No-Go Theorems and the Foundations of Quantum Physics

In the history of quantum physics several no-go theorems have been proved, and many of them have played a central role in the development of the theory, such as Bell’s or the Kochen–Specker theorem. A recent paper by F. Laudisa has raised reasonable doubts concerning the strategy followed in proving some of these results, since they rely on the standard framework of quantum mechanics, a theory that presents several ontological problems. The aim of this paper is twofold: on the one hand, I intend to reinforce Laudisa’s methodological point by critically discussing Malament’s theorem in the context of the philosophical foundation of quantum field theory; secondly, I rehabilitate Gisin’s theorem showing that Laudisa’s concerns do not apply to it.     

Consciousness as an Inhibited Manifestation and Quantum Physics

The term soul is used in the traditional literature as a synonym for one’s true Self and is associated with the subjective essence of one’s living. Since, we don’t have any means to quantify it, the science has ruled out this idea from its investigations. But, in a recent study, Ceylan et al. (2017) has reintroduced the word soul to scientific literature and examined the possibility of the study of the soul through scientific modalities. The primary focus of their study is to find and understand the scientific analog of the soul as quoted and discussed in the traditional literature. In the present paper, we examine the idea of a soul that uses a novel approach; integrating neuroscience and quantum physics, as proposed in Ceylan et al. (2017). For this purpose, we make use of findings from neuroscientific studies on meditation to understand the concepts of soul and consciousness in terms of inhibition mechanisms. In this context, this paper serves as an attempt to call for more studies to discuss and expand the hypothesis about the soul as uninhibited mental activity.     

Disintegration,New Consciousness,and Discontinuous Transformation: A Qualitative Investigation of Quantum Change

The role of qualitative methods within humanistic psychology research is explored though a Web-based dialogue among the authors expressing varying, and often quite diverging, views on assorted concerns about research methodologies and their underlying epistemologies. Specifically explored is whether qualitative methods are inherently better for capturing an understanding of human experience congruent with a human science approach to research or, alternatively, whether both qualitative and quantitative approaches simply offer different, and often complementary, advantages and disadvantages. The divisiveness between humanistic and positive psychology is also explored in relationship to the former field's frequent preference for qualitative methods within a human science paradigm, in contrast to the latter field's frequent preference for quantitative methods within a positivistic science paradigm.     

Imagination and Reality: On the Relations Between Myth, Consciousness, and the Quantum Sea

There often appears to be a striking correspondence between mythic stories and aspects of reality. We will examine the processes of creative imagination within a neurobiological frame and suggest a theory that may explain the functions of myth in relation to the hidden aspects of reality. Myth is peppered with archetypal entities and interactions that operate to reveal hidden processes in reality that are relative to the human condition. The imagery in myths in a sense "sustains the true." That is, mythopoetic imagery keeps the interpretive process in experience closer to the actual nature of reality than the rational faculties operating alone are able to do. Indeed, whereas rationalizing can easily lead us awry, genuine myth rarely does. Explanations of events offered by cultures around the world are frequently couched in terms of mythic themes and events. An important function of myth is to provide a "field of tropes" that in-forms the lived experience of people. This paper focuses especially on those aspects of myth that represent facets of the quantum universe and give us clues as to the relationship between consciousness, symbolism, and reality.     

Reading comprehension with the Go/No-Go procedure with compound stimuli

The present study investigated whether the Go/No-Go procedure with compound stimuli produces emergent relations among dictated words (A), pictures (B), and printed words (C) and the emergence of textual behavior (CD) using a multiple probe design across word sets. Three preschool children were exposed to 4 phases: (1) pretests for BC, CB, and CD relations, (2) pretraining with known stimuli, (3) AB and AC training, and (4) posttests for BC, CB, and CD relations. During AB and AC training, responses to A1B1, A2B2, A1C1, and A2C2 compound stimuli, but not to A1B2, A2B1, A1C2, and A2C1, were reinforced. The results showed that all participants met the learning criterion and demonstrated emergence of BC and CB relations (i.e., relations between pictures and printed words), and CD relations (i.e., textual behavior) after training. These results suggest that the Go/No-Go procedure with compound stimuli is an effective alternative for establishing reading comprehension.     

Contextual Deduction Theorems

Logics that do not have a deduction-detachment theorem (briefly, a DDT) may still possess a contextual DDT??a syntactic notion introduced here for arbitrary deductive systems, along with a local variant. Substructural logics without sentential constants are natural witnesses to these phenomena. In the presence of a contextual DDT, we can still upgrade many weak completeness results to strong ones, e.g., the finite model property implies the strong finite model property. It turns out that a finitary system has a contextual DDT iff it is protoalgebraic and gives rise to a dually Brouwerian semilattice of compact deductive filters in every finitely generated algebra of the corresponding type. Any such system is filter distributive, although it may lack the filter extension property. More generally, filter distributivity and modularity are characterized for all finitary systems with a local contextual DDT, and several examples are discussed. For algebraizable logics, the well-known correspondence between the DDT and the equational definability of principal congruences is adapted to the contextual case.     

Consciousness and self-reference

Reflection on the self's way of being in consciousness yields two arguments for a theory of self-reference not based inany wayat all on self-cognition. First, I show that one theory of self-reference predicts an experience of the self because the theory inadequately analyzes the semantical facts about indexicality. I construct a dilemma for this cognitivism, which it cannot get out of, for it requires evensolitary self-reference to be based on some original self-knowledge, which is not available. I describe my kinetic model of unspoken self-reference, and I show how it fits the facts of four forms of consciousness, all of which presuppose self-reference, rather than yield it. Second, aspeaker uses the first person pronoun in sentences because she is aware of the unmediated role in agency of the beliefs she would express, and not because she is aware of herself in their content. The cognitive model, in contrast, succumbs to a vicious regress and is exposed as an obstacle to an understanding of consciousness.A version of this essay was read at Rabindra Bharati University, Calcutta (February 1985), University of North Bengal (March 1985) and Jadavpur University (March 1985). My thanks to S. Basu and S. Chakraborty at Rabindra Bharati, and to M. Ghosh and S. K. Sen at North Bengal, and to Ch. Gupta and P. K. Sen of Jadavpur University. Jadavpur's Prof. Sen's extensive comments in support of the cognitive model of reference led me to revise the essay thoroughly. North Bengal University may have published a version of this essay. I also thank Kent Baldner and the referees of this journal for insightful comments forcing further revisions.     

Consciousness and Self-awareness

In this paper I propose to inquire into the theory of self-awareness propounded by the two Buddhist epistemologists, Dignaga and Dharmakirti. I first give an outline of the Buddhist notion of consciousness, then deal with the notion of objectual appearance, and finally dwell on the theory itself together with certain arguments in its favor. It is shown that the Buddhists subscribed themselves to the following self-awareness thesis: that our waking consciousness is always pre-reflectively and nonconceptually aware of itself. Adopting an approach of interpretive and comparative analysis, I also clarify significant differences between the theory and the correspondent Cartesian views in order to reveal the theory's contemporary relevancy.     

Consciousness and Commentaries

There are several neuropsychological syndromes in which good residual function is retained in the absence of acknowledged awareness, among them blindsight, amnesia, and unilateral neglect. All of them point to the need in studying conscious awareness not only for an “on-line” demonstration of the relevant capacity, but for an independent commentary or classificatory response by the subject, whether human or animal. The parametric limits of blindsight (visual discrimination without awareness) can be measured using a “commentary key” psychophysical paradigm, and the results may possibly allow an approach to identifying neural structures involved in visual awareness.     

Truth and Consciousness

Many work on flushing out what our consciousness means in cognitive and phenomenological terms, but no one has yet connected the dots on how consciousness and truth intersect, much less how our phenomenal consciousness can form the ground for most of our models of truth. Here, I connect those dots and argue that the basic structure of our phenomenal consciousness grounds the nature of truth as concordance, to harmonize in agreement, and that most extant theories on truth are well explained in that grounding. Said another way, the unifying and bifurcating intentional structure of phenomenal consciousness is the non-epistemic ground of truth, such that most theories of truth can be explained as particular expressions of concordance based upon the differing aspects of that ground.     

Categoricity Theorems and Conceptions of Set

Two models of second-order ZFC need not be isomorphic to each other, but at least one is isomorphic to an initial segment of the other. The situation is subtler for impure set theory, but Vann McGee has recently proved a categoricity result for second-order ZFCU plus the axiom that the urelements form a set. Two models of this theory with the same universe of discourse need not be isomorphic to each other, but the pure sets of one are isomorphic to the pure sets of the other.This paper argues that similar results obtain for considerably weaker second-order axiomatizations of impure set theory that are in line with two different conceptions of set, the iterative conception and the limitation of size doctrine.     

Consciousness

Various reflections on the nature of consciousness, partly inspired by Alastair Hannay's views on the subject, are presented. In particular, its reality as a distinct non-physical existence is defended against such alternatives as have dominated philosophy for many years. The main difficulty in such a defense concerns the contingency it seems to imply as to the relations between consciousness and its expression in behaviour. But it only implies such contingency if some version of the Humean principle that there cannot be necessary connections between distinct existences is assumed. It is more promising to see this relation as the falsification of this Humean principle and thus avoid what seems the main recommendation of behaviourism, functionalism etc. Some final reflections on the nature of the physical suggest that something like consciousness may be the noumenal essence of the physical in general.I must express my warm thanks to Alastair Hannay and Dagfinn Føllesdal, and to the organisers of the conference in Oslo who arranged to celebrate their sixtieth birthdays, for having been invited to participate. As I was a graduate student with Alastair Hannay at University College, London, when A. J. Ayer was the head of the department, and am his almost exact contemporary, I have taken the opportunity for some reflections on the way philosophy of mind has gone over the intervening years. This article retains some of the informality of style which was appropriate for such an occasion.     

The Soul,as an Uninhibited Mental Activity,is Reduced into Consciousness by Rules of Quantum Physics

This paper is an effort to describe, in neuroscientific terms, one of the most ambiguous concepts of the universe—the soul. Previous efforts to understand what the soul is and where it may exist have accepted the soul as a subjective and individual entity. We will make two additions to this view: (1) The soul is a result of uninhibited mental activity and lacks spatial and temporal information; (2) The soul is an undivided whole and, to become divided, the soul has to be reduced into unconscious and conscious mental events. This reduction process parallels the maturation of the frontal cortex and GABA becoming the main inhibitory neurotransmitter. As examples of uninhibited mental activity, we will discuss the perceptual differences of a newborn, individuals undergoing dissociation, and individuals induced by psychedelic drugs. Then, we will explain the similarities between the structure of the universe and the structure of the brain, and we propose that consideration of the rules of quantum physics is necessary to understand how the soul is reduced into consciousness.     

Consciousness and the brainstem

In the first part of this article we summarize a theoretical framework and a set of hypotheses aimed at accounting for consciousness in neurobiological terms. The basic form of consciousness, core consciousness is placed in the context of life regulation; it is seen as yet another level of biological processing aimed at ensuring the homeostatic balance of a living organism; and the representation of the current organism state within somato-sensing structures is seen as critical to its development. Core consciousness is conceived as the imaged relationship of the interaction between an object and the changed organism state it causes. In the second part of the article we discuss the functional neuroanatomy of nuclei in the brainstem reticular formation because they constitute the basic set of somato-sensing structures necessary for core consciousness and its core self to emerge. The close relationship between the mechanisms underlying cortical activation and the bioregulatory mechanisms outlined here is entirely compatible with the classical idea that the reticular formation modulates the electrophysiological activity of the cerebral cortex. However, in the perspective presented here, that modulation is placed in the setting of the organism's homeostatic regulation.