Lewis,Change and Temporary Intrinsics

This is an attempt to sort out what is it that makes many of us uncomfortable with the perdurantist solution to the problem of change. Lewis argues that only perdurantism can reconcile change with persistence over time, while neither presentism nor endurantism can. So, first, I defend the endurantist solution to the problem of change, by arguing that what is relative to time are not properties, but their possession. Second, I explore the anti-perdurantist strategy of arguing that Lewis cannot solve the problem of change, for he cannot account for how some properties are possessed by objects in time. However, I argue that this strategy fails, for if by saying that objects in time can have properties ‘timelessly’ we mean “at no particular time” and “tenselessly”, only objects outside time can have properties in that way; but if we mean “for all the time they exist”, or “essentially”, perdurantists can account for this. Finally, I argue that actually perdurantism cannot solve the problem, but for different reasons: for either it sweeps the problem under the carpet, denying change, and in general subverting our conceptual scheme in a dangerous way, or it becomes equivalent to the endurantist picture that properties are had at times. Nor perdurantism is justified by the Relativity Theory or the B-theory of time, because while endurantism is certainly comfortable with presentism, it need not be committed to it; and even if it were, presentism need not be refuted by the Relativity Theory.     

Substantiating Byzantium: The role of artifacts in the co‐construction of narratives

Acknowledging the abundance of narrative elements in servicescapes and anchored on the premise that consumption experiences are co‐constructed, this research extends existing servicescapes scholarship by theorizing the role of material objects in the co‐construction of narratives at storyscapes, that is, those servicescapes where narratives are at the center stage of the consumption experience. Using a museum exhibition of Byzantine heritage in Thessaloniki, Greece, the findings provide insight on the way in which consumers engage and “read” material artifacts in narrative co‐construction. The emergent framework theorizes consumer participation as narrative substantiation and sheds light on its four constitutive narrative‐construction processes (completing, relating, recontextualizing, and imagining) and on the ways in which consumers anchor these processes on artifact's materiality (artifactual knowledge, practicalness, intermateriality, and realness). Furthermore, this research offers an alternative approach to the existing language analogy according to which objects have their own voice and rhetoric. I see objects, instead, as contributing an evocative engagement according to which consumers unpack objects not only in their reference to the servicescape narrative but also in reference to their own personal and collective lives. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Interrogation,Interpretation and Integration of Spirituality: Insights from Sri Aurobindo for “Care for Creation”

This paper brings together three strands of enquiry – interrogation of spirituality, interpretation of spirituality and Sri Aurobindo's integrative spirituality – which form the three natural parts of the paper. In the first part I interrogate the idea and category “spirituality” and argue that this term came to be understood in opposition to the “material” only in medieval times, and thus the common notion of spirituality as opposed to materiality is misplaced. In the second part, in light of George Lindbeck's work, I will explore the question – is it possible for different traditions that interpret spirituality differently to hold a common unifying position? I will argue that if we are to arrive at an understanding of spirituality that will be acceptable to different traditions, then the very conception of spirituality must be informed by all. In the final part, I will argue that Sri Aurobindo's integrative spirituality offers a sufficient rationale for creation‐care by proposing a view of spirituality which, on the one hand, overcomes the spiritual‐material dichotomy, while on the other, contains an implicit guard against imposing its view of spirituality on other traditions. Finally, by bringing Sri Aurobindo into the dialogue I demonstrate how insights from another tradition can be drawn to enrich our understanding of spirituality.     

Time and Matter: Historicity,Facticity and the Question of Phenomenological Realism

This paper deals with the question of historical facticity in the phenomenological tradition. I argue that taking historicity into consideration in its factical constitution means transgressing the realm of the primordial or existential temporality. Following Ricoeur’s discussion of the idea of the “referential status of the past,” the question of the material foundation of historical meaning-formation, i.e., relation between temporality and materiality will be brought into the forefront of phenomenological investigations. It is with this context in mind that I argue that exploring the conditions of historicity with regard to its factical and material determinations should assume a realist position in phenomenology.     

The Proclamation of Charles H. Long in the Time of Black Lives Matter,Standing Rock,and COVID-19

Revisiting Charles H. Long's 1991 proclamation of a modern crisis of materiality, this essay examines Long's theorization of the fetish-commodity legacies, that recreated African persons into objects and commodities, as a means of understanding our present tripartite pandemic of systemic racism, environmental destruction, and COVID-19. Examining the period of, what Long elsewhere terms, the “second creation,” I interrogate what this crisis means for the study of religion and for our society today. Building on Long's conception of “soul stuff” and yet moving beyond notions of human exceptionalism, I argue that to move beyond fetish and colonial legacies and realize a “third creation” (or, in other words, a (re-)re-creation), both scholars and the public must craft a new materialism that honors the ontological reality and value of all existence.     

Methods of materiality: participant observation and qualitative research in psychology

This article challenges the hegemonic status of “language” as the primary substance of qualitative research in psychology, whether through interviews or recordings of naturally occurring talk. It thereby questions the overt focus on analyzing linguistic “meaning.” Instead, it is suggested that researchers should start paying attention to the material world (consisting of both human bodies and material objects) and what it means for how people live their lives. It is argued that this can be done by incorporating the concept of material presence to capture embodied and material layers of existence, and the method of participant observation is suggested as a viable approach to achieve this end. An empirical example of how authority is produced in a parent-teacher conference, not only through language but also through material objects and embodied being, is then presented. The article concludes by suggesting practical guidelines for incorporating attention to materiality in qualitative research.     

Against the Moral Powers Test of basic liberty

In Rawlsian political philosophy, “basic liberties” are rights subject to a high degree of protection, such that they cannot easily be overridden for concerns of stability, efficiency, or social justice. For Rawls, something qualifies as a basic liberty if and only if bears the right relationship to our “two moral powers”: a capacity to form a sense of the good life and a capacity for a sense of justice. However, which rights are basic liberties is subject to frequent ideological debate, which Rawlsian libertarians and Rawlsian socialists arguing that Rawls's own view is mistaken or incomplete. I argue that problem is that Moral Powers Test does not quite work. Only a small amount of liberty—not enough to qualify a society as liberal—can clearly be shown to pass the Moral Powers Test. One might attempt to rescue the Moral Powers Test by relaxing or modifying its requirements, but, I will argue, there appears to be no unproblematic and nonquestion‐begging way to do so. The Moral Powers Test must be abandoned or, at least, requires some unknown but radical revision or require supplements from outside Rawls's own theory.     

D. W. Winnicott,transitional objects and the creation of the divine

Religious expressions and religious behaviours are often considered to be mainly mental or spiritual phenomena, to a large degree divorced from or threatened by physical or material forms that may accompany their expression. This paper asks whether the diminution of the material or the condemnation of idols, icons and religious art loses sight of possible benefits that involvement with these forms of material divinity has for believers. Using the concept of transitional objects and transitional phenomena developed by D. W. Winnicott, a mid-twentieth-century psychoanalyst, I argue that idols, icons and religious art often represent transitional objects that form psychological bridges, intermediaries or anticipated “transitions” from humans to unseen divinities who require materialisation in some form to be maintained actively in the believer’s mind. In the process of creating or designing these material forms, the forms themselves often come to be considered “divine”. Illustrations are provided.     

To the Nothingnesses Themselves: Husserl’s Influence on Sartre’s Notion of Nothingness

In this article I argue that Sartre’s notions of nothingness and “negatity” are not, as he presents it, primarily reactions to Hegel and Heidegger. Instead, they are a reaction to an ongoing struggle with Husserl’s notion of intentionality and related notions. I do this by comparing the criticism aimed at Husserl in Sartre’s Being and Nothingness to that presented in his earlier work, The Imagination, where he discusses Husserl more elaborately. Furthermore, I compare his criticism to Husserl’s own criticism of the “doctrine of immanent objects”, in order to show that Sartre’s notion of nothingness is a continuation of Husserl’s criticism, and that he turns Husserl’s own arguments against himself.     

Sadomasochism as Make‐Believe

In “Rethinking Sadomasochism,” Patrick Hopkins challenges the “radical” feminist claim that sadomasochism is incompatible with feminism. He does so by appeal to the notion of “simulation.” I argue that Hopkins's conclusions are generally right, but they cannot be inferred from his “simulation” argument. I replace Hopkins's “simulation” with Kendall Walton's more sophisticated theory of “make‐believe.” I use this theory to better argue that privately conducted sadomasochism is compatible with feminism.     

(Inadvertently) Instructing Missionaries in (Public University) World Religions Courses: Examining a Pedagogical Dilemma,its Dimensions,and a Course Section Solution

In this article, I explore an ethical and pedagogical dilemma that I encounter each semester in my world religions courses: namely, that a great number of students enroll in the courses as part of their missionary training programs, and come to class understanding successful learning to mean gathering enough information about the world's religious “traditions” so as to effectively seduce people out of them. How should we teach world religions – in public university religious studies courses – with this student constituency? What are/ought to be our student learning goals? What can and should we expect to accomplish? How can we maximize student learning, while also maintaining our disciplinary integrity? In response to these questions, I propose a world religions course module, the goal of which is for students to examine – as objects of inquiry – the lenses through which they understand religion(s). With a recognition of their own lenses, I argue, missionary students become more aware of the biases and presumptions about others that they bring to the table, and they learn to see the ways in which these presumptions inform what they see and know about others, and also what they do not so easily see.     

A tale of two methods

Simulations (both digital and analog) and experiments share many features. But what essential features distinguish them? I discuss two proposals in the literature. On one proposal, experiments investigate nature directly, while simulations merely investigate models. On another proposal, simulations differ from experiments in that simulationists manipulate objects that bear only a formal (rather than material) similarity to the targets of their investigations. Both of these proposals are rejected. I argue that simulations fundamentally differ from experiments with regard to the background knowledge that is invoked to argue for the “external validity” of the investigation.     

Real Representation of Fictional Objects

Assuming there are fictional objects, what sorts of properties do they have? Intuitively, most of their properties involve being represented—appearing in works of fiction, being depicted as clever, being portrayed by actors, being admired or feared, and so on. But several philosophers, including Saul Kripke, Peter van Inwagen, Kendall Walton, and Amie Thomasson, argue that even if there are fictional objects, they are not really represented in some or all of these cases. I reconstruct four kinds of arguments for this unexpected conclusion; they concern the semantics of names, pragmatic force, creation, and representations’ qualitative content. But I find all the arguments flawed. I then argue for the contrary, employing a new perspective: representation of fictional objects begins with the works of fiction that originate them. A work of fiction represents its “native” objects because our culture bestows that property on it (and on other works of fiction). I sketch conditions for such property bestowal and argue that they are satisfied in this case.     

Naming and Nonexistence

I defend a cluster of views about names from fiction and myth. The views are based on two claims: first, proper names refer directly to their bearers; and second, names from fiction and myth are genuinely empty, they simply do not refer. I argue that when such names are used in direct discourse, utterances containing them have truth values but do not express propositions. I also argue that it is a mistake to think that if an utterance of, for example, “Vulcan is a planet” fails to express a proposition, then an utterance of “Le Verrier believed that Vulcan is a planet” cannot express a proposition. The argument applies to claims about fiction, such as “Sherlock Holmes is strong,” and claims about the attitudes of authors and auditors. The upshot is a semantics for fictional statements that provides a satisfying way for direct reference theorists to avoid taking fictional entities to be abstract objects and to accept the commonsense view that what is true in a fiction is ultimately a matter of what is pretended to be the case.     

Husserl’s hyletic data and phenomenal consciousness

In the Logical Investigations, Ideas I and many other texts, Husserl maintains that perceptual consciousness involves the intentional “animation” or interpretation of sensory data or hyle, e.g., “color-data,” “tone-data,” and algedonic data. These data are not intrinsically representational nor are they normally themselves objects of representation, though we can attend to them in reflection. These data are “immanent” in consciousness; they survive the phenomenological reduction. They partly ground the intuitive or “in-the-flesh” aspect of perception, and they have a determinacy of character that we do not create but can only discover. This determinate, non-representational stratum of perceptual consciousness also serves as a bridge between consciousness and the world beyond it. I articulate and defend this conception of perceptual consciousness. I locate the view in the space of contemporary positions on phenomenal character and argue for its superiority. I close by briefly arguing that the Husserlian account is perfectly compatible with physicalism (this involves disarming the Grain Problem).     

Subverting utilitarian subject-object relations in video games: A philosophical analysis of Thatgamecompany’s Journey

In this article, I analyse the self-other relations that underpin the gameplay design of the majority of popular video games. Specifically, these self-other relations can be described as “utilitarian subject-object relations”, in which the player assumes the perspective of the player-character, or subject of the video game, while all the other elements of the video game, including the digital environment and the non-player characters and creatures, are treated as separate objects that merely exist to be used by the player-character. These subject-object relations are usually driven by the violent accumulation of power, which can, in turn, be channelled by the player-character into further violent actions against the so-called objects within the video game. In contrast to this typical model of gameplay, the gameplay of Thatgamecompany’s Journey does not include a subject that merely acts on and uses the other elements within the video game world for its own ends, but rather entails a relation of “becoming-other” in which the player-character and the other elements are involved in constant processes of reciprocal determination. In order to analyse the “becoming-other” relations that underpin Journey’s gameplay, I employ specific concepts from the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari, including the concepts of “becoming-other”, “percepts” and “affects”. Ultimately, I argue that Journey not only subverts the utilitarian, often violent, subject-object relations that have become an industry trope in the majority of video games, but also promotes self-other relations that are arguably far more positive and creative for video game design in general.     

The “Positive Argument” for Constructive Empiricism and Inference to the Best Explanation

In this paper, I argue that the “positive argument” for Constructive Empiricism (CE), according to which CE “makes better sense of science, and of scientific activity, than realism does” (van Fraassen in The scientific image, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980, 73), is an Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). But constructive empiricists are critical of IBE, and thus they have to be critical of their own “positive argument” for CE. If my argument is sound, then constructive empiricists are in the awkward position of having to reject their own “positive argument” for CE by their own lights.     

Toward a more inclusive understanding of the “brain drain”

I argue in this paper that the proposals developed by Gillian Brock in Debating the Brain Drain: May Governments Restrict Emigration? should not only be applied to so-called “highly skilled” emigrants. I contend that Brock’s proposals, in order to be implemented justly, must be re-framed such that they are inclusive of so-called “low-skilled” or “unskilled” migrants. I argue for a more inclusive understanding of the “brain drain” in immigration policy – one that can make use of Brock’s important proposals in an expanded fashion – and I provide an account of what this more inclusive understanding should look like.     

Performance-Enhancing Drugs,Sport, and the Ideal of Natural Athletic Performance

The use of certain performance-enhancing drugs (PED) is banned in sport. I discuss critically standard justifications of the ban based on arguments from two widely used criteria: fairness and harms to health. I argue that these arguments on their own are inadequate, and only make sense within a normative understanding of athletic performance and the value of sport. In the discourse over PED, the distinction between “natural” and “artificial” performance has exerted significant impact. I examine whether the distinction makes sense from a moral point of view. I propose an understanding of “natural” athletic performance by combining biological knowledge of training with an interpretation of the normative structure of sport. I conclude that this understanding can serve as moral justification of the PED ban and enable critical and analytically based line drawing between acceptable and nonacceptable performance-enhancing means in sport.