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The language of thought and natural language understanding 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Jonathan Knowles 《Analysis》1998,58(4):264-272
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Mitch Parsell 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2011,10(2):261-275
In this paper, I examine Wilfrid Sellars’ famous Myth of Jones. I argue the myth provides an ontologically austere account
of thoughts and beliefs that makes sense of the full range of our folk psychological abilities. Sellars’ account draws on
both Gilbert Ryle and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Ryle provides Sellars with the resources to make thoughts metaphysically respectable
and Wittgenstein the resources to make beliefs rationally criticisable. By combining these insights into a single account,
Sellars is able to see reasons as causes and, hence, to respect the full range of our folk psychological generalisations.
This is achieved by modelling folk psychological practice on theoretical reasoning. But despite frequent misinterpretation, Sellars does not claim that
thoughts and beliefs are theoretical concepts. Thus, folk psychological explanation is not theoretical, and hence, it is not
replaceable by scientific theory. Hence, scientific concepts will not eliminate folk psychological concepts. Thus, Sellars avoids eliminativism. 相似文献
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John L. Pollock 《Philosophical Studies》1990,58(1-2):95-120
Conclusions To conclude then, our question was, What determines the content of a thought? This question gets its punch by being set against the background assumption that thoughts are internal physical occurrences. The answer I have proposed is that thoughts can be classified in four importantly different ways. Introspection yields syntactic categories. These are important for cognitive processing, but they do not correspond to contents. A second way of categorizing thoughts is in terms of narrow content. This is determined by the functional role of the thought in rational architecture together with the way in which that rational architecture is tied to the world through input correlations. Narrow contents are indexical, so to get truth bearers we must augment the narrow contents with the values of the indexical parameters. Propositional content can be taken to consist of pairs of narrow contents and values for indexical parameters. Finally, thoughts can be classified in terms of that clauses. This kind of classification does not uniquely determine propositional content, but describes it in a more general way. 相似文献
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Steven Levine 《European Journal of Philosophy》2016,24(4):855-878
In this paper I take up the question of whether Wilfrid Sellars has a notion of non‐conceptual perceptual content. The question is controversial, being one of the fault lines along which so‐called left and right Sellarsians diverge. In the paper I try to make clear what it is in Sellars' thought that leads interpreters to such disparate conclusions. My account depends on highlighting the importance of Sellars' little discussed thesis that perception involves a systematic form of mis‐categorization, one where perceivers mistake their sensory states to be properties of physical objects. I argue that the counterpart color and shape attributes of these states, which become ‘point of viewish’ when organized by the productive imagination, provides perceptual experience with its non‐conceptual representational content. I then argue that this content is not a form of the mythical Given because one can only have a non‐conceptual point of view on an object when an object is introduced into one's perceptual experience through the conceptual mis‐taking of one's sensory states. So, while Sellars has a notion of non‐conceptual representational content, it can only be salient in the context of a perceptual act that is conceptual overall. 相似文献
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Charles E. M. Dunlop 《Synthese》1990,82(2):275-296
Roger Schank's research in AI takes seriously the ideas that understanding natural language involves mapping its expressions into an internal representation scheme and that these internal representations have a syntax appropriate for computational operations. It therefore falls within the computational approach to the study of mind. This paper discusses certain aspects of Schank's approach in order to assess its potential adequacy as a (partial) model of cognition. This version of the Language of Thought hypothesis encounters some of the same difficulties that arise for Fodor's account.An ancestor of this paper was written while I was on sabbatical leave from the University of Michigan, Flint, during which time I held a fellowship in the Computer Science Department of Wright State University. Revisions were made while I held a Visiting Lectureship at the University of Waikato. I am grateful to these three institutions for their support, and to James H. Fetzer, David Hemmendinger, and Edwin Hung for helpful comments on earlier versions. 相似文献
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Willem A. deVries 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2019,27(3):363-378
ABSTRACTI have claimed previously that Hegel and Sellars are both, in the end, monistic visionaries, though with radically different visions of the grand unity of things. In this paper I explain and defend that claim. Section one differentiates several kinds of monism; section two discusses Hegel’s vision of the underlying unity of thing, while section three does the same for Sellars. The compare-and-contrast assignment is brought to completion in section four. 相似文献
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Stefan Brandt 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2017,25(1):108-132
I compare Sellars’s criticism of the ‘myth of the given’ with Quine’s criticism of the ‘two dogmas’ of empiricism, that is, the analytic–synthetic distinction and reductionism. In Sections I to III, I present Quine’s and Sellars’s views. In IV to X, I discuss similarities and differences in their views. In XI to XII, I show that Sellars’s arguments against the ‘myth of the given’ are incompatible with Quine’s rejection of the analytic–synthetic distinction. 相似文献