Major themes in the Arabic political literature of Islamic revivalism, 1970–1985: The Islamic system of government (al‐nizam al‐islami), shūra democracy and the implementation of the Sharica as opposed to secularism (cilmaniyya)

The analysis of the political literature of Islamic revivalism belongs to the pertinent issues of Muslim‐Christian dialogue. This article is an inquiry into the major themes of this literature published in Arabic. The historical context of the writings of political Islam is the failure of the secular nation‐state in the world of Islam to cope with the processes of modernization and development. The political Islamic response to this failure is the revival of the dream of reconstructing the Islamic state along the model of Medina on the eve of the rise of Islam. The analysis of the intellectual reconstruction of the early Islamic state as an expression of divine order, which ought to replace the secular state, reveals that this construction is imbued with projections of modern times into the Islamic past. Thus the alleged Islamic government of nizam islami/Islamic system as a modern issue is an outgrowth of political Islam. In this sense, the notion that Islam is a din wa‐dawla/ divine order of the state cannot be found in classical Islamic sources. Part one of this two‐part article comes to the conclusion that political Islam is a burden for modern Islam and an obstacle to the accommodation of the needs of the Muslim people to the modern age; it is not a promising future prospect in the present situation of crisis.     

Cultural relations between the west and the world of Islam: Meeting points and possibilities of co‐operation on the academic level

Faced with world‐wide political and ecological problems the West and the world of Islam stand in need of dialogue and cooperation. For these to continue and succeed, the discrimination of the West against Islam must stop. However, Islam is misunderstood also in its own camp. Efforts to research Islam on the academic level, as impartially and as free from prejudice as possible, are therefore of the utmost importance. Western civilization and technology have been adopted in the Islamic world, whereas as far as the humanities are concerned, an attitude of unconditional acceptance coexists with one of total re‐jection. Critical discussion and argument with the West can and must in no way be separated from a thoroughgoing Islamic self‐criticism.     

Pragmatic Dogma: Understanding the Ideological Continuities in Iran's Response to the Charlie Hebdo Attacks

ABSTRACT

Ayatollah Khomeini's 1989 fatwa against Salman Rushdie cemented Iran's space within Western discourses surrounding blasphemy and Islam. The fatwa has earned its place within the polarizing debate between free speech and religious tolerance, which fundamentally serves the political ambitions of those involved. This article therefore argues that, in order to understand accusations of blasphemy in Iran, one must address the political concerns in which the accusation takes place since these reveal Iran's tendency towards pragmatic dogma – the practice of meeting the needs of the state in a way that accords with its religious ideology. The responses of Iranian officials to the Charlie Hebdo killings in 2015 provide a useful case study for the analysis of this pragmatic dogma, since the Islamic Republic pursued a different approach to the Charlie Hebdo “blasphemy” from that which it had followed with Rushdie. Instead of condoning the killings, Iran's political and religious elite chose to condemn the actions of both the cartoonists and the gunmen, without outlining a punishment. The article will argue that this case demonstrates many of the continuing themes in Iran's approach to blasphemy, since the Charlie Hebdo cartoons have largely been used to reinforce the Islamic Republic's overall worldview.     

Organizing Muslim Virtue: Community Organizing,Comparative Religious Ethics,and the South African Muslim Struggle Against Apartheid

While offering valuable comparative insights into models of the self and ethical formation across religious traditions, studies of virtue ethics have been critiqued for putting forward accounts which are elite-focused. Some comparative ethicists have pointed to work in religious ethics and political theology on faith-based community organizing as offering compelling case studies of non-elite ethical formation. I seek to add to this literature by performing an analysis of the theories and practices of ethical formation in the South African Muslim anti-apartheid grassroots organization known as the “Call of Islam.” The “Call of Islam” emphasized a liberation-oriented praxis and active solidarity with non-Muslim organizations for the purposes of protesting apartheid and employed a range of social practices including study circles (halaqat) and political funeral processions to prepare and equip its members for such work. As such, it not only sheds light on non-elite ethical formation, but in its cultivation of the habits and dispositions of democratic solidarity, it also serves as an Islamic example of broad-based community organizing.     

A Clash of Civilizations? Preferences for Religious Political Leaders in 86 Nations

Huntington claimed that today's major conflicts are most likely to erupt between religiously defined “civilizations,” in particular between Christianity and Islam. Using World Values Surveys from 86 nations, we examine differences between Christians and Muslims in preferences for religious political leaders. The results suggest a marked difference between Muslims and Christians in their attitudes toward religious politicians, with Muslims more favorable by 20 points out of 100. Devoutness, education, degree of government corruption, and status as a formerly Communist state account for the difference. Little support is found for the clash‐of‐civilizations hypothesis. Instead, we find that a clash of individual beliefs—between the devout and the secular—along with enduring differences between the more developed and less developed world explains the difference between Islam and Christianity with regards to preferences for religious political leaders.     

Apolitical Interpretation of Islam: Said Nursi's Faith-Based Activism in Comparison with Political Islamism and Sufism

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, Islam has generally been represented in the media as a political ideology and some academics have over-emphasized this political image of Islam. These are not baseless speculations; there are several political Islamic groups worldwide. However, there are also many apolitical Islamic groups. This article analyzes one of the most influential apolitical Islamic movements in the world, the Nurcus, and its founder, Bediüzzaman Said Nursi. Nursi, the author of the Risale-i Nur collection, emphasized the ascetic aspect of Islam: ‘Ninety-nine percent of Islam is about ethics, worship, the hereafter, and virtue. Only one percent is about politics; leave that to the rulers.’ He also added, ‘I seek refuge in God from Satan and [party] politics.’ Through the analysis of Nursi's thought and activism, the article will try to answer the following questions: Was Nursi a Sufi? What are the theological and structural bases of Nursi's apolitical interpretation of Islam? What is the impact of the secular state in Turkey on the development of Nursi's apolitical outlook and activism? What does his apolitical understanding of Islam say to non-Turkish Muslims who do not live in a secular state?     

Religion and Civic Engagement in Muslim Countries

Previous studies of religion on civic and political participation focus primarily on Western Christian societies. Studies of Muslim societies concentrate on Islamic religiosity's effect on attitudes toward democracy, not on how Muslim religious participation carries over into social and political arenas. This article examines the relationship between religion and civic engagement in nine Muslim‐majority countries using data from the World Values Surveys. I find that active participation in Muslim organizations is associated with greater civic engagement, while religious service attendance is not. In a subset of countries, daily prayer is associated with less civic engagement. The main area in which Muslim societies differ from Western ones is in the lack of association between civic engagement, trust, and tolerance. Religious participation is a more significant predictor of secular engagement than commonly used “social capital” measures, suggesting a need to adapt measures of religiosity to account for differences in religious expression across non‐Christian faiths.     

Relationships between core ideological motives,social and economic conservatism,and religiosity: Evidence from a Turkish sample

The “conservatism as motivated social cognition” approach posits two core ideological motives underlying political conservatism across cultures. However, there is a scarcity of tests from non‐Western cultures, and much research has failed to distinguish between social and economic conservatism. Using a relatively large undergraduate sample from a non‐Western, predominantly Muslim country (Turkey), we tested the associations among resistance to change and opposition to equality motives, social and economic conservatism, right‐wing political orientation, and religiosity. In line with the “conservatism as motivated social cognition” account, we found that (a) social conservatism is more strongly related to resistance to change (rather than opposition to equality), (b) economic conservatism is more strongly related to opposition to equality (rather than resistance to change), (c) social conservatism is the strongest predictor of right‐wing political orientation among other conservatism measures, and (d) political orientation and religiosity had divergent effects: While right‐wing political orientation was related to economic conservatism, religiosity was inversely related to the latter, providing support for previous work indicating a resemblance between leftists and Islamists in Turkey. The results generally support the motivated social cognition approach to conservatism while also highlighting the importance of distinguishing between social and economic conservatism.     

Shi‘i Islamic cosmopolitanism and the transformation of religious authority in Senegal

Senegalese “conversion” to Shi‘i Islam resulted from cosmopolitan interactions with West Africa’s resident Lebanese population and Iranian revolutionary ideologies. Shi‘i advocates spread their religious convictions through teaching, conferences, holiday celebrations, and media publicity. Key to their success are libraries full of Arabic and French texts from Iran and Lebanon. Inherent in Islamic education is the authority bestowed on those who are knowledgeable, and with the spread of religious knowledge through books, media, and the Internet comes a broadening of the scope of religious authority and resulting conflict with or accommodation of old political communities. Senegalese converts to Shi‘i Islam use their literacy in Arabic and individually acquired libraries of Islamic legal books to bypass the authority of Sufi marabouts. Some keep their feet in both Sunni and Shi‘i worlds, and their ability to compare religious texts of both traditions wins them disciples. Shi‘i minorities claim autochthony and authenticity in Senegal through narrating revisionist historical accounts of the spread of (Shi‘i) Islam to Africa. Conferences commemorating the martyrdom of Imam Husayn during the Shi‘i mourning period in the month of Muharram target Sufi Muslims who also love the family of the Prophet. Shi‘i leaders skillfully detach this foreign religious ideology from Middle Eastern politics and make this branch of Islam relevant to Senegalese through establishing religious centers as NGOs, which work to bring health care and economic development to neighborhoods in the name of Shi‘i Islam.     

The limits of religion: liberalism and anti-liberalism in the Islamic Republic of Iran

This essay investigates the ways that ‘religion,’ as a particular category of discourse, organised Muslim debates in the Islamic Republic of Iran during the 1990s and early 2000s. Recent work in the study of religion has highlighted not only liberalism’s privatised and largely protestant notion of religion, but also the ways that understanding of religion affects the representation of Islam in the West. Studies of Islam, continuing the critique of liberal assumptions regarding religion, often uphold a traditionalist understanding of Islam as an equally valuable way of being in the world. This article, in contrast, explores the ways that liberal religion figures in both liberal and anti-liberal Muslim debate. Specifically, it traces the ways that Muslim theology (kalām) draws upon and contests the rationality and secularity of the world and, in so doing, turns the gaze back to continuing discontents with liberalism in the West.     

ISLAM AND SCIENCE: THE NEXT PHASE OF DEBATES

This article reviews the new developments that have occurred in the past ten to fifteen years in the field of Islam and science: (1) the emergence of a “new generation” of thinkers, Muslim scientists who accept modern science's fundamental methodology, theories, and results, and try to find ways to “harmonize” it with Islam; and (2) the exponential increase in the popularity of the I‘jaz ‘Ilmiy “theory,” the “miraculous scientific content of the Qur'an” (and, some say, the Hadith) as well as the continuation of the traditionalist school (Iqbal and others, following Nasr) among a section of the Muslim intelligentsia. The author then focuses on the next phase of issues, that is the “challenges” that this “new generation” must address, including the integration of methodological naturalism and evolution (biological and human) in the Islamic worldview, and positions to adopt regarding divine action and miracles. The author also mentions “educational and social issues” where Islam and science interface, and concludes with “the way forward.”     

Christian‐Muslim relations in the African context

Abstract

The course of Islam and Christianity in Africa as well as statistical figures suggest a wide variety within, as well as considerable divergence between, both religions in the many African contexts. Though the majority of African Muslims still stick to a ‘traditional African Islam’, we observe a resurgence of Islam reflecting a growing religious awareness, on the one hand, and tendencies towards an ideological re‐interpretation (Islamism), on the other. Trends in resurgent Islam are highlighted by the examples of Islamic internationalism and da'wa, the modernisation of Islamic education, and the proliferation of Islamic political groups all over the continent. Various dimensions of Christian—Muslim relations in Africa today show areas of conflict as well as of cooperation and exchange. Against the background of the economic and social disintegration of many African societies, there is no alternative to inter‐religious dialogue which must be based on an authentic African theological foundation, being rooted in the African heritage shared by Muslim and Christian communities alike.     

Syncretic Spirituality: Islam in Indigenous Australia

Far from being an exclusively present-day, let alone post-9/11, phenomenon, Islam in Indigenous Australia has a set of historical precedents. Focusing on three early waves of Muslim sojourners and immigrants, the article begins with an overview of the long and complex history of Indigenous engagement with Islam. Introducing readers to a broad spectrum of Indigenous identification with Islam, it examines the kin-based or informal absorption of Islamic values that occurs particularly among those with Muslim forbears (a process termed “kinversion”). The article then turns from the primarily historical material to an investigation of the contemporary experience of Islam in Indigenous Australian lives. As Islam is among the fastest growing religions in the world today, an increased rate of conversion to Islam among Indigenous communities might simply be a sign of the times. This is not, however, the case. There are uniquely Australian circumstances that inform it, and for some Indigenous people an identification with Islam has provided an alternative route back to their Indigenous roots.     

Religion,Cultural Clash,and Muslim American Attitudes About Politically Motivated Violence

Does adherence to Islam predict attitudes about “suicide bombing” among American Muslims? This study examines the effects of religious and political factors on views of politically motivated violence (PMV). We draw from diverse scholarship, emphasizing arguments that are inspired by Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations perspective, as well as recent work in the sociology of Islam. Using a measure that gauges support for “suicide bombing” from the 2007 Pew Survey of American Muslims, results from logistic regression models suggest that political views and religious factors have a minimal effect on Muslim American attitudes toward suicide bombing. Furthermore, we find that Qur’ānic authoritativeness (i.e., the view that the Qur’ān is the word of God and not written by men) is associated with lower odds of supporting this form of PMV. We discuss the implications of our findings for the often anecdotal and alarmist accounts that link Muslim religiosity to support for “radical” extremism. We close with study limitations and avenues of future research.     

Political implications of the Islamic notion of ‘supersession’ as reflected in Islamic jurisprudence

The paper undertakes to investigate the ways in which the dominant Muslim community regulated legal‐ethical relations with its non‐Muslim minorities. The ideological underpinnings of the Islamic legal tradition in the area of jihad provided legitimacy for the Muslim political domination of the lands and peoples beyond the original boundaries of Islam. The central argument of the paper is that Muslim jurists were involved in the routinization of the qur'anic message about ‘Islam being the only true religion with God’ (Q. 3:19) in the context of the social and political position of the community. The interaction between the idea of Islam being the universal faith for all humankind and the existing predominance of Muslim political power created the specific legal language that provided the justification to extend the notion of jihad beyond its strictly defensive meaning in the Qur'an to its being an offensive instrument for Muslim creation of a dominant political order.     

Creative thinking and collective mobilisation in the Muslim world

ABSTRACT

To what extent does openness to new ideas and creativity (ONIC) help explain the elite-challenging collective mobilisation in the Muslim world? Are religious Muslims who are open to creative and innovative thinking more or less likely to engage in pro-democratic collective action? Analysing 16 Muslim-majority countries, this study advances the debate of Muslim contentious politics by systematically examining the extent to which ONIC explains the variation in high-risk, pro-democratic collective mobilisation. A quad-dimensional analysis of creativity indicates that ONIC is an empirically distinctive measure to capture openness and creative thinking. The evidence further suggests that, ceteris paribus, Islamic religiosity and ONIC are not mutually exclusive and that both are positively associated with collective protests. Notably, ONIC does appear to intervene to mediate the positive relationship between Islam and engagement in high-risk collective action, implying that the effects of religiosity may not be independent from how Muslims position themselves towards being open to novel ideas or creativity. The findings also demonstrate that an individual-level ONIC may be boosting the likelihood of protest engagement among more devout individuals in Islamic societies.     

The Mosaic of Muslim Religiosity and Social‐Political Attitudes in Kyrgyzstan: A Gender‐Based Exploration

This research explores the diversity of Islam in post‐Soviet Kyrgyzstan and the implications of that diversity for social‐political attitudes. Our hypotheses are (1) Kyrgyzstani Muslims can be categorized into gender‐based religious groupings defined by various religious indicators and (2) membership in these groupings influences social‐political attitudes. Using a 2011 nationwide survey in Kyrgyzstan and applying statistical clustering, we identify three groups of religiosity within each gender. Looking at four issues such as preferences for Islam in politics and for religious versus civil law, we find significant differences among the religious groups even after region, urbanity, and ethnicity are controlled. These findings suggest that narratives treating Muslims as a single, unified community or simply contrasting Muslims and non‐Muslims need to be expanded to capture meaningful variations. Our findings are consistent with the theoretical notion that more devout Muslims form a subculture that seeks to extend Islamic values into secular realms.     

Beyond “Heartless Conservative” and “Bleeding Heart Liberal” Caricatures: How Religiosity Shapes the Relationship Between Political Orientation and Empathy

Is political orientation associated with self‐reported empathy? Popular caricatures frame political orientation in terms of the “heartless conservative” and the “bleeding heart liberal.” Yet, previous research has produced findings that present mixed evidence to support these caricatures. Using data from the 2004 General Social Survey, analyses show that the caricatures of the caring liberal and the cold‐hearted conservative are supported by results for empathy—in which conservatives have lower levels of empathy than liberals—but this pattern holds only when individuals also have low levels of religiosity. In the context of high religiosity, self‐identified conservatives do not have lower empathy than self‐identified liberals, net of a host of sociodemographic characteristics. Our observations demonstrate that patterns in empathy across political orientation are evident only when levels of different forms of religiosity are considered.     

A Religiously Partisan Science? Islamic and Christian Perspectives

Both within Christianity and Islam we can find influential scholars who maintain that science is not religiously neutral because it contains a naturalist bias. They argue that Christians or Muslims should respond by developing their own kind of science, an “Islamic science,” a “sacred science,” a “theistic science” or a “faith-informed science.” In this article the recent writings of two advocates of such a view, standing in two different religious traditions, namely Mehdi Golshani (Islam) and Alvin Plantinga (Christianity) are compared, analyzed, and evaluated. A distinction between different ways in which religion might enter into the fabric of science is introduced and it is argued that the most crucial issues surround the question of whether or not religion ought to play a part in the validation of theories.