Engineering and the Problem of Moral Overload

When thinking about ethics, technology is often only mentioned as the source of our problems, not as a potential solution to our moral dilemmas. When thinking about technology, ethics is often only mentioned as a constraint on developments, not as a source and spring of innovation. In this paper, we argue that ethics can be the source of technological development rather than just a constraint and technological progress can create moral progress rather than just moral problems. We show this by an analysis of how technology can contribute to the solution of so-called moral overload or moral dilemmas. Such dilemmas typically create a moral residue that is the basis of a second-order principle that tells us to reshape the world so that we can meet all our moral obligations. We can do so, among other things, through guided technological innovation.     

EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONTEXTUALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF MORAL LUCK

Abstract: We have a strong intuition that a person's moral standing should not be affected by luck, but the fact is that we do blame a morally unfortunate person more than her fortunate counterpart. This is the problem of moral luck. I argue that the problem arises because account is not taken of the fact that the extension of the term ‘blame’ is contextually determined. Loosely speaking, the more likely an act is to have an undesirable consequence, the more its agent is to blame. But how likely a consequence is depends on which possibilities of harm we take to be relevant.     

Moral identity and the experience of moral elevation in response to acts of uncommon goodness

Four studies using survey and experimental designs examined whether people whose moral identity is highly self-defining are more susceptible to experiencing a state of moral elevation after being exposed to acts of uncommon moral goodness. Moral elevation consists of a suite of responses that motivate prosocial action tendencies. Study 1 showed that people higher (vs. lower) in moral identity centrality reported experiencing more intense elevating emotions, had more positive views of humanity, and were more desirous of becoming a better person after reading about an act of uncommon goodness than about a merely positive situation or an act of common benevolence. Study 2 showed that those high in moral identity centrality were more likely to recall acts of moral goodness and experience moral elevation in response to such events more strongly. These experiences were positively related to self-reported prosocial behavior. Study 3 showed a direct effect on behavior using manipulated, rather than measured, moral identity centrality. Study 4 replicated the effect of moral identity on the states of elevation as well as on self-reported physical sensations and showed that the elevation mediates the relationship between moral identity, witnessing uncommon goodness, and prosocial behavior.     

Better Living Through Chemistry? A Reply to Savulescu and Persson on ‘Moral Enhancement’

In ‘Moral Enhancement, Freedom, and the God Machine’, Savulescu and Persson argue that recent scientific findings suggest that there is a realistic prospect of achieving ‘moral enhancement’ and respond to Harris's criticism that this would threaten individual freedom and autonomy. I argue that although some pharmaceutical and neuro‐scientific interventions may influence behaviour and emotions in ways that we may be inclined to evaluate positively, describing this as ‘moral enhancement’ presupposes a particular, contested account, of what it is to act morally and implies that entirely familiar drugs such as alcohol, ecstasy, and marijuana are also capable of making people ‘more moral’. Moreover, while Savulescu and Persson establish the theoretical possibility of using drugs to promote autonomy, the real threat posed to freedom by ‘moral bioenhancement’ is that the ‘enhancers’ will be wielding power over the ‘enhanced’. Drawing on Pettit's notion of ‘freedom as non‐domination’, I argue that individuals may be rendered unfree even by a hypothetical technology such as Savulescu and Persson's ‘God machine’, which would only intervene if they chose to act immorally. While it is impossible to rule out the theoretical possibility that moral enhancement might be all‐things‐considered justified even where it did threaten freedom and autonomy, I argue that any technology for biomedical shaping of behaviour and dispositions is much more likely to be used for ill rather than good.     

Exposure to moral relativism compromises moral behavior

Across two studies we investigated the relationship between moral relativism versus absolutism and moral behavior. In Experiment 1, we found that participants who read a relativist argument for tolerating female genital mutilation were more likely to cheat to win an incentivized raffle than participants who read an absolutist argument against female genital mutilation, or those in a control condition. In Experiment 2, participants who read a definition of morality phrased in absolutist terms expressed less willingness to engage in petty theft than those who read a definition of morality phrased in relativist terms, or those in a control condition. Experiment 2 also provided evidence that effects were not due to absolutist arguments signaling that fewer behaviors are morally permissible, nor to relativist arguments defending more disagreeable moral positions. Rather, the content of the philosophical positions themselves—the fact that relativism describes morality as subjective and culturally-historically contingent, whereas absolutism describes morality as objective and universal—makes individuals more likely to engage in immoral behaviors when exposed to moral relativism compared to moral absolutism.     

Art and Moral Revolution

Traditionally, questions about the role of the arts in moral thought have focused on the arts’ role in the acquisition of new moral knowledge, the refinement of moral concepts, and the capacity to apply our moral view to particular situations. Here I suggest that there is an importantly different and largely overlooked role for the arts in moral thought: an ability to reconfigure the structure of our moral thought and effect what we might call a revolution in that framework. In this article I explain this distinction between two kinds of change in view, suggest the second type has not been addressed by the extant literature, provide examples of this role, and argue for its importance.     

道德脸面共享及脸面共享行为:社会关系和伦理事件的影响

用两个基于情境故事的纸笔实验,探讨了五类重要关系他人卷入三类负向和两类正向道德事件时,个体的脸面共享感受和脸面共享行为。研究1采用3(违背家庭伦理、违背消极义务、违背职业伦理)×5(父-子/女、兄弟、师生、朋友、同乡关系)被试间设计,研究2采用2(维护家庭伦理、维护消极义务)×5(父-子/女、兄弟、师生、朋友、同乡关系)被试间设计。结果发现:(1)当关系人违背道德时,脸面共享强度随关系的亲疏远近逐步减弱; 当关系人遵从道德时,脸面共享主要表现在家内和地缘关系上。(2)以孝道观念为核心的家庭伦理,对脸面共享感受影响最大。(3)在关系人违背道德时,个体更可能采用‘避而不谈'和‘辩护'行为,较少采用‘划界避殃'行为; 个体更可能因家庭成员违背道德而避而不谈,更愿意为关系亲密者而不是为同乡辩护; 关系人遵从伦理时,个体更可能采用宣扬行为,而不是表示关系亲密和主动谈及行为; 维护家庭伦理比见义勇为更可能被宣扬,后者则更可能被主动谈及。     

WHO CARES? THE EFFECT OF GENDER AND CONTEXT ON THE SELF AND MORAL REASONING

Theorists suggest that gender differences in moral reasoning are due to differences in the self-concept, with women feeling connected to others and using a care approach, whereas men feel separate from others and adopt a justice approach. Using a self-categorization analysis, the current research suggests that the nature of the self–other relationship, rather than gender, predicts moral reasoning. Study 1 found moral reasoning to be dependent upon the social distance between the self and others, with a care-based approach more likely when interacting with a friend than a stranger. Study 2 suggests that when individuals see others as ingroup members they are more likely to utilize care-based moral reasoning than when others are seen as outgroup members. Further, traditional gender differences in moral reasoning were found only when gender was made salient. These studies suggest that both the self and moral reasoning are better conceptualized as fluid and context dependent.     

Psychological Researches in Schizophrenic Language and Thought

Seventy-two five- to seven-year-old boys were exposed to televised adult models and were then administered tests of resistance to deviation (moral behavior), moral choice, and moral judgment level. Boys exposed to a model who said he would resist deviating from a prohibition and who supported his statement with a morally realistic justification were subsequently more likely to use that model's statements to guide their own moral behavior and moral choice than were boys exposed to a model advocating resistance to deviation with a morally autonomous justification. Realistic models expressing a deviating moral choice led to more deviating moral choices in observers than did autonomous deviating models. The moral judgment levels of the boys were not significantly affected by the models. The boys' moral behavior was predictive of their moral choice while moral judgment level was not significantly related to the other two indices of morality.     

权威人格与权力感对道德思维方式的影响

本研究考察了在一个道德两难的情境中, 权威人格和权力感对道德思维方式的影响。研究以某市公检法系统的122名公务员为被试。首先采用权威人格问卷筛选出高权威人格组和低权威人格组被试, 然后分别进行高、低权力感的启动, 最后让被试对一个道德上的两难情景做出选择, 选择的结果可以反映被试的道德思维方式。研究结果显示, 高权威人格组被试在启动了他们高的权力感后, 产生了明显的以规则导向为主的道德思维, 而对低权威人格被试, 他们道德思维方式则不受权力感启动的影响。由于社会冲突的产生常常与冲突情境中的道德思维方式有关, 因此本研究的结果有助于我们更好地理解某些社会冲突产生的原因, 并从心理学的角度提出解决冲突的方法。     

Moral elevation can induce nursing

There is little extant research on the psychological or physiological response to witnessing good deeds. The authors call the emotional reaction to virtue "moral elevation" and the authors examined its effects on mother-infant dyads. Breastfeeding women who watched a morally elevating video were more likely to nurse their infants and were marginally more likely to hug them, compared to women who watched an equally enjoyable comedy video. Both of these effects suggest that moral elevation may involve the release of oxytocin, a hormone associated with lactation and affiliation.     

Interpersonal Moral Conflicts Between Couples: Effects of Type of Dilemma, Role, and Partner's Judgments on Level of Moral Reasoning and Probability of Resolution

Forty-two male–female couples completed Kohlberg's test of moral development and made moral judgments about the most recent interpersonal moral conflict they had experienced in their everyday lives. Participants made lower stage moral judgments about their interpersonal moral conflicts than about the dilemmas on Kohlberg's test. The type of interpersonal moral conflict participants experienced and their role in the conflict were related to the types of moral judgments they made. Participants who reported philosophical conflicts made more mature moral judgments than participants who reported antisocial conflicts, especially if their role in the antisocial conflict was that of a transgressor. Conflicts were most likely to be resolved when partners' moral judgments about their conflict were similar in moral maturity. The implications of these findings for models of moral judgment are discussed.     

The role of moral identity in the aftermath of dishonesty

People lie on a regular basis. However, lying can pose a threat to the self-view of being an honest and moral person. How do people respond to their previous dishonest acts? A way to deal with psychological discomfort arisen for previous lying is reconfirming oneself to be an honest and moral person, for example, by showing subsequent moral behavior. We hypothesize that people engage in this reconfirmation depending on whether their moral identity is central to their self-concept. This was supported in three studies in which, compared to low moral identifiers, high moral identifiers engaged in more efforts to uphold a moral self-image and were more likely to show a compensatory reaction rather than a consistency reaction to their previous dishonesty. Implications for the topics of moral self-regulation and compensatory ethics and for the concept of moral identity are discussed.     

Religion and the morality of mentality

Christian doctrine considers mental states important in judging a person's moral status, whereas Jewish doctrine considers them less important. The authors provide evidence from 4 studies that American Jews and Protestants differ in the moral import they attribute to mental states (honoring one's parents, thinking about having a sexual affair, and thinking about harming an animal). Although Protestants and Jews rated the moral status of the actions equally. Protestants rated a target person with inappropriate mental states more negatively than did Jews. These differences in moral judgment were partially mediated by Protestants' beliefs that mental states are controllable and likely to lead to action and were strongly related to agreement with general statements claiming that thoughts are morally relevant. These religious differences were not related to differences in collectivistic (interdependent) and individualistic (independent) tendencies.     

JUDGEMENTS OF INTENTIONALITY AND MORAL WORTH: EXPERIMENTAL CHALLENGES TO HINDRIKS

Joshua Knobe found that people are more likely to describe an action as intentional if it has had a bad outcome than a good outcome, and to blame a bad outcome than to praise a good one. These asymmetries raised numerous questions about lay moral judgement. Frank Hindriks recently proposed that one acts intentionally if one fails to comply with a normative reason against performing the action, that moral praise requires appropriate motivation, whereas moral blame does not, and that these asymmetries are normal features of a theory of intentional action, not anomalies. I present two empirical studies revealing asymmetries in lay judgements of intentionality and moral blameworthiness; these cannot be explained by Hindriks' theory of intentional action.     

Autonomy and the Asymmetry Problem for Moral Expertise

We seem less likely to endorse moral expertise than reasoning expertise or aesthetic expertise. This seems puzzling given that moral norms are intuitively taken to be at least more objective than aesthetic norms. One possible diagnosis of the asymmetry is that moral judgments require autonomy of judgement in away that other judgments do not. However, the author points out that aesthetic judgments that have been ‘borrowed’ by aesthetic experts generate the same autonomy worry as moral judgments which are borrowed by moral experts. The author then explores various approaches to accepting the testimony of moral experts and concludes that the asymmetry may best be explained by (1) the conditions for moral expertise being more difficult to satisfy than those of aesthetic expertise and (2) the intuitive greater seriousness of accepting the moral judgments of others, since moral norms are generally viewed as more binding than aesthetic norms.     

Individualism Reconsidered: Readings Bearing on the Endangered Self in Modern Society/The Endangered Self (Books)

Protestants, relative to Jews, consider thoughts about immoral actions to be immoral and more likely to lead to action. In Study 1, controlling for agreement that thoughts lead to actions did not eliminate the effect of religion on agreement that thoughts have moral status. Protestants also considered thoughts about cheating on an exam (which Jews and Protestants consider equally likely) and thoughts about having an affair with Julia Roberts (an unlikely event) more morally relevant than Jews (Studies 2 &; 3), The studies suggest that likelihood of action differences are only a partial account of Jewish-Protestant differences in the moral relevance of thoughts.     

Moral development and behavior.

The study of moral development as well as the relation of moral development and behavior has been of great interest to many over the past half a century. While some studies have shown no association between one's moral development and behavior, some evidence indicates level of moral reasoning influences behavior. Over 16 selected studies postconventional principles of justice are likely to be more prosocial and law-abiding than those appropriate at the lower stages of moral development.     

道德决策的机制及干预研究:自我相关性与风险水平的作用

现有的道德决策脑机制研究更多地关注了认知和情绪的交互作用,较少关注个体对"自我相关性"和"风险水平"信息的整合加工,更是忽视了帮助情境和伤害情境下道德决策的心理与脑机制的异同。因此,有必要通过行为、事件相关电位(ERP)和多模态脑功能成像(f MRI)等多种方法来系统考察帮助和伤害情境下自我相关性和风险水平交互影响道德决策的认知和神经机制,并进一步探讨共情训练对道德决策的干预作用。旨在揭示道德决策的时间进程和神经基础;探寻自我相关性与风险水平对道德决策的影响,及其在不同情境和共情水平下可能存在的变异;共情训练能否有效提升个体的道德决策水平。     

高技术的伦理风险及其应对

当代高技术的迅速崛起正日益改变世界,高技术的发展更增加了高技术伦理风险负效应的不确定性,既提供了更多的道德选择的可能性,又提出了严峻的挑战,进而使高技术的道德选择成为高技术活动主体不可回避的问题。为了在高技术的道德选择中尽可能减少高技术伦理风险负效应,就必须坚持必仁且智的价值取向、德得相通的运作方略、内圣外王的探究智慧,进而达到天人合一的澄明之境———使人-社会-自然系统协调发展。