What is terrorism and can psychology do anything to prevent it?

Terrorism has a long history, which continues to unfold, and takes many forms. Notwithstanding these facts, there is no generally accepted definition of terrorism. I set forth the definitional issues that underlie the current debate about terrorism. By comparing terrorism with various forms of violence, I argue that it is plausible to construe terrorism as crime and, in support of this, I demonstrate why terrorism cannot be morally justified. Next, I cluster various immediate and long-term approaches intended to prevent terrorism, highlighting psychologically based strategies, such as behavioral profiling, teaching tolerance and citizenship, modifying media images of terrorism, and building peace. In order to understand and respond more effectively to 21st-century terrorism, I advocate adoption of a multidisciplinary, contextually sensitive approach.     

How international is psychology?

Psychology claims to be an international discipline. This claim has been based upon subjective estimates of attendance at international congresses, status reports from selected countries published within edited volumes, and a survey of the member countries of the International Union of Psychological Science (IUPsyS) (Rosenzweig, 1992). However, to be truly international, the work of psychologists in countries around the world must be internationally disseminated. Systematic examination of international congress presentations and abstracts of published psychological literature indexed on widely available electronic databases (e.g., PsycLIT) provides a more objective means of documenting the international presence of psychology. In this article, counts by country were made of research contributions reported within PsycLIT and on the programs of International Congresses of Applied Psychology over the five years in which the congresses were held from 1982 to 1998. Analyses of these data revealed PsycLIT to be more international in scope than previously assumed—45% of its entries were by authors from outside the US. Coverage of research from developing countries was even more limited within PsycLIT (4.67%), but proportionally greater within international congresses (10%). PsycLIT entries not in the English language were found noticeably to have declined from approximately 12–14% levels in the 1980s to only about 6% in the 1990s. An index of the presence of psychology in each country, based upon presentations at IAAP congresses, memberships in international associations, and the extent of PsycLIT entries over the previous three decades, provided an objective, empirically‐based answer to the question ‘How International is Psychology?' This index indicated that psychology has a significant presence in 47 countries, a presence in another 22 countries, but minimal or no presence in 82 other countries. The meaning of these data for the discipline and ways in which psychology's worldwide presence might be strengthened and extended were discussed.     

What is it to be healthy?

According to Christopher Boorse's Bio-Statistical Theory (BST), 'health' is statistically normal function in a reference class, and 'health' and 'disease' are empirical, objective and value-free concepts. I demonstrate that the success of the BST depends on its choice of reference classes; different reference classes result in different accounts of health. I argue that nothing in nature empirically or objectively dictates the use of reference classes Boorse proposes. Reference classes in the BST, and the concept of health, are therefore not value-free. Nor is there a reason to favour the BST over accounts of health that use different reference classes.     

What is it like to be Oscar?

Oscar is going to be the first artificial person — at any rate, he is going to be the first artificial person to be built in Tucson's Philosophy Department. Oscar's creator, John Pollock, maintains that once Oscar is complete he will experience qualia, will be self-conscious, will have desires, fears, intentions, and a full range of mental states (Pollock 1989, pp. ix–x). In this paper I focus on what seems to me to be the most problematical of these claims, viz., that Oscar will experience qualia. I argue that we have not been given sufficient reasons to believe this bold claim. I doubt that Oscar will enjoy qualitative conscious phenomena and I maintain that it will be like nothing to be Oscar.     

What is merit,that it can be transferred?

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - A concept of merit is used for spiritual accounting in many religious traditions, seemingly a substantial point of connection between religion and...     

The cocktail party problem: what is it? How can it be solved? And why should animal behaviorists study it?

Animals often use acoustic signals to communicate in groups or social aggregations in which multiple individuals signal within a receiver's hearing range. Consequently, receivers face challenges related to acoustic interference and auditory masking that are not unlike the human cocktail party problem, which refers to the problem of perceiving speech in noisy social settings. Understanding the sensory solutions to the cocktail party problem has been a goal of research on human hearing and speech communication for several decades. Despite a general interest in acoustic signaling in groups, animal behaviorists have devoted comparatively less attention toward understanding how animals solve problems equivalent to the human cocktail party problem. After illustrating how humans and nonhuman animals experience and overcome similar perceptual challenges in cocktail-party-like social environments, this article reviews previous psychophysical and physiological studies of humans and nonhuman animals to describe how the cocktail party problem can be solved. This review also outlines several basic and applied benefits that could result from studies of the cocktail party problem in the context of animal acoustic communication.     

What is it Like to be Someone Else? Simulation and Empathy

This paper explores two models of empathy. One model places theory centre stage; the other emphasises our capacity to re-enact fragments of another's mental life. I argue that considerations of parsimony strongly support the latter, simulative approach. My results have consequences for the current debate between the theory-theory and simulation theory. That debate is standardly conceived as a debate about mental state attribution rather than about empathy. However, on the simulation model, empathy and mental state attribution involve a common mechanism. Thus the strength of the simulative approach to empathy lends considerable credence to the simulation account of mental state attribution. Considerations of empathy are thus surprisingly important in the philosophy of mind..     

What is it Like to be a Phenomenologist?

In a recent paper, 'On the Persistence of Phenomenology' (in T. Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience , Paderborn, 1995), Diana Raffman presents a new argument for qualia, an argument that provides new focus for the qualia debate. We think Raffman's work relocates the debate to a better neighbourhood, a neighbourhood in which what tempts us to think that there must be qualia or phenomenal information is highlighted. Raffman, we argue, locates the core thought shared by many of the friends of qualia, namely, that our conceptual resources are inadequate for capturing the richness of experience. Experience is ineffably determinate. Moreover, Raffman's argument in support of this thought seems especially embarrassing to scientific-minded materialists, since the argument relies largely on well established empirical facts. We show, however, that Raffman's argument fails. So, if we are correct that her argument highlights what is tempting about qualia, then we have also shown that it is not tempting.     

How stable is sense of coherence? Changes following an intervention for unemployed individuals

The present investigation was concerned with the changeability of sense of coherence. We examined changes in sense of coherence (SOC) over a six-month period in a sample of Finnish unemployed individuals ( n = 74) participating in an intervention program designed to boost re-employment. Over the study period, participants' sense of coherence improved significantly and re-employed individuals reported the greatest changes. Different changes in the subcomponents of SOC, comprehensibility, manageability and meaningfulness, were found. Contrary to expectations, participants younger than 30 years of age did not show greater changes in their SOC. Initial personal resources were predictors of both positive and negative changes in SOC.     

How can Ethnomethodology be Heideggerian?

The purpose of this paper is to begin to try to understand the extent to which ethnomethodology (EM) might be informed by some concepts and ideas from the work of the philosopher Martin Heidegger. This is done in two parts. The first looks at Heidegger's later work and compares his conception of the ontological difference with Garfinkel's work on the difference between EM and formal sociological analysis (FA). The second part turns to Heidegger's earlier work (around Being and Time) and works through a number of affinities between the analysis of Dasein and ethnomethodological versions of everydayness.     

What is it Like to be a Group Agent?

The existence of group agents is relatively widely accepted. Examples are corporations, courts, NGOs, and even entire states. But should we also accept that there is such a thing as group consciousness? I give an overview of some of the key issues in this debate and sketch a tentative argument for the view that group agents lack phenomenal consciousness (pace Schwitzgebel 2015 ). In developing my argument, I draw on integrated information theory, a much‐discussed theory of consciousness. I conclude by pointing out an implication of my argument for the normative status of group agents.     

Is systemic thinking really extraneous to common sense?

Systemic therapists assume, but have not yet proved that ordinary people: (i) normally do not use triadic thinking and (ii) are able, thanks to therapists' interviewing techniques, to construct triadic explanations. To test these assumptions this study analyses the explanations provided by 400 undergraduates of an unexpected piece of behaviour framed in four stimulus situations where the breadth of the observation field was manipulated. The results show that triadic explanations are unusual and increase with the widening of the field of observation from the monad to the triad. It is the ‘enigmatic’ triadic situation – adding a puzzling discrepancy between the actors' forms of behaviour – that elicits more triadic explanations. This suggests that therapists should explore with clients the contradictions disclosed by the widening of the field of observation and support reframings actively co‐constructed with them instead of ‘pre‐packaged’ ones.     

We live to create dissonance: is it possible to be a Christian and racist?

Confronted with the reality of the limited exposure to human diversity among their students at two Christian universities, two African American professors relate their efforts to prepare students to teach in the twenty‐first century. This article is a reflective report on the strategies and events that occurred as a result of challenging students' long‐held beliefs and attitudes. Strategies were deliberately provocative and disturbing, intended to create dissonance within the students related to Christian ideals and perceptions of non‐European Americans. Ultimately, students confronted the question: Is it possible to be a Christian and racist?     

A sustainable future for humanity? How can psychology help?

The sustainability of human life on Earth in the future is in danger. Human actions are producing many harmful and possibly irreversible changes to the environmental conditions that support life on Earth. This article summarizes major threats to Earth's environment, including global warming, ozone layer destruction, exhaustion of fisheries and agricultural land, and widespread exposure to toxic chemicals. Unless they are overcome, these changes will make human life increasingly miserable and eventually may make Earth nearly uninhabitable for future generations. These threats are caused by patterns of human behavior, particularly over-population and over-consumption. Urgent changes to human lifestyles and cultural practices are required for the world to escape ecological disaster, and psychologists should lead the way in helping people adopt sustainable patterns of living. Specific steps toward that goal are proposed in this and the following four articles.     

How social is the social psychology of emotion?

Two classic studies published 50 years ago showed how other people provide information that shapes the activation and interpretation of emotions. The present paper traces development of the social psychology of emotions from this starting point. Subsequent research into group-based and social appraisal has advanced understanding of the impact of social information on emotions and suggested new ways of investigating associated phenomena. Although potential integrations of interpersonal and group-oriented approaches offer promise for the future, the continuing focus on emotions as cognitively mediated effects of social factors should broaden to encompass dynamic relational processes.