Decision frame and procedural justice: interactive effects on perceptions of distributive justice

This work examined the effect of procedural justice and item frame on responses to positively and negatively worded survey items. Under conditions of low procedural justice, there is a significant difference in the rating of distributive justice items positively and negatively framed, but not when procedural justice is high. Implications for decision frame theory and biasing of responses to survey items are considered.     

Aristotle on Rawls: A critique of quantitative justice

Conclusion Is the 20th Century as obviously preferable to all other times as Rawls would have us assume? Is 20th Century Stockholm preferable to 12th Century Florence in each and every way? In 12th Century Florence men lived without liberty or equality. Yet Florentines were reasonably happy, accepted their place in life, and communicated directly with others. It was a society with sharply marked class distinctions. In such a society the lowly can gain more self-respect through identity, excellence, and capacity within their station than in an egalitarian society. The lowly can perceive the importance of their labour, be secure that their place is assured by powerful protectors, see models of virtue to admire, and derive a sense of contributing to a meangingful social drama. They may also learn something of the difference between the noble and the ignoble. Are these not qualities Aristotle would appreciate? Medieval man was certainly not free but 'sneither was he alone and isolated ... Man was rooted in a structuralized whole, and thus life had a meaning which left no place, and no need, for doubt. In a brief reference to feudalism Rawls himself seems to realise this state of affairs (74). In contrast, Stockholm is a competitive society where loneliness, anxiety, and identity crises have been endlessly documented by social scientists, all occurring despite the high material standard of living. Yet Stockholm would seem to be the model for Rawls and obviously not Florence. One wonders if this social scientific knowledge of Stockholm will be part of the knowledge available to persons in the original position. Justice is not quantitative but qualitative, so Aristotle might say in a brief discussion. In a just society a person's possessions and consumptions are not on the minds of the other people with whom they meet and treat. When Odysseus came home he was delighted to climb into a peasant's cart to ride the last mile home. Contrast this king with King Arthur riding with another peasant on another road, choking with the anxiety that he may not be acting kingly by being in the cart. In Ithaca both king and commoner were sure of each other and, more importantly of themselves.An earlier version was presented at a Conference of the Australasian Political Studies Association.

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Partiality and distributive justice in African bioethics

African ethical theories tend to hold that moral agents ought to be partial, in the sense that they should favour members of their family or close community. This is considered an advantage over the impartiality of many Western moral theories, which are regarded as having counterintuitive implications, such as the idea that it is unethical to save a family member before a stranger. The partiality of African ethics is thought to be particularly valuable in the context of bioethics. Thaddeus Metz, in particular, argues that his African-derived theory best accounts for a number of plausible intuitions, such as the intuition that health care practitioners ought to be biased towards the patients for whom they are directly responsible. In this article, I claim that the plausible intuitions drawn on in favour of partiality can be satisfactorily explained on the basis of impartial moral theories. Moreover, I argue that blanket acceptance of partiality has problematic consequences for distributive justice in resource allocation in biomedical contexts. By contrast, impartial theories can justify plausible instances of partiality whilst avoiding the pitfalls of fully partial moral theories. Although this provides grounds for abandoning partiality in principle, I claim that this finding should not be seen as damaging to African medical ethics. Instead, it prompts investigation of underexplored possibilities of impartial African moral theories. To demonstrate the value of this direction, I sketch some novel and attractive conceptions that combine impartiality with elements of African ethics.     

群体情境下儿童的分配公平性

群体情境下儿童的资源分配决策受到群体身份、群体地位和群体规范的影响。在群体因素与公平分配之间, 儿童或坚持公平正义, 或偏向群体利益。这三种群体因素对儿童的分配公平性均造成了影响; 个体因素也会影响群体情境下儿童的分配决策。未来研究应对群体因素多加关注, 通过操控分配情境中的群体信息, 尝试探讨三种群体因素之间的相互作用, 以进一步了解复杂的群体情境下儿童的分配公平性。群体情境下影响分配公平性的个体因素也是需要未来研究逐一验证和讨论的问题。     

A social categorisation approach to distributive justice

In this chapter, I put forward an approach to distributive justice in terms of categorisation processes. It is assumed that a hierarchical set of social categorisations determine the identity of those individuals or groups considered for an allocation in a given situation, and whether or how these potential recipients are subcategorised and differentiated for decisions on their relative entitlement. I review empirical evidence for the approach and its predictions that (1) the salience of a shared inclusive identity enhances perceptions of equal entitlement, whereas (2) perceptions of different entitlements are based on the perceived defining values of the relevant inclusive category. Following from either process, (3) people are more justice motivated when they identify with the relevant inclusive category. Further, (4) subgroup identities influence the representation of the inclusive categorisation and/or the target of one's justice concerns, and thus the meaning of justice.     

Gender and distributive justice: The influence of gender-related characteristics on allocations

The influence of dispositional and situational gender-related factors on the distributive justice behavior of males and females was examined in this research. Using the self-other allocation paradigm, traditional and andrognyous subjects outperformed traditional or androgynous opposite-sex co-workers (Experiment 1) or same-sex co-workers (Experiment 2). The task gender-linkage and the physical attractiveness of the opposite-sex co-workers were also considered. The results indicated that androgynous persons were more generous in their allocations and were less influenced by the gender-related characteristics of an opposite-sex co-workers than traditional persons. In same-sex dyads, males were more equitable than females and were uninfluenced by gender-related factors. Traditional, but not androgynous, females adjusted their allocation behavior according to the gender-linkage of the task, allocating more equitably on gender-congruent tasks than on gender-incongruent tasks. The significance of these findings to understanding sex differences in distributive justice behavior is discussed.     

Influence of role and gender on the use of distributive versus procedural justice principles

Differences in perceptions of fairness may result from differential emphasis on distributive and procedural justice. The author found that organizational role and gender influenced the extent to which distributive and procedural justice principles were used when participants allocated and evaluated pay raises. When participants took the role of a supervisor, they were more likely to use procedural justice principles; when they took the role of a subordinate, they were more likely to use distributive justice principles. Also, men were more likely to use distributive justice than procedural justice principles when allocating and evaluating raises. These findings suggest that organizations should become aware of individual and role-based differences in emphasis on justice-related factors that could potentially lead to perceptions of unfairness.     

Natural law and history in Locke's theory of distributive justice

According to the tradition of natural law justice is inherent to, and should always be observed in, all interpersonal relations: the science of natural law is nothing more or less than the expression of such principles of justice. The theoretical peculiarities that crop up regarding the lawfulness of appropriation are determined by the indirect interpersonal relations that take place within the process of appropriation: though appropriation is an action directed not towards another person or his property, but towards tangible external goods, this action may have important consequences for other people. Therefore Locke's theory of appropriation is a theory of justice.Locke's solution is made possible by the methodological improvement which allows a clear separation between the natural law and the historical and empirical conditions of its application: this improvement is a consequence of the distinction between modes and substances established in Locke's Essay.Locke's theory can be considered an extensive re-elaboration, in polemic against Filmer, of the anti-monopolistic principle characteristic of the whole of Scholastic social thought: this principle is intimately connected with the principle of man's natural liberty.Locke maintains a negative and formal conception of justice: justice prohibits interference with others' liberty of appropriation. Alongside the justice is the positive and conditional obligation of charity which prescribes the transfer of some of one's own goods to others who need them in order to survive. But for Locke there are precise limits on the obligation of charity: the application of charity suspends the application of justice only when the immediate physical survival is at stake; in all other cases justice leaves no room for charity.The Lockian negative conception of justice, which allows unlimited liberty of appropriation, is dependent on the empirical and historical condition of the incommensurability of the main resource. The widespread use of money acts as an accelerating element in the process of exhaustion of the incommensurability of land-resources but, at the same time, it renders self-preservation and appropriation almost completely independent of the natural environment. Money creates an infinite number of opportunities for the outlay of labour irrespective of the availability of land, that is, it renders labour the principal resource of the civilized world, and labour is an incommensurable and infinitely reproducible resource. The incommensurability of the labour resource thus supports the Lockian theory of negative distributive justice; but over the Lockian solution already loomed the threatening shadow of pauperism.The subject of this essay is further dealt with in my book on Locke's political and social philosophy Nel crepuscolo della probabilitá, Bibliopolis, Napoli, 1983. There I develop further the interpretation of Locke's theory of justice presented here and analyse his theoretical and historical presuppositions.     

The paradox of global environmental justice: Appealing to the distributive justice framework for the global South

While a relativist view of environmental ethics could be quite difficult to justify, it is also difficult to be so strict about the quest for global environmental justice. At the same time, even though the reality of environmental degradation is plain to see, most African traditional communities, and even their respective states at large, still wallow in poverty such that they remain in need of developing themselves if they are to reach the level of development of the countries in the global North. More so, the majority of indigenous and mostly poor and underrepresented African people in the global South are faced with disproportionate amounts of environmental benefits and burdens compared to their counterparts in the global North. In this article, I therefore seek to examine a normative framework for conceptualising global environmental justice within different environmental, social, political and economic contexts. I consider how best environmental benefits and burdens could be fairly distributed across communities with different environmental, social, political and economic advantages. In the end, I appeal to John Rawls’s conception of distributive justice as a framework for arriving at an acceptable view of global environmental justice that takes into account the circumstances of the global South.