共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Richard Dagger 《Res Publica》2008,14(4):259-275
This article defends the fair-play theory of legal punishment against three objections. The first, the irrelevance objection, is the long-standing complaint that fair play fails to capture what it is about crimes that makes criminals deserving of
punishment; the others are the recently raised false-equivalence and lacks-integration objections. In response, I sketch an account of fair-play theory that is grounded in a conception of the political order
as a meta-cooperative practice—a conception that falls somewhere between contractual and communitarian conceptions—and draw on this
account to show how the theory can overcome the objections.
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Richard DaggerEmail: |
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3.
Ishtiyaque Haji 《Sophia》2009,48(1):1-14
In this paper, I expose a conundrum regarding divine creation as Leibniz conceives of such creation. What energizes the conundrum
is that the concept of omnibenevolence—“consequential omnibenevolence”—that the Leibnizian argument for the view that the
actual world is the best of all possible worlds presupposes, appears to sanction the conclusion that God has no practical
reasons to create the actual world.
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Ishtiyaque HajiEmail: |
4.
Daphna Erdinast-Vulcan 《Human Studies》2007,30(4):395-409
In this paper I address some related aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s unfinished texts, The Visible and the Invisible and The Prose of the World. The point of departure for my reading of these works is the sense of philosophical disillusionment which underlies and motivates
them, and which, I argue, leads Merleau-Ponty towards an engagement with art in general and with literature in particular.
I suggest that Merleau-Ponty’s emerging conception of ethics—premised on the paradox of a “universal singularity” and concerned
with the concrete experience of the individual subject, rather than with abstractions and formal categories—can best be articulated
through the formalist concept of “defamiliarization,” the fundamental performativity of all literature, and the dialogic relations
which, though inherent in all discourse, become most powerfully evident in the dynamics of reading.
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Daphna Erdinast-VulcanEmail: |
5.
Kenneth P. Winkler 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):477-501
Locke is what present-day aestheticians, critics, and historians call an intentionalist. He believes that when we interpret
speech and writing, we aim—in large part and perhaps even for the most part—to recover the intentions, or intended meanings,
of the speaker or writer. Berkeley and Hume shared Locke’s commitment to intentionalism, but it is a theme that recent philosophical
interpreters of all three writers have left largely unexplored. In this paper I discuss the bearing of intentionalism on more
familiar themes in empiricist reflections on language, among them the signification of things (as opposed to ideas); the signifying
role of whole propositions; and the possibility of reference to an “external” world.
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Kenneth P. WinklerEmail: |
6.
Gabriele Contessa 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(2):187-190
In this note, I argue that a dynamically shifted world—i.e. a world identical to our own except for a fixed constant difference
in the absolute acceleration of each object—is nomically impossible in a Newtonian world populated by finitely many objects.
A dynamic shift however seems to be nomically possible in a world populated by infinitely many objects, but only in a broad
sense of nomic possibility.
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Gabriele ContessaEmail: |
7.
Gary Foster 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(2):153-168
Harry Frankfurt characterizes love as “a disinterested concern for the existence of what is loved, and for what is good for
it.” As such, he views romantic love as an inauthentic paradigm for love since such love desires reciprocation, sexual gratification
and so on. I argue that Frankfurt’s conception of love is (a) too general—he does not distinguish between the type of love
one has for one’s partner, one’s country, a moral ideal, etc., (b) it overemphasizes the role of bestowal at the expense of
the part played by appraisal and (c) it is insufficiently social. Certain forms of love, romantic love and friendship for
instance, are defined largely in terms of reciprocation. For Frankfurt, reciprocation is somewhat of an accidental feature
of love. This deficiency in Frankfurt’s conception of love can be traced to a problem in his conception of selfhood which
I argue is insufficiently social in nature.
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Gary FosterEmail: |
8.
Baron Reed 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(1):91-104
The traditional argument for skepticism relies on a comparison between a normal subject and a subject in a skeptical scenario:
because there is no relevant difference between them, neither has knowledge. Externalists respond by arguing that there is
in fact a relevant difference—the normal subject is properly situated in her environment. I argue, however, that there is
another sort of comparison available—one between a normal subject and a subject with a belief that is accidentally true—that
makes possible a new argument for skepticism. Unlike the traditional form of skeptical argument, this new argument applies
equally well to both internalist and externalist theories of knowledge.
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Baron ReedEmail: |
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10.
Alexander A. Guerrero 《Philosophical Studies》2007,136(1):59-97
This paper takes on several distinct but related tasks. First, I present and discuss what I will call the “Ignorance Thesis,”
which states that whenever an agent acts from ignorance, whether factual or moral, she is culpable for the act only if she
is culpable for the ignorance from which she acts. Second, I offer a counterexample to the Ignorance Thesis, an example that
applies most directly to the part I call the “Moral Ignorance Thesis.” Third, I argue for a principle—Don’t Know, Don’t Kill—that
supports the view that the purported counterexample actually is a counterexample. Finally, I suggest that my arguments in
this direction can supply a novel sort of argument against many instances of killing and eating certain sorts of animals.
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Alexander A. GuerreroEmail: |
11.
James D. Marshall 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2007,26(1):67-75
First I would like to thank Clarence Joldersma for his review of our Poststructuralism, Philosophy, Pedagogy (Marshall, 2004-PPP). In particular, I would thank him for his opening sentence: “[t]his book is a response to a lack.” It
is the notion of a lack, noted again later in his review, which I wish to take up mainly in this response. Rather than defending
or elaborating our particular contributions to PPP—the latter would be a great indignity to my colleagues as I would not write
over them—I will take the opportunity to develop the theme of a lack, as I believe that Joldersma has raised a very important issue. But first I will respond briefly to some of Joldersma’s general
and opening statements about the book, and my philosophical position in particular.
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James D. MarshallEmail: |
12.
The Problem of Moral Spontaneity in the Guodian Corpus 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Edward Slingerland 《Dao》2008,7(3):237-256
This paper discusses certain conceptual tensions in a set of archeological texts from the Warring States period, the Guodian
corpus. One of the central themes of the Guodian corpus is the disanalogy between spontaneous, natural familial relationships
and artificial political relationships. This is problematic because, like many early Chinese texts, the Guodian corpus believes
that political relationships must come to be characterized by unselfconsciousness and spontaneity if social order is to prevail.
This tension will be compared to my earlier work on the “paradox of wu-wei (effortless action),” and the Guodian corpus’ “solution”
to the problem of teaching spontaneity—drawing upon the transformative power of music—will be placed within the landscape
of early “Confucian” and “Daoist” theories concerning human nature and self-cultivation.
相似文献
Edward SlingerlandEmail: |
13.
Barry L. Bull 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2008,27(6):449-460
Liberal political theory is widely believed to be an inadequate source of civic commitment and thus of civic education primarily
because of its commitment to what is perceived as a pervasive individualism. In this paper, I explore the possibility that
John Rawls’s later political philosophy may provide a response to this belief. I first articulate a conception of liberal
politics derived from Rawls’s idea of reflective equilibrium that generates an overlapping consensus about political principles
among those who hold a wide variety of cultural and personal conceptions of the good. Next I develop the aims for civic education
in a society that employs such a politics. Then I suggest the elements of the public school curriculum appropriate for such
a civic education, including a robust multicultural education, intellectual reflection on the society’s history, and philosophical
training that enables children to understand the events and policies of their nation as following from general political principles.
I also consider the kinds of classroom practice that seem necessary to provide the motivation to engage in the process of
the emergence of an overlapping consensus, including opportunities to develop and to reflect on the principles that may be
included in the current consensus and to understand the way in which those principles relate to children’s developing conceptions
of the good. Finally, I compare this conception of civic education to those of other liberal theorists.
相似文献
Barry L. BullEmail: |
14.
Social Externalism and First-Person Authority 总被引:3,自引:2,他引:1
Lynne Rudder Baker 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(2):287-300
Social Externalism is the thesis that many of our thoughts are individuated in part by the linguistic and social practices
of the thinker’s community. After defending Social Externalism and arguing for its broad application, I turn to the kind of
defeasible first-person authority that we have over our own thoughts. Then, I present and refute an argument that uses first-person
authority to disprove Social Externalism. Finally, I argue briefly that Social Externalism—far from being incompatible with
first-person authority—provides a check on first-personal pronouncements and thus saves first-person authority from being
simply a matter of social convention and from collapsing into the subjectivity of “what seems right is right.”
相似文献
Lynne Rudder BakerEmail: |
15.
Timo Kajamies 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):525-534
In his topical article, Andrew Cling claims that the best extant formulation of the so-called epistemic regress problem rests
on five assumptions that are too strong. Cling offers an improved version that rests on a different set of three core epistemic
assumptions, each of which he argues for. Despite of owing a great deal to Cling’s ideas, I argue that the epistemic regress
problem surfaces from more fundamental assumptions than those offered by Cling. There are ultimately two core assumptions—in
fact two contradictory strands within the concept of epistemic support—which jointly create a powerful challenge for our pursuit
of paramount epistemic values.
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Timo KajamiesEmail: |
16.
Supernatural Miracles and Religious Inclusiveness 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Morgan Luck 《Sophia》2007,46(3):287-293
In this paper I shall assess Clarke’s assertion that all definitions of miracles that purport to satisfy the criterion of
religious inclusiveness should substitute the term ‘supernatural’ for ‘non-natural’. In addition, I shall attempt to strengthen
Clarke’s conception of the supernatural by offering an analysis of what it means for something to be ‘above’ nature. Lastly,
I shall offer a new argument as to why Clarke’s intention-based definition of miracles is necessarily less religiously inclusive
than Mumford’s causation-based definition.
相似文献
Morgan LuckEmail: |
17.
Frank Arntzenius 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(2):277-297
I argue that standard decision theories, namely causal decision theory and evidential decision theory, both are unsatisfactory.
I devise a new decision theory, from which, under certain conditions, standard game theory can be derived.
相似文献
Frank ArntzeniusEmail: |
18.
Sins of the American Empire and Pastoral Responses 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Ryan LaMothe 《Pastoral Psychology》2007,55(4):459-472
This article describes attributes of the American Empire and addresses characteristic sins—pride, sloth, greed, and idolatry—that
are necessary for maintaining the domestic and foreign policies aimed toward expanding the economic and military power of
the United States. In particular, I claim that theo-political narratives and rituals extant in U.S. culture are internalized,
structuring our collective psyches and shaping both our wills and actions. Pride, sloth, greed, and idolatry signify the distortion
of will, giving rise to actions that result in harm and alienation. To address this reality, several pastoral strategies are
depicted.
相似文献
Ryan LaMotheEmail: |
19.
Farrokh B. Sekaleshfar 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2009,30(2):161-171
Personhood constitutes the pivotal point in the abortion debate. There exists a diversity of views as to when foetal personhood
actually starts—from conception and implantation to viability and even birth. One perspective that has lost support for decades
is that of quickening, a stance associated with Lord Ellenborough’s 1803 Act. This paper attempts to put quickening back into
the limelight, albeit through a new interpretation. After discussing its philosophy and underpinning rationale, I will assess
a number of arguments that have been directed against quickening as a viable point of distinction. I conclude by suggesting
that according to modern proponents of quickening proponents, rational soul ensoulment begins after a certain degree of cerebral
cortical formation has been realized, thus marking foetal volition, which promotes foetal interests, for the first time.
相似文献
Farrokh B. SekaleshfarEmail: Email: |
20.
Mark Heller 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(1):83-101
The Donkey Problem (as I am calling it) concerns the relationship between more and less fundamental ontologies. I will claim
that the moral to draw from the Donkey Problem is that the less fundamental objects are merely conventional. This conventionalism
has consequences for the 3D/4D debate. Four-dimensionalism is motivated by a desire to avoid coinciding objects, but once
we accept that the non-fundamental ontology is conventional there is no longer any reason to reject coincidence. I therefore
encourage 4Dists to become even more radical—embrace the Donkey Problem’s conventionalism and deflate the debate between 3Dists
and 4Dists.
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Mark HellerEmail: |