Weighing pragmatic and evidential reasons for belief

In this paper I argue that we can give a plausible account of how to compare pragmatic and evidential normative reasons for belief. The account I offer is given in the form of a ‘defeasing function’. This function allows for a sophisticated comparison of the two types of reasons without assigning complex features to the logical structures of either type of reason. I would like to thank John Broome, Stewart Cohen, Roger Crisp, Jonathan Dancy, Brie Gertler, and Iwao Hirose for their comments on earlier versions of this material. A number of revisions have also been made as a result of helpful questions raised during presentations of this paper at Arizona State University, McGill University, and the University of Virginia.     

The persistence of the belief that madness is hereditary

For more than a century geneticists and social scientists have been trying to prove that mental illness is hereditary. Today most professionals and lay people believe that the hereditary nature of schizophrenia and various other mental illnesses has been confirmed by an accumulation of various evidence. However, a review of that evidence finds that is far from conclusive. It is therefore suggested that a stubborn insistence on this genetic theory of madness is itself part of the problem—a universal tendency to sweep the dark side of family life under the rug—and leads to biased research.     

Older children's misunderstanding of uncertain belief after passing the false belief test

A four-location belief task was designed to examine children's understanding of another's uncertain belief after passing a false belief (FB) task. In Experiment 1, after passing the FB task, participants were asked what a puppet would do after he failed to find his toy at the falsely believed location. Most 4-year-olds and half of 6-year-olds children who passed the FB test showed difficulty in handling uncertain belief; answering that the puppet would then look for his toy at the current (moved-to) location. Eight-year-old children and adults all recognized that the puppet would look for the toy everywhere, or at random. In Experiment 2, 4- and 6-year-olds were presented two other search tasks; it was shown that preschoolers could use search strategies to solve a similar search problem when FB was not involved. This new aspect of post-FB understanding can be interpreted in terms of limited understanding of uncertainty in a less-knowledgeable individual and of limited ability to infer the consequences of belief-disconfirmation.     

Ideological differences in attitude and belief similarity: distinguishing perception and reality

ABSTRACT

Attitude and belief similarity have long stood as topics of inquiry for social psychology. Recent research suggests that there might be meaningful differences across people in the extent to which they perceive and actually share others’ attitudes and beliefs. I outline research examining the relationship between political ideology and the perception and reality of attitude similarity. Specifically, I review research documenting that (a) conservatives perceive greater ingroup similarity than do liberals, (b) conservatives overestimate and liberals underestimate ingroup similarity, (c) liberals and conservatives both underestimate similarity to outgroup members, and (d) liberals possess more actual ingroup similarity than do conservatives on a national level. Collectively, this review contributes to understanding how political ideology relates to (perceived) attitude similarity.     

Measurement of supernatural belief: sex differences and locus of control

Although we live in an age dominated by science and technology, there exists an increasingly popular anti-science sentiment. This study describes the development of a scale to assess the degree of personal acceptance of supernatural causality versus acceptance of scientific explanation. In addition to the psychometric data concerning validity and reliability of the scale, data are presented which showed the personality factor of supernaturalism to be independent of orthodox religious attitudes. Results indicated a significantly greater supernatural acceptance for women, and a positive relation of supernaturalism with external locus of control.     

The anticipated belief differences theory of prejudice: Analysis and evaluation

The main supporting evidence for Rokeach's theory of prejudice (the Anticipated Belief Differences Theory of Prejudice) comes from the strong belief effects obtained in a simple Race/Belief manipulation. Analysis shows that the theory is unfalsifiable with this paradigm and is therefore neither tested nor confirmed by the many studies purporting to do so. The Belief-undefined/Belief-partially-defined manipulation of Stein, Hardyck and Smith (1965) does test the theory. However, these authors' conclusion that favourable evidence was obtained is incorrect owing to the use of an inappropriate statistic. Although race effects can be incorporated within a theory of belief prejudice it is equally possible to incorporate belief effects within any theory of prejudice which is contingent on an initial categorization into in-group and out-group. An empirical distinction between Rokeach's theory and other theories of prejudice can be made using a Belief-undefined/Belief-partially-defined manipulation. Finally the theoretical adequacy of Rokeach's theory is discussed in terms of more general characteristics of prejudice.     

Happiness as a belief system: individual differences and priming in emotion judgments

Three studies involving 104 undergraduates sought to examine how an individual's level of life satisfaction organizes their knowledge concerning the self's emotions. Participants judged the self's positive and negative emotions within a computerized task. Key results sought to determine whether judging two positive emotions in a consecutive sequence speeds the second judgment--a pattern of priming that would suggest a tighter, more interconnected structure in semantic memory related to one's positive emotions. As expected, individual differences in life satisfaction predicted the magnitude of this priming effect (Studies 1 & 2), which appeared to be unique to judgments of the self's emotions (Study 3). The results indicate that happy, relative to less happy, individuals organize information concerning their positive emotions in a qualitatively different and tighter semantic manner.     

Individual differences in working memory capacity and resistance to belief bias in syllogistic reasoning

In two experiments, we investigated the possibility that individual differences in working memory capacity (WMC) would provide resistance to belief bias in syllogistic reasoning. In Experiment 1 (N?=?157), participants showed a belief bias effect in that they had longer response times and decreased accuracy on syllogisms with conflict between the validity and believability of the conclusion than on syllogisms with no such conflict. However, this effect did not differ as a function of individual differences in WMC. Experiment 2 (N?=?122) replicated this effect with the addition of decontextualized (i.e., nonsense) syllogisms as a different means of measuring the magnitude of the belief bias effect. Although individual differences in WMC and fluid intelligence were related to better reasoning overall, the magnitude of the belief bias effect was not smaller for participants with greater WMC. The present study offers two novel findings: (a) The belief bias effect is independent of individual differences in WMC and fluid intelligence, and (b) resolving conflict in verbal reasoning is not a type of conflict resolution that correlates with individual differences in WMC, further establishing boundary conditions for the role of WMC in human cognitive processes.     

Individual differences in information order effects: The importance of right-hemisphere access in belief updating

The order in which information is received alters the evaluation of causal hypotheses. Specifically, research suggests that the last piece of information oftentimes has the greatest impact on the evaluation and that the difference in subjective value between two pieces of information is an important factor influencing the magnitude of this recency effect. The present paper extends this line of work by exploring individual differences in this phenomenon via one's degree of handedness. Two hundred and five participants were given two hypothetical scenarios and related causal hypotheses accompanied by two pieces of additional information and asked to revise their belief in each hypothesis as information accumulated. Results confirmed predictions that 1) inconsistent/mixed-handers (those who use their non-dominant hand for at least some activities) show a larger effect with two pieces of inconsistent weak or strong information, and 2) neither mixed-handers nor consistent/strong-handers (those who use their dominant hand for almost all activities) show an effect with strong and weak pieces of consistent information. Mixed-handers' susceptibility to persuasive arguments and Ramachandran’s (1995; Ramachandran and Blakeslee, 1998) belief-updating theory centered around communication between the two halves of the brain and functional access to the right hemisphere are used to account for these data.     

Individual differences in afterimage persistence: relationships to hypnotic susceptibility and visuospatial skills.

To investigate the moderating role of individual differences in hypnotic susceptibility and visuospatial skills on afterimage persistence, we presented a codable (cross) flash of light to 40 men and 46 women who had been dark adapted for 20 min. In an unrelated classroom setting, subjects had previously been given two standardized scales of hypnotic susceptibility (Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Shor & Orne, 1962; Group Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale, Form C, Crawford & Allen, 1982) and the Mental Rotations Test (Vandenberg & Kuse, 1978). The first afterimage interval and the afterimage duration correlated significantly with hypnotic responsiveness, supporting Wallace (1979), but did not show the anticipated relationships with mental rotation visuospatial skills. Individuals in the high hypnotizable group had (a) significantly longer afterimage intervals between its first appearance and first disappearance than did those in medium or low groups, as well as (b) significantly longer afterimages between the first appearance and the final disappearance than did those in low groups, but those in medium groups did not differ significantly from the other groups. Discriminant analysis using the afterimage persistence measures classified correctly 65.2% of high hypnotizables, 37.5% of medium hypnotizables, and 54.8% of low hypnotizables. Hypothesized cognitive skills that assist in the maintenance of afterimages and underlie hypnotic susceptibility include abilities to maintain focused attention and resist distractions over time and to maintain vivid visual images.     

When logic and belief collide: Individual differences in reasoning times support a selective processing model

When the validity of a deductive conclusion conflicts with its believability people often respond in a belief-biased manner. This study used response times to test the selective processing model, which views belief-bias effects as arising from the interplay between superficial heuristic processes and more rigorous analytic processes. Participants were split into three response groups according to their propensity to endorse logically normative conclusions. The low-logic, high belief-bias group demonstrated rapid responding, consistent with heuristic processing. The medium-logic, moderate belief-bias group showed slower responding, consistent with enhanced analytic processing, albeit selectively biased by conclusion believability. The high-logic, low belief-bias group's relatively unbiased responses came at the cost of increased processing times, especially with invalid-believable conclusions. These findings support selective processing claims that distinct heuristic and analytic processing systems underpin reasoning, and indicate that certain individuals differentially engage one system more than the other. A minor amendment is proposed to the current selective processing model to capture the full range of observed effects.     

Cognitive biases explain religious belief,paranormal belief,and belief in life’s purpose

Cognitive theories of religion have postulated several cognitive biases that predispose human minds towards religious belief. However, to date, these hypotheses have not been tested simultaneously and in relation to each other, using an individual difference approach. We used a path model to assess the extent to which several interacting cognitive tendencies, namely mentalizing, mind body dualism, teleological thinking, and anthropomorphism, as well as cultural exposure to religion, predict belief in God, paranormal beliefs and belief in life’s purpose. Our model, based on two independent samples (N = 492 and N = 920) found that the previously known relationship between mentalizing and belief is mediated by individual differences in dualism, and to a lesser extent by teleological thinking. Anthropomorphism was unrelated to religious belief, but was related to paranormal belief. Cultural exposure to religion (mostly Christianity) was negatively related to anthropomorphism, and was unrelated to any of the other cognitive tendencies. These patterns were robust for both men and women, and across at least two ethnic identifications. The data were most consistent with a path model suggesting that mentalizing comes first, which leads to dualism and teleology, which in turn lead to religious, paranormal, and life’s-purpose beliefs. Alternative theoretical models were tested but did not find empirical support.     

Individual differences in resultant achievement motivation and latency to and persistence at an achievement task

Alternative hypotheses generated from the Atkinson (1957) and Atkinson and Feather (1966) risk-taking model of achievement motivation and the Atkinson and Birch (1970) dynamics of action theory comparing groups high and low in resultant achievement motivation (RAM) on latency to and persistence at an achievement task were tested. Subjects who had made two or more atypical shifts (choice of an easier task following success and choice of a more difficult task following failure) during 21 trials of a target-shooting game the first week were classified as low RAM (n=154), and subjects who had made 0 or 1 atypical shift were classified as high RAM (n=155). In week 2 subjects divided their time among two nonachievement tasks and the very easy, easy, intermediate, difficult, or most difficult levels of the achievement task. No main effects or interactions were found when latency to the achievement task was analyzed in a RAM by Difficulty level × Gender individual difference design. High-RAM subjects persisted significantly longer than low-RAM subjects across all conditions. Results are explained using the dynamic concepts of instigation, inhibition, and consummation. Analyses of sequential choices (week 1) among five difficulty levels did not support the Atkinson (1957) explanation of atypical shifts as avoidance of intermediate challenges for low-RAM subjects. Subjects who avoided the target-shooting game the second week more often persisted at the very easy task following success but not at the most difficult task following failure, results that are partially supportive of Feather's (1961) analysis of persistence.I wish to thank Dr. David Reuman, who suggested the research topic; the 24 undergraduate research assistants who ran subjects for this experiment; Rochelle Breitenbach, Laurie Colisanti, Kevin Kurkowski, Lee Ann McHenry, and Brenda Yee, who assisted with the data preparation and analyses; Ann Beck and Randi Gilbert, who provided editorial assistance; and Dr. Tilly Houtmans, who commented on an earlier version of this paper. A paper based on the dynamics of action research was presented at the Nags Head Conference on Motivation and Emotion on June 17, 1990. A paper based on the level of aspiration/achievement motivation results was presented at the Third International Meeting of the Society for the Advancement of Field Theory on September 16, 1988. A copy of the BASIC program for the Apple IIe computer is available to anyone who sends a 5 1/4-inch diskette.     

有关王阳明的两个考证

王阳明《年谱》所谓“始揭‘致良知’之教”的确切含义是指第一次明确提出“致良知”的话头;作为其立论依据的“遗书守益”之“书”可疑之处甚多;王阳明正式提出“致良知”话头的时间,很可能不在正德十六年辛巳,而在嘉靖三年甲申。《年谱》对“南大吉续刻《传习录》”时间的认定是错误的,南刻《传习录》成书时间当在嘉靖五年八月与嘉靖七年十月之间。     

The evidential status of philosophical intuition

Philosophers have traditionally held that claims about necessities and possibilities are to be evaluated by consulting our philosophical intuitions; that is, those peculiarly compelling deliverances about possibilities that arise from a serious and reflective attempt to conceive of counterexamples to these claims. But many contemporary philosophers, particularly naturalists, argue that intuitions of this sort are unreliable, citing examples of once-intuitive, but now abandoned, philosophical theses, as well as recent psychological studies that seem to establish the general fallibility of intuition. In the first two sections of this paper, I evaluate these arguments, and also the counter-arguments of contemporary defenders of tradition. In the next two sections, I sketch an alternative account of the role of philosophical intuitions that incorporates elements of traditionalism and naturalism - and defend it against other such views. In the final section, however, I discuss intuitions about conscious experience, and acknowledge that my view may not extend comfortably to this case. This may seem unfortunate, since so much contemporary discussion of the epistemology of modality seems motivated by worries about the mind-body problem, and informed by the position one wishes to endorse. But, as I argue, if conscious experience is indeed an exception to the view I suggest in this paper, it is an exception that proves - and can illuminate - the rule.     

Age differences in dual-task performance after practice

This study investigated whether older adults could acquire the ability to perform 2 cognitive operations in parallel in a paradigm in which young adults had been shown to be able to do so (K. Oberauer & R. Kliegl, 2004). Twelve young and 12 older adults practiced a numerical and a visuospatial continuous memory updating task in single-task and dual-task conditions for 16 to 24 sessions. After practice, 9 young adults were able to process the 2 tasks without dual-task costs, but none of the older adults had reached the criterion of parallel processing. The results suggest a qualitative difference between young and older adults in how they approach dual-task situations.     

Return of the Candy Witch: Individual differences in acceptance and stability of belief in a novel fantastical being

Recent research indicates that preschoolers make sophisticated choices in accepting testimony as a source of knowledge. Nonetheless, many children accept fantastical beings as real based on misleading testimony. The present study probes factors associated with belief in a novel fantastical figure, the Candy Witch, that 3‐ to 7‐year‐olds heard about at school. Short‐term belief was predicted by an interaction of age, existing beliefs in fantastical figures, and whether the child was ‘visited’ by the Candy Witch. Stability of belief was assessed over the course of 3 weeks and again 1‐year later. First year results revealed three patterns of belief: stable belief, wavering belief and stable non‐belief. First year belief status was not related to age, but older children from the stable belief group were more likely than younger children to disbelieve 1‐year later. The discussion presents a new proposal for the trajectory from belief to disbelief and an updated perspective on the role of individual differences in belief.     

Extinction after partial reinforcement: predicted vs. judged persistence

The partial reinforcement extinction effect (PREE) (i.e., increased persistence following partial reward) is one of the most important generalizations from experimental studies of learning. Many theories of PREE assume that it involves cognitive and emotional mechanisms, but investigations of PREE have focused almost exclusively on behavioral measures. Four experiments with human adults investigated whether PREE is also reflected in cognitive measures. Independent groups of subjects learned an instrumental response under CRF vs. PRF contingencies, and then predicted (Experiments 1, 2, and 3) and/or judged (Experiments 3 and 4) their own persistence under extinction conditions. Predictions of persistcnce were unrelated to prior continuous or partial reinforcement contingencies (Experiments 1, 2, and 3), but subsequent judgments of persistence behavior were accurate (Experiments 3 and 4). These results indicate that increased persistence due to occasional reward is not well represented cognitively prior to its behavioral manifestation, but it is well represented after that manifestation. Possible explanations and implications of this apparent behavior cognition dissociation are discussed.