Chance,determinism, and unsettledness

A previously unrecognised argument against deterministic chance is introduced. The argument rests on the twin ideas that determined outcomes are settled, while chancy outcomes are unsettled, thus making cases of determined but chancy outcomes impossible. Closer attention to tacit assumptions about settledness makes available some principled lines of resistance to the argument for compatibilists about chance and determinism. Yet the costs of maintaining compatibilism may be higher with respect to this argument than with respect to existing incompatibilist arguments.

     

Freedom,determinism and circular reasoning

This paper uses a short dialogue between a determinist and a free-will advocate as a basis for exploring some of the elements of circular reasoning which have for centuries kept alive one of the classical debates of philosophy, the freedom-versus-determinism debate. The chronic circularity which infests both sides of the debate arises from a procedural asymmetry in the argument, which in turn is produced by the different metaphysical commitments of the debaters.     

Why-questions, determinism and circular reasoning

In this article I shall aim at showing that there exists beneath the surface of many why-questions about human behaviour a nest of deterministic assumptions which can preclude their ever being truly answered. A symptom of the presence of these underlying assumptions can be observed in an explanation-seeking dialogue in which the questioner persistently tries to discover why a certain human behaviour occurred. He repeats his why-question until he gets the type of answer he wants, but in the process he effectively reasons in a circle. If the repeated questioning with its implied circular reasoning becomes chronic, then the questioner will beg the question with regards to the answer he desires and consequently run the risk of missing the truth.     

Compatibilism,determinism, and the identity theory

Two issues are raised with regard to Ted Honderich's A Theory of Determinism. First, regarding the relation between a token identity theory of mental and physical events and Honderich's ‘psychoneural union theory’, it is suggested that a token identity theory would serve Honderich's purposes while securing a simpler ontology. Second, it is argued that there is a substantive philosophical issue dividing compatibilists and incompatibilists on the question of whether persons possess free will, contrary to Honderich's contention that the compatibilist and incompatibilist differ only in responsive attitude.     

Judgments about moral responsibility and determinism in patients with behavioural variant of frontotemporal dementia: still compatibilists

Do laypeople think that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism? Recently, philosophers and psychologists trying to answer this question have found contradictory results: while some experiments reveal people to have compatibilist intuitions, others suggest that people could in fact be incompatibilist. To account for this contradictory answers, Nichols and Knobe (2007) have advanced a ‘performance error model’ according to which people are genuine incompatibilist that are sometimes biased to give compatibilist answers by emotional reactions. To test for this hypothesis, we investigated intuitions about determinism and moral responsibility in patients suffering from behavioural frontotemporal dementia. Patients suffering from bvFTD have impoverished emotional reaction. Thus, the ‘performance error model’ should predict that bvFTD patients will give less compatibilist answers. However, we found that bvFTD patients give answers quite similar to subjects in control group and were mostly compatibilist. Thus, we conclude that the ‘performance error model’ should be abandoned in favour of other available model that best fit our data.     

Intervention,determinism, and the causal minimality condition

We clarify the status of the so-called causal minimality condition in the theory of causal Bayesian networks, which has received much attention in the recent literature on the epistemology of causation. In doing so, we argue that the condition is well motivated in the interventionist (or manipulability) account of causation, assuming the causal Markov condition which is essential to the semantics of causal Bayesian networks. Our argument has two parts. First, we show that the causal minimality condition, rather than an add-on methodological assumption of simplicity, necessarily follows from the substantive interventionist theses, provided that the actual probability distribution is strictly positive. Second, we demonstrate that the causal minimality condition can fail when the actual probability distribution is not positive, as is the case in the presence of deterministic relationships. But we argue that the interventionist account still entails a pragmatic justification of the causal minimality condition. Our argument in the second part exemplifies a general perspective that we think commendable: when evaluating methods for inferring causal structures and their underlying assumptions, it is relevant to consider how the inferred causal structure will be subsequently used for counterfactual reasoning.     

Jonathan Edwards and determinism

This paper argues a new interpretation of Jonathan Edwards's psychological account of human action. In Freedom of the Will (1754), Edwards adapted a sophisticated version of Newtonian determinism to the understanding of human thinking and action. Rejecting a mechanistic determinism, in which antecedent faculties “cause” actions, Edwards instead advocated a systemic view. Thus, rather than the “greatest apparent good” causing the “will,” which in turn caused an action, Edwards claimed that “The will is as the greatest apparent good,” thus grounding a systemic and dynamic account. Misunderstanding of his view has led to much confusion and a failure to properly locate Edwards within the history of American thought. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Psychological determinism and rationality

There are arguments which purport to rebut psychological determinism by appealing to its alleged incompatibility with rationality. I argue that they all fail. Against Davidson, I argue that rationality does not preclude the existence of psychological laws. Against Popper, I argue that rationality is compatible with the possibility of predicting human actions. Against Schlesinger, I claim that Newcomb's problem cannot be invoked to show that human actions are unpredictable. Having vindicated the possibility of a rationally-based theory of action, I consider the form it might take.     

Divine determinism,human freedom,and the consequence argument

In this paper I consider the view, held by some Thomistic thinkers, that divine determinism is compatible with human freedom, even though natural determinism is not. After examining the purported differences between divine and natural determinism, I discuss the Consequence Argument, which has been put forward to establish the incompatibility of natural determinism and human freedom. The Consequence Argument, I note, hinges on the premise that an action ultimately determined by factors outside of the actor’s control is not free. Since, I argue, divine determinism also entails that human actions are ultimately determined by factors outside of the actors’ control, I suggest that a parallel argument to the Consequence Argument can be constructed for the incompatibility of divine determinism and human freedom. I conclude that those who reject natural compatibilism on the basis of the Consequence Argument should also reject divine compatibilism.     

Decision responsibility, task responsibility, identifiability, and social loafing

Two laboratory experiments were conducted. Results of the first experiment revealed that identifiability had no impact on the degree of cognitive loafing when group members were asked to make a decision. Identifiability did have an impact when group members were asked to express an opinion. The second experiment replicated findings of the first experiment and, in addition, indicated that unidentifiable individuals with sole task responsibility loafed more than unidentifiable individuals who shared task responsibility. Cognitive effort was measured through recall of stimulus material.