Why concepts can't be theories

In this paper, I present an alternative argument for Jerry Fodor's recent conclusion that there are currently no tenable theories of concepts in the cognitive sciences and in the philosophy of mind. Briefly, my approach focuses on the ‘theory-theory’ of concepts. I argue that the two ways in which cognitive psychologists have formulated this theory lead to serious difficulties, and that there cannot be, in principle, a third way in which it can be reformulated. Insofar as the ‘theory-theory’ is supposed to replace, and to rectify the problems of, the earlier ‘classical’ and ‘probabilistic’ theories, its failure confirms Fodor's original observation. Since my critique does not rest on controversial philosophical assumptions and is readily available from within the cognitive sciences, it is a stronger argument than Fodor's.     

Why we can't get along

The author examines various arguments to explain the internal conflicts and schisms that have afflicted depth psychology since its beginnings. These arguments include the inevitable splits that occur in the course of institutional development, the inheritance of family schisms within the profession, historical, geographical and political influences, Freud's notion of the 'narcissism of minor differences' along with Gordon's idea of the need for enemies in establishing identity, and the impact of market forces. The author refutes these arguments and postulates instead that the profession attracts narcissistically disturbed members who have not been or cannot be sufficiently analysed. The profession needs to address this endemic narcissism in order to prevent further splitting and to establish a more ecumenical framework.     

You can't reason with them: Dismissing religious defectors as irrational

Millions of people leave their religion every year. Such defection often results in religious persecution, ostracism, and heightened intergroup conflict. Yet little is known about the underlying perceptions of religious defectors and what intergroup processes predict hostility toward them. In two pre-registered studies (N = 512), we investigated how religious group members' thoughts and feelings about defectors may lead to ostracism and a lack of dialogue. In both studies, group members rated defectors as unlikeable and irrational. Further, the strength of group members' religious group identification (but not religious belief conviction) predicted dislike and unwillingness to relate wisely with defectors (Study 2). Implications for intergroup research and improving the experience of religious defectors are discussed.     

A reason to be rational

This essay argues that in spite of the powerful arguments by Kolodny and Broome there is a reason to be rational. The suggested reason to be rational is that if an agent complies with rational requirements the people around him, as well as he himself, will be able to explain and predict his attitudes. Rationality allows us to make sense of an agent’s attitudes in terms of his other attitudes. This form of explainability is valuable, because it provides us with greater comprehension as regards an agent’s attitudes. Thus, I argue that there is an instrumental reason to be rational.     

Why Science cannot be Value-Free

Against the ideal of value-free science I argue that science is not––and cannot be––value-free and that relevant values are both cognitive and moral. I develop an argument by indicating various aspects of the value-ladenness of science. The recognition of the value-ladenness of science requires rethinking our understanding of the rationality and responsibility of science. Its rationality cannot be seen as merely instrumental––as it was seen by the ideal of value-free science––for this would result in limiting the autonomy of science and reducing scientists to “minds to hire”. The scientific rationality must be seen as practical rationality which takes into account the full horizon of values. The scientific responsibility must also be broaden in scope and type. On this basis I draw three practical conclusions concerning the organization of research and training of young scientists, appealing to Plato’s claim that those most capable of healing are also those most capable of harming.     

Why purists should be infallibilists

Philosophical Studies - Two of the most orthodox ideas in epistemology are fallibilism and purism. According to the fallibilist, one can know that a particular claim is true even though one’s...     

Why can't I get hives: brief strategic therapy with an obsessional child

A case study is presented of a 10-year-old boy who obsessively feared he would vomit. The material is formulated within a psychodynamic as well as a strategic model, and treatment approaches are suggested for each. The treatment consisted of a five-session, strategic, problem-focused approach over three months with a two-year follow-up. The rationale and effective ingredients of the intervention are discussed.     

Why introverts can't always tell who likes them: multitasking and nonverbal decoding

Despite personality theories suggesting that extraversion correlates with social skill, most studies have not found a positive correlation between extraversion and nonverbal decoding. The authors propose that introverts are less able to multitask and thus are poorer at nonverbal decoding, but only when it is a secondary task. Prior research has uniformly extracted the nonverbal decoding from its multitasking context and, consequently, never tested this hypothesis. In Studies 1-3, introverts exhibited a nonverbal decoding deficit, relative to extraverts, but only when decoding was a secondary rather than a primary task within a multitasking context. In Study 4, extraversion was found to correlate with central executive efficiency (r = .42) but not with storage capacity (r = .04). These results are discussed in terms of arousal theories of extraversion and the role of catecholamines (dopamine and norepinephrine) in prefrontal function.     

Why elementary propositions cannot be negative

Philosophical Studies -     

Why Bad People Can't be Good Friends

Must the best friends necessarily be good people? On the one hand, as Aristotle puts it, ‘people think that the same people are good and also friends’. But on the other hand, friendship sometimes seems to require that one behave badly. For example, a normally honest person might lie to corroborate a friend's story. What I will call closeness, which I take to include sensitivity to friends' subjective values and concerns as well as an inclination to take their subjective interests as reasons for action, is characteristic of friendship. But this seems to require that good friends should be morally flexible, more so than is compatible with a virtuous character. This would imply tension between ideals of friendship and ideals of character. But there is an important connection between virtue and friendship which arises precisely from friends' closeness, when concern for wellbeing, another important feature of friendship, is also taken into account. This helps mitigate the tension and shows how friendship and virtue are interconnected. The connection in turn provides friendship‐based reason to think the best friends must be good people, even though concerns of friendship may occasionally clash with other moral concerns.     

Why Adults have to be Children First

The Journal of Value Inquiry -