Victims' Stories of Human Rights Abuse: The Ethics of Ownership,Dissemination, and Reception

This paper addresses three commentaries on Victims' Stories and the Advancement of Human Rights. In response to Vittorio Bufacchi, it argues that asking victims to tell their stories needn't be coercive or unjust and that victims are entitled to decide whether and under what conditions to tell their stories. In response to Serene Khader, it argues that empathy with victims' stories can contribute to building a culture of human rights provided that measures are taken to overcome the implicit biases and colonialist interpellations she identifies. In response to Andrea Westlund, it proposes a taxonomy of types of narrative closure and offers some arguments to strengthen her view that empathy with victims' stories endows audience members with a new reason and new motivation to support human rights.     

AD HOMINEM ARGUMENTS AND INTELLIGENT DESIGN: REPLY TO KOPERSKI

Abstract Jeffrey Koperski claims in Zygon (2008) that critics of Intelligent Design engage in fallacious ad hominem attacks on ID proponents and that this is a “bad way” to engage them. I show that Koperski has made several errors in his evaluation of the ID critics. He does not distinguish legitimate, relevant ad hominem arguments from fallacious ad hominem attacks. He conflates (or equates) the logical use of valid with the colloquial use of valid. Moreover, Koperski doesn't take seriously the legitimate concerns of the ID critics, and in doing so, commits the straw man fallacy. In the end, I show that no one disagrees with the criticism of improper use of fallacies as methods of evaluation. But what constitutes proper, relevant evaluation of the ID theorists and their motivation is a matter of dispute. And sometimes attacking a person as a method of evaluation is justified, and thus is not fallacious. The definition of ad hominem arguments as either a “good way” or a “bad way” rests on justification, which I argue ID opponents have. The basis for these good objections relies on the motivation many Christians have to share their faith with non‐Christians, which they call the “great commission.”     

Identity-Neutral and Identity-Constitutive Reasons for Preserving Nature

abstract Environmental ethicists will often say that in dealing with natural entities we need the guidance of an ethic rooted in ‘the intrinsic value of nature’. They will add that subjectivist value theories are unable to account for the normativity of intrinsic value discourse. This preoccupation with normativity explains why many environmental ethicists favour value objectivism. As I see it, value theories must address not only the problem of normativity but also the problem of motivation. In fact, my approach to the question as to which type of value theory does most justice to our intuition regarding the value of nature is primarily in terms of the motivational perspective. I argue that neither the usual objectivist theories nor their subjectivist counterparts can accommodate and explain the fact that those who agree that nature has intrinsic value may well differ in motivation to support its preservation. I suggest that such difference in kinds of motivation is related to distinct kinds of value judgement in which belief in the intrinsic value of nature is expressed. To clarify my view I discuss the subjectivist value theory of Gerald Gaus[1]. Gaus regards the distinction between personal and impersonal value judgements to be deeply embedded in his theory. His internalism about the relation between reason and motivation however, leads him to the mistaken conclusion that independent impersonal value judgements do not provide reasons for action. Next, I introduce the distinction between identity‐neutral and identity‐constitutive reasons. This distinction allows me to formulate more clearly the differences between the kinds of reasons provided by personal and impersonal value judgements. The resulting theory explains how it is that people who do not (personally) value nature may still be motivated to support nature preservation. It also explains why not everyone who endorses natural values will join movements for the preservation of nature.     

Effect of achievement motivation on cognitive control adaptations

Previous research addressing motivational effects on cognitive control adaptations primarily manipulated external rewards. In the present study, we examined whether achievement motivation, reflecting intrinsic motivation, modulates cognitive control adaptations. In each of two experiments, students were divided into a high achievement motivation group (HAM; Experiment 1: N?=?36; Experiment 2: N?=?39) and a low achievement motivation group (LAM; Experiment 1: N?=?30; Experiment 2: N?=?39) on the basis of the Achievement Motivation Scale. Cognitive control adaptations were assessed by sequential congruency effects (SCEs) in Flanker tasks. Using a standard Flanker task in Experiment 1 and examining response times, the HAM but not LAM participants showed evidence of cognitive control adaptations. Because SCEs in a standard Flanker task may reflect lower-level, bottom-up processes rather than cognitive control adaptations, we used an adapted version of the Flanker task in Experiment 2 that controlled for the potential influence of such processes. Experiment 2 again revealed evidence of SCEs in the HAM but not LAM participants. These results suggest that cognitive control adaptions may be modulated by achievement motivation. Such potential modulation could be taken into account when evaluating results of previous and future fundamental and applied studies on cognitive control adaptations.     

Reactance,autonomy and paths to persuasion: Examining perceptions of threats to freedom and informational value

Autonomy, often associated with an open and reflective evaluation of experience, is sometimes confused with reactance, which indicates resistance to persuasion attempts. Two studies examined a path model in which autonomy and reactance predicted motivation following the provision of anonymous or source-identified health-risk information, via the mediation of perceived threat to decision-making freedom and of perceived informational value. Study 1 (N = 122) investigated alcohol consumption. The results showed that autonomy was positively related to autonomous motivation and intentions to drink responsibly. Reactance negatively predicted autonomous motivation in the source-identified information condition but positively predicted autonomous motivation and intentions in the anonymous information condition. Reactance negatively predicted attitudes through the mediation of perceived threat to decision-making freedom. Study 2 (N = 145) tested our hypothesized model for smoking behavior and replicated several of the Study 1 findings. Implications for our understanding of autonomy, reactance, and responses to risk-information are discussed.     

Mottainai: a Japanese sense of anima mundi

The Japanese expression ‘Mottainai!’ can be translated as ‘What a waste!’ or ‘Don't be wasteful!’ However, mottainai means much more than that. It expresses a sense of concern or regret for whatever is wasted because its intrinsic value is not properly utilized. Buddhism and Japan's indigenous religion, Shinto, are integral to the Japanese psyche, accordingly the other‐than‐human world is also experienced and lived in daily life. In the Japanese worldview everything in nature is endowed with spirit, every individual existence is dependent on others and all are connected in an ever‐changing world. Mottainai offers a glimpse of the anima mundi inherent in this worldview. This contrasts with our anthropocentric Zeitgeist, which manifests outwardly as environmental crisis and inwardly as fixation upon social interactions, especially through communication technologies, to the exclusion of all else. Jung's statement, ‘The decisive question for man is: Is he related to something infinite or not? That is the telling question of his life’, has never been more pertinent. Encounters beyond the human world could be understood as touching this ‘something infinite’, and the apparent benefits of such experiences in the analytical process are illustrated with clinical vignettes from the author's practice.     

Setting limits on children's behavior: The differential effects of controlling vs. informational styles on intrinsic motivation and creativity

The imposition of external constraints on an activity has frequently been shown to undermine intrinsic motivation. Given that limits must often be set upon peoples' activities, especially in parenting and education, the present study addressed the question of whether limits can be set without undermining intrinsic motivation for the activity being limited. Using cognitive evaluation theory, contrasting limit setting styles of either a controlling or informational nature, or no limits, were placed upon forty-four first- and second-grade children engaged in a painting activity. The intrinsic motivation, enjoyment, creativity, and quality of artistic production were expected to be decreased by controlling limits relative to informational and no-limits, which were not expected to differ from each other. The results provided substantial support for these predictions, suggesting that limits can be set without undermining intrinsic motivation if they are informational in nature. Support was also found for the consensual assessment of creativity method recently developed by Amabile (1982a). Results of the study are discussed along with the general relation between creativity and intrinsic motivation.     

The effect of extrinsic constraints on children's creativity while using a computer

Abstract:

Two studies were conducted to examine the impact of extrinsic constraints on children's performance while using a computer. Open‐ended tasks were presented and possible differential effects of rewards and evaluations imposed by human (experimenter) and non‐human (computer) sources were explored in relation to product creativity, motivation, and affective response. Both studies provide support for the hypothesis that reward and evaluation will undermine creativity and motivation, even when a computer serves as the source of these constraints. In addition, a developmental trend emerged with older children being far more adversely affected than their younger counterparts. The theoretical and applied significance of these results are discussed.     

Research Artifacts and the Social Psychology of Psychological Experiments

In psychological research with human subjects, experimenters need to anticipate potential artifacts that may be attributable to the social context of such research. Called research artifacts in this review, they are essentially uncontrolled, systematic errors (or biases) that threaten the degree of validity of statements made about whether changes in one variable result in changes in another variable. This discussion focuses on a proposed Markov‐like model emphasizing three mediating variables that operate in a theoretical chain of events. One variable refers to the likelihood of the subject's receptivity to task‐orienting cues (called demand characteristics), or incidental hints about the experimenter's expectations. A second variable refers to the likelihood of the subject's motivation (or willingness) to comply with those cues or hints. A third variable refers to the likelihood of the subject's capability of responding in accordance with the cues or hints. These three variables are discussed along with strategies that researchers can use to break the chain of events.     

Underlying motivation in the approach and avoidance goals of depressed and non-depressed individuals

Neurobiological theories predict decreased approach motivation and increased avoidance motivation in depression, but the results of previous studies have been equivocal. This study addressed a key limitation of previous research by assessing participants' underlying motivation for adopting their goals. Depressed (N=26) and non-depressed (N=33) participants listed approach and avoidance goals and wrote down their underlying reasons for adopting those goals. The groups did not differ on either the number of goals or underlying reasons but when underlying reasons were coded for approach or avoidance motivation depressed participants, compared to controls, showed less approach motivation and more avoidance motivation in relation to their approach goals. There were no effects related to avoidance goals. The results suggest that while the goals of depressed persons appear to be similar to those who are not depressed there are important differences at the level of underlying motivation.     

Content analysis of infanticide and neonaticide cases in the UK

Twenty cases, 14 infanticides and 6 neonaticides committed between 1989 and 2020 by biological mothers were analysed using Smallest Space Analysis for the presence of themes. Three themes associated with offender motivation were identified: Desperation, Disturbance and Rejection. Desperation theme included variables suggesting the mother committed the crime as a result of distress or perceived necessity. Disturbance suggested the motivation behind the offence to be as a result of the mother's caregiving role being disturbed; and the Rejection theme explained complete maternal rejection of the infant or new-born as the motivation behind the crime. Alongside the themes, three core variables were identified to be common for the crime regardless of motivation: the crime being committed at Home, the victim Female, and the crime being Denied by the mother. The implications of the findings are discussed including the potential for an investigative support tool and developing understandings of neonaticide and infanticide as separate crimes.     

Moral Reasons: Internal and External1

The view defended is one sense externalist on the relation between moral reasons and motivation: A's having a moral reason to do X does not necessarily imply that A has a motivation that would support A's doing X via some appropriate deliberative route. However, it is in another sense externalist in holding that there are the kind of moral reasons there are only if the relevant motivational capacities are generally present in human beings, if not in all individuals. The process of socialization is an attempt to embed the recognition of what we have moral reason to do in the intentional content of one's feelings. E.g., learning that about others' suffering embeds their suffering as a reason to help in the intentional content of incipient compassionate feelings. This endows the reason with motivational efficacy while conferring further direction to the feelings in ways that shape us for social cooperation.     

Pre- to Post-Season Changes in the Intrinsic Motivation of First Year College Athletes: Relationships with Coaching Behavior and Scholarship Status

This study examined whether the intrinsic motivation levels of first-year college athletes changed from pre- to post-season as a function of their scholarship status or their perceptions of their coaches' behavior. Division I college athletes ( N = 72) completed questionnaires assessing their intrinsic motivation at the beginning and end of their first year of participation. They also reported their scholarship status and their perceptions of their coaches' behaviors over the season. Contrary to predictions, results revealed that neither scholarship status nor time affected the athletes' level of intrinsic motivation. Strong support for the relationship between athletes' perceptions of their coaches' behavior and changes in athletes' level of intrinsic motivation over the season, however, emerged. Increases in athletes' level of intrinsic motivation were associated with athletes' perceptions that their coaches exhibited high frequencies of training and instruction behavior, and low frequencies of autocratic behavior and social support. Results are discussed in relation to cognitive evaluation theory and previous research on intrinsic motivation.     

In Politics We Trust…or Not? Trusting and Distrusting Demonstrators Compared

This article sheds light on the debate regarding political trust and protest activity. The debate boils down to the question whether trust in politics is positively or negatively related to protest activity. We exploit a dataset encompassing data on about 9,000 demonstrators spread over seven European countries. These demonstrators' trust in their parliaments varies widely, ranging from trustworthy capable, to corrupt incapable. We examine the diverging sociodemographic profiles and motivational dynamics that turn distrusting and trusting citizens into demonstrators. We hypothesize and show that distrusting demonstrators turn their back to institutionalized politics; for them, demonstrating substitutes the party politics they distrust. For trusting demonstrators, demonstrating supplements party politics. Trusting and distrusting demonstrators also differ considerably in terms of motivation. Distrusting demonstrators are stronger motivated to demonstrate than trusting demonstrators. Moreover, while political cynicism amplifies the motivation of distrusting demonstrators, it suppresses the motivation of trusting demonstrators. We conclude that the question to be answered is not so much whether people who engage in protest activity trust or distrust their political elites, but rather who the trusting and distrusting protesters are and why they protest.     

The influence of motivational and emotional factors in mathematical learning in secondary education

IntroductionWhile motivation has, for decades, been investigated as a key component of academic learning and performance, academic emotions have often been left out of the scope of investigation. According to several researchers, mathematics learning seems to be particularly affected by students’ emotions.ObjectiveThis paper is aimed at characterizing the emotions and motivation of eighth grade students in a mathematical setting and highlighting the cluster of emotions–activity emotions vs outcome emotions–which best predict math value, math self-concept, behavioral engagement and math performance.MethodData were collected through questionnaires from 115 students and analyzed through means comparisons and linear regressions.ResultsResults indicated that eighth grade students give a relatively high value to mathematics have a positive mathematics self-concept and are moderately engaged in mathematical tasks. Regression analysis showed that mathematics value and behavioral engagement are better explained by activity emotions while mathematics self-concept and performance are better predicted by outcome emotions.ConclusionThe implications of these findings in terms of educational practices are discussed at the end of this study.     

Motivation as a predictor of outcomes in school‐based humanistic counselling

Background: Recent years have seen a growth in the provision of counselling within UK secondary schools, and research indicates that it is associated with significant reductions in psychological distress. However, little is known about the moderators and mediators of positive therapeutic benefit. In the field of adult mental health, motivation has been found to be one of the strongest predictors of therapeutic outcomes, and it was hypothesised that this may also be a predictor of outcomes for young people in school‐based counselling services. Aims: To assess the relationship between young people's motivation for counselling and its effectiveness within a secondary school setting. Sample: Eighty‐one young people (12–17 years old) who attended school‐based humanistic counselling services in Scotland. Method: Clients completed a measure of motivation for counselling at the commencement of their therapeutic work and a measure of psychological wellbeing at the commencement and termination of counselling. Results: Motivation for counselling was not found to be significantly related to outcomes. Discussion: The results indicate that the association between motivation and outcomes may be weaker in young people as compared with adults. However, a number of design factors may also account for the non‐significant findings: insufficient participants, marginal reliability of the motivation measure and social desirability effects.     

Response to Strenger

Despite certain apparently common values, Strenger's critique is addressed largely to an inaccurate account of my views. It is also internally contradictory in various ways. On one hand, for example, Strenger favors a dialectic of science and the humanities as they bear on psychoanalysis; on the other hand, he declares science to be the exclusive psychoanalytic “metaphysic.” Remarkably, he claims that my critique of technical rationality is tantamount to advocating a passive reflective stance on the analyst's part, precluding anything akin to “coaching” to foster change. But I've written consistently about the dialectic of proactive therapeutic influence and critical reflection on that very influence and its implications. What's unacceptable about technical rationality is its positivist confidence about the effectiveness of prescribed interventions based on allegedly scientific evidence. With his lengthy survey of extra-analytic studies, Strenger evades engaging my specific arguments since they are strictly about the unwarranted privileging of the findings of psychoanalytic process and outcome research relative to clinical experience. He mistakenly equates my repudiation of such privileging with rejection of the value of “science” altogether for psychoanalysis. Finally, Strenger's claim that my “dialectical constructivism” eschews formulating universal truths about human nature ignores my consideration of human potentials for both denying and confronting mortality and the associated challenge of human agency. Embracing that challenge constitutes a moral position for psychoanalysis that is unequivocally opposed to uncritical compliance with culturally shaped demands for various types of therapeutic services.     

Love in the Time of Consequentialism

There are several powerful motivations for neutral value‐based deontic theories such as Act Consequentialism. Traditionally, such theories have had great difficulty accounting for partiality towards one's personal relationships and projects. This paper presents a neutral value‐based theory that preserves the motivations for Act Consequentialism while vindicating some crucial intuitions about reasons to be partial. There are two central ideas. The first is that when it comes to working out what you ought to do, your friends’ interests, the needs of your family, the significance of your own projects and ideals, etc. have more weight than the interests and needs of strangers. Your friends’ interests are not (thereby) more neutrally valuable than the interests of others. So there is a difference between the value of an outcome and its deontic significance. The second familiar idea is that reasons are modifiable. Reasons of partiality are reasons the weights of which are a function of the value of the relevant outcome modified by facts about the value of caring about the outcome in question. The resulting principle has various further explanatory advantages; in particular, it accounts for project‐ and relationship‐specific permissions and requirements, both at a time and across time.     

The inertness of reason and Hume's legacy

Hume argues against the seventeenth-century rationalists that reason is impotent to motivate action and to originate morality. Hume's arguments have standardly been considered the foundation for the Humean theory of motivation in contemporary philosophy. The Humean theory alleges that beliefs require independent desires to motivate action. Recently, however, new commentaries allege that Hume's argument concerning the inertness of reason has no bearing on whether beliefs can motivate. These commentaries maintain that for Hume, beliefs about future pleasurable and painful objects on their own can produce the desires that move us to action. First, I show that this reading puts Hume at odds with Humeans, since the latter are committed, not only to the view that beliefs and desires are both necessary to action, but also to the view that beliefs do not produce desires. Second, I review textual, philosophical and historical grounds for my interpretation of Hume's argument for the inertness of reason. I argue that the new line on Hume, while consistent with a certain reading of the Treatise, is not supported by the Dissertation on the Passions and the second Enquiry, where Hume argues that all motivation has an origin in “taste”, which I take to be different from belief. Thus, Hume's arguments do support the contemporary Humean theory of motivation.