Intertheory relations from unified theories

The concept of unified theory is defined in logical and abstract semantic terms, and employed in the analysis of relations between empirical scientific theories. The conceptual framework of the approach applies to binary relations such as the reduction or replacement of one theory by another, and to multiple intertheory relations. Historically, unified theories tend to arise within the contexts of scientific conflicts which they may show susceptible of solution even in the most controversial cases of the logical incompatibility or conceptual incommensurability of competing theories. These conclusions are exemplified by the Planck-Einstein quantum theory of thermal radiation. The analysis shows in which sense it can, and in which it cannot, be said that this theory unifies Wien's law and the Rayleigh-Jeans law of black-body radiation.     

Empirical comparison of Markov and quantum models of decision making

There are at least two general theories for building probabilistic-dynamical systems: one is Markov theory and another is quantum theory. These two mathematical frameworks share many fundamental ideas, but they also differ in some key properties. On the one hand, Markov theory obeys the law of total probability, but quantum theory does not; on the other hand, quantum theory obeys the doubly stochastic law, but Markov theory does not. Therefore, the decision about whether to use a Markov or a quantum system depends on which of these laws are empirically obeyed in an application. This article derives two general methods for testing these theories that are parameter free, and presents a new experimental test. The article concludes with a review of experimental findings from cognitive psychology that evaluate these two properties.     

Informational versus functional theories of scientific representation

Recent work in the philosophy of science has generated an apparent conflict between theories attempting to explicate the nature of scientific representation. On one side, there are what one might call ‘informational’ views, which emphasize objective relations (such as similarity, isomorphism, and homomorphism) between representations (theories, models, simulations, diagrams, etc.) and their target systems. On the other side, there are what one might call ‘functional’ views, which emphasize cognitive activities performed in connection with these targets, such as interpretation and inference. The main sources of the impression of conflict here are arguments by some functionalists to the effect that informational theories are flawed: it is suggested that relations typically championed by informational theories are neither necessary nor sufficient for scientific representation, and that any theory excluding functions is inadequate. In this paper I critically examine these arguments, and contend that, as it turns out, informational and functional theories are importantly complementary.     

State-trace analysis: A method of testing simple theories of causation

An independent variable measures some aspect of a treatment applied to a person; a dependent variable measures some aspect of the treatment's effect upon the person. Two dependent variables will often covary with each other because they are affected by a common independent variable. A state trace is a graph which plots the value of one dependent variable as a function of another. (Thus, a state trace is a generalization of the yes-no receiver-operating-characteristic curve.) By appropriately analyzing state traces, it is possible to test theories concerning (a) the mechanisms by which independent variables affect dependent variables and (b) how these mechanisms differ from one population of persons to another. As an illustration, a study of long-term memory in normal persons, schizophrenics, and persons with organic brain syndrome is presented. The effects of number of word presentations and length of retention interval upon probability of word recall and recognition were investigated. The results were analyzed by state-trace analysis.     

Justice,Law and Philosophy—an interview with Jacques Derrida

In South Africa the acquisition of full political and civil rights for all rectified the former political situation of apartheid South Africa. Against the background of key developments in the political legacy of the West, including the opposing theoretical orientations of individualistic and universalistic approaches, the historical roots of those conditions which eventually were recognised as essential for the idea of a just state are highlighted. Adding a mere multiplicity of individuals (atomistic social contract theories) or postulating one or another encompassing whole (such as Rousseau's volonté générale) precludes an insight into the own inner laws of distinct societal spheres. The concept of sovereignty appears not to be sufficient to delimit state-law properly. An alternative view is introduced by Althusius (1603) with his objection to the application of the whole-parts relation to society and the state. He acknowledges ‘leges propriae’ (proper laws for each societal collectivity and thus opened up an avenue for introducing the principle of sphere-sovereignty, which leaves room for the internal spheres of law of non-political societal entities as well as for personal freedom. If the spheres of public law, civil private law and non-civil private law are intact, political freedom, personal freedom and societal freedoms are secured—the structural conditions for the just state. The Constitution of South Africa incorporates these requirements for a Rechtsstaat and in addition contains a unique equity content. The future of the South African democracy is therefore crucially dependent upon the internalisation of a truly Rechtsstaat political culture.     

Prospect relativity: how choice options influence decision under risk

In many theories of decision under risk (e.g., expected utility theory, rank-dependent utility theory, and prospect theory), the utility of a prospect is independent of other options in the choice set. The experiments presented here show a large effect of the available options, suggesting instead that prospects are valued relative to one another. The judged certainty equivalent for a prospect is strongly influenced by the options available. Similarly, the selection of a preferred prospect is strongly influenced by the prospects available. Alternative theories of decision under risk (e.g., the stochastic difference model, multialternative decision field theory, and range frequency theory), where prospects are valued relative to one another, can provide an account of these context effects.     

Shifts of criteria or neural timing? The assumptions underlying timing perception studies

In timing perception studies, the timing of one event is usually manipulated relative to another, and participants are asked to judge if the two events were synchronous, or to judge which of the two events occurred first. Responses are analyzed to determine a measure of central tendency, which is taken as an estimate of the timing at which the two events are perceptually synchronous. When these estimates do not coincide with physical synchrony, it is often assumed that the sensory signals are asynchronous, as though the transfer of information concerning one input has been accelerated or decelerated relative to the other. Here we show that, while this is a viable interpretation, it is equally plausible that such effects are driven by shifts in the criteria used to differentiate simultaneous from asynchronous inputs. Our analyses expose important ambiguities concerning the interpretation of simultaneity judgement data, which have hitherto been underappreciated.     

Simulation and Irrationality

Abstract

In this paper, I hope to show how a recent theory in the philosophy of mind concerning how we ‘read’ the minds of others—namely, Heal's version of simulation theory—is consistent with the view that the kind of understanding we bring to bear on the irrational is different in kind from the way we understand one another in the course of everyday life. I shall attempt to show that Heal's version of simulation theory (co-cognition) is to be favoured over its rival ‘theory theories’ in the light of its accommodation of deeply irrational mental states. I claim that simulation theory preserves an asymmetry of psychological explanation which is not similarly preserved by a theory theory account, and I argue that this preservation of asymmetry is an advantage of Heal's account.     

A system for programming experiments and for recording and analyzing data automatically

A system designed for use in complex operant conditioning experiments is described. Some of its key features are: (a) plugboards that permit the experimenter to change either from one program to another or from one analysis to another in less than a minute, (b) time-sharing of permanently-wired, electronic logic components, (c) recordings suitable for automatic analyses. Included are flow diagrams of the system and sample logic diagrams for programming experiments and for analyzing data.     

Proportionality,Contrast and Explanation

If counterfactual dependence is sufficient for causation and if omissions can be causes, then all events have many more causes than common sense tends to recognize. This problem is standardly addressed by appeal to pragmatics. However, Carolina Sartorio [2010] has recently raised what I shall argue is a more interesting problem concerning omissions for counterfactual theories of causation—more interesting because it demands a more subtle pragmatic solution. I discuss the relationship between the idea that causes are proportional to their effects, the idea that causation is contrastive, and the question of the dimensions along which causal explanations should be evaluated with respect to one another.     

Tacit and accessible understanding of language

The empirical nature of our understanding of language is explored. I first show that there are several important and different distinctions between tacit and accessible awareness. I then present empirical evidence concerning our understanding of language. The data suggests that our awareness of sentence-meanings is sometimes merely tacit according to one of these distinctions, but is accessible according to another. I present and defend an interpretation of this mixed view. The present project is shown to impact on several diverse areas, including inferential role semantics and holism, the nature of learning, and the role of linguistics in the law. I am indebted to a number of people for their useful feedback, especially Peter Ludlow, Paul Pietroski, and two anonymous reviewers. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at an Eastern meeting of the APA, a meeting of the Society for Exact Philosophy at Simon Fraser University, and at a semantics workshop in Ottawa, Canada. I greatly appreciate the comments from those audiences.     

Size-weight interaction in judgements of compound stimuli

Recent work in the fields of multidimensional information transmission and perceptual accentuation due to value has led to theories concerning unidimensional judgements of compound stimuli. The present study attempts to explore these theories, adding the dimension of size to judged weight, following negative results with judgements of size when brightness is varied.

Three sets of stimulus objects were prepared. Variation of weight was the same in each set. However, the size of the objects was the same in one set, while in another set size increased with weight, and in a third set size and weight were negatively correlated. Three groups of 16 subjects were asked to make replicated absolute judgements of the weights in each set.

It appeared that judgements of weight are more affected by density when density varies than when changes of size produce constant density. As predicted, contrast between successive stimuli is greatest when size and weight are negatively correlated, and least with positive correlation. The extent of the judged scales, and the means of these scales, follow the same pattern. Differences in discriminability between the three series, whilst in the expected direction, are not significant. The hypothesis that these effects would be more apparent in the psychologically linked dimensions of size and weight, than in the relatively neutral case of size and brightness, was largely confirmed. These findings both amplify and modify the previous suggestions concerning compound stimuli.     

Distant Causation in <Emphasis Type="Italic">C</Emphasis>+

The action language C+ of Giunchiglia, Lee, Lifschitz, McCain and Turner is a high-level, logical formalism for the representation of domains involving action and change. However, one cannot directly express relationships which hold between states more than one time-step distant, or even say that one action determines another at the next time. We present C+_timed, a generalization of C+ which removes these limitations. As for C+, translations to the language of causal theories are given. We also define a new kind of transition system called a ‘run system’ to provide a graphical semantics. Finally, we show how domains involving prohibition and permission can be modelled, by incorporating the ideas of another extension of C+.     

Not Seeing is Believing: the Role of Invisibility in Human Lives

Our life is full of invisibility that exerts power on our acts, relationships, and construction of the self. This paper discusses psychological processes in which invisibility plays an essential role, and constructs a typology of invisibility in society and in our lives. After a brief look at the crucial role of invisibility in prevailing theories of psychology, I first show how invisibility works in children’s meaning constructions, the process in which their selves become clear for observers (the presentational self, Komatsu 2010). The development of children’s meaning making is led by different types of invisibility concerning the children themselves. Second, I extend the discussion from the development of individuals to the role of socially regulated invisibility that controls our acts and relationships with others, introducing examples concerning religious belief in history. After these discussions, I present a hierarchical classification of invisibility from a simple spatial-temporal separation of concretely existing objects and ourselves to an abstract aspect of invisibility in which the object and its meaning are unclear.     

John Bowlby and Margaret s. Mahler: their lives and theories

Traumatic aspects of the lives of John Bowlby and Margaret Mahler can be seen to inform their intellectual careers, a perspective that suggests that attachment theory and separation-individuation theory are far more consonant with one another than otherwise. Articulating the domains of convergence between the two theories reveals the essential complementarity of the special strengths of each. Both theories were attempts to understand the role of experience in the development of mental representations. Mahler paid close clinical attention to inner mental states and their evolution, while Bowlby searched for behavioral correlates that could lend themselves to empirical observation and inferences about internal representations.     

The Mental Representation of Human Action

Various theories of moral cognition posit that moral intuitions can be understood as the output of a computational process performed over structured mental representations of human action. We propose that action plan diagrams—“act trees”—can be a useful tool for theorists to succinctly and clearly present their hypotheses about the information contained in these representations. We then develop a methodology for using a series of linguistic probes to test the theories embodied in the act trees. In Study 1, we validate the method by testing a specific hypothesis (diagrammed by act trees) about how subjects are representing two classic moral dilemmas and finding that the data support the hypothesis. In Studies 2–4, we explore possible explanations for discrete and surprising findings that our hypothesis did not predict. In Study 5, we apply the method to a less well‐studied case and show how new experiments generated by our method can be used to settle debates about how actions are mentally represented. In Study 6, we argue that our method captures the mental representation of human action better than an alternative approach. A brief conclusion suggests that act trees can be profitably used in various fields interested in complex representations of human action, including law, philosophy, psychology, linguistics, neuroscience, computer science, robotics, and artificial intelligence.     

Groups and Oppression

Oppression is a form of injustice that occurs when one social group is subordinated while another is privileged, and oppression is maintained by a variety of different mechanisms including social norms, stereotypes, and institutional rules. A key feature of oppression is that it is perpetrated by and affects social groups. In this article I show that because of the central role that groups play in theories of oppression, those theories face significant, and heretofore mostly unrecognized, metaphysical problems. I then identify resources from analytic metaphysics that can be used to address these problems. I show that, although we should not be pessimistic about the prospects for a viable theory of oppression, it will take serious metaphysical work to develop a plausible ontology of oppression, and existing theories have for the most part failed to respond to this challenge.     

西方有关择偶启事的研究和论争

文章梳理了自20世纪70年代至本世纪初,西方以择偶启事为研究蓝本的择偶标准与择偶策略研究,展示了西方研究者运用进化心理学理论、社会学习理论与社会交换理论,对一般异性恋择偶,择偶启事回复率、初婚和再婚人士择偶,同性恋、异性恋、双性恋择偶间比较,以及网络启事择偶几方面的研究历程;预测了未来择偶启事研究的趋势应是几种理论间观点的相互借鉴与整合     

A new characterization of scientific theories

First, I discuss the older “theory-centered” and the more recent semantic conception of scientific theories. I argue that these two perspectives are nothing more than terminological variants of one another. I then offer a new theory-centered view of scientific theories. I argue that this new view captures the insights had by each of these earlier views, that it’s closer to how scientists think about their own theories, and that it better accommodates the phenomenon of inconsistent scientific theories.