Automaticity and eyewitness accuracy: a 10- to 12-second rule for distinguishing accurate from inaccurate positive identifications

Eyewitness researchers have shown that witnesses accurately choosing the culprit out of a lineup reach their decisions more quickly than those erroneously choosing an innocent individual. However, this research is silent regarding how quickly or slowly witnesses must be, in absolute terms, to indicate that they are accurate or inaccurate. Across 4 studies, the authors discovered that a time boundary of roughly 10 to 12 s best differentiated accurate from inaccurate positive identifications. Witnesses making their identification faster than 10 to 12 s were nearly 90% accurate; those taking longer were roughly 50% accurate. This finding is consistent with previous research showing that accurate witnesses are more likely than inaccurate witnesses to reach their decisions automatically, that is, quickly, without conscious thought or effort.     

Simultaneous and sequential lineups: decision processes of accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses

The cognitive processes and decision‐making strategies of eyewitnesses were tested for their predictive qualities in determining the accuracy of identifications from lineups. The sequential lineup presentation was compared with the traditionally employed simultaneous lineup under culprit (target) present and culprit absent conditions. Consistent with previous research the sequential presentation resulted in an equivalent number of correct identifications compared to the simultaneous lineup but reduced false identification rates. Although sequential lineups were found to be associated with the use of absolute strategies, those shown a simultaneous lineup reported the use of both relative and absolute strategies. Accurate identifications and rejections were found to be associated with the use of absolute strategies, irrespective of lineup presentation or presence of target. Also accurate identifications, at least with a sequential lineup, were generally made faster than inaccurate identifications. These results are compared to previous studies with respect to the effect that mode of processing (relative versus absolute judgements) has on a witness's decision making and identification accuracy. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Accuracy of judgments of sexual orientation from thin slices of behavior.

In this research the authors examined the accuracy of judging sexual orientation on the basis of brief observations or "thin slices" of nonverbal behavior. In Study 1, sexual orientation was judged more accurately than chance, with judgments being more accurate when based on dynamic nonverbal behavior (10-s and 1-s silent video segments) than on static information (a series of 8 still photographs). Gay men and lesbians were more accurate than heterosexuals in judging still photographs and 1-s clips but not in 10-s clips. In Study 2, judgments based on 10-s dynamic figural outline displays containing primarily gestural information were more accurate than chance.     

An analysis of performance by pre-school children on the KRISP and on a length discrimination task

The speed and accuracy of judgements made by pre-school children on the Kansas Reflection-Impulsivity Scale for Pre-schoolers (KRISP - Wright 1971, 1973) and on a two-choice length discrimination task were investigated. If subjects were relatively accurate on the KRISP then correct responses tended to be faster than errors while if subjects were relatively inaccurate errors were the faster. It is inferred that accurate subjects respond asymptotically in terms of a speed-accuracy tradeoff while inaccurate subjects set a less demanding criterion. Accurate subjects showed a tendency to increase inspection time as a function of item difficulty. This relation did not hold for inaccurate subjects.However, groups classified by means of the KRISP did not differ in either the speed of correct responses or accuracy of line length discriminations. For all groups judgement times were significantly related to stimulus differences and to stimulus ratios. There was no evidence that so-called impulsive children engage in less efficient and less detailed processing than other children.It is argued, contrary to the view of Kagan and his co-workers (e.g. Kakan 1966), that speed and accuracy of responding may not reflect a stable trait dimension. Rather children appear to be able to change their strategies according to the particular demands, implicit or explicit, of the task.     

Influence of individual differences in temporal sensitivity on timing performance

This research was designed to examine the consistency of individual differences in timing. Subjects were tested initially on a temporal-signal-detection task. In a series of trials, subjects judged whether a stimulus figure was displayed for either 12 s or greater than 12 s. Task performance was used to classify the subjects into groups with high or low temporal sensitivity (d'). Later, the subjects were tested on two classic time-judgment tasks. In a temporal-interference task, subjects reproduced intervals of 8-16 s during which they had rehearsed 0, 3, or 7 digits. Absolute error in time judgments increased linearly as a function of task demands. However, subjects with low temporal sensitivity made more error under all conditions compared with those with high sensitivity. In an isochronous-tapping task, subjects produced a series of 2-s and 5-s intervals. The low-temporal-sensitivity group produced more variable and inaccurate responses than the high-sensitivity group. The results demonstrate cross-situational consistency in timing performance across different tasks, time-judgment methods, and stimulus durations.     

The Moderating Effect of Ecphoric Experience on Post‐identification Feedback: A Critical Test of the Cues‐based Inference Conceptualization

Confidence inflation from confirming post‐identification feedback is greater when the eyewitness is inaccurate than when the eyewitness is accurate, which is evidence that witnesses infer their confidence from feedback only to the extent that their internal cues are weak. But the accurate/inaccurate asymmetry has alternative interpretations. A critical test between these interpretations was conducted by including disconfirming feedback conditions. Student participants (n = 404) witnessed a mock crime, had either a strong or weak ecphoric experience when making their line‐up identifications, and subsequently received no feedback, confirming feedback, or disconfirming feedback. Consistent with a cues‐based conceptualization of the feedback effect, disconfirming feedback influenced witnesses with weak ecphoric experiences more than witnesses with strong ecphoric experiences, ironically increasing the confidence‐accuracy relation. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses look the same: a limitation of the ‘pop‐out’ effect and the 10‐ to 12‐second rule

Research has found support for a ‘pop‐out effect’ that occurs when witnesses who accurately identify a criminal from a lineup are faster and uses more automatic processing than inaccurate witnesses who misidentify a foil. We present evidence that this finding may not occur with biased lineups. Witnesses to a mock theft were asked to make a lineup identification and three types of witnesses were compared: (1) accurate witnesses who identified a thief, (2) inaccurate witnesses who misidentified a foil who was more similar looking to the thief than the other lineup foils and (3) inaccurate witnesses who misidentified a foil who was not more similar in appearance to the thief than the other lineup foils. Accurate witnesses who identified the thief and inaccurate witnesses who misidentified a foil more similar to the thief than the other lineup foils were indistinguishable; both were faster, used more automatic recognition processes and were more confident than inaccurate witnesses who identified other foils. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Timing light and tone signals in pigeons

Pigeons' ability to time light and tone stimuli was examined in four experiments. In Experiment 1, two groups of pigeons were trained to discriminate between 2- and 8-s durations of lights or tones and then were transferred to reversal or nonreversal discriminations in the alternate modality. Pigeons learned the light discrimination faster than the tone discrimination and showed immediate positive intermodal transfer from tone to light but not from light to tone. In Experiments 2-4, the peak procedure was used to study birds' timing of 15- and 30-s fixed-interval light and tone signals. Peak times on empty trials under baseline conditions closely approximated the length of fixed-interval signals. When pigeons were tested with time-outs and intermodal switches introduced midway through an empty trial, they tended to reset the timing mechanism and begin timing again from 0 s. With both estimation and production procedures, pigeons were less accurate when timing the tone stimuli than when timing the light stimuli. A comparison of these data with data from timing experiments with rats suggests several possible differences in timing processes between pigeons and rats.     

Effects of race on responses and response latencies in the weapon identification task: a test of six models

The authors consider six models of underlying process in the weapon identification task: The first two are response-time extensions of signal detection models; the last four, of the process dissociation model. Predictions for accuracy data, correct response latencies, and false response latencies are used to discriminate between models. In the present study, racial bias in responses and correct response latency was replicated. New findings were that the direction of bias was reversed in error latency and that errors were faster than correct responses. These findings rule out four models, in particular, the idea that race biases early perception and interpretation of targets. Implications for reducing errors in the weapon identification task and possibilities of discriminating between the remaining two models are discussed.     

Witnesses’ memories for lineup fillers postdicts their identification accuracy

Witnesses who have quick, automatic recognition experiences when viewing a lineup tend to make more accurate decisions than witnesses who engage in slower, more deliberative processes. A novel postdictor of identification accuracy is predicted from these findings: memories for lineup fillers should be stronger among inaccurate, rather than accurate, witnesses. Undergraduate students (N = 320) viewed a mock crime, made a lineup identification decision, and were given a surprise test for their memory for the lineup fillers. Consistent with predictions, better memories for lineup fillers postdicted mistaken identifications and the suspect's innocence. Information gain analyses showed that under some conditions, memory for lineup fillers provided as much information about the suspect's guilt as a lineup identification. Findings are consistent with the idea that postdictors of eyewitness accuracy are valuable to the extent that they measure the automaticity or deliberativeness of the witness's experience when viewing the lineup.     

Searching for the variables that control human rule‐governed “insensitivity”

Verbal rules or instructions often exert obvious and meaningful control over human behavior. Sometimes instructions benefit the individual by enabling faster acquisition of a skill or by obviating an aversive consequence. However, research has also suggested a clear disadvantage: “insensitivity” to changing underlying contingencies. The two experiments described here investigated the variables that control initial rule‐following behavior and rule‐following insensitivity. When the initial rule was inaccurate, behavior was consistent with the rule for approximately half of participants and all participants' behavior was mostly insensitive to changing contingencies. When the initial rule was accurate, behavior of all participants was consistent with it and behavior for nearly all participants was insensitive to changes in underlying contingencies. These findings have implications for how best to establish and maintain rule‐following behavior in applied settings when deviant behavior would be more reinforcing to the individual.     

Uniforms affect the accuracy of children's eyewitness identification decisions

A substantial proportion of line‐up identifications involving child eyewitnesses in the UK are conducted by police officers wearing uniform. This study examined the possibility that wearing a uniform constitutes an authority cue that adversely affects a child's ability to make accurate eyewitness identifications. Sixty participants aged 9–10 years old witnessed a staged crime and were later asked to identify a ‘burglar’ from a simultaneous line‐up using a 2 (uniform: present vs. absent) × 2 (target: present vs. absent) design. Children in the uniform present conditions made significantly more choices than children in the uniform absent conditions. More importantly, in the presence of a uniform, children made significantly more false identifications in target‐absent line‐ups. Analysis of supplementary, identification‐related variables (identification time and confidence, state anxiety) suggested that (1) the children experienced uncertainty if the target was absent from the line‐up, but (2) this uncertainty was not expressed when the line‐up administrator wore a uniform, leading to an increase in false identifications. Implications for line‐up administration procedures for children are discussed. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effects of consequences of advice on patterns of rule control and rule choice

Rules in the form of advice can inaccurately state the effects of recommended responses by overstating or understating size of the consequences. Three experiments investigated the effects of such inaccuracies on patterns of rule control and rule choice with female college students. In Experiment 1, signaled accurate, overstated, or understated rules specified that a given number of points would be earned by pressing a designated key. For some subjects, rules specified a number of points to be gained; for other subjects, rules specified a number of points to be lost from an amount given earlier. Point totals stated in the inaccurate rules averaged 25% more (overstated) or 25% less (understated) than those received. When subjects could choose either the response specified in the rule or an alternative response that produced an unpredictable number of points, they showed greater sensitivity to the inaccuracy of overstated rules than understated rules. In trials at the end of the experiment in which subjects could choose which rule to see, subjects did not always choose accurate rules and often chose inaccurate rules for which they had shown less sensitivity earlier. Experiment 2 replicated this pattern in which subjects could choose which type of rule to see on a greater number of trials. Some evidence suggested that subjects prefer an improvement from the outcomes promised to those later received. In Experiment 3, rules misstated by averages of 25% and 50% were compared. Evidence suggested that increasing the size of the misstatement reduced the discrimination of inaccurate rules from accurate ones.     

Preference as a function of active interresponse times: a test of the active time model

In this article, we describe a test of the active time model for concurrent variable interval (VI) choice. The active time model (ATM) suggests that the time since the most recent response is one of the variables controlling choice in concurrent VI VI schedules of reinforcement. In our experiment, pigeons were trained in a multiple concurrent similar to that employed by Belke (1992), with VI 20-s and VI 40-s schedules in one component, and VI 40-s and VI 80-s schedules in the other component. However, rather than use a free-operant design, we used a discrete-trial procedure that restricted interresponse times to a range of 0.5-9.0 s. After 45 sessions of training, unreinforced probe periods were mixed with reinforced training periods. These probes paired the two stimuli associated with the VI 40-s schedules. Further, the probes were defined such that during their occurrence, interresponse times were either "short" (0.5-3.0 s) or "long" (7.5-9.0 s). All pigeons showed a preference for the stimulus associated with the relatively rich VI 40-s schedule--a result mirroring that of Belke. We also observed, though, that this preference was more extreme during long probes than during short probes--a result predicted by ATM.     

Correlation between self-reported rigidity and rule-governed insensitivity to operant contingencies

Adults were selected on the basis of their scores on the Scale for Personality Rigidity (Rehfisch, 1958a). Their scores served as a measure of hypothesized rule governance in the natural environment. Experiment 1 studied the effects of accurate versus minimal instructions and high versus low rigidity on performance on a multiple differential-reinforcement-of-low-rate (DRL) 4-s fixed-ratio (FR) 18 schedule. When the schedule was switched to extinction, accurate instructions and high rigidity were associated with greater perseveration in the response pattern subjects developed during the reinforcement phase. In Experiment 2, the effects of rigidity and of accurate versus inaccurate instructions were studied. Initially, all subjects received accurate instructions about an FR schedule. The schedule was then switched to DRL, but only half of the subjects received instructions about the DRL contingency, and the other half received FR instructions as before. Accurate instructions minimized individual differences because both high and low scorers on the rigidity scale earned points in DRL. However, when inaccurate instructions were provided, all high-rigidity subjects followed them although they did not earn points on the schedule, whereas most low-rigidity subjects abandoned them and responded appropriately to DRL. The experiments demonstrate a correlation between performances observed in the human operant laboratory and a paper-and-pencil test of rigidity that purportedly reflects important response styles that differentiate individuals in the natural environment. Implications for applied research and intervention are discussed.     

The damaging effect of confirming feedback on the relation between eyewitness certainty and identification accuracy

The authors investigated eyewitnesses' retrospective certainty (see G. L. Wells & A. L. Bradfield, 1999). The authors hypothesized that extemal influence from the lineup administrator would damage the certainty-accuracy relation by inflating the retrospective certainty of inaccurate eyewitnesses more than that of accurate eyewitnesses (N = 245). Two variables were manipulated: eyewitness accuracy (through the presence or absence of the culprit in the lineup) and feedback (confirming vs. control). Confirming feedback inflated retrospective certainty more for inaccurate eyewitnesses than for accurate eyewitnesses, significantly reducing the certainty-accuracy relation (from r = .58 in the control condition to r = .37 in the confirming feedback condition). Double-blind testing is recommended for lineups to prevent these external influences on eyewitnesses.     

The oblique effect and three-dimensional shape

The classical oblique effect refers to the finding that observers are faster and more accurate in discriminating the orientation of a line or edge when it is at or near vertical or horizontal than when it is at an oblique orientation (Appelle, 1972; Mach, 1861). Based on the finding that observer sensitivity to orientation of simple symmetric shapes like an ellipse or the letter "X" also exhibits an oblique effect, Li and Westheimer (1997) suggested that the effect does not arise solely from inequality of simple orientation-tuned receptors in early visual processing, but also involves later orientation processing that can encompass more complex inputs such as shape axes. In this work, we examined how the oblique effect impacts three-dimensional shapes defined by texture cues.     

Recounting the same events again and again: children's consistency across multiple interviews

Children (2–13 years at time of injury) were interviewed four times about an injury that required hospital Emergency Room treatment, namely at 1 week, 6 months, 1 year, and 2 years. The consistency of children's reports was assessed and all children gave mostly the same information at each interview, although consistency was higher for older children and for injury rather than hospital details. Furthermore, details recalled at every interview were virtually always accurate while details that were sometimes omitted were a little less likely to be accurate. New information that was introduced after 6 months was more likely to be accurate than inaccurate but new information introduced at 1 or 2 years post‐injury was just as likely to be wrong as right (except for 12–13‐year‐olds). Implications for forensic situations are discussed. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Shock-duration reduction on the basis of interresponse times: the effect of the interresponse time limit

Rats were trained on a free-operant procedure in which the duration of randomly occurring shocks depended on the interresponse times of lever presses. Shocks of 1.6-mA intensity were delivered at random intervals with an average density of 10 shocks per min. Each shock that was delivered lasted 0.3 s as long as the interresponse times were within a preset limit. Whenever the interresponse time exceeded the limit, the shocks that were delivered lasted 1 s until the occurrence of a response that met the limit. The limit was reduced in 3-s steps from 15 s to either 6 s or 3 s, at which point 3 of the animals were exposed to an ascending series. The avoidance of long-duration shocks was highly efficient at the 15-s and 12-s limits, and it decreased at the 9-s limit. With the exception of one animal, performance was substantially worse at the 6-s limit and it deteriorated for all the animals that were exposed to the 3-s limit. The data suggest that shock-duration reduction is quite effective as negative reinforcement for avoidance but is perhaps less effective than shock-intensity reduction.