Emilio Uranga’s Análisis Del Ser Del Mexicano: De‐colonizing Pretensions,Re‐colonizing Critiques

This essay introduces and defends Emilio Uranga's philosophical intervention in his 1952 text, Análisis del ser del mexicano. Here, to begin with, a case is made that the Análisis can be read as an effort at decolonizing philosophy. This is followed by a consideration of recent criticisms of “la filosofía de lo mexicano,” which naturally extend to Uranga's text, since this is the philosophical tradition in which we find it. Finally, a defense is given against these critiques and a suggestion is made that in order to properly understand the Análisis it is crucial that one understand both its liberatory impulse and its method.     

Merleau‐Ponty’s Reading of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism

The aim of this paper is to explore Merleau‐Ponty’s ambivalent relationship with Kant’s transcendental philosophy. I begin by looking at several points of convergence between Kant and Merleau‐Ponty, focusing on the affinities between Kant’s account of transcendental realism and Merleau‐Ponty’s notion of objective thought. I then show how Merleau‐Ponty’s analysis of Kant’s paradox of asymmetrical objects points to a parallel in Kant’s thought to Merleau‐Ponty’s thesis of the primacy of perception. In the second part of the paper, I show why Merleau‐Ponty believes that, despite the promise of Kant’s thought, he fails to adequately escape from objective thought. After presenting the central claims of the transcendental deduction, I piece together Merleau‐Ponty’s criticism of it by answering three questions: For Merleau‐Ponty, how do we encounter the world prior to reflection? How is experience constituted? And what leads Kant to mischaracterise experience in his own transcendental philosophy?     

Kant’s Quasi‐Eudaimonism

In contrast to eudaimonism, Kant argues that moral reasoning and prudential reasoning are two distinct uses of practical reason, each with its own standard for good action. Despite Kant’s commitment to the ineradicable potential for fundamental conflict between these types of practical reasoning, I argue that once we shift to consideration of a developmental narrative of these faculties, we see that virtuous moral reasoning is able to substantively influence prudential reasoning, while prudential reason should be responsive to such influence. Further, Kant indicates the integration of virtue as a commitment concerning practical priorities, and so too what should and should not agree with the agent, is beneficial for prudential reasoning by prudential reasoning’s own standards. Although Kant’s ethical system breaks from eudaimonism in significant ways, it retains the eudaimonist claim that virtuously‐informed pursuits of happiness are not only better for virtue, but also better for happiness.     

Re‐embedding Moral Agency

The connection between ethics and theological vision has become increasingly important for ethics as we better appreciate how the moral agent is embedded in a framework that affectively and intellectually shapes her moral reasoning. Moral reasoning is always reasoning within (that is, within a moral framework, a religious worldview, and/or a set of ideological commitments). A similar framing occurs in literature, which I refer to as its “horizon.” A literary text's horizon comprises the theological and metaphysical commitments that are implied by the text and that the reader relies on to make sense of it. I suggest that there is a parallel between how moral frameworks and literary horizons operate in that both shape moral judgment. I argue that in using literature as a resource for ethics, the same contemporary currents that have led us to appreciate the embeddedness of moral reasoning should also encourage us to give more careful attention to the theological or metaphysical vision implied by a text. Such a “theo‐ethical” reading of literature provides a richer understanding of particular moral goods and the interplay between those goods and ethical themes like agency, hope, and redemption. I substantiate this claim with a reading of William Blake's Jerusalem: The Emanation of the Giant Albion.     

Re‐experiencing Evangelism in the City

The paper reflects on some of the exposure visits/city walks that were organized as part of the recent workshop on life‐giving evangelism in the city, held in Sydney, Australia. These exposure visits were designed to engage participants in reflection on evangelism and stimulate their own expressions of contextually relevant evangelistic practice. I suggest that the visits remind us of at least five key themes in evangelism – invitation, invaded space, serving the least and lost, the importance of the local, and the need for celebration in the midst of our multicultural world. In the second part of the paper, I reflect on the discussion that took place with my class at United Theological College, Sydney, on the theme of evangelism, particularly from the perspective of the three recent global statements on mission. Finally, I join in the call for joy to be the hallmark of our engagement in evangelism. We are to “glow with fervour” as people who have first received the joy of Christ.     

Herman Bavinck’s ‘Yes’ and Karl Barth’s ‘No’: Constructing a Dialectic‐in‐Organic Approach to the Theology of General Revelation

By grounding theology in God’s revelation, Herman Bavinck (1854‐1921) and Karl Barth (1886‐1968) take differing attitudes to general revelation, which is widely accepted in the circle of Reformed theology. Bavinck firmly says ‘Yes’ to the existence of the knowledge of God in creation. In contrast with him, Barth holds fast to the Christocentric view of God’s revelation, and thus says ‘No’ to general revelation in the universe. This divergence is primarily due to their different theological thinking and concerns. Bavinck deploys organic thinking in revelation and focuses on God’s creation, which seems to blur the distinction between general and special revelation. By contrast, Barth makes use of dialectical thinking and preoccupies himself with divine‐human reconciliation, which subordinates creation to God’s redemption. To this extent, both bring about disparities within God’s revelation. This essay proposes a dialectic‐in‐organic approach to general revelation, which affirms the disclosure of the knowledge of the Triune God in creation, recognises the independent value of creation, and maintains the diversity‐with‐parity within the revelation of the Triune God.     

Thomas Aquinas’ Divine Simplicity as Biblical Hermeneutic

Long draws from the Old Testament scholar Walter Brueggemann's commentary on Jeremiah some strong reasons for rejecting the traditional teaching on divine simplicity. Above all, for Brueggemann the book of Jeremiah simply will not work if God is simple: God explicitly tells Jeremiah that God suffers and also that God changes in response to Israel. According to Long, however, Thomas Aquinas's doctrine of divine simplicity actually upholds the points that Brueggemann draws from Jeremiah. Long argues that theological accounts of divine simplicity should especially have two purposes: to serve as a way of manifesting in speech the mystery of the Triune God, and to affirm God's transcendent sovereignty over creation. In light of Brueggemann's approach, Long examines four early Reformed theologians: Peter Vermigli (1499‐1562), Girolamo Zanchi (1516‐1590), John Biddle (1615‐1662) and John Owen (1616‐1683). While Biddle rejects divine simplicity, the others uphold it. Long shows that their teaching on divine simplicity focuses on God's transcendent sovereignty over creation. By contrast, Long finds Aquinas's doctrine of divine simplicity to be more helpful in upholding Brueggemann's insights, insofar as Aquinas uses the doctrine to defend the simplicity of the Triune God. Rather than focusing on God's sovereign power, Aquinas's doctrine of divine simplicity focuses on getting the Trinitarian processions right.     

Re‐examining the effects of noncontingent success on self‐handicapping behaviour

Background: Self‐handicapping refers to the practice on the part of certain individuals to handicap their performance when poor performance is likely to reveal low ability. Noncontingent success (feedback that is inflated relative to performance) is more likely to promote self‐handicapping behaviour than noncontingent failure (failure feedback based on false or misleading information). However, the reasons for the differing effects of these forms of performance feedback on self‐handicapping behaviour remain obscure. Aims: The present study sought an explanation for the differing effects of these forms of performance feedback, testing the assumption that students high in self‐handicapping behaviour would react more negatively following noncontingent success, reporting more unstable and external attributions, higher anxiety, and a greater propensity to claim handicaps than those low in self‐handicapping behaviour. No differences were expected on any of these measures for high relative to low self‐handicappers following either noncontingent failure or success. Sample: Participants were 72 undergraduate students, divided equally between high and low self‐handicapping groups. Method: High and low self‐handicappers were assigned to one of three performance feedback conditions: noncontingent failure, success and noncontingent success. High and low self‐handicappers were then given an opportunity to claim handicaps prior to completing measures of attributions and state anxiety. Subsequently, they completed 12 remote associate tasks, serving as an assessment of performance, and 16 unicursal tasks, assessing practice effort. Results: Following noncontingent success, high self‐handicappers reported greater anxiety, more unproductive attributions and claimed more handicaps than low self‐handicappers. However no differences were evident for high and low self‐handicappers following either noncontingent failure or success. High self‐handicappers also performed poorly on the remote associates tasks and reduced practice effort on the unicursal tasks.