very meaning of practical agency. By tying agency to institutionally sustained recognition it effectively excludes the exercise of practical reason geared toward emancipation from a settled normative order. Adorno's notion of autonomy as resistance is enlisted to develop an account of practical reason that is neither institutionally constrained nor without appropriate consideration of the historical location of the practical agent.     

'Tarrying with the Negative': Bataille and Derrida's Reading of Negation in Hegel's Phenomenology

Central to Bataille's critique of Hegel is his reading in 'Hegel, Death, and Sacrifice' of 'negation' and of 'lordship and bondage' in the Phenomenology of Spirit . Whereas Hegel invokes negation as inclusive of death, Bataille points out (following his teacher Kojeve) that negation in the dynamic of lordship and bondage must of necessity be representational rather than actual. Derrida, in 'From Restricted to General Economy' sees in Bataille's perspective an undercutting of the overall Hegelian project consonant with his own ongoing deconstruction of Hegelian sublation. I argue that not only does Hegel fail to adequately pursue his own best advice to 'tarry with the negative,' but Bataille and Derrida's critique misconstrues the relation between sublation and dialectic in Hegel's work. I explicate Adorno's 'negative dialectic' by way of alternative both to Hegelian speculative dialectic and to its Bataillean–Derridean deconstruction.     

Jenson,Hegel and the Spirit of Recognition

This article engages the pneumatology and account of divine freedom found in Robert Jenson's Systematic Theology. It raises a novel set of questions about Jenson's account of divine freedom, which bears on persistent questions regarding the nature of G.W.F. Hegel's influence upon Jenson. While most engagements with Jenson take for granted what it is to be ‘Hegelian’, this article foregrounds the diversity of contemporary Hegel interpretation. It argues that Jenson's account of divine freedom would profit from a stronger dose of Hegel's philosophy – specifically, Hegel's account of mutual recognition – provided that Hegel is interpreted along the lines of the non‐traditional school of Hegel interpretation. The article concludes with a brief constructive sketch of a Jensonian pneumatology conceived along these lines.     

Aesthetic freedom and democratic ethical life: A Hegelian account of the relationship between aesthetics and democratic politics

This paper presents a novel Hegelian view of the relationship between aesthetics and democratic politics. My account avoids the drawbacks associated with approaches, such as Rancière's, that reconceive all of the political in aesthetic terms or, like Rockhill's, reduce the aesthetic to art. Instead, I maintain that the aesthetic is best understood as a distinct recognition relationship of individual freedom. My argument proceeds by highlighting shortcomings of Honneth's account of democratic Sittlichkeit and then addressing these impasses by integrating aesthetic freedom into the picture. The first two steps of my argument concern the fact that the form of life outlined by Honneth aspires to be a form of free life, yet his account of democratic Sittlichkeit gives rise to two dimensions of unfreedom. The first problem of unfreedom pertains to the scope of freedom. The relationships of freedom incorporated into Honneth's account fail to turn given social roles into the subject matter of a sufficiently unrestricted practice of freedom. The second problem of freedom concerns conformism. In a final step, I complete my argument that Honneth's account is unsatisfactory and incomplete by showing that aesthetic freedom is socially valid and thus ought to form part of our accounts of democratic ethical life.     

Kant and Hegel on freedom: Two new interpretations

Can Kant's theory of freedom be defended in contemporary ‘incompatibilist’ terms, as Henry Allison believes, or is it vulnerable to Hegelian criticisms of the ‘compatibilist’ sort that Allen Wood presents? I argue that the answer to both of these questions is negative, and that there is a third option, namely that Kant's real theory of freedom is not as well off as Allison contends, nor as weak as Wood claims. Allison tries to save Kant's theory of freedom from both what he takes to be traditional and improper interpretations ‐ notably including Hegel's and Wood's ‐ of what that theory means, as well as from traditional and improper objections to its defensibility. I argue in part with Wood (and Hegel) against Allison on the issue of the meaning of Kant's theory, and in part with Allison against Wood (and Hegel) on the issue of the defensibility of Kant's theory.     

Brandom,Hegel and Inferentialism

In the course of developing a semantics with epistemological intent, Brandom claims that his inferentialism is Hegelian. This paper argues that, even on a charitable reading, Brandom is an anti-Hegelian.     

BOHM AND WHITEHEAD ON WHOLENESS, FREEDOM, CAUSALITY, AND TIME

Abstract. David Bohm's developing postmodern thought (combining precision and wholeness) is seen to contain two tendencies. One is a vision of "underlying wholeness," in which all causation is vertical, and the implicate-explicate relation is ubiquitous. This provides a possible solution to certain problems, but creates many others involving freedom, causation, and time. Second, many of Bohm's statements suggest that his deepest intuitions could be formulated without those problems in terms of the distinctions developed in Alfred North Whitehead's philosophy of "prehensive wholeness," in which the ubiquity of creativity would require a more restricted use of the implicate-explicate relation.     

Free Love: A Hegelian Defense of Same‐Sex Marriage Rights

By revisiting Hegel's Philosophy of Right, I mount a Hegelian defense of same‐sex marriage rights. I first argue that Hegel's account of the Idea of freedom articulates both the necessity of popular shifts in the determinations of the institutions of right, as well as the duty to struggle to progressively actualize freedom through them. I then contend that Hegel, by grounding marriage in free consent, clears the path for expanding this ethical institution to include all monogamous couples. Lastly, I close by sketching the specifically Hegelian reasons we ought to actively struggle to expand the institution of marriage.     

Freedom and Disability Rights: Dependence,Independence, and Interdependence

The increasing focus on disability rights—as found, for instance, in the U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)—challenges philosophical imaginaries. This article broadens the philosophical imaginary of freedom by exploring the relation of dependence, independence, and interdependence in the lives of people with disabilities. It argues (1) that traditional concepts of freedom are rather insensitive to difference within humanity, and (2) that the lives of people with severe disabilities challenge philosophers to argue and conceptualize freedom not only as independence and interdependence but also as dependence. After tracing this need through a Hegelian understanding, via Julia Kristeva's work on disability, and finally the CRPD, it concludes that a unified solution might not be possible. Hence, it argues that disability issues necessitate philosophical modesty.     

Proust's Recherche and Hegelian Teleology

The final volume of Marcel Proust's novel [Agrave] la Recherche du Temps perdu (Recherche) presents a striking puzzle. In this volume, the narrator Marcel proposes a literary theory which is supposed to provide the theoretical basis for the whole book, such that the Recherche can be considered a novel which contains its own theory. However, the Recherche as a whole does not seem to comply with this literary theory. I suggest in this paper that this puzzle can be solved by appreciating that Marcel's theory of literature, and his understanding of the way literature relates to his own life, is based on a Hegelian notion of teleology.     

Killing, Letting Die, and the Morality of Abortion

abstract   David Boonin, in his A Defense of Abortion, argues that abortions that involve killing the foetus are morally permissible, even if granting for the sake of argument that the foetus has a right to life. His primary argument is an argument by analogy to a 'trolley case'. I offer two lines of counterargument to his argument by analogy. First, I argue that Boonin's analogy between his trolley case and a normal unwanted pregnancy does not hold. I revise his trolley case in light of my objections. Second, I argue that Boonin's arguments for the permissibility of killing, when applied to this revised trolley case — and by extension, typical unwanted pregnancies — do not succeed in justifying killing.     

Dewey's philosophy and the experience of working: Labor,tools and language

Although Richard Rorty has done much to renew interest in the philosophy of John Dewey, he nonetheless rejects two of the most important components of Dewey's philosophy, that is, his metaphysics and epistemology. Following George Santayana, Rorty accuses Dewey of trying to serve Locke and Hegel, an impossibility as Rorty rightly sees it. Rorty (1982) says that Dewey should have been “Hegelian all the way” (p. 85). By reconstructing a bit of Hegel's early philosophy of work, and comparing it to Dewey's metaphysics and epistemology we can see that Dewey was indeed “Hegelian all the way” and that Rorty has constructed a false dilemma. We also gain some interesting insight into Dewey's philosophy by viewing it in terms of labor, tools and language.     

Organism,normativity, plasticity: Canguilhem,Kant, Malabou

Some of Catherine Malabou’s recent work has developed her conception of plasticity (originally deployed in a reading of Hegelian Aufhebung) in relation to neuroscience. This development clarifies and advances her attempt to bring contemporary theory into dialogue with the natural sciences, while indirectly indicating her engagement with the French tradition in philosophy of science and philosophy of medicine, especially the work of Georges Canguilhem. I argue that we can see her development of plasticity as an answer to some specific shortcomings in Canguilhem’s conception of organic or biological normativity as advanced in The Normal and the Pathological. Such a view of plasticity shows its potential to provide the basis for a powerful critical engagement with contemporary conceptions of selfhood, self-transformation, subjectivation, and the general theory of norms.     

Andrew Shanks,German Idealism,and the Speculative Redemption of Theodicy

In this review essay I discuss and critically evaluate the neo-Hegelian theologian Andrew Shanks’ Theodicy Beyond the Death of ‘God’ with regard to its central argument of the theological adequacy of the composite theodicy funded by Hegel, Jacob Boehme (1575-1624) and F. W. J. Schelling and also its highly individual theological style. While I commend Shanks’ impulses to enlarge the Hegelian discourse by speculative discourses that are more mythopoetic, especially given Shanks’ long-standing interest in the critical and constructive power of poetry, I consider it to be an open question not only as to whether Shanks has sustained his case for the theological adequacy of the composite theodicy, but whether this composite speculative matrix has the capacity to enlist the prophetic discourses of both the Bible and modern poetry that Shanks thinks it has. In addition, while Shanks’ theological style is a unique blend of disciplined analysis with a more hortatory rhetoric, as rendered in this his latest book, the generally polemical tone and the tendency to dismissive judgments not only regarding particular philosophers and theologians, but also particular forms of historical Christianity such as Roman Catholicism, compromise – if not entirely invalidate – its repeated message of inclusion.     

Wings of desire: Reflections on sexual desire,identity and freedom

The aim of this paper is to give a critical discussion of Sartre’s concept of sexual desire and its relation to self-identity and freedom. Why Sartre? Sartre is one of very few philosophers who offers a systematic account of sexual desire. He has influenced eminent philosophical concepts of sexual desire held by, for instance, de Beauvoir, Lacan, Foucault, Levinas, Irigaray and Butler, but not much is written about his own notion of sexual desire. This alone is reason to explore Sartre’s view. What makes his view of sexual desire particularly interesting is that it is framed by his theory of freedom. Sartre offers the original, radical notion that freedom is absolute. Because consciousness is never self-identical, he argues, human identity is not fixed. Instead, we are consequently nothing else but what we keep desiring to make of ourselves. He concludes that we are always free to choose our drives and desires, even what seem to be our most enslaving, natural sexual instincts. The question raised in this article, however, concerns what the nature of sexual desire is and how free we really are to choose our sexual desires. I first contextualise Sartre’s view of sexual desire within his notion of desire in general and its relation to instinct, drive, consciousness, freedom and identity. Then, I give a detailed discussion of his analysis of sexual desire, its relation to freedom, and, what Sartre calls its failures. Finally, I discuss a critique of, and alternative to, Sartre’s theory of sexual desire from the perspective of my own notion of heteronomous and autonomous desire and freedom.