L. L. Thurstone: A new assessment

Most psychologists have heard of Thurstone, and know him as a pioneer of mathematical psychology and factor analysis. But his appearances in history books are rare and peripheral, as a man of technical prowess rather than intellectual achievement, and at best he is seen as a link in the tradition culminating in signal detection and mathematical learning theory. Nineteen eighty-seven is the centenary of his birth, so it is a timely moment to correct this picture. Thurstone was influenced by G. H. Mead, and his work is best placed within the pragmatist movement, not as moving towards the mechanistic psychology that now dominates psychology. Viewed in this way, his true status and the reasons for his relative neglect become apparent. This is illustrated by a detailed consideration of his mathematical learning models.     

Edward L. Thorndike: the selectionist connectionist

From the very outset of his work, Thorndike allied himself with the Darwinian proposition that complex phenomena can arise as the cumulative effects of a selection process, here the process envisioned by the law of effect. Thorndike's selectionist approach, when combined with his connectionism, laid the foundation for a synthesis of behavior analysis and neuroscience.     

Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration. By Charles L. Griswold

Although demanding and hard to grant, forgiveness has been treasured for centuries because it has the power to heal emotional wounds, restore human relationships and break the chain of violence. Some writers, though, have asserted that forgiveness found its boundaries in Auschwitz; the Nazi crimes against humanity reached the pinnacle there and cannot be forgiven. While discussing forgiveness in the context of the Holocaust and outside of it, this article pursues the following issues: Does forgiveness have limits? What would be the implications of being unable to forgive? Can punishment of the perpetrator help the process of forgiveness? Does the offended party forgive his or her hurt only?     

J. L. Austin and Literal Meaning

Alice Crary has recently developed a radical reading of J. L. Austin's philosophy of language. The central contention of Crary's reading is that Austin gives convincing reasons to reject the idea that sentences have context‐invariant literal meaning. While I am in sympathy with Crary about the continuing importance of Austin's work, and I think Crary's reading is deep and interesting, I do not think literal sentence meaning is one of Austin's targets, and the arguments that Crary attributes to Austin or finds Austinian in spirit do not provide convincing reasons to reject literal sentence meaning. In this paper, I challenge Crary's reading of Austin and defend the idea of literal sentence meaning.