Why we can't get along

The author examines various arguments to explain the internal conflicts and schisms that have afflicted depth psychology since its beginnings. These arguments include the inevitable splits that occur in the course of institutional development, the inheritance of family schisms within the profession, historical, geographical and political influences, Freud's notion of the 'narcissism of minor differences' along with Gordon's idea of the need for enemies in establishing identity, and the impact of market forces. The author refutes these arguments and postulates instead that the profession attracts narcissistically disturbed members who have not been or cannot be sufficiently analysed. The profession needs to address this endemic narcissism in order to prevent further splitting and to establish a more ecumenical framework.     

Why Science cannot be Value-Free

Against the ideal of value-free science I argue that science is not––and cannot be––value-free and that relevant values are both cognitive and moral. I develop an argument by indicating various aspects of the value-ladenness of science. The recognition of the value-ladenness of science requires rethinking our understanding of the rationality and responsibility of science. Its rationality cannot be seen as merely instrumental––as it was seen by the ideal of value-free science––for this would result in limiting the autonomy of science and reducing scientists to “minds to hire”. The scientific rationality must be seen as practical rationality which takes into account the full horizon of values. The scientific responsibility must also be broaden in scope and type. On this basis I draw three practical conclusions concerning the organization of research and training of young scientists, appealing to Plato’s claim that those most capable of healing are also those most capable of harming.     

Why purists should be infallibilists

Philosophical Studies - Two of the most orthodox ideas in epistemology are fallibilism and purism. According to the fallibilist, one can know that a particular claim is true even though one’s...     

Why introverts can't always tell who likes them: multitasking and nonverbal decoding

Despite personality theories suggesting that extraversion correlates with social skill, most studies have not found a positive correlation between extraversion and nonverbal decoding. The authors propose that introverts are less able to multitask and thus are poorer at nonverbal decoding, but only when it is a secondary task. Prior research has uniformly extracted the nonverbal decoding from its multitasking context and, consequently, never tested this hypothesis. In Studies 1-3, introverts exhibited a nonverbal decoding deficit, relative to extraverts, but only when decoding was a secondary rather than a primary task within a multitasking context. In Study 4, extraversion was found to correlate with central executive efficiency (r = .42) but not with storage capacity (r = .04). These results are discussed in terms of arousal theories of extraversion and the role of catecholamines (dopamine and norepinephrine) in prefrontal function.     

Why elementary propositions cannot be negative

Philosophical Studies -     

Why can't I get hives: brief strategic therapy with an obsessional child

A case study is presented of a 10-year-old boy who obsessively feared he would vomit. The material is formulated within a psychodynamic as well as a strategic model, and treatment approaches are suggested for each. The treatment consisted of a five-session, strategic, problem-focused approach over three months with a two-year follow-up. The rationale and effective ingredients of the intervention are discussed.     

Why Adults have to be Children First

The Journal of Value Inquiry -     

Nature unmirrored,epistemology naturalized

A. Knowledge and Justification: The nature of epistemic justification and its supervenience.B. Understanding and Validation: Two projects of epistemology, one to understand justification, the other to promote it.C. Epistemic Rationalism: A simple foundationalism of intuition and deduction.D. Reliabilism: A broader foundationalism.E. Foundationalism Assailed.F. Nature Unmirrored: Rorty reviewed.G. Reliabilist Foundationalism: Two problems.H. Coherence: A more radical response to the failure of rationalism.I. Perspectival Coherence: The requirement of an epistemic perspective and its relation to foundationalism.J. Epistemology of Epistemology.K. How to Naturalize Epistemology: Quine reviewed.L. Epistemology Naturalized: Through the Project of Validation.     

Why the Trans Inclusion Problem cannot be Solved

Philosophia - What is a woman? The definition of this central concept of feminism has lately become especially controversial and politically charged. “Ameliorative Inquirists” have...     

Why Propositions Might be Sets of Truth-supporting Circumstances

Soames (Philos Top 15:44–87, 1987, J Philos Logic 37:267–276, 2008) has argued that propositions cannot be sets of truth-supporting circumstances. This argument is criticized for assuming that various singular terms are directly referential when in fact there are good grounds to doubt this.     

Why Historical Injustice Must be Taught in Schools

In societies that have failed to confront past injustice, the most common justifications for the inclusion of history education within the school curriculum invoke the idea that those who cannot learn from the past are doomed to repeat it; or they appeal to goals such as reconciliation, or to the importance of recognizing and morally redressing the harm done to victims. These justifications are all sound and important. However, they must be supplemented with a justification of a different kind, one that appeals to a different kind of value, namely that of personal and political autonomy. When historical injustice is left unaddressed in school, so this paper argues, all children and adolescents are wronged, including those who were not involved in, or were directly affected by, past injustice. This is not simply because as a result they run the risk of repeating, or of being the victims of, behavior that caused past violence; or because without history education the harm done to their predecessors is left unacknowledged. They are wronged because ignorance of past injustice curtails the full exercise of their autonomous agency. It does so by denying them access to information that is crucial for evaluating their values and commitments. History education in schools can avoid this scenario, promoting autonomy instead.     

Why a scientific realist cannot be a functionalist

According to functionalism, mental state types consist solely in relations to inputs, outputs, and other mental states. I argue that two central claims of a prominent and plausible type of scientific realism conflict with the functionalist position. These claims are that natural kinds in a mature science are not reducible to natural kinds in any other, and that all dispositional features of natural kinds can be explained at the type-level. These claims, when applied to psychology, have the consequence that at least some mental state types consist not merely in relations to inputs, outputs, and other mental states, but also in nonrelational properties that play a role in explaining functional relations. Consequently, a scientific realist of the sort I describe must reject functionalism.     

Covering up what can't be seen: concealable stigma and mental control.

In these studies the authors examined the effects of concealing a stigma in a social interaction relevant to the stigma. An interview paradigm called for undergraduate female participants who either did or did not have eating disordered characteristics to play the role of someone who did or did not have an eating disorder (ED) while answering stigma-relevant questions. The data suggest that the participants who concealed their stigmas become preoccupied with the control of stigma-relevant thoughts. In Study 1, participants with an ED who role-played not having an ED exhibited more secrecy, suppression, and intrusive thoughts of their ED and more projection of ED-related thoughts onto the interviewer than did those with an ED who role-played someone with an ED or those without an ED who role-played someone without an ED. This finding was replicated in Study 2, and the authors found both increasing accessibility of ED-related words among those participants with concealed stigmas during the interview and high levels of accessibility following the interview.