The meditations and the logic of testimony

This paper argues that an examination of the ontology that underpins Descartes’s Fifth Meditation ontological proof of God’s existence will contribute to a better understanding of the nature and structure of the proof. Attention to the Cartesian meditator’s development of this ontology in earlier meditations also makes clear why this proof could not have been asserted before the Fifth Meditation. Finally, it is argued that Kant’s objections against the ontological proof have no force against Descartes’ particular version of the proof.     

Analytic listening and the five senses: introduction

This introductory essay, the three papers that follow-by Jonathan Palmer, Forrest Hamer, and Peter Goldberg-and the commentary by Susan Yamaguchi are products of the panel "Analytic Listening and the Five Senses," presented at the American Psychoanalytic Association meeting in San Francisco, June 11, 2011.     

The puzzle of philosophical testimony

An epistemologist tells you that knowledge is more than justified true belief. You trust them and thus come to believe this on the basis of their testimony. Did you thereby come to know that this view is correct? Intuitively, there is something intellectually wrong with forming philosophical beliefs on the basis of testimony, and yet it's hard to see why philosophy should be significantly epistemically different from other areas of inquiry in a way that would fully prohibit belief by testimony. This, I argue, is the puzzle of philosophical testimony. In this paper, I explore the puzzle of philosophical testimony and its ramifications. In particular, I examine the case for pessimism about philosophical testimony—the thesis that philosophical belief on the basis of testimony is impossible or is in some way illegitimate—and I argue that it lacks adequate support. I then consider whether the source of the apparent intellectual wrongness of testimonial‐based philosophical belief is grounded in non‐epistemic norms and goals of philosophical practice itself and argue that such norms are implausible, don't conflict with testimonial‐based philosophical belief, or else are mere disciplinary norms, lacking substantial normative force that would make it wrong to form testimonial‐based philosophical belief.     

On specification and the senses

In this target article we question the assumption that perception is divided into separate domains of vision, hearing, touch, taste, and smell. We review implications of this assumption for theories of perception and for our understanding of ambient energy arrays (e.g., the optic and acoustic arrays) that are available to perceptual systems. We analyze three hypotheses about relations between ambient arrays and physical reality: (1) that there is an ambiguous relation between ambient energy arrays and physical reality, (2) that there is a unique relation between individual energy arrays and physical reality, and (3) that there is a redundant but unambiguous relation, within or across arrays, between energy arrays and physical reality. This is followed by a review of the physics of motion, focusing on the existence and status of referents for physical motion. Our review indicates that it is not possible, in principle, for there to be a unique relation between physical motion and the structure of individual energy arrays. We argue that physical motion relative to different referents is specified only in the global array, which consists of higher-order relations across different forms of energy. The existence of specificity in the global array is consistent with the idea of direct perception, and so poses a challenge to traditional, inference-based theories of perception and cognition. However, it also presents a challenge to much of the ecological approach to perception and action, which has accepted the assumption of separate senses.     

The psychological reality of word senses

This paper tests psychologists' frequent assumption that dictionaries are psychologically realistic models of polysemy in the mental lexicon. Psychologists have not often explored the nature of polysemy, and lexicographers' methods have not involved scientific sampling of usages or informants. It is argued, however, that the lexicographic technique of citation sorting is an effective way of discovering sense differences. Here this technique was used in three tasks involving usage samples for 24 high- and low-frequency nouns varying widely in degree of polysemy in the dictionary. Analyses of agreement within and between subjects showed that subjects consistently judged and substantially agreed upon the major senses of most nouns, but that few nouns in either frequency group were perceived to have more than three significant senses. Additionally, the possibility that larger usage samples will bias people to make more sense groupings was found not to be true, suggesting that the larger number of senses lexicographers create for high-frequency words are not artifacts of larger usage samples.This research was partially supported by grants from the Spencer and Sloan Foundations to George A. Miller.     

The case for guidance: testimony before Congress

The author, as a member of APGA's Federal Relations Committee, recently presented testimony on counseling and, guidance services before the U.S. House of Representatives' Subcommittee on Labor, Health, Education and Welfare and Related Agencies. This testimony, on behalf of APGA and ASCA, concerned fiscal year 1973 appropriations for the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Title III (ESEA, III)—Counseling, Guidance and Testing. This article is drawn from the author's testimony and is directed toward reporting some of the positive outcomes of counseling and guidance, the dilemma of cutbacks in services, and the need for substantial expansion of fiscal and. personal support for counseling and guidance.     

Predicting the present: expert testimony and civil commitment

This article uses the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert as an opportunity to address a chronic concern regarding the disparity between mental health law as officially enunciated and the practical application of that law. After Daubert, admissibility of expert evidence under the federal rules requires a qualified expert, a reliable basis for the testimony, and relevance to the legal issue. Ongoing psychological research pursues empirical data that expands the scope of psychological expertise and clarifies its limits. This article addresses the requirement of relevance by examining the logical relationship between the psychologist's actuarial and clinical expertise and the legal issues addressed by the court in civil commitment proceedings. Ideally, Daubert might stimulate a process of cooperative analysis in which psychologists and lawyers clarify the proper roles of psychological experts and of the courts with which those experts interact. This article begins that project by clarifying the legal determination required in civil commitment proceedings and by explicating the relationship between the responsibilities of experts and those of courts.     

Renewing the senses: conversion experience and the phenomenology of the spiritual life

In his discussion of conversion experience, in The Varieties of Religious Experience, William James draws attention to a variety of experience which has not been much investigated in the philosophy of religion literature, but which seems to be of some importance religiously??namely, an experience which consists in a re-vivification of the sensory world as a whole. In this paper, I develop four accounts of the nature of this kind of experience, and I show how the experience can inform our conception of the spiritual life, considered as a world-directed mode of experience and practice.     

The admissibility of expert testimony regarding malingering and deception

This article discusses the legal admissibility of expert testimony and the ability of mental health professionals to detect malingering and deception among defendants. A legal analysis of the admissibility of expert testimony regarding malingering and deception in formal legal proceedings is presented. Some guidelines are provided to help mental health professionals and attorneys determine the admissibility of evidence they intend to introduce. Although psychologists and psychiatrists currently have a limited ability to identify accurately malingering and deception, expert testimony about the genuineness of a defendant's mental illness is likely to be held admissible for both practical and evidentiary reasons. In contrast, evidence about a witness' credibility is rarely admissible. In addition, psychologists are ethically obliged to recognize their limitations in making representations about their skills.     

The information effect: constructive memory, testimony, and epistemic luck

The incorporation of post-event testimonial information into an agent’s memory representation of the event via constructive memory processes gives rise to the misinformation effect, in which the incorporation of inaccurate testimonial information results in the formation of a false memory belief. While psychological research has focussed primarily on the incorporation of inaccurate information, the incorporation of accurate information raises a particularly interesting epistemological question: do the resulting memory beliefs qualify as knowledge? It is intuitively plausible that they do not, for they appear to be only luckily true. I argue, however, that, despite its intuitive plausibility, this view is mistaken: once we adopt an adequate (modal) conception of epistemic luck and an adequate (adaptive) general approach to memory, it becomes clear that memory beliefs resulting from the incorporation of accurate testimonial information are not in general luckily true. I conclude by sketching some implications of this argument for the psychology of memory, suggesting that the misinformation effect would better be investigated in the context of a broader “information effect”.