Individual differences in the rubber-hand illusion: Predicting self-reports of people's personal experiences

Can we assess individual differences in the extent to which a person perceives the rubber-hand illusion on the basis of self-reported experiences? In this research, we develop such an instrument using Rasch-type models. In our conception, incorporating an object (e.g., a rubber hand) into one's body image requires various sensorimotor and cognitive processes. The extent to which people can meet these requirements thus determines how intensely people experience and, simultaneously, describe the illusion. As a consequence, individual differences in people's susceptibility to the rubber-hand illusion can be determined by inspecting reports of their personal experiences. The proposed model turned out to be functional in its capability to predict self-reports of people's experiences and to reliably assess individual differences in susceptibility to the illusion. Regarding validity, we found a small, but significant, correlation between individual susceptibility and proprioceptive drift. Additionally, we found that asynchrony, and tapping rather than stroking the fingers constrain the experience of the illusion.     

The role of agency for perceived ownership in the virtual hand illusion

The rubber hand illusion shows that people can perceive artificial effectors as part of their own body under suitable conditions, and the virtual hand illusion shows the same for virtual effectors. In this study, we compared a virtual version of the rubber-hand setup with a virtual-hand setup, and manipulated the synchrony between stimulation or movement of a virtual “effector” and stimulation or movement of people’s own hand, the similarity between virtual effector and people’s own hand, and the degree of agency (the degree to which the virtual effector could be controlled by people’s own movements). Synchrony-induced ownership illusion was strongly affected by agency but not similarity, which is inconsistent with top-down modulation approaches but consistent with bottom-up approaches to ownership. However, both agency and similarity induce a general bias towards perceiving an object as part of one’s body, suggesting that ownership judgments integrate various sources of information.     

The role of vision in the on-line correction of illusion effects on action.

In this study, participants reached out and picked up a bar placed on a background grating that induced an illusion in the perceived orientation of the bar. The illusion had a large effect on the orientation of the hand early in the reaches, but this effect decreased continuously as the hand approached the target. This pattern occurred whether or not participants were allowed vision of the hand and target while reaching. These results are consistent with a "planning/control" model of action, in which actions are planned using a context-dependent visual representation but monitored and corrected on-line using a context-independent visual representation. The hypothesized neural bases of these representations are discussed.     

自我表征的可塑性:基于橡胶手错觉的研究

自我识别是人类自我觉知的行为标记。传统方法认为稳定的自我表征是自我识别的基础。随着对橡胶手错觉及一系列自我表征和自我识别错觉的揭示,这一能让人将外部客体感知为自身一部分的错觉研究使得我们能够以多感官整合的方式来研究自我表征和自我识别。拥有感和自主感被认为是我们进行自我识别的两类基本体验,本文对一系列橡胶手错觉范式研究的系统回顾表明,拥有感和自主感会发生改变,这说明人的自我表征是可变的和可塑的。     

Spatial limits on referred touch to an alien limb may reflect boundaries of visuo-tactile peripersonal space surrounding the hand

In this study, the spatial limits of referred touch to a rubber hand were investigated. Participants rated the strength of the perceived illusion when the rubber hand was placed in one of six different spatial positions (at a distance of 17.5-67.5cm horizontal from the participant's own hand). The results revealed a significant nonlinear relationship in the strength of the illusion, with the strongest ratings given when the two hands were closest; decaying significantly after a distance of 30cm. The time taken to elicit the illusion followed a similar trend. These results may reflect the response properties of bimodal visuo-tactile cells encoding peripersonal space around the hand.     

Weber's illusion and body shape: anisotropy of tactile size perception on the hand

The perceived distance between touches on a single skin surface is larger on regions of high tactile sensitivity than those with lower acuity, an effect known as Weber's illusion. This illusion suggests that tactile size perception involves a representation of the perceived size of body parts preserving characteristics of the somatosensory homunculus. Here, we investigated how body shape is coded within this representation by comparing tactile distances presented in different orientations on the hand. Participants judged which of two tactile distances on the dorsum of their left hand felt larger. One distance was aligned with the proximodistal axis (along the hand), the other with the mediolateral axis (across the hand). Across distances were consistently perceived as larger than along ones. A second experiment showed that this effect is specific to the hairy skin of the hand dorsum and does not occur on glabrous skin of the palm. A third experiment demonstrated that this bias reflects orientation on the hand surface, rather than an eye- or torso-centered reference frame. These results mirror known orientational anisotropies of both tactile acuity and of tactile receptive fields (RFs) of cortical neurons. We suggest that the dorsum of the hand is implicitly represented as wider than it actually is and that the shape of tactile RFs may partly explain distortions of mental body representations.     

The rubber hand illusion revisited: visuotactile integration and self-attribution

Watching a rubber hand being stroked, while one's own unseen hand is synchronously stroked, may cause the rubber hand to be attributed to one's own body, to "feel like it's my hand." A behavioral measure of the rubber hand illusion (RHI) is a drift of the perceived position of one's own hand toward the rubber hand. The authors investigated (a) the influence of general body scheme representations on the RHI in Experiments 1 and 2 and (b) the necessary conditions of visuotactile stimulation underlying the RHI in Experiments 3 and 4. Overall, the results suggest that at the level of the process underlying the build up of the RHI, bottom-up processes of visuotactile correlation drive the illusion as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition. Conversely, at the level of the phenomenological content, the illusion is modulated by top-down influences originating from the representation of one's own body.     

我观故我在？— 从橡胶手错觉对自我身体所有权的探讨

橡胶手错觉是一种能将非自我的肢体感知为自我的肢体的反应。继发现橡胶手错觉现象后,研究者通过操纵自变量以及观测不同的因变量,得到了大量新的研究结果。橡胶手错觉的出现与强度受到时间、空间和手姿势的影响。橡胶手错觉的产生机制为单纯的多感觉整合或多感觉整合与身体表征共同作用的结果。未来研究侧重于被试取样、研究策略以及医学领域中瘫痪患者的认知神经康复和截肢病人的假肢控制方面。     

Tactile expectations and the perception of self-touch: An investigation using the rubber hand paradigm

The rubber hand paradigm is used to create the illusion of self-touch, by having the participant administer stimulation to a prosthetic hand while the Examiner, with an identical stimulus (index finger, paintbrush or stick), administers stimulation to the participant’s hand. With synchronous stimulation, participants experience the compelling illusion that they are touching their own hand. In the current study, the robustness of this illusion was assessed using incongruent stimuli. The participant used the index finger of the right hand to administer stimulation to a prosthetic hand while the Examiner used a paintbrush to administer stimulation to the participant’s left hand. The results indicate that this violation of tactile expectations does not diminish the illusion of self-touch. Participants experienced the illusion despite the use of incongruent stimuli, both when vision was precluded and when visual feedback provided clear evidence of the tactile mismatch.     

Self awareness and the body image

What mental representations give us the sense of our body as a unique object in the world? We investigated this issue in the context of the rubber hand illusion (RHI), an illusion of body image in which a prosthetic hand brushed synchronously, but not asynchronously, with one’s own hand is perceived as actually being one’s hand. We conducted a large-scale study of the RHI, and used psychometric analysis to reveal the structure of the subjective experience of embodiment [Longo et al. (2008). What is embodiment? A psychometric approach. Cognition,107, 978-998]. Here, we use this dataset to investigate the relation between incorporation of a rubber hand into the body image and the perceived similarity between the participant’s hand and the rubber hand. Objective similarity (as measured by skin luminance, hand shape, and third-person similarity ratings) did not appear to influence participants’ experience of the RHI. Conversely, incorporation of the rubber hand into the body image did affect the similarity that participants perceived between their own hand and the rubber hand. Participants who had experienced the RHI perceived their hand and the rubber hand as significantly more similar than participants who had not experienced the illusion. That is, embodiment leads to perceived similarity, but perceived similarity does not lead to embodiment. Furthermore, similarity ratings following the illusion were selectively correlated with some components of embodiment, but not with others. These results suggest an important role of a mental body image in the perception of the relation between the self and others.     

Application of the rubber hand illusion paradigm: comparison between upper and lower limbs

The “rubber hand illusion (RHI)” is a perceptual illusion, which allows the integration of artificial limbs into the body representation of a person by means of combined visual and tactile stimulation. The illusion has been frequently replicated but always concerning the upper limbs. The present study verified an analog illusion that can be called the “rubber foot illusion” (RFI). In a conjoint experiment using both a rubber hand and a rubber foot, brushstrokes were applied to the respective real and rubber limb placed alongside the real one. However, only the artificial limb’s handling was visible. The brushstrokes were given either synchronously, with a delay of ±0.5 s, or without tactile stimulation of the real limb. Questionnaire data and the proprioceptive drift towards the rubber limb (determined by calling on the subjects to show where they locate their unseen limb) defined the illusion strength. Results revealed that the illusion was induced in both limbs with comparable strength, but only in the synchronous condition.     

Absence of compensation and reasoning-like processes in the perception of orientation in depth

When errors are present in the perceived depth between the parts of a physically stationary object, the object appears to rotate as the head is moved laterally (Gogel, 1980). This illusory rotation has been attributed either to compensation (Wallach, 1985, 1987) or to inferential-like processes (Rock, 1983). Alternatively, the perceived distances of and directions to the parts of the object are sufficient to explain the illusory perceived orientations and perceived rotations of the stimulus. This was examined in three experiments. In Experiment 1, a perceived illusory orientation of a stimulus object extended in depth was produced by misleading binocular disparity and was measured at two different lateral positions of the head under two conditions. In the static condition, the head was stationary at different times at each of the two measurement positions of the head. In the dynamic condition, continuous motion of the head occurred between these two positions. In Experiment 2, static and dynamic conditions of illusory stimulus orientation were observed with the head stationary. In Experiment 3, a perspective illusion instead of binocular disparity produced the errors in perceived depth. In no experiment did the perceived orientation of the object differ for the static and dynamic conditions. In the absence of head motion, neither compensatory nor inferential-like processes were available. It is concluded that these processes are not needed to explain either illusory or nonillusory perceptions of the orientation or rotation of stimuli viewed with a laterally moving head.     

Absence of compensation and reasoning-like processes in the perception of orientation in depth.

When errors are present in the perceived depth between the parts of a physically stationary object, the object appears to rotate as the head is moved laterally (Gogel, 1980). This illusory rotation has been attributed either to compensation (Wallach, 1985, 1987) or to inferential-like processes (Rock, 1983). Alternatively, the perceived distances of and directions to the parts of the object are sufficient to explain the illusory perceived orientations and perceived rotations of the stimulus. This was examined in three experiments. In Experiment 1, a perceived illusory orientation of a stimulus object extended in depth was produced by misleading binocular disparity and was measured at two different lateral positions of the head under two conditions. In the static condition, the head was stationary at different times at each of the two measurement positions of the head. In the dynamic condition, continuous motion of the head occurred between these two positions. In Experiment 2, static and dynamic conditions of illusory stimulus orientation were observed with the head stationary. In Experiment 3, a perspective illusion instead of binocular disparity produced the errors in perceived depth. In no experiment did the perceived orientation of the object differ for the static and dynamic conditions. In the absence of head motion, neither compensatory nor inferential-like processes were available. It is concluded that these processes are not needed to explain either illusory or nonillusory perceptions of the orientation or rotation of stimuli viewed with a laterally moving head.     

Effect of viewing plane on perceived distances in real and virtual environments

Three experiments examined perceived absolute distance in a head-mounted display virtual environment (HMD-VE) and a matched real-world environment, as a function of the type and orientation of the distance viewed. In Experiment 1, participants turned and walked, without vision, a distance to match the viewed interval for both egocentric (viewer-to-target) and exocentric (target-to-target) extents. Egocentric distances were underestimated in the HMD-VE while exocentric distances were estimated similarly across environments. Since egocentric distances were displayed in the depth plane and exocentric distances in the frontal plane, the pattern of results could have been related to the orientation of the distance or to the type of distance. Experiments 2 and 3 tested these alternatives. Participants estimated exocentric distances presented along the depth or frontal plane either by turning and walking (Experiment 2) or by turning and throwing a beanbag to indicate the perceived extent (Experiment 3). For both Experiments 2 and 3, depth intervals were underestimated in the HMD-VE compared to the real world. However, frontal intervals were estimated similarly across environments. The findings suggest anisotropy in HMD-VE distance perception such that distance underestimation in the HMD-VE generalizes to intervals in the depth plane, but not to intervals in the frontal plane. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Attending to illusory differences in object size

Focused visual attention can be shifted between objects and locations (attentional orienting) or expanded and contracted in spatial extent (attentional focusing). Although orienting and focusing both modulate visual processing, they have been shown to be distinct, independent modes of attentional control. Objects play a central role in visual attention, and it is known that high-level object representations guide attentional orienting. It not known, however, whether attentional focusing is driven by low-level object representations (which code object size in terms of retinotopic extent) or by high-level representations (which code perceived size). We manipulated the perceived size of physically identical objects by using line drawings or photographs that induced the Ponzo illusion, in a task requiring the detection of a target within these objects. The distribution of attention was determined by the perceived size and not by the retinotopic size of an attended object, indicating that attentional focusing is guided by high-level object representations.     

Roughness perception during the rubber hand illusion

Watching a rubber hand being stroked by a paintbrush while feeling identical stroking of one’s own occluded hand can create a compelling illusion that the seen hand becomes part of one’s own body. It has been suggested that this so-called rubber hand illusion (RHI) does not simply reflect a bottom–up multisensory integration process but that the illusion is also modulated by top–down, cognitive factors. Here we investigated for the first time whether the conceptual interpretation of the sensory quality of the visuotactile stimulation in terms of roughness can influence the occurrence of the illusion and vice versa, whether the presence of the RHI can modulate the perceived sensory quality of a given tactile stimulus (i.e., in terms of roughness). We used a classical RHI paradigm in which participants watched a rubber hand being stroked by either a piece of soft or rough fabric while they received synchronous or asynchronous tactile stimulation that was either congruent or incongruent with respect to the sensory quality of the material touching the rubber hand. (In)congruencies between the visual and tactile stimulation did neither affect the RHI on an implicit level nor on an explicit level, and the experience of the RHI in turn did not cause any modulations of the felt sensory quality of touch on participant’s own hand. These findings first suggest that the RHI seems to be resistant to top–down knowledge in terms of a conceptual interpretation of tactile sensations. Second, they argue against the hypothesis that participants own hand tends to disappear during the illusion and that the rubber hand actively replaces it.     

The perceived position of the hand in space

This paper reports a series of experiments of the perceived position of the hand in egocentric space. The experiments focused on the bias in the proprioceptively perceived position of the hand at a series of locations spanning the midline from left to right. Perceived position was tested in a matching paradigm, in which subjects indicated the perceived position of a target, which could have been either a visual stimulus or their own fingertip, by placing the index finger of the other hand in the corresponding location on the other side of a fixed surface. Both the constant error, or bias, and the variable error, or consistency of matching attempts, were measured. Experiment 1 showed that (1) there is a far-left advantage in matching tasks, such that errors in perceived position are significantly lower in extreme-left positions than in extreme-right positions, and (2) there is a strong hand-bias effect in the absence of vision, such that the perceived positions of the left and right index fingertips held in the same actual target position in fact differ significantly. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated that this hand-bias effect is genuinely due to errors in the perceived position of the matched hand, and not to the attempt at matching it with the other hand. These results suggest that there is no unifying representation of egocentric, proprioceptive space. Rather, separate representations appear to be maintained for each effector. The bias of these representations may reflect the motor function of that effector.     

Oculomotor Effects in the Size-Distance Paradox and the Moon Illusion

Drawing on 2 concepts—the resting position of the eyes and a binocular geometry for perceived size, the moon illusion is explained as the consequence of different oculomotor adjustments caused by change in the direction of gaze contingent upon the viewing conditions of the moon. Hence, each particular moon will be viewed with a different vergence state which, in turn, yields a different amount of binocular disparity. The vergence state will determine the perceived size of an object whereas disparity will determine its perceived distance. It is further contended that the perceived size of the moon is based on a new binocular information source for size perception enabling the size of an object to be perceived even in the absence of egocentric distance information. Discussion focuses on the paradoxical aspect of the moon illusion and how the size-distance invariance hypothesis may have contributed to its effect.     

Egocentric reference frame bias in the palmar haptic perception of surface orientation

The effect of egocentric reference frames on palmar haptic perception of orientation was investigated in vertically separated locations in a sagittal plane. Reference stimuli to be haptically matched were presented either haptically (to the contralateral hand) or visually. As in prior investigations of haptic orientation perception, a strong egocentric bias was found, such that haptic orientation matches made in the lower part of personal space were much lower (i.e., were perceived as being higher) than those made at eye level. The same haptic bias was observed both when the reference surface to be matched was observed visually and when bimanual matching was used. These findings support the conclusion that, despite the presence of an unambiguous allocentric (gravitational) reference frame in vertical planes, haptic orientation perception in the sagittal plane reflects an egocentric bias.     

Anisotropy in the extended haptic perception of longitudinal distances

Using horizontal rotational motions of a hand-held rod, participants in four experiments probed the aperture between two blocks separated in depth. The farther block could be either on the outer or on the inner side of the hand-rod system, defining apertures of opposite sense. The participants reported the perceived size of the in-depth intervals by adjusting, with the nonprobing hand, the lateral separation between two blocks or the egocentric distances of two blocks. Over variations in hand and geometric arrangement of stimulus and report blocks, perceived aperture size depended on the aperture's sense: Apertures with the farther edge on the outer side of the hand-rod were reported as being larger than their mirror image counterparts. The effect was not observed in judgments of a single edge distance (Experiment 5); it was configuration dependent. The sense effect would not be expected from the physical quantity accommodating perceived frontal apertures. Possible expansions of the physical model are discussed.