Two-year-olds compute syntactic structure on-line

Syntax allows human beings to build an infinite number of new sentences from a finite stock of words. Because toddlers typically utter only one or two words at a time, they have been thought to have no syntax. Using event-related potentials (ERPs), we demonstrated that 2-year-olds do compute syntactic structure when listening to spoken sentences. We observed an early left-lateralized brain response when an expected verb was incorrectly replaced by a noun (or vice versa). Thus, toddlers build on-line expectations as to the syntactic category of the next word in a sentence. In addition, the response topography was different for nouns and verbs, suggesting that different neural networks already underlie noun and verb processing in toddlers, as they do in adults.     

Observers' proficiency at identifying pretense acts based on behavioral cues

Discriminating what is pretense from what is real is a fundamental problem in development. Research has addressed the proficiency with which adults and children discriminate between play fighting and real fighting, and yet none (to our knowledge) has investigated discrimination of other kinds of pretense and real acts. In addition, little is known about what aspects of pretender behavior (as opposed to pretend content) might cue pretense interpretations. In two experiments, 8-20 s clips showing pretense and real snack behaviors were presented to adult and child participants. All participants distinguished between pretense and real behaviors at better than chance level. Furthermore, certain features (specific looking patterns and mistimed behaviors) were most prominent in the videotapes that were most often correctly identified. This provides empirical support for the suggestion that these cues, as opposed to more commonly cited cues, like smiles, might serve as important indicators of pretense for children and adults.     

The intentional spring: a strategy for modeling systems that learn to perform intentional acts

In motor task learning by instruction, the instructor's skill and intention, which, initially, are extrinsic constraints on the learner's perceiving and acting, eventually become internalized as intrinsic constraints by the learner. How is this process to be described formally? This process takes place via a forcing function that acts both as an anticipatory (informing) influence and a hereditary (controlling) influence. A mathematical strategy is suggested by which such intentions and skills might be dynamically learned. A hypothetical task is discussed in which a blindfolded learner is motorically instructed to pull a spring to a specific target in a specific manner. The modeling strategy involves generalizing Hooke's law to the coupled instructor-spring-Learner system. Specifically, dual Volterra functions express the anticipatory and hereditary influences passed via an instructor-controlled forcing function on the shared spring. Boundary conditions (task goals) on the instructor-spring system, construed as a mathematical (self-adjoint) operator, are passed to the learner-spring system. Psychological interpretation is given to the involved mathematical operations that are passed, and mathematical (Hilbert-Schmidt's and Green's function) techniques are used to account for the release of the boundary conditions by the instructor and their absorption by the learner, and an appropriate change of their power spectra.     

Infants' visual anticipation of object structure in grasp planning

The coordination between visual and manual domains is a cornerstone of learning in early development. If infants anticipate an object's physical characteristics prior to contact (i.e., from visual inspection), they could learn more about the physical world through visual observation only than if manual exploration is required. In this experiment, infants grasped a series of four round balls quite similar in size and overall shape, but different in structure. Two were composed of solid hard plastic (one transparent, one opaque) in a rigid structure, and two were composed of more flexible plastic in a nonrigid structure. This nonrigid structure afforded grasping using a precision grasp with fingertips extending inside the ball's outer edge. In contrast, the rigid balls could be grasped only by a full-hand power grasp (due to the relative sizes of ball and infants' hands). The infants' manual anticipations were assessed in their first reach for each ball, prior to their first contact with the ball. In addition, grasping and other exploratory behaviors were assessed after contact with the ball. Results from this study suggest that infants from 5 to 15 months of age incorporate visible information about an object's structure into their action on the object. This provides evidence that visuomotor connections are present as soon as infants start reaching for objects, allowing them to select the appropriate grasp for an object's structure, even if they are not always capable of executing a pickup of the object using this grasp. Further research should investigate the discrepancies between infants' grasp planning and their grasp execution.     

Perception and action: On the praxial structure of intentional consciousness

Progressively Husserl started referring to the whole sphere of the life of intentional acts in terms of praxis. Perception, imagination, judgement, scientific consciousness, etc., are all seen as practices. What is the meaning of this move? A seemingly self-evident possibility is that intentionality is praxial, because even perception is not completely free from empty intending moments that demand fulfilment; and all fulfilment is attained by means of bodily activities that enable our senses to acquire the relevant contents. I reject this approach as insufficient and misguided. I argue that perception and intentionality in general is praxial because consciousness, in all of its constituting syntheses, is or becomes organized as a practice-structure. Intentional consciousness organizes its contents according to rules so as to accomplish the evident or true givenness of its intended correlates.     

Sequentiality of speech acts in conversational structure

One aspect of the phenomenon of coherence in conversational discourse was addressed in the present study: sequentiality of speech acts. Several models of discourse structure have postulated sequencing rules between speech acts in conversations, but these efforts have been hampered by the lack of an efficient empirical method that can characterize a large body of language data. The lag sequential technique is proposed here as a tool that can be used to abstract a grammar of speech act contingency from spoken discourse. Derived patterns of discourse between female adults and preschool children confirmed expectations that most discourse is based upon three fundamental speech act pairings: question-answer, statement-reply, and directive-acknowledgment. It was also found that interlocutor differences in status, knowledge, and conversational ability affected the structure of the discourse in predictable ways.     

Young children's understanding of diversity in pretense

Four studies probed preschoolers' understanding of diversity in the domain of pretense. In Study 1, 3- and 4-year-olds were shown video skits in which two characters pretended different things with the same object. To assess preschoolers understanding that the mind is involved in pretense, thought bubbles were superimposed over the actors' heads. Results of this study indicated that both 3- and 4-year-olds appreciate the potential for diversity in pretense, and understand pretense to be a mental activity. Results of Study 2 replicate Study 1, and argue against alternative explanations for participants' good performance in that study. Studies 3 and 4 compared the unique contributions made by dialogs and thought bubbles and revealed that 3-year-olds relied more on actors' mental contents than on their actions or dialogs when reasoning about pretense. Results of the studies are discussed in terms of children's developing understanding of the subjective and mental aspects of pretense, and the implications of this understanding for the development of their understanding of mind more generally.     

Fictional coreference as a problem for the pretense theory

There seems to be a perfectly ordinary sense in which different speakers can use an empty name to talk about the same thing. Call this fictional coreference. It is a constraint on an adequate theory of empty names that it provide a satisfactory account of fictional coreference. The main claim of this paper is that the pretense theory of empty names does not respect this constraint.

Overcoming the effects of intentional forgetting

The long-term effects of the compartmentalization of task-irrelevant memories were investigated using a directed forgetting procedure. Many models tacitly assume the persistence of the costs and benefits of directed forgetting or otherwise fail to predict what factors might reduce or eliminate them. In contrast, a retrieving effectively from memory model (REM; Lehman & Malmberg, 2009) predicts that intentional forgetting should only be observed for free recall when temporal context is used to probe memory. By manipulating whether study lists were constructed from category exemplars or from a random set of words, and by either providing temporal or category cues at test, we tested the prediction. The effects of directed forgetting were eliminated when categorized lists were studied and category cues were provided. When categorized lists were used but category cues were not provided, the usual costs and benefits of directed forgetting were observed. These results specify the conditions under which the consequences of intentional forgetting can be overcome.     

How fantasy benefits young children's understanding of pretense

Sobel and Lillard (2001) demonstrated that 4-year-olds' understanding of the role that the mind plays in pretending improved when children were asked questions in a fantasy context. The present study investigated whether this fantasy effect was motivated by children recognizing that fantasy contains violations of real-world causal structure. In Experiment 1, 4-year-olds were shown a fantasy character engaged in ordinary actions or actions that violated causal knowledge. Children were more likely to say that a troll doll who was acting like but ignorant of the character was not pretending to be that character when read the violation story. Experiment 2 suggested that this difference was not caused by a greater interest in the violation story. Experiment 3 demonstrated a similar difference for characters engaged in social and functional violations that were possible in the real world. These data are consistent with the hypothesis that preschoolers use actions and appearance more than mental states to make judgments about pretense, but that those judgments can be influenced by the context in which the questions are presented.     

The intentional and the intended

The paper defends the thesis that for S to V intentionally is for S to V as (in the way) S intended to. For the normal agent the relevant sort of intention is an intention that one's intention to V generate an instance of one's V-ing along some (usually dimly-conceived) productive path. Such an account allows us to say some actions are intentional to a greater or lesser extent (a desirable option for certain cases of wayward causal chains), preserves the intuitive link between intention and intentionally, and supports the common sense view that the concept of intending is more basic than those of acting with an intention and of acting intentionally. The remainder of the paper responds to certain apparent counter-examples offered by Audi, Harman, and Bratman. In the course of this, I discuss connections between intending to V and hoping to V, and I argue that one can intend to do what one doesn't expect to do, and that one always intends what one attempts.     

Enabling conditions and children’s understanding of pretense

Two experiments examined whether preschoolers’ difficulties on tasks that required relating pretending and knowledge (e.g., Lillard, A. S. (1993a). Young children’s conceptualization of pretense: Action or mental representational state? Child Development, 64, 372-386) were due to children’s inability to appreciate the causal mechanism behind enabling conditions. In Experiment 1, 4-year-olds were told about a character who knew about one kind of animal and did not know about another. The character acted in a manner consistent with both animals. Children were asked whether the character was pretending to be the animal of which he was ignorant. The character’s knowledge was either represented in a generic manner (as a picture) or in a manner that suggested a particular enabling condition relation that children found accessible (as a battery, which most 4-year-olds recognize is critical for making toys work). Children were more successful at relating knowledge and pretending in the battery condition. This improvement in performance extended to another task in which children had to identify the enabling condition relation between knowledge and identification, in which there were reduced demands on the inhibitory mechanisms necessary for success. Experiment 2 found that the results in Experiment 1 were not due to demands of the procedure used in Experiment 1. These results are discussed in the context of recent theories of theory of mind that focus on the importance of causal relations among mental states.     

Pulling out the intentional structure of action: the relation between action processing and action production in infancy

Adults and children readily construct action representations organized with respect to an ultimate goal. These representations allow one to predict the consequences of action, interpret and describe actions, and categorize action sequences. In this paper, we explore the ontogeny of hierarchically organized action representations, and its relation to infants' ability to produce similar sequences. To do so, we examine infants' perception and performance of a means-end sequence: pulling a cloth to retrieve a toy. Using a visual habituation paradigm, we demonstrate that 12-month-old infants understand that the initial step of the cloth-pulling sequence is directed toward the ultimate goal of attaining the toy, and use their knowledge of the causal constraints of the sequence to make this goal attribution. Ten-month-olds, however, appear transitional with respect to this understanding: their ability to identify the goal of the cloth-pulling sequence is related to their own ability to planfully solve a similar sequence. These findings are consistent with a burgeoning body of literature suggesting an intimate link between action production and perception, and suggest that this link is in place by at least 10 months of age.