A cleansing fire: Moral outrage alleviates guilt and buffers threats to one’s moral identity

Why do people express moral outrage? While this sentiment often stems from a perceived violation of some moral principle, we test the counter-intuitive possibility that moral outrage at third-party transgressions is sometimes a means of reducing guilt over one’s own moral failings and restoring a moral identity. We tested this guilt-driven account of outrage in five studies examining outrage at corporate labor exploitation and environmental destruction. Study 1 showed that personal guilt uniquely predicted moral outrage at corporate harm-doing and support for retributive punishment. Ingroup (vs. outgroup) wrongdoing elicited outrage at corporations through increased guilt, while the opportunity to express outrage reduced guilt (Study 2) and restored perceived personal morality (Study 3). Study 4 tested whether effects were due merely to downward social comparison and Study 5 showed that guilt-driven outrage was attenuated by an affirmation of moral identity in an unrelated context.     

Competitive victimhood as a response to accusations of ingroup harm doing

Accusations of unjust harm doing by the ingroup threaten the group's moral identity. One strategy for restoring ingroup moral identity after such a threat is competitive victimhood: claiming the ingroup has suffered compared with the harmed outgroup. Men accused of harming women were more likely to claim that men are discriminated against compared with women (Study 1), and women showed the same effect when accused of discriminating against men (Study 3). Undergraduates engaged in competitive victimhood with university staff after their group was accused of harming staff (Study 2). Study 4 showed that the effect of accusations on competitive victimhood among high-status group members is mediated by perceived stigma reversal: the expectation that one should feel guilty for being in a high-status group. Exposure to a competitive victimhood claim on behalf of one's ingroup reduced stigma reversal and collective guilt after an accusation of ingroup harm doing (Study 5).     

Effects of Employee Sickness Presence on Customer Repurchase and Recommendation Intentions: The Role of Customer Affective Reactions

Sickness presence can have important individual and organizational consequences, such as health deterioration or productivity loss. Additional risks, such as negative customer reactions, may be particularly relevant in the service sector. Based on affective events theory and appraisal theories, we hypothesize that employee sickness presence negatively impacts customer repurchase and recommendation intentions. Furthermore, we explore potential affective mechanisms of these effects, including disease avoidance, personal anger, moral outrage, post-consumption guilt, and customer compassion for the employee. We conducted four studies, including three experimental vignette methodology studies (Ns?=?227, 72, and 763) and a qualitative study (N?=?54). In Study 1, employee sickness presence had negative effects on repurchase and recommendation intentions. Results of Study 2 show that customers experienced disgust, fear, anger, guilt, compassion, and indifference in response to sickness presence. In Study 3, anger explained the negative effects of employee sickness presence on repurchase and recommendation intentions, while appraisals of moral fairness were negatively related to both customer intentions. Finally, in Study 4, disgust and anger explained negative effects, while fear, guilt, and compassion explained positive effects of employee sickness presence on customer intentions. Appraisals of goal incongruence, reduced agency of the customer, and uncertainty were negatively related to customer intentions. The physical absence of the customer in the service encounter (phone call) mitigated the experience of disgust, fear, and anger, whereas it exacerbated feelings of compassion for the ill employee.

     

Appearance-based rejection sensitivity: implications for mental and physical health, affect, and motivation

Appearance-Based Rejection Sensitivity (Appearance-RS) is a personality-processing system characterized by anxious concerns and expectations about being rejected based on one's physical attractiveness. People differ in their sensitivity to rejection based on appearance, with consequences for mental and physical health, self-esteem, affect, and feelings of belonging. Study 1 describes the development and validation of the Appearance-RS scale, its relation to personality variables and to health-related outcomes. Study 2 provides experimental evidence that high Appearance-RS people feel more alone and rejected when asked to think about negative aspects of their appearance. Finally, Study 3 tests ways to reduce the negative effects of receiving an appearance threat among high Appearance-RS participants. Specifically, high Appearance-RS participants who engaged in self-affirmation (thought of their personal strengths) or received a secure attachment prime (thought of a close, caring relationship) were buffered from the negative effects of an appearance threat on subsequent state self-esteem and mood.     

Nie Wieder: Group‐Based Emotions for In‐Group Wrongdoing Affect Attitudes toward Unrelated Minorities

This article focuses on the effects of group‐based emotions for in‐group wrongdoing on attitudes towards seemingly unrelated groups. Two forms of shame are distinguished from one another and from guilt and linked to positive and negative attitudes towards an unrelated minority. In Study 1 (N = 203), Germans' feelings of moral shame—arising from the belief that the in‐group's Nazi past violates an important moral value—are associated with increased support for Turks living in Germany. Image shame—arising from a threatened social image—is associated with increased social distance. In Study 2 (N = 301), Britons' emotions regarding atrocities committed by in‐group members during the war in Iraq have similar links with attitudes towards Pakistani immigrants. We extend the findings of Study 1 by demonstrating that the effects are mediated by a sense of moral obligation and observed more strongly when the unrelated group is perceived as similar to the harmed group. Guilt was unrelated to any outcome variable across both studies. Theoretical and practical implications about the nature of group‐based emotions and their potential for affecting wider intergroup relations are discussed.     

Punishing hypocrisy: The roles of hypocrisy and moral emotions in deciding culpability and punishment of criminal and civil moral transgressors

Three experiments explored how hypocrisy affects attributions of criminal guilt and the desire to punish hypocritical criminals. Study 1 established that via perceived hypocrisy, a hypocritical criminal was seen as more culpable and was punished more than a non-hypocritical criminal who committed an identical crime. Study 2 expanded on this, showing that negative moral emotions (anger and disgust) mediated the relationships between perceived hypocrisy, criminal guilt, and punishment. Study 3 replicated the emotion finding from Study 2 using new scenarios where group agents were clearly aware of the hypocrisy of their actions, yet acted anyway. Again, perceived hypocrisy worked through moral emotions to affect criminal guilt and punishment. The current studies provide empirical support for theories relating hypocrisy and moral transgressions to moral emotions, also informing the literature on the role of moral emotions in moral reasoning and legal decision making.     

But I Still Feel Guilt: A Test of a Moral Disengagement Propensity Model

ABSTRACT

We explored the impact of moral disengagement on individual experiences of guilt. We modeled three forms of workplace deviance (withdrawal, interpersonal deviance, and work-family deviance) as mediators between the propensity to morally disengage and guilt, and also includes the moderating effects of perceived work hours culture. Data were collected from 226 employees matched with a colleague and spouse. Results demonstrated that moral disengagement released individuals who engaged in interpersonal and work-family deviance from subsequent feelings of guilt, but only reduced feelings of guilt for those who withdrew. We also found an interactive effect of perceived work hours culture on the relationships between moral disengagement propensity and all three forms of deviance. The indirect effect from moral disengagement propensity to guilt through withdrawal was stronger when perceived work hours was high.     

Why individuals protest the perceived transgressions of their country: the role of anger, shame, and guilt

The present research examined emotions as predictors of opposition to policies and actions of one's country that are perceived to be illegitimate. Two studies investigated the political implications of American (Study 1) and British (Study 2) citizens' anger, guilt, and shame responses to perceived harm caused by their countries' occupation of Iraq. In both studies, a manipulation of pervasive threat to the country's image increased participants' shame but not guilt. The emotions predicted political action intentions to advocate distinct opposition strategies. Shame predicted action intentions to advocate withdrawal from Iraq. Anger predicted action intentions to advocate compensation to Iraq, confrontation of agents responsible, and withdrawal from Iraq. Anger directed at different targets (ingroup, ingroup representative, and outgroup representative) predicted action intentions to support distinct strategies (Study 2). Guilt did not independently predict any political action intentions. Implications for the study of political action and emotions in intergroup contexts are discussed.     

Negative Intergroup Contact and Radical Right‐Wing Voting: The Moderating Roles of Personal and Collective Self‐Efficacy

This study examines whether negative contact with immigrants promotes voting for radical right‐wing parties, to what extent this relationship can be explained by feelings of outgroup threat, and whether this relationship depends on perceived personal and collective self‐efficacy. Hypotheses were tested among 630 native Dutch respondents, mainly living in multicultural neighborhoods. The results show that negative contact with immigrants is associated with feelings of personal (egocentric) and group (sociotropic) threat, and both these feelings, in turn, are associated with radical right‐wing voting. However, negative intergroup contact is less strongly related to egocentric threat when individuals feel able to personally address negative situations with other people (personal self‐efficacy). Furthermore, the findings suggest that negative intergroup contact is less strongly related to sociotropic threat when individuals believe that people in their neighborhood are able to collectively address some negative situations (collective self‐efficacy).     

When feeling bad makes you look good: Guilt,shame, and person perception

In two studies, we examined how expressions of guilt and shame affected person perception. In the first study, participants read an autobiographical vignette in which the writer did something wrong and reported feeling either guilt, shame, or no emotion. The participants then rated the writer's motivations, beliefs, and traits, as well as their own feelings toward the writer. The person expressing feelings of guilt or shame was perceived more positively on a number of attributes, including moral motivation and social attunement, than the person who reported feeling no emotion. In the second study, the writer of the vignette reported experiencing (or not experiencing) cognitive and motivational aspects of guilt or shame. Expressing a desire to apologise (guilt) or feelings of worthlessness (private shame) resulted in more positive impressions than did reputational concerns (public shame) or a lack of any of these feelings. Our results indicate that verbal expressions of moral emotions such as guilt and shame influence perception of moral character as well as likeability.     

When feeling bad makes you look good: guilt, shame, and person perception

In two studies, we examined how expressions of guilt and shame affected person perception. In the first study, participants read an autobiographical vignette in which the writer did something wrong and reported feeling either guilt, shame, or no emotion. The participants then rated the writer's motivations, beliefs, and traits, as well as their own feelings toward the writer. The person expressing feelings of guilt or shame was perceived more positively on a number of attributes, including moral motivation and social attunement, than the person who reported feeling no emotion. In the second study, the writer of the vignette reported experiencing (or not experiencing) cognitive and motivational aspects of guilt or shame. Expressing a desire to apologise (guilt) or feelings of worthlessness (private shame) resulted in more positive impressions than did reputational concerns (public shame) or a lack of any of these feelings. Our results indicate that verbal expressions of moral emotions such as guilt and shame influence perception of moral character as well as likeability.     

Taking control of violence against doctors

Violence against healthcare professionals is a serious but understudied global problem and one that lacks evidence-based solutions. The current research offers a novel explanation and intervention for addressing this issue: We propose that low feelings of control among patients and their family members play an important role in shaping doctor-patient relationships. To regain a sense of control, we suggest that patients attribute responsibility to doctors for their suffering, which may in turn lead to aggressive behavioural intentions against one's doctors. We conducted three studies to understand whether individuals with low perceived control blame doctors more, and whether threats to their sense of control cause participants to attribute more responsibility to doctors. Study 1 found that feelings of lack of control were an important predictor of attributing responsibility for negative illness-related incidents to doctors in a manner consistent with blame. Study 2 specified that the chaotic and unpredictable nature of illness, and not just its negative valence, is what drives attributions of increased responsibility to doctors. Study 3, which utilized a field setting in hospitals, found that an experimental intervention to increase feelings of control decreased frustration against (Study 3a/3b) and intention to harm doctors (Study 3b). These findings suggest that increasing feelings of control among patients can improve patient-doctor relationships. We also discuss the role of control and scapegoating during the COVID-19 pandemic.     

Crying: discussing its basic reasons and uses

Crying can occur in a great variety of contexts, including fulfilment and happiness as well as failure, loss, and sadness or other negative feelings, such as anger and guilt. Despite such differences, we have tried to identify a unitary underlying psychological cause for crying: perceived helplessness. We explore the different crying situations, describing the basic cognitive ingredients and critical steps in the process leading to crying. We start from those situations which directly imply personal frustration and suffering, then we consider empathic crying, crying for joy, and “aesthetic” crying, i.e., crying elicited by aesthetic experiences. We try to show that all of them imply a common core: some frustration (anticipated, actual, or previous), one's attempt to resist, perceived helplessness, and surrender to frustration. Finally, we address both the psychological benefits and costs of crying, either expected or unexpected, showing their links with perceived helplessness.     

Mastering moral misery: Emotional and coping responses to intragroup morality (vs. competence) evaluations

In social groups, individuals are often confronted with evaluations of their behaviour by other group members and are motivated to adapt their own behaviour accordingly. In two studies we examine emotional responses towards, and perceived coping abilities with, morality vs. competence evaluations individuals receive from other in-group members. In Study 1, we show that evaluations of one's immoral behaviour primarily induce guilt, whereas evaluations of incompetent behaviour raise anger. In Study 2, we elaborate on the psychological process associated with these emotional responses, and demonstrate that evaluations of immorality, compared to incompetence, diminish group members’ perceived coping abilities, which in turn intensifies feelings of guilt. However, when anticipating an opportunity to restore one's self-image as a moral group member, perceived coping abilities are increased and the experience of guilt is alleviated. Together these studies demonstrate how group members can overcome their moral misery when restoring their self-image.     

The effects of feelings of guilt on the behaviour of uncooperative individuals in repeated social bargaining games: An affect-as-information interpretation of the role of emotion in social interaction

In two studies we found that feelings of guilt provoke individuals to cooperate in repeated social bargaining games (a prisoner's dilemma in Study 1 and an ultimatum game in Study 2). Feelings of guilt were either experimentally manipulated (Study 1) or assessed via self-report (Study 2) after participants had played one round of a social bargaining game. As predicted, individuals who experienced feelings of guilt (compared to individuals who felt no guilt) after pursuing a non-cooperative strategy in the first round of play, displayed higher levels of cooperation in the subsequent round of play (even one week later). Results are discussed in terms of an “affect-as-information” model, which suggests that non-cooperating individuals who experience the negative affective state associated with guilt in a social bargaining game may be using this feeling state as “information” about the future costs of pursuing an uncooperative strategy. Because in guilt the focus is on the specific, individuals are capable of ridding themselves of this emotional state through action (Lewis, 1993, p. 570)     

The effect of essentialism in settings of historic intergroup atrocities

Three studies tested the effects of essentialist beliefs regarding the national ingroup in situations where a perpetrator group has inflicted harm on a victim group. For members of the perpetrator group, it was hypothesised that ‘essentialism’ has a direct positive association with ‘collective guilt’ felt as a result of misdeeds conducted by other ingroup members in the past. Simultaneously, it was hypothesised to have an indirect negative association with collective guilt, mediated by perceived threat to the ingroup. Considering these indirect and direct effects jointly, it was hypothesised that the negative indirect effect suppresses the direct positive effect, and that the latter would only emerge if perceived ‘ingroup threat’ was controlled for. This was tested in a survey conducted in Latvia among Russians (N = 70) and their feelings toward how Russians had treated ethnic Latvians during the Soviet occupation; and in a survey in Germany among Germans (N = 84), focussing on their feelings toward the Holocaust. For members of the victim group, it was hypothesised that essentialism would be associated with more anger and reluctance to forgive past events inflicted on other ingroup members. It was proposed that this effect would be mediated by feeling connected to the ingroup victims. This was tested in a survey conducted among Hong Kong Chinese and their feelings toward the Japanese and the Nanjing massacre (N = 56). Results from all three studies supported the hypotheses. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Feeling guilty as a source of information about threat and performance

OCD patients experience increased feelings of guilt, threat and uncertainty about harm prevention. As to the relation between these phenomena, it was hypothesised that the experience of guilt acts as "information" that increases the sense of threat and decreases the sense that preventive action is effective. We tested whether state guilt is used as information about risk and prevention effects and whether people high in trait guilt do so more than others. Participants high and low in trait guilt were included. Three types of affect were experimentally induced: guilt, anxiety and a neutral affect. Then, participants estimated the likelihood and severity of a negative outcome, and the dissatisfaction with preventive performances in two OCD relevant scenarios. Relative to low-trait guilt participants, people high in trait guilt had higher ratings of risk after induction of state guilt. With regards to dissatisfaction with preventive performance, there was only a trend for high-trait guilt participants to respond stronger to state guilt. The results suggest that people with a general inclination to feel guilty use temporary feelings of guilt as information about the threat content of a situation and do so even if the source of state guilt is unrelated to the situation. Implications for the understanding of OCD are discussed.     

Righteous or self‐righteous anger? Justice sensitivity moderates defensive outrage at a third‐party harm‐doer

While bystanders' outrage over moral transgressions may represent a genuine desire to restore justice, such expressions can also be self‐serving—alleviating guilt and bolstering one's moral status. Four studies examined whether individual differences in observer justice sensitivity (JS_O) moderate the degree to which outrage at third‐party harm‐doing reflects concerns about one's own moral identity rather than justice per se. Among participants low (vs. high) in JS_O, feelings of guilt predicted greater outrage and desire to punish a corporation's sweatshop labor practices (Studies 1 & 2). Furthermore, affirming one's personal moral identity reduced outrage and support for punishing a corporate harm‐doer among those low, but not high in JS_O (Studies 3 & 4). Similar moderation was absent for other forms of justice sensitivity and just world beliefs. Effects were not explained by negative affect, empathy, personal harm, or political orientation. Results suggest that JS_O uniquely differentiates defensive and justice‐driven moral outrage (150/150).     

Emotional Policy: Personal Sadness and Anger Shape Judgments about a Welfare Case

When making decisions about a welfare case, it is reasonable for one's thoughts and feelings about the potential welfare recipient to influence the decision. It is less reasonable for one's "incidental" feelings (e.g., sadness or anger arising from an event in one's personal life) to influence such decisions. In two studies, however, data reveal that incidental anger and sadness do in fact carry over, shaping welfare policy preferences. Study 1 found that incidental anger decreased the amount of welfare assistance participants recommended providing relative to neutral emotion, whereas sadness increased the amount recommended. Study 2 replicated the results and found that limiting participants' cognitive resources eliminated the difference between sadness and anger, thus implying that differences in depth-of-thought drove the effects. In sum, the results reveal ways in which: (a) personal emotions carry over to shape preferences for public policies, (b) emotions of the same valence have opposing effects, and (c) differential depth-of-cognitive-processing contributes to such effects.     

Predicting support for social action: How values, justice-related variables, discrete emotions, and outcome expectations influence support for the Stolen Generations

The Stolen Generations are Indigenous Australians who were taken from their homes by the State and placed in children??s homes or foster care. This study investigated relations between the values held by Non-Indigenous Australians and willingness to support a hypothetical organization set up to repair the damage caused. Participants (N?=?235) completed the Schwartz Portrait Values Questionnaire followed by items concerning their perceived responsibility; Indigenous deservingness; feelings of pleasure, anger, guilt, regret, shame, and sympathy; their support for the organization; and how efficacious they expected their support would be. It was found at the bivariate level that support was positively associated with self-transcendence values (universalism, benevolence) and negatively associated with both self-enhancement (power, achievement, hedonism) and security values. A path analysis implied that universalism values influenced support via the justice-related variables of perceived responsibility and undeserved treatment, outcome expectations, negative emotions, and sympathy. This study contributes new information about the effects of values on personal willingness to repair past wrongs.