Knowledge does not necessarily make the heart grow fonder: The moderating role of knowledge on accessibility experiences

Accessibility experiences have been a subject of interest since Tversky and Kahneman (1973) published their account of the availability heuristic—specifically, individuals often utilize the phenomenological experience of ease or difficulty of recall in constructing a judgment (Schwarz, 1998). The reported studies contribute further to work in this area by examining the moderating role of knowledge on accessibility experiences and their use in evaluative judgments. We argue that knowledgeable individuals are more likely to experience interference effects in early stages of recall. This would result in a reversal of the usual phenomenon such that while low knowledge individuals would find recalling larger sets effortful, which would lead them to form more negative evaluations when recalling larger amounts of information, high knowledge individuals would find recalling smaller sets effortful and would form more negative evaluations when recalling smaller amounts of information. We discuss potential explanations and draw attention to the distinction between generating a response and the appropriateness of the response in accessibility experiences.     

Experience and appraisal of worry among high worriers with and without generalized anxiety disorder

Recent research has revealed that a large number of highly worried individuals do not qualify for a diagnosis of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). This raises the intriguing question of why some high worriers are more impaired and distressed by their worrying than others, particularly when the severity of their worry is the same. The present investigation sought to address this question by examining whether GAD and non-GAD high worriers differ in their actual worry experiences, their subjective appraisals of worry experiences, or both experiences and appraisals of worry. GAD and non-GAD worriers, selected for matching levels of trait worry severity, completed an attention-focus task with thought sampling before and after a brief worry induction. They also completed questionnaires assessing their experiences during and after the worry induction, as well as their general beliefs about worry. GAD worriers experienced less control over negative intrusive thoughts immediately after worrying, reported greater somatic hyperarousal following worry, and endorsed several negative beliefs about worry more strongly than their worry-matched controls. Results suggest that GAD is associated with unique experiences and appraisals that distinguish it from other forms of severe worry.     

Emotion as a boost to metacognition: How worry enhances the quality of confidence

Emotion and cognition are known to interact during human decision processes. In this study we focus on a specific kind of cognition, namely metacognition. Our experiment induces a negative emotion, worry, during a perceptual task. In a numerosity task subjects have to make a two alternative forced choice and then reveal their confidence in this decision. We measure metacognition in terms of discrimination and calibration abilities. Our results show that metacognition, but not choice, is affected by the level of worry anticipated before the decision. Under worry individuals tend to have better metacognition in terms of the two measures. Furthermore understanding the formation of confidence is better explained with taking into account the level of worry in the model. This study shows the importance of an emotional component in the formation and the quality of the subjective probabilities.     

The Mere‐Measurement Effect: Why Does Measuring Intentions Change Actual Behavior?

Recent research has demonstrated that merely measuring an individual's purchase intentions changes his or her subsequent behavior in the market. Several different alternative explanations have been proposed to explain why this “mere‐measurement effect” occurs. However, these explanations have not been tested to date. The purpose of this article is to test several competing explanations for why measuring general intentions to purchase (e.g., How likely are you to buy a car?) changes specific brand‐level behavior (e.g., which specific brand of car is purchased). The results provide a clearer understanding of the cognitive mechanism through which the mere‐measurement effect operates. The results show that when asked to provide general intentions to select a product in a given category, respondents are more likely to choose options toward which they hold positive and accessible attitudes, and are less likely to choose options for which they hold negative and accessible attitudes, compared to a control group of participants who are not asked a general intentions question. These results provide support for the conjecture that asking a general purchase intent question influences behavior by changing the accessibility of attitudes toward specific options in the category.     

Protecting Against Low‐Probability Disasters: The Role of Worry

We carry out a large monetary stakes insurance experiment with very small probabilities of losses and ambiguous as well as exact probabilities. Many individuals do not want to pay anything for insurance whether the probabilities are given exactly or are ambiguous. Many others, however, are willing to pay surprisingly large amounts. With ambiguity, the percentage of those paying nothing is smaller and the willingness to pay (WTP) of the other individuals larger than with exact probabilities. Comparing elasticities with ambiguity, we find that worry is much more important than subjective probability in determining WTP for insurance. Furthermore, when the ambiguous loss probability is increased by a factor of 1000, it has almost no effect on WTP. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Elusive Counterfactuals

I offer a novel solution to the problem of counterfactual skepticism: the worry that all contingent counterfactuals without explicit probabilities in the consequent are false. I argue that a specific kind of contextualist semantics and pragmatics for would‐ and might‐counterfactuals can block both central routes to counterfactual skepticism. One, it can explain the clash between would‐ and might‐counterfactuals as in: (1) If you had dropped that vase, it would have broken. and (2) If you had dropped that vase, it might have safely quantum tunneled to China. Two, it can explain why counterfactuals like (1) can be true despite the fact that quantum tunneling worlds are among the most similar worlds. I further argue that this brand of contextualism accounts for the data better than other existing solutions to the problem.     

Intolerance of uncertainty and perceived threat

The present study examined the relations between dimensions of intolerance of uncertainty (i.e., desire for predictability and uncertainty paralysis) and perceptions of threat (i.e., perceptions of the probabilities and costs of future undesirable outcomes) in a sample of 239 college students. Uncertainty paralysis was positively associated with both perceived probabilities and perceived costs for negative outcomes. Desire for predictability was positively associated with perceived costs for negative outcomes but was not associated with perceived probabilities for negative outcomes. When probability estimates for low base rate outcomes were examined separately, desire for predictability was negatively associated with perceived probabilities. Finally, perceived threat partially mediated the relations between dimensions of intolerance of uncertainty and worry. The results of the present study suggest mechanisms through which dimensions of intolerance of uncertainty might lead to excessive worry.     

Effects of worry on physiological and subjective reactivity to emotional stimuli in generalized anxiety disorder and nonanxious control participants

The present study examined the effect of worry versus relaxation and neutral thought activity on both physiological and subjective responding to positive and negative emotional stimuli. Thirty-eight participants with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) and 35 nonanxious control participants were randomly assigned to engage in worry, relaxation, or neutral inductions prior to sequential exposure to each of four emotion-inducing film clips. The clips were designed to elicit fear, sadness, happiness, and calm emotions. Self reported negative and positive affect was assessed following each induction and exposure, and vagal activity was measured throughout. Results indicate that worry (vs. relaxation) led to reduced vagal tone for the GAD group, as well as higher negative affect levels for both groups. Additionally, prior worry resulted in less physiological and subjective responding to the fearful film clip, and reduced negative affect in response to the sad clip. This suggests that worry may facilitate avoidance of processing negative emotions by way of preventing a negative emotional contrast. Implications for the role of worry in emotion avoidance are discussed.     

Deterministic probability: neither chance nor credence

Some have argued that chance and determinism are compatible in order to account for the objectivity of probabilities in theories that are compatible with determinism, like Classical Statistical Mechanics (CSM) and Evolutionary Theory (ET). Contrarily, some have argued that chance and determinism are incompatible, and so such probabilities are subjective. In this paper, I argue that both of these positions are unsatisfactory. I argue that the probabilities of theories like CSM and ET are not chances, but also that they are not subjective probabilities either. Rather, they are a third type of probability, which I call counterfactual probability. The main distinguishing feature of counterfactual-probability is the role it plays in conveying important counterfactual information in explanations. This distinguishes counterfactual probability from chance as a second concept of objective probability.     

Expectancy Accessibility and the Influence of Outcome Expectancies on Adolescent Smokeless Tobacco Use

This study investigated the moderating influence of expectancy accessibility on the relation between outcome expectancies and drug use intentions. Specifically, it was hypothesized that expectancies made temporarily more accessible would predict smokeless tobacco intentions to a greater degree than would less accessible expectancies. In addition, it was anticipated that expectancies regarding positive outcomes of smokeless tobacco use would be better predictors of intention than would expectancies about negative outcomes. Results partially supported the accessibility hypothesis, but this effect occurred for positive outcome expectancies only. In addition, the anticipated prepotency of positive over negative expectancies in predicting drug use intentions was strongly supported. These findings are consistent with theories of problem behavior which differentiate between positive and negative outcome expectancies and which postulate that accessibility of expectancies plays an important role in expectancy-behavior relations.     

Probability and category redefinition in the fault tree paradigm

Fault trees have been advocated as aids for problem solvers. However, research has suggested limitations in their usefulness. Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1978) found that subjects given incomplete (pruned) trees were insensitive to omissions; these authors hypothesized that Tversky and Kahneman's (1974) availability heuristic was the mediating factor. Using a within-subjects design, subjects in Experiment 1 received both full and pruned trees and estimated probabilities for various reasons why a car would fail to start. To increase the availability of omissions, some Experiment 1 subjects first generated possible causes of starting failure. The basic Fischhoff et al. findings were replicated, but several aspects of the results argued against the availability hypothesis as the mechanism for judgment. Instead, subjects appeared to idiosyncratically redefine category membership when making judgments based upon pruned trees. By employing a sorting task in Experiment 2 we corroborated the results of Experiment 1: Subjects do redefine the actual contents of the categories when faced with an omission from the fault tree. The implications of these results for the use of fault trees as a problem solving aid are discussed.     

Rethinking the Role of Worry in Generalized Anxiety Disorder: Evidence Supporting a Model of Emotional Contrast Avoidance

The Contrast Avoidance model (Newman & Llera, 2011) proposes that individuals with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) are hypersensitive to sharp upward shifts in negative emotion that typically accompany negative events, and use worry to maintain sustained intrapersonal negativity in an attempt to avoid these shifts. Although research shows that worry increases negative emotionality and mutes further emotional reactivity to a stressor when compared to the worry period (e.g., Llera & Newman, 2010), no study has tracked changes in negative emotionality from baseline to worry inductions followed by a range of emotional exposures. Further, no study has yet assessed participants’ subjective appraisals of prior worry on helping to cope with such exposures. The present study tested the main tenets of the Contrast Avoidance model by randomly assigning participants with GAD (n = 48) and nonanxious controls (n = 47) to experience worry, relaxation, and neutral inductions prior to sequential exposure to fearful, sad, and humorous film clips. Both physiological (nonspecific skin conductance responses [NS-SCRs]) and self-reported emotional changes were observed. Results indicated that worry boosted negative emotionality from baseline, which was sustained across negative exposures, whereas low negative emotionality during relaxation and neutral inductions allowed for sharp increases in response to exposures. Furthermore, GAD participants found worry to be more helpful than other conditions in coping with exposures, whereas control participants reported the opposite pattern. Results provide preliminary support for the Contrast Avoidance model. This suggests that treatment should focus on underlying avoidance patterns before attempting to reduce worry behavior.     

Memory accessibility and probability judgments: an experimental evaluation of the availability heuristic.

Consistent with Tversky and Kahneman's (1973, 1974) availability heuristic hypothesis, the current study found a negative correlation between recall latency for past events and the perceived future probability of similar events. Furthermore, when the relative accessibility of memories of positive and negative events was experimentally manipulated using the Velten mood-induction procedure, the perceived future probabilities of similar events also changed in a manner consistent with the availability heuristic account. Reductions in recall latencies resulting from the mood manipulations were, as predicted, related to increases in perceived probability, and vice versa. Partial correlations indicated that this association between the observed patterns of changes in recall latencies and probability judgments could not be accounted for by the existence of independent associations between each of these effects and the magnitude of mood change.     

Effects of momentary assessed stressful events and worry episodes on somatic health complaints

Somatic health complaints are extremely common and are responsible for a large part of human suffering and healthcare costs. It has been recognised that psychosocial stress can affect somatic health. According to the 'perseverative cognition hypothesis', stressful events affect somatic health because people keep on worrying about them. Worry would prolong stress-related physiological activity that can ultimately lead to health problems. In this ambulatory study we tested whether stressful events and worry predict daily somatic complaints, and whether worry mediates the effects of stressful events. In addition, it was tested whether these effects were independent from negative affect. Using electronic diaries, 69 teachers (age 21-60 years) from Dutch primary and secondary schools reported daily stressful events, worry episodes, negative affect and somatic complaints for a period of 6 days. Results showed that worry intensity predicted the number of somatic complaints and mediated the effect of stressful events on somatic complaints. Furthermore, these results were independent from biobehavioural variables and daily negative affect. These findings support the perseverative cognition hypothesis proposing that the negative somatic health effects of stressful events are largely due to the worry; that is, to the prolonged cognitive representation of stressors.     

Spanish adaptation of the "Why worry?" questionnaire

This study presents the validation of Spanish version of Why worry? Questionnaire which assesses a variable of process related to the overestimation of the positive and negative consequences of the excessive and uncontrollable worry that is characteristic of Generalized Anxiety Disorder. 833 participants from Tenerife (Canary Island) completed this questionnaire among other psychological measures. The exploratory factor analysis yielded a two-factors structure that explained 41.34% of the total variance; both of them showed adecuate internal consistency (alpha 1 = 0.86 and alpha 2 = 0.85) and test-retest (r 1 = 0.70 and r 2 = 0.75) reliability coefficients. A confirmatory factor analysis confirmed two-factor structure. As expected, concurrent validation uncovered substantial correlation with anxiety and mood disorders. The results support a good discriminate validity. The Spanish version of why worry questionnaire provides a reliable and valid instrument, which we can use in cross-cultural studies on worry as a GAD characteristic.     

Probability and conspiratorial thinking

Conspiracy theories as alternative explanations for events and states of affairs enjoy widespread popularity. We test one possible explanation for why people are prone to conspiratorial thinking: We hypothesize that conspiratorial thinking as an explanation for events increases as the probability of those events decreases. In order to test this hypothesis, we have conducted five experiments in which participants were exposed to different information about probabilities of fictional events. The results of all experiments support the hypothesis: The lower the probability of an event, the stronger participants embrace conspiratorial explanations. Conspiratorial thinking, we conclude, potentially represents a cognitive heuristic: A coping mechanism for uncertainty.     

Cognitive Heuristics and AIDS Risk Assessment Among Physicians1

Physicians (N= 331) reported perceived risk of HIV exposure, worry about on-the-job HIV exposure, and experience with patients who test seropositive for the HIV. In addition, the use of the availability heuristic was examined by responses to questions about talking and reading about AIDS, and the use of the simulation heuristic was examined by responses to questions about imagining oneself being exposed to HIV on the job. Simulation of the HIV-exposure experience related significantly to perceived risk (p < .001), even after variance attributable to actual experience and use of the availability heuristic was taken into account. Availability of AIDS information related marginally to perceived risk after variance attributable to actual experience and use of the simulation heuristic was taken into account. Simulation related strongly with worry about on-the-job exposure (p < .001), and availability was not significantly related to worry after variance associated with simulation and experience with AIDS was removed. Implications of these results for physician training are discussed.     

Relationships between metacognitive beliefs,social evaluative threat and worry

A worry state is assumed to emerge from the interaction between metacognitive beliefs, and the appraisal of environmental demands (Wells & Matthews, 1994). The aim of this study was to show that metacognitive beliefs moderate the effect of sources of social evaluative threat on worry. Our sample (N = 174) completed a working memory task in two contexts (threatful vs. neutral), while both pre- and post-task measures subjective stress states were recorded. Our results confirmed significant effects of sources of social evaluative threat and metacognitive beliefs on worry. The interaction metacognition * threat context effect on worry was not significant. Our findings support the hypothesis that worry is a form of subjective stress explained by a combination of outcome uncontrollability and social evaluative threat. Social evaluative threat and metacognitive beliefs appeared as two, independent predictors of a worry state. Our results are discussed in reference to the Self Regulative model of stress.     

Decision Theory and Vocational Counseling: Important Concepts and Questions

Ignorance of specifics of career decision-making processes has prevented development and use of more effective vocational counseling procedures. Simply giving clients vocational information and assuming rational use of it is criticized. Contemporary decision theories suggest several relevant variables. Two variables, subjective probabilities (individual's self-estimates of success) and utilities (desirabilities held for outcomes or alternatives), are discussed in relation to presenting clients with objective probability information concerning future plans. Some relevant research is reviewed and two questions are discussed: (1) How do different methods of presenting information influence subjective probabilities? (2) How are utilities influenced by objective probability data?     

Nominalistic content,grounding, and covering generalizations: Reply to ‘Grounding and the indispensability argument’

‘Grounding and the indispensability argument’ presents a number of ways in which nominalists can use the notion of grounding to rebut the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical objects. I will begin by considering the strategy that puts grounding to the service of easy-road nominalists (“Nominalistic content meets grounding” section). I will give some support to this strategy by addressing a worry some may have about it (“A misguided worry about the grounding strategy” section). I will then consider a problem for the fast-lane strategy (“Grounding and generality: a problem for the fast lane” section) and a problem for easy-road nominalists willing to accept Liggins’ grounding strategy (“More on the grounding strategy and easy-road nominalism” section). Both are related to the problem of formulating nominalistic explanations at the right level of generality. I will then consider a problem that Liggins only hints at (“Mathematics and covering generalizations” section). This problem has to do with mathematics’ function of providing the sort of covering generalizations we need in scientific explanations.