Rapid-response versus free-time selection tasks using different logical connectives

When reasoning with conditional statements (i.e., if [not] p then [not] q), people tend to display matching bias: Options that match the entities named in the rule are selected even when logically inappropriate. Three different Wason selection tasks were administered under free-time and rapid-response formats. For the latter, individual cards were presented for one second, and required a response within a further one second. Previous research using these formats (Roberts & Newton, 2001) has shown that this increases matching bias, in line with the action of preconscious heuristic processes which direct attention towards relevant aspects of a problem, but whose action can be overturned if there is sufficient time to apply analytic reasoning processes. The selection tasks administered included a standard abstract conditional task, a disjunctive version (i.e., either [not] p or [not] q), and a conditional task in which the cards showed explicitly negated values. Both conditional tasks demonstrated matching bias, but under rapid-response presentation, matching bias only increased for the standard conditional and disjunctive tasks. Overall, the data support Evans’ (e.g., 2006) heuristic-analytic framework albeit with some caveats, and it is suggested that the broad question, of whether individual selection task formats show or do not show matching bias, requires more detailed investigation.     

Developmental patterns in the encoding and combination of logical connectives

A total of 224 subjects in grades 2, 4, 6, 8, high school, and college solved problems requiring comprehension of the logical connectives and, or, if-then, only if, and if and only if, as well as the terms is and is not. Half the subjects were required merely to encode the connectives; the other half were required to combine as well as encode them. Problems were presented in two replications (over two sessions) via two different content vehicles. Quantitative analyses revealed significant effects of task, age, session, and connective, with comprehension of different connectives developing at different rates. In general, comprehension of the conjunctive connective was easiest; comprehension of the conditional and biconditional connectives was most difficult. Qualitative analyses indicated just how the logical connectives were interpreted at each grade level, and also investigated individual differences within each grade level.     

Mental representation from the bottom up

Commonsense psychology and cognitive science both regularly assume the existence of representational states. I propose a naturalistic theory of representation sufficient to meet the pretheoretical constraints of a folk theory of representation, constraints including the capacities for accuracy and inaccuracy, selectivity of proper objects of representation, perspective, articulation, and efficacy or content-determined functionality. The proposed model states that a representing device is a device which changes state when information is received over multiple information channels originating at a single source. The changed state of a representing device is a representation. The unitary information source which would give rise to the information impinging on the representing device, and hence, give rise to the representation, is the content of the representation. The model meets the pretheoretic constraints, and also conforms to available neurobiological data for two invertebrate species.     

Mental models and logical reasoning problems in the GRE

The Graduate Record Examination (GRE) contains a class of complex reasoning tests known as logical reasoning problems. These problems are demanding for human reasoners and beyond the competence of any existing computer program. This article applies the mental model theory of reasoning to the analysis of these problems. It predicts 3 main causes of difficulty, which were corroborated by the results of 4 experiments: the nature of the logical task (Experiment 1), the set of foils (Experiment 2), and the nature of the conclusions (Experiments 3 and 4). This article shows how these factors can be applied to the design of new problems.     

Implicit connectives of algebraizable logics

An extensions by new axioms and rules of an algebraizable logic in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi is not necessarily algebraizable if it involves new connective symbols, or it may be algebraizable in an essentially different way than the original logic. However, extension whose axioms and rules define implicitly the new connectives are algebraizable, via the same equivalence formulas and defining equations of the original logic, by enriched algebras of its equivalente quasivariety semantics. For certain strongly algebraizable logics, all connectives defined implicitly by axiomatic extensions of the logic are explicitly definable.Special issue of Studia Logica: Algebraic Theory of Quasivarieties Presented by M. E. Adams, K. V. Adaricheva, W. Dziobiak, and A. V. Kravchenko     

Naming the parents of the THOG: Mental representation and reasoning

It was hypothesized that subjects misrepresent the THOG problem by confusing data and hypotheses. An abstract version of the problem in which the given exemplars and the hypothetical ones were designated by two different labels was used in three experiments. Experiment 1 showed that this version elicits a better performance than the standard version of the problem. Experiments 2 and 3 confirmed these results, by ruling out a possible alternative account of the facilitatory effect obtained in Experiment 1. The present results are discussed in relationship to the general issues of content effects and non-consequentialism in reasoning.     

Mental representation of three-dimensional objects in visual problem solving and recognition

Subjects inspected sets of flat, separated orthographic projections of surfaces of potential three-dimensional objects. After solving problems based on these orthographic views, subjects discriminated between isometric views of the same objects and drawings of distractor structures. Recognition of the isometrics, which had never been shown during the problem solving phase of the experiment, was excellent. In addition, recognition of isometrics corresponding to problems that had been solved correctly when presented in orthographic form was significantly superior to recognition of isometrics based on problems solved incorrectly. In Experiment 2, conditions were included in which either orthographic or isometric views functioned as problem solving or recognition displays. Only in the case of orthographic problem solving followed by isometric recognition (Experiment 1) was the superiority of recognition for correctly-solved problems over incorrectly-solved problems obtained. The pattern of results suggests that viewers construct mental representations embodying structural information about integrated, three-dimensional objects when asked to reason about flat, disconnected projections.     

Mental representation of prepositional compounds: evidence from Italian agrammatic patients

The processing of Prepositional compounds (typical Neo-latin noun--noun modifications where a head noun is modified by a prepositional phrase, e.g., mulino a vento, windmill) was preliminarily studied with a group of six agrammatic aphasic patients, and, in more detail, with a further agrammatic patient (MB). Omission was the most frequent error type in naming, whereas in the other tasks (repetition, reading, writing, and completion) errors were mostly substitutions of the target preposition. This happened even with fully lexicalized compound forms, i.e., those forms where the linking preposition is syntactically and semantically opaque. These findings are interpreted in terms of a dual-route theory of lexical access to morphologically complex words.     

Mental representation and learning: The influence of practice on the development of mental representation structure in complex action

ObjectivesRecent research has elicited distinct differences in mental representations between athletes of different skill levels. Such differences suggest that the structure of mental representations changes as a function of skill level. However, research examining how such mental representation structures develop over the course of learning is lacking. In the present study, we examine the effects of practice on the development of one's mental representation of a complex action during early skill acquisition.DesignFor this purpose, we created a controllable learning situation, using a repeated-measures design with a control group. More specifically, novice golfers were randomly assigned to either a practice group (n = 12) or a control group (n = 12). Both groups were tested before and after an acquisition phase of three days as well as after a three day retention interval.MethodsMental representation structures of the putt were recorded, employing the structural dimensional analysis of mental representation (SDA-M), which provides psychometric data on the structure and grouping of action concepts in long-term memory. In addition, outcome performance of the practice group was measured, using two-dimensional error scores of the putt.ResultsFindings revealed a significant improvement in task performance, as well as functional changes in the structure of the practice group's mental representation. In contrast, no functional adaptations were evident in the mental representation of the control group.ConclusionOur findings suggest that motor skill acquisition is associated with functional adaptations of action-related knowledge in long-term memory.     

Mental representation and hypothetico-deductive reasoning: The case of the THOG problem

Summary This article reports three experiments that deal with the source of the difficulty of Wason's (1977) THOG problem. The solution of this problem demands both the postulation of hypotheses and a combinatorial analysis of their consequences. Experiment 1 showed that the generation of the hypotheses is not in itself sufficient to solve the problem. Experiment 2 showed that a version presenting a plausible context for separating the level of data from that of hypotheses produced a better performance than both the original abstract version and a thematic version lacking the plausible context separating the levels. Experiment 3 gave evidence that this context can produce facilitation even with the geometric material of the classic version. This experiment also showed that a pictorial presentation of data and a verbal presentation of hypotheses affect performance negatively. The results demonstrate the role of problem representation in problem solving, and, in particular, the role of homogeneity in representing data and hypotheses in hypothetico-deductive reasoning.     

Context and strategy in acquiring temporal connectives

There has been considerable debate over the role of comprehension strategies in the acquisition of temporal connectives. This study examined the role of caluse logic and interpretational strategies in the acquisition of temporal words; age-related changes were also considered. Thirty-two children between 3 and 5 years of age served as subjects. Sentences with a variety of temporal words were used to tap children's comprehension of before, after, when, while, just before that, and and after that. Clause logic was found to significantly improve the understanding of these sentences. However, the order of mention and main clause first strategies were used infrequently. Apparently, when children respond to sentences that describe information in a way that is consistent with that they normally hear, these strategies are seldom applied.I wish to express my thanks to Janice Bogen, who assisted in data collection, and to Erika Hoff-Ginsberg, who assisted in some of the data analysis.     

Reasoning from connectives and relations between entities

This article reports investigations of inferences that depend both on connectives between clauses, such as or else, and on relations between entities, such as in the same place as. Participants made more valid inferences from biconditionals—for instance, Ann is taller than Beth if and only if Beth is taller than Cath—than from exclusive disjunctions (Exp. 1). They made more valid transitive inferences from a biconditional when a categorical premise affirmed rather than denied one of its clauses, but they made more valid transitive inferences from an exclusive disjunction when a categorical premise denied rather than affirmed one of its clauses (Exp. 2). From exclusive disjunctions, such as Either Ann is not in the same place as Beth or else Beth is not in the same place as Cath, individuals tended to infer that all three individuals could be in different places, whereas in fact this was impossible (Exps. 3a and 3b). The theory of mental models predicts all of these results.     

Reassessing logical hylomorphism and the demarcation of logical constants

The paper investigates the propriety of applying the form versus matter distinction to arguments and to logic in general. Its main point is that many of the currently pervasive views on form and matter with respect to logic rest on several substantive and even contentious assumptions which are nevertheless uncritically accepted. Indeed, many of the issues raised by the application of this distinction to arguments seem to be related to a questionable combination of different presuppositions and expectations; this holds in particular of the vexed issue of demarcating the class of logical constants. I begin with a characterization of currently widespread views on form and matter in logic, which I refer to as ‘logical hylomorphism as we know it’—LHAWKI, for short—and argue that the hylomorphism underlying LHAWKI is mereological. Next, I sketch an overview of the historical developments leading from Aristotelian, non-mereological metaphysical hylomorphism to mereological logical hylomorphism (LHAWKI). I conclude with a reassessment of the prospects for the combination of hylomorphism and logic, arguing in particular that LHAWKI is not the only and certainly not the most suitable version of logical hylomorphism. In particular, this implies that the project of demarcating the class of logical constants as a means to define the scope and nature of logic rests on highly problematic assumptions.     

Mental representation of length and weight series and transitive inferences in young children

Forty-eight second graders (8 years of age) were trained on length or weight relationships between adjacent members of a five-term series of colored objects. Feedback was visual and of either minimal or strong salience. Differences in weight were assessed by either a balance scale or a spring scale. Results showed that more salient visual feedback reduced the learning effort for length but not for weight comparisons. After training children were tested on all possible object pairs. Children's comparisons of items by length were very accurate in contrast to their comparisons by weight. An explanation for these findings is suggested by the data from a group of 6-year-olds who were trained on two independent pairs of a four-term series. Test results showed that subjects spontaneously encoded absolute lengths but tended to ignore information about the absolute weight of objects. It is suggested that high test accuracy depends on stimulus material for which the absolute values of the relevant dimension are encoded. The implications for taking test performance as an indicator of “transitive reasoning” ability are discussed.     

Pragmatic connectives,argumentative coherence and relevance

This article is concerned with pragmatic connectives and their uses in discursive argumentation. Three approaches to pragmatic connectives will be presented: (1) argumentation theory, which implies a conception of pragmatics integrated within semantics, and a specific type of argumentative rules, called topoi; (2) discourse structure theory, which associates a function in the structuring of discourse sequences to pragmatic connectives; (3) relevance theory, which constitutes a cognitive pragmatic theory, in which no specific principle is associated to linguistic items. However, two main functions to pragmatic connectives can be proposed: the facilitation of inferences, and the access to relevance. The final purpose of this article is to indicate how argumentative effects in discourse can be explained in a cognitively-based pragmatic theory.