Philosophical Themes in Schleiermacher’s Christology

Philosophical foundations of Friedrich Schleiermacher’s christology are found in his rejection of the likeness theology found in many medieval theologians and in German rationalist philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries such as Leibniz and Kant. Instead, Schleiermacher offers a theology of divine otherness, as an interpretation of religious consciousness as awareness of oneself as “absolutely” (i.e., totally and unconditionally) dependent. On this basis all that we can characterize of that on which we are absolutely dependent (God) is its causality. Hence, Schleiermacher argues, Christian theology must not speak of a “nature” of God, but only of a causality of God, as present in Christ in a special way. It is argued that he identifies this divine causality as love (that is, as a causality tending toward human redemption), and as identical with Christ’s human love, on the basis of a teleology known in Christian experience of redemption.     

Reconsidering Resurrection,Incarnation and Nature in Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre

In the Glaubenslehre, Friedrich Schleiermacher affirms the resurrection of Christ but dissociates it from redemption. Many interpreters have proposed that Schleiermacher's move to evacuate the resurrection of salvific content follows necessarily from his positions on the nature‐system and the unity of the divine creative decree. This article argues that Schleiermacher could have offered a more ramified place for the resurrection of Christ in the Glaubenslehre had he interpreted it as the consummation and extension of God's incarnation in Christ. In this light, it suggests three propositions that would both extend redemptive significance to the resurrection and preserve the integrity of the nature‐system, and defends those propositions against two likely and significant objections.     

Identity with Jesus Christ: The Case of Leon Gabor

From July 1, 1959 to August 15, 1961, Milton Rokeach studied three male patients at Ypsilanti State Hospital who believed that they were Jesus Christ. They met regularly together with Rokeach and his research staff, a procedure designed to challenge their delusional systems. He believed that Leon Gabor, the youngest of the three, would be the most likely to abandon his delusional beliefs. Instead, Leon met the challenges that the procedure posed by creative elaborations of his delusional system, especially through the adoption of a new name that gave the initial appearance of the abandonment of his Christ identity but in fact drew on aspects of the real Jesus Christ’s identity that were missing from his earlier self-representation.     

Contemplating the Monad Who Saves Us: Maximus the Confessor and John of Damascus on Divine Simplicity

Daley explores divine simplicity according to Maximus the Confessor and John of Damascus, grounding his account in their classical philosophical antecedents. He notes that often we think of the sixth and seventh centuries as devoted to questions about Jesus Christ, not about God per se. Admittedly, the aftermath of the Council of Chalcedon produced ongoing controversy in the East regarding the unity of the two natures of Christ, for example, whether Christ had one operation or two. Maximus, a follower of Patriarch Sophronius of Jerusalem, became embroiled in controversy through his firm rejection of the effort by Emperor Heraclius and Patriarch Sergius of Constantinople to unite the churches in the East by holding solely to a single activity and a single will in Christ. Maximus’s position won out at the Third Council of Constantinople (680‐1). Daley draws attention here, however, to the relationship of these Christological debates to the understanding of God, and especially what it means to speak of the “divine nature” and the “divine will.” This topic required of Christian thinkers not merely philosophical reflection but also Trinitarian reflection. Daley’s point is that it well behooves us to look closely into what Maximus and John of Damascus have to say about divine simplicity, in light of the more central controversies in which these Church Fathers were engaged.     

The moral obligations of reasonable non-believers

People who do not believe that there is a God constitute an obvious problem for divine command metaethics. They have moral obligations, and are often enough aware of having them. Yet it is not easy to think of such persons as “hearing” divine commands. This makes it hard to see how a divine command theory can offer a completely general account of the nature of moral obligation. The present paper takes a close look at this issue as it emerges in the context of the most recent version of Robert Adams’ modified divine command theory. I argue that, despite a valiant attempt to do so, Adams does not succeed in giving an adequate account of the moral obligations of non-believers. More generally, I claim that if divine commands are construed as genuine speech acts, theists are well advised not to adopt a divine command theory.     

Karl Barth and the Purification of Divine Simplicity

Johnson investigates Karl Barth's critical appropriation of the doctrine of divine simplicity. While Barth is critical of traditional formulations of the doctrine, he understands himself to be refining the doctrine rather than rejecting it. Barth notes that Scripture attributes a diverse set of perfections to God in describing his salvific actions. These diverse perfections, however, have a fundamental unity: God does not contradict himself, but rather his perfections describe his unified, trustworthy agency. For this reason, we can know that in God's inmost being, God is not self‐contradictory but utterly unified or simple in his self‐fidelity. Johnson points out that a key element of Barth's doctrine of God is that it can never be the mere deduction of an abstract, transcendent entity; rather, it must begin with the transcendent God's relationship to creation, and therefore must begin with Jesus Christ, who reveals the true being of God. Johnson identifies three guidelines for speaking of Barth's doctrine: each one of God's perfections must be seen as perfections of his one divine being; God's one being does not exist above and behind his revealed perfections; and God's revealed perfections are essential to his divine nature. On this basis, Johnson explores what Barth has to say about the relationship between God's freedom and his self‐fidelity, including as this regards his freedom to live his one eternal life for us.     

Becoming No-Thing: Eckhart and Hegel on Identity and Difference

Abstract: My goal in this paper is to draw productively on Meister Eckhart's concept of the ‘no-thing’ in order to illuminate Hegel's ontotheological account of both human and divine kenosis. I advance the view that just as divine kenosis is understood as the outpouring of the divine which includes the death of Christ in its economic activity, human kenosis also requires an engagement with death, namely, a spiritual death to the finite. It is via this species of death which is a becoming ‘no-thing’ that the reconciliation between the human and the divine is disclosed as a unity that relies on the shared identity of the divine and the human while simultaneously respecting the integrity of both. Indeed, it is in and through their parallel activity of kenosis that finite and infinite being achieve their respective transcendence by necessarily engaging with the being of the other. Hence, Hegel's ontotheological work is not reducible to sheer immanentism as some scholars suggest, but instead upholds the genuine transcendence of the divine.     

Divine Immanence: Nicholas of Cusa's Understanding of Theophany and the Retrieval of a 'New' Model of God

The global ecological crisis has spawned intensive reflectionabout views of the natural world. Western Christian thoughthas received special scrutiny as modern alienation from naturehas been traced to Christian theology. Undiscovered within themystical theology of Nicholas of Cusa lies an ecologically promisingvision of nature. The concept of divine immanence presentedby this medieval thinker provides a rich spirituality that isinclusive, rather than exclusive, of the natural world. It isalso far more intimate than contemporary stewardship theology.Cusanus interprets theophany as divine self-expression. A seriesof striking metaphors, including God's enfolding and unfolding,God as ‘Not-other’, and Christ as the contractedmaximum, reveals a holistic spirituality. Nicholas of Cusa'sconcept of divine immanence infuses the world with immeasurablevalue and gives rise to a Christian theology that can addressthe current ecological crisis.     

Is Socrates a Prophet? (In Light of the Views of His Contemporaries and the Main Commentators)

Everybody acknowledges the importance of Socrates’ role and influence on the history of philosophy, as well as on the culture of humanity. He is also considered to be the first martyr of virtue and wisdom in human history. In spite of this, even though most Western commentators recognize the elevated meanings and high level of Socratic wisdom, they refuse to consider it to have a supra-human source and to be divine prophecy. In this article and through the analysis of Socrates’ words and speeches, which can be found in authentic sources such as some of Plato’s writings, the author aims to prove the truth of Socrates’ claim according to which he had the gift of prophecy. By putting together rational proofs and historical clues from his life, we will underline the veracity of such a claim. A part of the article will be dedicated to underlining the fact that our reasoning is based on authentic and historical references of Socrates’ speeches, which are mainly mentioned in Plato’s Apology. By quoting the main and most important commentators’ views in this field, we will therefore endeavor to show that there is a sort of general consensus among most commentators to consider this treatise to be an historical document. The importance as well as main outcome of this article is that if we accept this theory, the general outlook of the history of philosophy will change radically. In addition, the claim that wisdom has a divine source, which is mentioned repeatedly in the content of divine wise men’s words and in some Islamic traditions, will be confirmed. Moreover, the link between spiritual truths and human reasoning will be corroborated and underlined.     

Sola Gratia as Divine Attribute: Resurrecting the God of the Gospel

Can we speak of sola gratia as a divine attribute so as to affirm that all that God does is grace? Traditionally, Western Christian theology has answered that question negatively, placing God's justice in opposition with God's grace and presenting a God whose love does not seem to be unconditional. This has been especially evident in the ways in which Scripture, the work of Christ, justification by faith, and the distinction between law and gospel commonly have been interpreted. By rethinking those traditional interpretations on the basis of an understanding of divine grace as unconditional love, we can indeed proclaim a God of sola gratia and a gospel capable of transforming human lives and responding effectively to the crisis of faith we face today.     

The Unity of Christ and the Anointing of the Spirit in Gregory of Nyssa’s Antirrheticus Adversus Apolinarium

I investigate Gregory of Nyssa’s use of the Spirit’s anointing motif in the Antirrheticus adversus Apolinarium to ground the unity of the divine and human in Christ, against Apolinarius of Laodicea’s own Spirit‐based account of Christ’s unity. Gregory’s three explicit references to Christ’s anointing by the Spirit – eternal, post‐passion and at conception – are analysed with respect to the exegesis of Psalm 44 (45):6‐7, Acts 2:36, John 17:5 and Luke 1:35. The development of Gregory’s Christology between Contra Eunomium III and the Antirrheticus is sketched and some concluding comments are given on the enduring influence this developed Christology had in In Illud: Tunc et ispse and In Canticum canticorum.     

Divine Simplicity and the Eternal Truths: Descartes and the Scholastics

Descartes famously endorsed the view that (CD) God freely created the eternal truths, such that He could have done otherwise than He did. This controversial doctrine is much discussed in recent secondary literature, yet Descartes’s actual arguments for CD have received very little attention. In this paper I focus on what many take to be a key Cartesian argument for CD: that divine simplicity entails the dependence of the eternal truths on the divine will. What makes this argument both important and interesting is that Descartes’s scholastic predecessors share the premise of divine simplicity but reject the CD conclusion. To properly understand Descartes, then, we must determine precisely where he diverges from his predecessors on the path from simplicity to CD. And when we do so we obtain a very surprising result: that despite many dramatic prima facie differences, there is no substantive difference between the relevant doctrines of Descartes and the scholastics. Or so I argue.     

Divine Transcendence and Human Transformation: Gregory of Nyssa's Anti–Apollinarian Christology

Gregory of Nyssa's treatment of the person of Christ has puzzled modern scholars, because it does not fit easily into the dogmatic categories that have been developed, in the light of the Chalcedonian definition, to distinguish orthodox from heretical or deficient Christology. This essay argues that the main focus of Gregory's Christology, even in his debate with the Apollinarian school, is not so much on the unity and distinctions to be observed in Christ's person, but on the transformation Christ has accomplished in his own humanity by irradiating it with his own divine presence, a transformation that is the "first–fruits" of a divinization which will include the whole human race.     

The triune drama of the resurrection<Emphasis Type="Italic">Via</Emphasis> Levinas’ non-phenomenology

The article aims to develop the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas as a valuable new perspective in understanding the triune drama of the Resurrection. Firstly, the juxtaposition of Levinas’ thought and Christian theology will be argued for, followed by a development of von Balthasar’s Trinitarian theology of the Resurrection. Especially, Levinas’ non-phenomenological notion of “otherness” will be used to offer an understanding of the Risen Christ’s “Otherness” as communicating the non-phenomenality of Holy Saturday to the disciples. As a result, we discover significant theological openings towards a vision of a Biblical God free from the constraints of ontological thinking and phenomenal experience.     

Luther and Shankara: Two Ways of Salvation in the Indian Context

Abstract : This article compares and contrasts the soteriology of Reformer Martin Luther with Advaita philosopher Shankara. Luther's emphasis on the communication of attributes (communicatio idiomatum) in the two natures of Christ gets doubled in faith, where the indwelling Christ takes on our human nature while giving the believer the fruits of his divine nature, such as eternal life. Conversely, our human finite history replete with suffering is taken up into the divine life, dignifying what is mundanely human. In the Indian tradition of the Upanishads and nonduality in philosophy, Shankara seeks the union of the Self (atman) with the highest reality, the Absolute (Brahman). The realization of the oneness of Self with Brahman requires the shedding of all historical or personal attributes. The result is that the suffering of oppressed untouchables and other lower castes is dubbed unreal. A healthy soteriology in the context of Indian spirituality—a Dalit soteriology—could benefit from Luther's exchange of attributes, because the mundane sufferings of humble people are dignitifed by receiving a place in God's reality.     

The Brothers Karamazov: Dostoevskij’s Hosanna

The novel The Brothers Karamazov shows the spiritual rebirth of man and society. At first the world of the town Skotoprigon’evsk is depicted as heathen and even demonic, where everyone is in search of earthly justice, forgetting about love and losing a connection to God; here the theme of orphanhood is dominant. The second half of the novel is dominated by the image of the Holy Trinity, the symbol of mutual love and unity. The human world, according to Dostoevskij, cannot be divided into adults and children, the guilty and the innocent, insofar as all can freely participate in the redemption of humanity’s sin (like Christ, the paragon of innocence). If all people are God’s children, death does not have power over them. Upon completing his final novel Dostoevkskij wrote: “my Hosanna has passed through a big crucible of doubt.” The Brothers Karamazov is Dostoevskij’s Hosanna. Translated by Robert Bird     

Julian of Norwich: Problems of Evil and the Seriousness of Sin

Julian of Norwich emphasizes God’s eternal and unchanging love for humankind. Her visions show how God is not angry with our sins and so has no need to forgive us. God does not shame or blame us but excuses us and plans how to reward and compensate us for sin. In relation to Mother Jesus, we remain dear lovely children who need help, correction, and education. Although these remarks suggest to some that Julian must be “soft” on sin, that she has no adequate appreciation of the worthiness of God or the dignity of human nature, I argue that this is far from the case. On the contrary, she makes Divine worthiness axiomatic and urges readers to live into it. She relocates human dignity not in its intrinsic value but in our centrality to God’s plan. She measures the seriousness of sin in terms of the “real hard work” it takes to rear us up out of it: crucifixion for Christ, the hell of being a sinner and the crucifixion of life-long penance for us. Nevertheless, the brightness of her visions dominates with her assurance that despite the sin-produced sufferings of this present life, all will be well.     

Moral Evil and Leibniz’s Form/Matter Defense of Divine Omnipotence

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Leibniz’s form/matter defense of omnipotence is paradoxical, but not irretrievably so. Leibniz maintains that God necessarily must concur only in the possibility for evil’s existence in the world (the form of evil), but there are individual instances of moral evil that are not necessary (the matter of evil) with which God need not concur. For Leibniz, that there is moral evil in the world is contingent on God’s will (a dimension of divine omnipotence), with the result that even though it is necessary that God exerts his will, there are particular products of his will that are contingent and unnecessary—including human moral evil. If there are instances of evil which are contingent on God’s will and yet unnecessary, then the problematic conclusion for Leibniz’s view must be that human evil depends upon divine concurrence, not just for its possibility in the world (which is necessary) but for its instance (which is contingent). If the form/matter defense of omnipotence contains a true paradox, then God concurs in the form as well as the matter of evil. To assuage this difficulty for Leibniz, I will argue that he could either give up an Augustinian notion of evil, or rely upon a distinction between *potenta absoluta* and *potenta ordinate*, which was popular among important thinkers in the medieval period.     

Divine determinism,human freedom,and the consequence argument

In this paper I consider the view, held by some Thomistic thinkers, that divine determinism is compatible with human freedom, even though natural determinism is not. After examining the purported differences between divine and natural determinism, I discuss the Consequence Argument, which has been put forward to establish the incompatibility of natural determinism and human freedom. The Consequence Argument, I note, hinges on the premise that an action ultimately determined by factors outside of the actor’s control is not free. Since, I argue, divine determinism also entails that human actions are ultimately determined by factors outside of the actors’ control, I suggest that a parallel argument to the Consequence Argument can be constructed for the incompatibility of divine determinism and human freedom. I conclude that those who reject natural compatibilism on the basis of the Consequence Argument should also reject divine compatibilism.     

Body Without End: Biological Mutualism and the Body of Christ

This article argues that the ecological turn towards biological mutualism enlivens our understanding of the eschatological promise contained in Christ’s resurrected and ascended body. I examine the implications of proposing that Christ’s body was not only incarnate as microbiome, but also rose and ascended as microbiome. First, I analyse contemporary approaches to Christology’s relation to creation and Andrew Davison’s theological exploration of mutualism. I then respond via Irenaeus’ defence of Christ’s bodily resurrection and ascension as promise for all flesh. By reading Irenaeus in light of the mutualistic body, we enrich our understanding of this promise: of fruitfulness for all creation, of fullness for human nature, and that fleshly life is no ultimate barrier to union with God. Finally, I propose that this reading also offers renewed insight into the Eucharist: this promise and its implications are also made manifest at the heart of the church, Christ’s body on earth.