Virtue and voluntarism

My aim here is to characterize a certain type of ‘virtue approach’ to questions of responsibility for belief; then to explore the extent to which this is helpful with respect to one fundamental puzzle raised by the claims that we have, and that we do not have, voluntary control over our beliefs; and then ultimately to attempt a more exact statement of doxastic responsibility and, with it a plausible statement of ‘weak doxastic voluntarism.’ See my longest treatment of these in Montmarquet (1993). An account closer to the one presented here may be found in Montmarquet (2000). More recent treatments, emphasizing point (ii) just below, the role of context, would include Montmarquet (forthcoming).     

Wobbling on a One-Legged Stool: The Decline of American Pluralism and the Academic Treatment of Corporate Social Responsibility

B. Readings (University in Ruins. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996) argued that universities have abandoned their original project of promoting a national culture and have tried to substitute by embracing globalization, but the vagueness and incoherence of the concept has failed to return purpose to the University. The academic treatment of corporate social responsibility illustrates this dilemma. For a generation after H.R. Bowen (Social Responsibilities of the Businessman. New York: Harper & Row, 1953) founded the field, scholars struggled to fit the concept within a national system of pluralistic power-sharing among a variety of institutions that would define and enforce standards of responsibility necessary for the general good of American society. That understanding changed in the nineteen eighties, shortly after corporate executives had united to an unprecedented degree to direct the power of government in their interests, influence the public agenda, and roll back the power of unions. In response, business ethicists began to reformulate corporate social responsibility as a voluntary practice on the part of these same executives. Since the Kantian and Lockean principles upon which this approach was based were themselves problematic, it is not surprising that the experience gained over the last generation casts doubt on the efficacy of this reliance on voluntary restraint and personal initiative. However, circumstances that include the failure of globalization to deliver on its promises may have changed sufficiently in recent years to revive interest in approaches that acknowledge the importance of countervailing power for encouraging greater corporate social responsibility.     

The virtues of belief: toward a non-evidentialist ethics of belief-formation

William Kingdon Clifford famously argued that “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.” His ethics of belief can be construed as involving two distinct theses—a moral claim (that it is wrong to hold beliefs to which one is not entitled) and an epistemological claim (that entitlement is always a function of evidential support). Although I reject the (universality of the) epistemological claim, I argue that something deserving of the name ethics of belief can nevertheless be preserved. However, in the second half of the paper I argue that Clifford’s response to the problem of unethical belief is insufficiently attentive to the role played by self-deception in the formation of unethical beliefs. By contrasting the first-person perspective of a doxastic agent with the third-person perspective of an outside observer, I argue that unethical belief is a symptom of deficiencies of character: fix these, and belief will fix itself. I suggest that the moral intuitions implicit in our response to examples of unethical belief (like Clifford’s famous example of the ship owner) can better be accounted for in terms of a non-evidentialist virtue ethics of belief-formation, and that such an account can survive the rejection of strong versions of doxastic voluntarism.

Joseph Butler, “Upon Self-Deceit” (1726)

     

Group Responsibility for Ethnic Conflict

When a group of persons such as a nation orcorporation has a relatively clear structureand set of decision procedures, it is capableof acting and should, it can well be argued, beconsidered morally as well as legallyresponsible. This is not because it is afull-fledged moral person, but becauseassigning responsibility is a human practice,and we have good moral reasons to adopt thepractice of considering such groupsresponsible. From such judgments, however,little follows about the responsibility ofindividual members of such groups; much moreneeds to be ascertained about which officialsor executives are responsible for what beforewe can consider individual members of nationsor corporations responsible.Whether an unorganized group can be morallyresponsible is much less clear, but there havebeen useful discussions in recent years of thepossible responsibility of whites for racism,or males for sexism, and the like. In thisessay I explore arguments for consideringgroups or their members responsible for ethnicconflict. Such groups may lack a clearorganizational structure, but they are notrandom assortments of persons. Groups can andoften should take responsibility for theattitudes and actions of their members, and cansometimes be considered responsible for failingto do so. And persons often can and shouldtake responsibility for the attitudes andactions of the groups of which they aremembers.     

Technological Delegation: Responsibility for the Unintended

This article defends three interconnected premises that together demand for a new way of dealing with moral responsibility in developing and using technological artifacts. The first premise is that humans increasingly make use of dissociated technological delegation. Second, because technologies do not simply fulfill our actions, but rather mediate them, the initial aims alter and outcomes are often different from those intended. Third, since the outcomes are often unforeseen and unintended, we can no longer simply apply the traditional (modernist) models for discussing moral responsibility. We need to reinterpret moral responsibility. A schematic layout of a model on Social Role-Responsibility that incorporates these three premises is presented to allow discussion of a new way of interpreting moral responsibility.

Choosing to believe

This article defends a regulative ethics of voluntary belief. In order to determine the occasion and the scope of such an ethics, the article begins with an examination of the concept of belief in conversation with the view of J. L. Schellenberg. Next, against the dominant position in contemporary epistemology, it argues that some beliefs can be voluntary, in the sense that they are under the immediate control of the believer, and replies to William Alston’s influential objections to doxastic voluntarism. If some beliefs are subject to the immediate control of the believer, then in these cases believers are ethically responsible not only for how they investigate those beliefs, but also for the choice of whether or not to believe them. The article concludes by formulating and defending two types of regulative ethical principles governing voluntary belief.     

责任心的心理学研究与展望

责任心是一种自觉地把分内的事做好的重要人格特质。责任心已经成为心理学的重要研究课题。已有的大量研究探讨了责任心的概念、结构及影响因素等问题,并开发出了一批责任心的测量工具。我国的责任心研究应在建立中国化的责任心结构模型及测量问卷、探讨责任心的作用机制以及培养责任心的有效方法等方面展开。     

The ethics of belief: doxastic self-control and intellectual virtue

Most of the literature on doxastic voluntarism has concentrated on the question of the voluntariness of belief and the issue of how our actual or possible control of our beliefs bears on our justification for holding them and on how, in the light of this control, our intellectual character should be assessed. This paper largely concerns a related question on which less philosophical work has been done: the voluntariness of the grounding of belief and the bearing of various views about this matter on justification, knowledge, and intellectual virtue. In part, my concern is the nature and extent of our voluntary control over our responses to reasons for believing—or over what we take to be such reasons. This paper provides a partial account of such control and, on the basis of the account, will clarify the criteria for appraising intellectual virtue.     

责任伦理视角下临床决策支持系统的伦理责任考量

从责任伦理的视角,提出临床决策支持系统（clinical decision support system,CDSS）在确保准确性、尊重自主性、保护隐私安全等责任中存在的合作意识缺失、职业责任薄弱、社会责任缺位等伦理责任问题,针对上述问题,通过以人为本、共存共生的责任伦理原则指出CDSS各方承担责任的主要路径,包括增强合作意识提高CDSS准确性、明确医生与开发者职业责任确保CDSS应用的自主性、加强企业社会责任保障隐私保护等,期望为责任相关者更好地承担伦理责任提供思路,为CDSS未来发展提供新的视角。

     

医生专家责任的法理分析

随着医患关系发展的多样化、复杂化,以及法律对医生专家责任规定的疏漏,医生和患者都面临着巨大的经济和精神压力。因此,明确医生专家责任的法律属性,分析专家责任的构成要件,探讨责任实现形式,建立责任转移方式以及责任限制制度,对于明确医生的权利义务,缓和医患关系,稳定医疗秩序,具有一定的现实意义。     

传统美德认同和责任情境对大学生责任行为倾向的影响

责任行为是个体在特定责任情境下履行责任和承担后果的行为。本研究采用问卷调查方法着重探讨大学生的传统美德认同和责任情境因素对责任行为倾向的影响。结果表明,传统美德认同,以及责任情境中的责任性质和责任对象都对大学生的责任行为倾向有显著影响,且三者的交互作用显著：（1）传统美德认同高的大学生在履行责任情境中,其责任行为倾向显著强于美德认同低的大学生;（2）履行责任时的责任行为倾向显著强于承担后果时的责任行为倾向,但低美德认同者的两种行为倾向在他人责任情境中无差异;（3）在履行责任情境中,大学生对自我的责任行为倾向显著强于对他人的责任行为倾向;但美德认同低的大学生在承担后果情境中则相反。     

公共健康问题与政府的治理责任

公共健康是人类社会存在与发展的重要财富,也是提高国民素质、加速经济增长的基本条件。中国经济近年来处在高速增长期,但并没有真正解决公共健康问题,公共不健康和健康不公平的现状实际上已成为制约社会发展的突出矛盾,对此政府必须坚持低收入人口优先受益原则,承担起加大公共卫生投资力度,加强公共卫生体系建设和进行全民公共健康道德教育的责任。     

Wanton Responsibility

Mainstream accounts of responsible agency either overlook or discount wanton agents as plausible candidates for responsible agency. This is largely due to the compatibilist project of such accounts, and to their deemphasis of historical and modal considerations. I argue that wantons – those who are indifferent to the desires that move them to act – can and ought to be counted as responsible agents. Indeed, they deserve special blame for the acts of wrong doing that issue from their wanton behavior.     

论责任与信任

责任与信任都是社会生活的基础 ,是人作为理性存在的理性要求。人的存在本质上既是孤独的 ,又力图摆脱孤独。孤独使人具有责任意识 ,成为道德的存在 ,摆脱孤独使人获得信任 ;责任与信任都与他者紧密联系 ,责任是为他者而存在 ,信任是与他者之共在 ;信任是社会交往的前提 ,保持信任虽不出于责任但却合乎责任 ,因而也具有道德价值。     

企业道德责任论

本文对“企业社会责任”与“企业道德责任”概念的内涵与外延进行了清晰化的梳理与条陈,明确了企业社会责任与企业道德责任通用的语义层次,阐述了企业社会责任与企业道德责任区分的价值和实践意义;立论了企业道德责任何以可能;具体分析了企业基本道德责任与积极道德责任实现的一般要件,指出法律制裁力、市场筛选力、中间力量的博弈力是企业基本道德责任实现的不可或缺的条件,而企业的盈利能力、企业经营团队尤其是主要领导者的较强社会责任感、社会组织和民众对企业的积极行善形成的褒奖机制则是积极道德责任必须附加的条件。     

Egalitarianism and Responsibility

This essay examines several possible rationales for the egalitarian judgment that justice requires better-off individuals to help those who are worse off even in the absence of social interaction. These rationales include equality (everyone should enjoy the same level of benefits), moral meritocracy (each should get benefits according to her responsibility or deservingness), the threshold of sufficiency (each should be assured a minimally decent quality of life), prioritarianism (a function of benefits to individuals should be maximized that gives priority to the worse off), and mixed views. A case is made for adopting either prioritarianism or a mixed view that gives priority both to the worse off and to the more responsible and deserving.     

Morality and Responsibility

Abstract

This paper addresses the need to (1) support the personal moral belief system that each individual brings into the therapy room, (2) help the individual nourish and develop her/his own system of being in the world that is congruent with her/his sense of right, and (3) incorporate a sense of morality and responsibility into the therapy process when it is lacking. Case studies will present the dilemmas that two women faced concerning the conflict they experienced between their responsibility to their families and their responsibility to themselves.     

Contemporary Psychotherapy: Promoting Personal Responsibility for Therapeutic Change

An assortment of factors in modern society can be involved in the etiology and treatment of mental illness. Theories about etiology usually underlie, and therefore guide, most strategies for treatment. Although a comprehensive bio-psycho-social approach to mental illness can help to foster the collaboration of an interdisciplinary treatment team, a heavy emphasis on biological factors or cultural deprivation may reduce the client's feelings of personal responsibility for change. Contemporary psychotherapy can help clients reduce their tendency to attribute blame to biological predispositions or external societal factors. Instead, it is more helpful to cultivate attributions for personal responsibility for change, growth, and maturation.     

公共卫生语境下的政府责任

近年来,公共卫生的要求越来越多地进入到中国百姓的生活之中,问题的焦点也从公共卫生本身逐渐转向政府,转向政府所应当承载的责任乃至信用程度上来。政府在公共卫生问题上责任的缺失固然有责任意识的淡漠原因,但责任本身的模糊与混乱也是不容忽视的。只有保障机制与约束机制,特别是问责制,同时发挥效用,才能保证政府责任的有效实现。     

论医疗事故的法律责任

随着我国医疗卫生体制的改革、法制建设的发展,特别是新《刑法》的施行、《执业医师法》的颁布,关于医疗事故中医方行政、民事和刑事法律责任的法律规定正逐步健全。为了引起医方的高度重视、提高医疗质量、减少医疗事故的发生、有效地避免触犯法律,故对医疗事故概念的界定、构成、免责情形及三种具体法律责任作了较为系统的阐述。