Indicatives at stake

Several authors have claimed that indicative conditionals are sensitive to the epistemic perspective of agents. According to this sort of view, the truth of an indicative conditional depends on the background evidence of some relevant agent or group of agents. In this paper, I argue that the context-dependence of indicative conditionals goes beyond this. Indicative conditionals are not only sensitive to the evidence of agents, but also to contextual factors that determine what is inferable from such background evidence (plus the antecedent of the conditional). More specifically, my proposal is that when the inference associated with a conditional is defeasible, the truth of that conditional is sensitive to practical stakes (in a similar way that knowledge claims are sensitive to practical stakes).     

Indicatives,concessives, and evidential support

This paper discusses the issue of categorical acceptability of indicative and concessive conditionals. It presents experimental results in favour of two claims concerning the role of the evidential support relation for acceptability (or otherwise) of conditionals of both types. In particular, the results show that, contrary to fairly standard philosophical theorising, high probability of a conditional's consequent given its antecedent is necessary but not sufficient for the acceptability of that conditional, and that the antecedent being evidence for the consequent is a further acceptability condition. The results further show that the evidential support relation is crucial in differentiating between the acceptability of an indicative conditional and the acceptability of the corresponding concessive conditional: typically, the use of a concessive conditional signals that the corresponding conditional probability is high in spite of the fact that the antecedent is evidence against the consequent, or in any case is not evidence for the consequent.     

A Test of Evolutionary and Sociocultural Explanations of Reactions to Sexual Harassment

Although the field of evolutionary psychology has been perceived to generate predictions that are untestable, one potentially falsifiable prediction of the evolutionary approach is that women should be less upset by unwanted sexual advances from high than from low status men. Three experiments tested this hypothesis within a workplace and an academic setting. Across the first two experiments, women and men were actually more upset by perceived sexual harassment from higher than lower status members of the other sex. Results of Study 3 suggested that women only showed this difference when there was a power relationship involved. These results conflict with the evolutionary prediction and support a sociocultural explanation of reactions to sexual harassment; that is, that they are influenced by power differentials.     

祈使句和逻辑(英文)

本文基于更新框架定义了一种动态的祈使句语义,并在此基础之上讨论了关于祈使句的逻辑。这个语义对于祈使句的一致性问题和Ross悖论提供了一种直接的解决方案。我们的工作在祈使句和祈使力结构之间的对应之上展开。首先,根据处理祈使句相容性的不同方式,我们给出了几种不同的祈使句一致性定义。然后,祈使句的意义被处理为祈使力机构上的依赖相容性的更新函项。最后,祈使句之间的蕴涵关系被归约为祈使力结构之间的某种关系。基于不同的相容性定义,我们给出了几种不同的蕴涵关系。     

Indicatives,Subjunctives, and the Falsity of the Antecedent

It is widely held that there are important differences between indicative conditionals (e.g., “If the authors are linguists, they have written a linguistics paper”) and subjunctive conditionals (e.g., “If the authors had been linguists, they would have written a linguistics paper”). A central difference is that indicatives and subjunctives convey different stances toward the truth of their antecedents. Indicatives (often) convey neutrality: for example, about whether the authors in question are linguists. Subjunctives (often) convey the falsity of the antecedent: for example, that the authors in question are not linguists. This paper tests prominent accounts of how these different stances are conveyed: whether by presupposition or conversational implicature. Experiment 1 tests the presupposition account by investigating whether the stances project—remain constant—when embedded under operators like negations, possibility modals, and interrogatives, a key characteristic of presuppositions. Experiment 2 tests the conversational-implicature account by investigating whether the stances can be cancelled without producing a contradiction, a key characteristic of implicatures. The results provide evidence that both stances—neutrality about the antecedent in indicatives and the falsity of the antecedent in subjunctives—are conveyed by conversational implicatures.     

The Content and Logic of Imperatives

Axiomathes - This paper articulates an account of imperatives that sensibly supports the idea of a logic of imperative inferences. We rebuke common objections to the very possibility of such a...     

Korsgaard on Hypothetical Imperatives

I argue that rationalists need not adopt Kant’s method for determining what one has reason to do, where by “Kant’s method” I mean the view that normative guidance comes only from directives imposed on the agent by the agent’s own will. I focus on Kant’s argument for “imperatives of skill,” one sort of hypothetical imperative. I argue, against Korsgaard, that Kant’s argument is neither better nor significantly different than the sort of argument non-Kantian rationalists offer. I close by arguing that Korsgaard is wrong to think that her question “why should I care about performing the means to my ends?” is a serious worry.     

Imperatives: a Judgemental Analysis

This paper proposes a framework for formalising intuitions about the behaviour of imperative commands. It seeks to capture notions of satisfaction and coherence. Rules are proposed to express key aspects of the general logical behaviour of imperative constructions. A key objective is for the framework to allow patterns of behaviour to be described while avoiding making any commitments about how commands, and their satisfaction criteria, are to be interpreted. We consider the status of some conundrums of imperative logic in the context of this proposal.     

Coherence and Explanations

The article advocates a particular coherence theory of justification that emphasizes the significance of explanatory relations. It is shown that other approaches to coherence have failed because they underestimate the importance of explanatory theories in forming a system of beliefs. Additionally, a conception of explanation as a unifying substantial embedding of models is sketched that closely conforms with the proposed theory of coherence.     

The Normative Source of Kantian Hypothetical Imperatives

Abstract

This paper offers a critique of Christine Korsgaard’s interpretation of Kantian instrumental reason. Korsgaard understands Kantian hypothetical imperatives to share a common normative source with the categorical imperative – namely self-legislating, human rational agency. However, her reading of Kantian hypothetical imperatives is problematic for three reasons. Firstly, Korsgaard’s agent-centred approach renders incoherent Kant’s analytic-synthetic division. Secondly, by minimising the dualistic framework of Kant’s practical philosophy the dialectical character of practical rationality is lost: norms of instrumental reasoning therefore become confused with those of moral reasoning. Thirdly, this in turn curtails the distinct critical authority of pure practical rationality over instrumental choice. The paper argues that we need to understand the normativity of instrumental rationality through the lens of Kant’s dualisms. An alternative interpretation is offered which highlights how the norms of hypothetical imperatives appeal to standards of theoretical cognition and practical efficiency rather than the self-legislative demands of pure practical reason.     

Science and Political Imperatives: Orders of Precedence

An ideal view is sketched of the relationship between the facts established in science and the values of ethics and politics, and of the distinction between them. Some necessary qualifications are drawn, which do not essentially undermine the ideal. Then two cases of scientific work are considered in which considerations of value may in different ways be playing a more intimate role in the science than the ideal would suggest. These are Darwin’s theory of evolution and the current consensus on climate change. Are any general lessons to be drawn from these cases?     

Nationalism and Its Explanations

This paper presents new terms for analyzing individuals' national attitudes and their conceptualization and operationalization, a universal psychological structure in which these concepts interconnect, and a nationalism explanatory model. Three empirical studies using anonymous self-administered surveys served to test and improve national attitude assessment and its developmental theory. These empirical studies were conducted in a well-established state (the Netherlands), a recently established state (Slovakia), and a region in which a considerable proportion of citizens are striving to develop a new independent state (the Basque Autonomous Community of Spain).     

Mathematics and Program Explanations

Aidan Lyon has recently argued that some mathematical explanations of empirical facts can be understood as program explanations. I present three objections to his argument.     

Chronometric Explanations

In this paper I present a problem for the conventionalist regarding temporal metrics, and I defend an objectivist position on the ground of its explanatory force. Roughly, the conventionalist has it that there is no fact of the matter with respect to the truth or falsity of judgments of the kind “event e₁ lasted as long as event e₂”, while the objectivist thinks that they are grounded in objective features of space-time. I argue that, by positing grounds for judgments of relative temporal length, the objectivist gains an explanatory force that the conventionalist position lacks.     

Complementary Explanations

Scientific explanations arc subject to the occurrence of inconsistencies. To rule them out in many cases demands the construction of new theories. As the examples of complementary explanations show, that may take a while. Furthermore, even if possible in principle, it is not always reasonable to eliminate inconsistencies immediately, e.g., by bringing in a more sophisticated formal language. After all, under some circumstances a provisional, not fully coherent explanation may be better than none. In any case, we need a logically controlled approach to such inconsistencies. Modern logic provides the tools which are necessary to solve this task. We will mention two alternative approaches. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Reasons Explanations and Pure Agency

We focus on the recent non-causal theory of reasons explanationsof free action proffered by a proponent of the agency theory, Timothy O'Connor. We argue that the conditions O'Connor offersare neither necessary nor sufficient for a person to act for a reason. Finally, we note that the role O'Connor assigns toreasons in the etiology of actions results in further conceptual difficulties for agent-causalism.     

Competing Explanations and Explaining-Away Arguments

An “explaining-away argument” [EAA] aims to discredit some explanatory hypothesis by appealing to the explanatory power of an alternative hypothesis. Nietzsche's genealogical argument against theism and Darwin's case against Paley's “old argument of design in nature” are famous examples. In order for EAAs to have their negative force, they must satisfy several conditions. After clarifying these conditions, I focus in on one in particular: the two hypotheses in question offer potential explanations that compete with one another. I develop a formal account of what it takes for potential explanations to compete, and I use this account to argue that EAAs are often misapplied today. This is due to the fact that philosophers often fail to appreciate the subtle line dividing competing from non-competing explanations.     

Ordinary Explanations and Career Theories

The author highlights the relatively unexplored relationship between ordinary language explanations of career behavior and formal theories of career development. As in Gergen and Gergen's (1982) framework, several ordinary explanations of career behavior are classified along two dimensions—the extent to which explanations are founded in the person or the situation and the extent to which they account for predictability and control or chance and change. The value of the framework for both theory development and practice is outlined. The use of ordinary explanations addresses a number of issues faced by counselors as they move between their clients' explanations and formal career and counseling theories.