刘寿棋主编的“简明伦理学”出版

湖南省老教育家、省伦理学研究会理事长刘寿祺同志主编的《简明伦理学》,已由湖南教育出版社出版。这是一本学习马克思主义伦理学、普及共产主义道德教育的通俗读物。该书运用马克思主义的立场、观点和方法,遵循理论联系实际的原则,从广大青少年的实际出发,对伦理学的基本理论、规范体系、道德实践等进行了比较系统的、简     

罗国杰对新中国伦理学教材体系的创造性探索与贡献

罗国杰先后主编的《马克思主义伦理学》《伦理学教程》《伦理学》以及撰写的数百篇学术论文,以马克思主义唯物史观和唯物辩证法为指导,全面研究社会生活中的道德现象,在对一般的道德理论问题研究的基础上集中阐释了社会主义社会的道德规范体系,落脚于社会主义新人的实践养成和人格修养,阐发和论述了一系列伦理学的基础理论范畴、基本理论和实践问题,建构了一个融理论伦理学、规范伦理学、美德伦理学和实践伦理学于一体的教材体系.这一教材体系既契合道德生活发展规律和人民群众对美好生活目标追求的理论意蕴,又凸显出了新中国伦理学教材体系和学科体系应有的原则、立场、观点和方法,为此后伦理学教材体系建设提供了基本的框架遵循、理论模式和发展方向,其贡献尤当被人们铭记.     

马克思主义生态伦理观及其当代价值

马克思主义生态伦理观是以人与自然的辩证统一关系为核心、关于人对自然道德义务与责任的基本理论与观点，其产生与演变渗透于马克思主义生态思想形成、发展、深化及完善的全过程。马克思主义生态伦理观坚持马克思主义的世界观和方法论，立足于马克思主义的价值论，构建了劳动使人对自然的开发利用具有道德合理性、实践是人与自然实现主客体统一的根本手段等重要逻辑思维。马克思主义生态伦理观为当代正确定位人与自然的关系、破解生态难题提供了新范式，开辟了人与自然关系发展的新境界，指明了人类文明形态前行的正确方向，夯实了人类新发展理念的伦理基础，为人类命运共同体思想的创立奠定了生态价值观基础，具有十分重要的理论价值与实践价值。     

马克思主义伦理观的理论特色与实践意义

能否正确认识马克思主义伦理观的理论特色及其实践意义,直接关系到对马克思主义当代价值的正确判断。马克思主义伦理观的理论特色首先表现在,它以实现工人阶级的根本利益作为其根本的出发点。马克思主义伦理观的另一个理论特色是它与近代“劝善的”伦理观相反,“劝善的”伦理观把个人意志放在首位,它主张意识不受生活的决定,“自由选择”不受社会条件的决定;而马克思主义则把社会关系放在首位,这是道德理论的根本性变革,因为有了这一规定性,道德理论才可能具有彻底性。在当代,运用马克思主义的道德理论批判形形色色的唯心主义道德观念和道德理论,同时,运用这一理论为社会主义制度、为最广大人民群众的根本利益辩护,是马克思主义理论研究的基本任务之一。     

中国共产党执政道德建设研究论纲

文章探讨了为什么要研究“中国共产党执政道德建设”;分析了中国共产党执政道德建设的内在规定性;梳理了中国共产党执政道德建设的研究基础,指出了中国共产党执政道德建设的研究路向与视角;构想了中国共产党执政道德建设的研究框架;阐述了中国共产党执政道德建设的研究方法;这对于加强中国共产党执政道德建设的研究,提升中国共产党执政道德水平,进而提高中国共产党的执政能力和领导水平具有重要的理论和实践指导意义。     

有机马克思主义:对马克思主义的超越、发展还是歪曲、冒充?

从理论渊源来看,有机马克思主义是怀特海哲学经过创立阶段、过程神学阶段、生态神学阶段、建设性后现代主义阶段之后的新发展阶段,是打着马克思主义旗号的神学色彩鲜明的怀特海主义。从基本立场、基本观点、基本方法来看,有机马克思主义与马克思主义存在显著差异,甚至对马克思主义存在很多曲解,有机马克思主义是非马克思主义,不是超越和发展了马克思主义,而是歪曲和冒充了马克思主义。唯有科学区分有机马克思主义与马克思主义,探析有机马克思主义的理论实质,才能澄清人们对有机马克思主义的模糊认识,捍卫马克思主义理论阵地。     

要重视中国伦理学史的研究

伦理学史是根据马克思主义的基本立场、观点和方法研究历史上人与人之间的行为规范探讨道德现象的历史演变(包括道德活动现象、道德意识现象和道德规范现象的历史演变)的一门科学。为马克思主义伦理学提供丰富的思想材料。那么,加强对中国伦理学史的研究,与我们建设社会主义精神文明,特别是与共产主义的道德建设具有什么关系呢?     

中国性伦理研究发展概况及分析

中国性伦理研究在50年代、80年代、21世纪初期经历了三次高潮,表现出以婚姻家庭研究为主,以道德实践的要求为动力的基本特征.中国性伦理研究的主要内容包括三个方面,即马克思恩格斯对性道德问题的基本观点.社会主义爱情、婚姻及家庭道德以及当代中国性伦理面临的挑战及发展.现阶段,应当深入挖掘马克思主义性伦理思想的基本原理,加强对性权利的研究,并在此基础上发展马克思主义性伦理理论.     

中国西部首届伦理学理论讨论会以“人的发展与道德进步”为主题召开

由川、陕两省伦理学会发起的中国西部首届伦理学理论讨论会,经过两省学会一年的筹备,于1987年4月6日至10日,以“人的发展与道德进步”为主题在西安召开。正式代表45人,来自11省市(包括西部以外的特遨代表),提供论文46篇。会议采取专题分组讨论与大会论辩相结合的形式,紧紧围绕中心议题,立足于马克思主义基本理论,就人与道德的关系,人的主体性、人的价值、个人与社会的关系、道德的本质、道德尺度与历史尺度关系、道德价值的判断等一系列基本理论问题进行了激烈而深入的论争。其中每个问题都有不同观点甚至对     

《现代青年伦理学》序

伦理学的研究,近年来不断的深化。这种深化的趋势,表现之一是理论水平、学术思想日益提高。学者们自由他研讨问题,提出了许多新观点、新思想、新结论。例如,关于道德权利的认识,关于道德特殊本质的探讨,关于社会主义分配公正问题的研究,关于社会主义初级阶段究竟应当实行何种道德等等,都有新的进展。 表现之二是伦理学的应用问题,引起了学者们的注意。有的学者,依据马克思主义伦理学的基本方法原则即理论联系实际,踊跃探索现实生活中的伦理道德问题。例如,权力与道德、经济改革与道德、企业文化与道德等,并且已经发表,或即将出     

Moral Realism,Moral Disagreement,and Moral Psychology

Abstract

This paper considers John Doris, Stephen Stich, Alexandra Plakias, and colleagues’ recent attempts to utilize empirical studies of cross-cultural variation in moral judgment to support a version of the argument from disagreement against moral realism. Crucially, Doris et al. claim that the moral disagreements highlighted by these studies are not susceptible to the standard ‘diffusing’ explanations realists have developed in response to earlier versions of the argument. I argue that plausible hypotheses about the cognitive processes underlying ordinary moral judgment and the acquisition of moral norms, when combined with a popular philosophical account of moral inquiry—the method of reflective equilibrium—undercut the anti-realist force of the moral disagreements that Doris et al. describe. I also show that Stich's recent attempt to provide further theoretical support for Doris et al.'s case is unsuccessful.     

Moral Disagreement and Moral Semantics

When speakers utter conflicting moral sentences (“X is wrong”/“X is not wrong”), it seems clear that they disagree. It has often been suggested that the fact that the speakers disagree gives us evidence for a claim about the semantics of the sentences they are uttering. Specifically, it has been suggested that the existence of the disagreement gives us reason to infer that there must be an incompatibility between the contents of these sentences (i.e., that it has to be the case that at least one of them is incorrect). This inference then plays a key role in a now‐standard argument against certain theories in moral semantics. In this paper, we introduce new evidence that bears on this debate. We show that there are moral conflict cases in which people are inclined to say both (a) that the two speakers disagree and (b) that it is not the case at least one of them must be saying something incorrect. We then explore how we might understand such disagreements. As a proof of concept, we sketch an account of the concept of disagreement and an independently motivated theory of moral semantics which, together, explain the possibility of such cases.     

Moral Worth and Moral Knowledge

To have moral worth an action not only needs to conform to the correct normative theory (whatever it is); it also needs to be motivated in the right way. I argue that morally worthy actions are motivated by the rightness of the action; they are motivated by an agent's concern for doing what's right and her knowledge that her action is morally right. Call this the Rightness Condition. On the Rightness Condition moral motivation involves both a conative and a cognitive element—in particular, it involves moral knowledge. I argue that the Rightness Condition is both necessary and sufficient for moral worth. I also argue that the Rightness Condition gives us an attractive account of actions performed under imperfect epistemic circumstances: by agents who rely on moral testimony or by those who, like Huckleberry Finn, have false moral convictions.     

Moral Overridingness and Moral Theory

I begin by proposing and explicating a plausible articulation of the view that morality is overriding. I then argue that it would be desirable for this thesis to be sustained. However, the prospects for its vindication will depend crucially on which moral theory we adopt. I examine some schematic moral theories in order to bring out which are friendly and which unfriendly to moral overridingness. In light of the reasons to hope that the overridingness thesis can be sustained, theories apparently incompatible with it – I argue that consequentialism is one – have a count against them.     

Moral Relativism and Moral Expressivism

Though moral relativism has had its supporters over the years, it is not a dominant position in philosophy. I will argue here, though, that the view is an attractive position. It evades some hardcore challenges that face absolutism, and it is reconcilable with an appealing emotivist approach to moral attitudes. In previous work, I have offered considerations in favor of a version of moral relativism that I call “perspectivalism.” These considerations are primarily grounded in linguistic data. Here I offer a self‐standing argument for perspectivalism. I begin with an argument against moral absolutism. I then argue that moral terms, such as ‘wrong’ and ‘right’, require for their application that the moral judge instantiate particular affective states, and I use this claim to provide further defense of moral relativism.