Measuring inaccuracy of uncertain doxastic states in many-valued logical systems

I will propose an alternative philosophical approach to the representation of uncertain doxastic states. I will argue that the current account of measuring inaccuracy of uncertain doxastic states is inadequate for Belnap's four-valued logic. Specifically, a situation can be found in which either an inaccuracy measure returns a completely wrong result or an agent's inaccuracy score is inadequate relative to the mistake in her doxastic attitude. This will motivate an alternative representation of uncertain doxastic states based on ordered pairs. I will describe a possible inaccuracy measure that is suitable for ordered pairs, and I will show that it has all the qualities that are required for an inaccuracy measure to be legitimate. Finally, I will introduce conditions of rationality for uncertain doxastic states represented by ordered pairs.     

The ethics of belief: doxastic self-control and intellectual virtue

Most of the literature on doxastic voluntarism has concentrated on the question of the voluntariness of belief and the issue of how our actual or possible control of our beliefs bears on our justification for holding them and on how, in the light of this control, our intellectual character should be assessed. This paper largely concerns a related question on which less philosophical work has been done: the voluntariness of the grounding of belief and the bearing of various views about this matter on justification, knowledge, and intellectual virtue. In part, my concern is the nature and extent of our voluntary control over our responses to reasons for believing—or over what we take to be such reasons. This paper provides a partial account of such control and, on the basis of the account, will clarify the criteria for appraising intellectual virtue.     

A one-person doxastic characterization of Nash strategies

Within a formal epistemic model for simultaneous-move games, we present the following conditions: (1) belief in the opponents’ rationality (BOR), stating that a player believes that every opponent chooses an optimal strategy, (2) self-referential beliefs (SRB), stating that a player believes that his opponents hold correct beliefs about his own beliefs, (3) projective beliefs (PB), stating that i believes that j’s belief about k’s choice is the same as i’s belief about k’s choice, and (4) conditionally independent beliefs (CIB), stating that a player believes that opponents’ types choose their strategies independently. We show that, if a player satisfies BOR, SRB and CIB, and believes that every opponent satisfies BOR, SRB, PB and CIB, then he will choose a Nash strategy (that is, a strategy that is optimal in some Nash equilibrium). We thus provide a sufficient collection of one-person conditions for Nash strategy choice. We also show that none of these seven conditions can be dropped.     

The Interface problem in Interactive systems

On-line computing implies a man-machine dialogue. It could be looked at as a communication channel with built-in constraints. We see a need to study in a systematic way how such constraints modify human behavior. Such studies will facilitate the needed specification for effective strategies in man-machine communication.     

On some recent moves in defence of doxastic compatibilism

According to the doxastic compatibilist, compatibilist criteria with respect to the freedom of action rule-in our having free beliefs. In Booth (Philosophical Papers 38:1–12, 2009), I challenged the doxastic compatibilist to either come up with an account of how doxastic attitudes can be intentional in the face of it very much seeming to many of us that they cannot. Or else, in rejecting that doxastic attitudes need to be voluntary in order to be free, to come up with a principled account of how her criteria of doxastic freedom are criteria of freedom. In two recent papers, Steup (Synthese 188:145–163, 2012; Dialectica 65(4):559–576, 2011) takes up the first disjunct of the challenge by proposing that even though beliefs cannot be practically intentional, they can be epistemically intentional. McHugh (McHugh forthcoming) instead takes up the second disjunct by proposing that the freedom of belief be modelled not on the freedom of action but on the freedom of intention. I argue that both Steup’s and McHugh’s strategies are problematic.     

The limits of systems therapy: The problem of intimacy

By placing so much emphasis on systemic thinking, marriage and family therapists have lost sight of the individual within the system. One of the limits of a systemic therapy is its capacity to deal with problems in intimacy, a central problem in marital therapy. A knowledge of individual development is crucial for family therapists. The two themes dealt with in this paper are 1) some concepts of self psychology which can be useful in understanding the fear of intimacy, and 2) at what point, in couples' therapy, it is advisable to shift to individual therapy for one or both partners.     

Automatic verification of multi-agent systems by model checking via ordered binary decision diagrams

We present a methodology for the verification of multi-agent systems, whose properties are specified by means of a modal logic that includes a temporal, an epistemic, and a modal operator to reason about correct behaviour of agents. The verification technique relies on model checking via ordered binary decision diagrams. We present an implementation and report on experimental results for two scenarios: the bit transmission problem with faults and the protocol of the dining cryptographers.     

A new solution to the problem of finding all numerical solutions to ordered metric structures

A new algorithm is used to test and describe the set of all possible solutions for any linear model of an empirical ordering derived from techniques such as additive conjoint measurement, unfolding theory, general Fechnerian scaling and ordinal multiple regression. The algorithm is computationally faster and numerically superior to previous algorithms.This research was supported in part by NIGMS grant GM-01231 to the University of Michigan. Authors' names are in alphabetic order.     

In defense of the one-factor doxastic account: A phenomenal account of delusions

According to the doxastic model, delusions are beliefs. In the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings mistaken for beliefs. I argue that endorsement of false second-order beliefs could also create unpleasant dissonance, that mentally healthy people often endorse irrational or conflicting beliefs, and that the lack of delusion-motivated action can be explained by the influence of nonbelief factors on action. The two-factor doxastic model posits irrationality as necessary, and one metric of rationality many scholars employ is whether a response is easily understood by folk psychology. A precedent for folk-psychological acceptance of contextually bizarre beliefs as a result of personal experience can already be found in the lack of imaginative resistance encountered not in response to the impossibilities portrayed in speculative fiction, but in response to the characters’ ability to incorporate these occurrences into their mental frameworks, despite them often being at odds with these characters’ bedrock understanding of the world.     

Discrete vs. continuous processing: The fate of an incompletely processed perceptual dimension

A relevant issue in the debate on continuous vs. discrete processing of information is whether incompletely processed information does or does not affect a subsequent reaction. Two stimuli (SL, SR) were presented on eye level, subtending a visual angle of 45 degrees. SL was always inspected first, followed by a saccade to SR and finally by a same/different response. The fixation time of SL (TL), the saccadic time (TM) and the time from fixating SR to the response (TR) were separately measured. SL and SR consisted of two-dimensional stimuli (size and letter shape) constructed in such a way that encoding size took longer for one group and encoding shape took longer for another group of 10 subjects. All subjects were tested in three conditions: Shape was relevant in one, size in the second, and both dimensions were relevant in the third condition.

TL was less when encoding the relevant dimension was fast. When both dimensions were relevant, TL was about as long as when only the slow dimension was relevant, suggesting parallel and interference-free processing during TL. When only the slow dimension was relevant, TR (same) was much longer when the fast dimension differed. When the fast dimension was relevant, TR (same) was slightly longer when the slow dimension differed, which can be handled by either model. The experiment was repeated with three well-practiced and less variable subjects who carried out sufficient trials to measure TR as a function of TL. The results of this study were in line with the discrete model: A different slow and irrelevant dimension did not affect the same response regardless of the duration of TL. Interestingly, subjects were capable of retrieving the slow dimension, suggesting a code which can be used for retrieval but which does not affect the same/different response.     

The feature-binding problem is an ill-posed problem

The binding problem arises when visual features (colour, orientation), said to be coded in independent brain modules, are to be integrated into unitary percepts. I argue that binding is an ill-posed problem, because those modules are now known to code jointly for multiple features, rendering the feature-binding issue moot. A hierarchical reentrant system explains the emergence of coherent visual objects from primitive features. An initial feed-forward sweep activates many high-level perceptual hypotheses, which descend to lower levels, where they correlate themselves with the ongoing activity. Low correlations are discarded, whereas the hypothesis that yields the highest correlation is confirmed and leads to conscious awareness. In this system, there is no separate binding process that actively assigns features to objects.     

Subjectivity in the act of representing: The case for subjective motion and change

The objective in the present paper is to analyze the aspect of subjectivity having to do with construing motion and change where no motion and change exists outside the representation, that is, in cases where the conceptualizer does not intend to convey the idea that these properties exist in the state of affairs described. In the process of doing so, I will elaborate on a critique of the notion of fictivity as it is currently being used in cognitive linguistics.