Further evidence that object-based correspondence effects are primarily modulated by object location not by grasping affordance

Tipper, Paul and Hayes found object-based correspondence effects for door-handle stimuli for shape judgments but not colour. They reasoned that a grasping affordance is activated when judging dimensions related to a grasping action (shape), but not for other dimensions (colour). Cho and Proctor, however, found the effect with respect to handle position when the bases of the door handles were centred (so handles were positioned left or right; the base-centred condition) but not when the handles were centred (the object-centred condition), suggesting that the effect is driven by object location, not grasping affordance. We conducted an independent replication of Cho and Proctor's design, but with behavioural and event-related potential measures. Participants made shape judgments in Experiment 1 and colour judgments in Experiment 2 on the same door-handle objects. Correspondence effects on response time and errors were obtained in both experiments for the base-centred condition but not the object-centred condition. Effects were absent in the P1 and N1 data, which are consistent with the hypothesis of little binding between visual processing of grasping component and action. These findings question the grasping-affordance view but support a spatial-coding view, suggesting that correspondence effects are modulated primarily by object location.     

Object-based correspondence effects for action-relevant and surface-property judgments with keypress responses: evidence for a basis in spatial coding

It has been proposed that grasping affordances produce a Simon-type correspondence effect for left–right keypress responses and the location of the graspable part of an object for judgments based on action-relevant properties such as shape, but not on surface properties. We tested the implications of this grasping affordance account and contrasted them with the ones derived from a spatial coding account that distinguishes holistic processing of integral dimensions and analytic processing of separable dimensions. In Experiments 1–3, judgments about the color of a door handle showed a Simon effect relative to the handle’s base, whereas judgments about the handle’s shape showed no Simon effect. In Experiment 4, when the middle of the handle was colored, the Simon effect was obtained relative to the base, but when the color was at the tip of the handle or near the base, Simon effects were obtained relative to the color location. For Experiment 5, only the base was colored, and the Simon effect was larger for a passive rather than active handle state, as in the color-judgment conditions of Experiments 2–4 in which the colored region overlapped with the base. In Experiment 6, orientation judgments showed no Simon effect, as the shape judgments did in Experiments 1 and 2. The findings of (a) an absence of Simon effects for shape and orientation judgments, (b) no larger Simon effects for active than passive handle states, and (c) isolation of the changing component for color judgments are consistent with the spatial coding account, according to which the distinction between object shape/orientation and color is one of integral versus separable dimensions.     

行动语义、客体背景和判断任务对客体动作承载性的影响

客体动作承载性指人们知觉客体时同时激活的针对客体的行动。当Gibson最初提出动作承载性概念时, 他认为客体的这种属性是可以自动激活的。然而近年来越来越多的证据显示, 在知觉和行动的关系中, 行动语义知识和客体所处背景对客体动作承载性具有调节作用, 表现在人们可以根据这些自上而下的信息选择针对客体的适当的行动。此外, 不同的判断任务在引发客体动作承载性效应上具有特异性, 表现在若判断任务仅需知觉客体表层属性时, 不能激活对客体的动作, 进而不能产生客体动作承载性; 若判断任务需要对客体进行深层加工时, 才会激活对客体的动作。未来研究还需要进一步探究行动语义知识和客体所处背景影响客体动作承载性发生的原因和机制, 以及不同判断任务中出现结果特异性的原因。     

Dissociating Simon and affordance compatibility effects: Silhouettes and photographs

When a graspable object’s handle is oriented to the same side as the response hand, responses are quicker and more accurate than when it is oriented to the opposite side. This effect has been attributed to the affordance of the object’s handle (Tucker & Ellis, 1998). Recent findings suggest this effect results instead from an abstract spatial response code (i.e., Simon effect; Cho & Proctor, 2010). However, the stimuli used in these previous studies differ in the amount of object and environmental depth information they contain, which may be critical to conveying an affordance. This information could explain these disparate findings as well as dissociate Simon and affordance compatibility effects. Four experiments demonstrate that the Simon effect results from the absence of this information, as in a silhouette, and the affordance effect results from its presence, as in a photograph. A fifth experiment confirmed that modifying information associated with the affordance, rather than the modification itself, produced the effects observed in the previous experiments. These findings support the following: (a) the internal details of an object and environmental depth can dissociate Simon and affordance compatibility effects, (b) this information is necessary to convey the object’s graspable affordance, and (c) the outer shape of the object is not sufficient to elicit an affordance effect. These findings are discussed in relation to the theory of embodied cognition.     

示能性:基于镜像神经元视角的理解

示能性(affordance)概念解释了人的行为与物体功能之间互动、互补的关系。但是,有关示能性生理基础却很少被提及。镜像神经元的发现为示能性生理基础提供了可能的解释。文章根据研究将示能性分为结构示能性和功能示能性,探讨了不同示能性和镜像神经元之间的关系,并提出不同神经通路中的镜像神经元是示能性生理基础的结论。背-背侧分流中的镜像神经元是结构示能性的神经基础,而腹-背侧分流中的镜像神经元是功能示能性的神经基础。     

The emergence of kind-based object individuation in infancy

Four experiments investigated whether 12-month-old infants use perceptual property information in a complex object individuation task, using the violation-of-expectancy looking time method (Xu, 2002; Xu & Carey, 1996). Infants were shown two objects with different properties emerge and return behind an occluder, one at a time. The occluder was then removed, revealing either two objects (expected outcome, if property differences support individuation) or one object (unexpected outcome). In Experiments 1-3, infants failed to use color, size, or a combination of color, size, and pattern differences to establish a representation of two distinct objects behind an occluder. In Experiment 4, infants succeeded in using cross-basic-level-kind shape differences to establish a representation of two objects but failed to do so using within-basic-level-kind shape differences. Control conditions found that the methods were sensitive. Infants succeeded when provided unambiguous spatiotemporal information for two objects, and they encoded the property differences during these experiments. These findings suggest that by 12 months, different properties play different roles in a complex object individuation task. Certain salient shape differences enter into the computation of numerical distinctness of objects before other property differences such as color or size. Since shape differences are often correlated with object kind differences, these results converge with others in the literature that suggest that by the end of the first year of life, infants' representational systems begin to distinguish kinds and properties.     

Self produced and observed actions influence emotion: the roles of action fluency and eye gaze

Affective responses to objects can be influenced by cognitive processes such as perceptual fluency. Here we investigated whether the quality of motor interaction with an object influences affective response to the object. Participants grasped and moved objects using either a fluent action or a non-fluent action (avoiding an obstacle). Liking ratings were higher for objects in the fluent condition. Two further studies investigated whether the fluency of another person’s actions influences affective response. Observers watched movie clips of the motor actions described above, in conditions where the observed actor could be seen to be looking towards the grasped object, or where the actor’s head and gaze were not visible. Two results were observed: First, when the actor’s gaze cannot be seen, liking ratings of the objects are reduced. Second, action fluency of observed actions does influence liking ratings, but only when the actor’s gaze towards the object is visible. These findings provide supporting evidence for the important role of observed eye gaze in action simulation, and demonstrate that non-emotive actions can evoke empathic states in observers. This research was supported by Economic and Social Research Council grant RES-000-23-0429 awarded to S. P. Tipper and A. E. Hayes.     

Primates do not spontaneously use shape properties for object individuation: a competence or a performance problem?

Several recent studies have documented that non-human primates can individuate objects according to property and/or kind information in much the same way as human infants do from around one year of age when they begin to acquire language. Some studies suggest, however, that only some properties are used for the individuation of food items: color, but not shape. The present study investigated whether these findings reveal a true competence problem with shape properties in the food domain or whether they merely reveal a performance problem (e.g., lack of attention to shapes). We tested 25 great apes (chimpanzees, bonobos and gorillas) in two food individuation tasks. We manipulated subjects’ experience with differences in color and shape properties of food items. Results indicated (i) that all subjects, regardless of their prior experience, solved the color-based object individuation task and (ii) that only the group with previous experience with different shape properties succeeded in the shape-based individuation task. Great apes can thus be primed to take shape into account for individuating food objects, and this results clearly speaks in favor of a performance (rather than a competence) problem in using shape for object individuation of food items.     

Action-related objects influence the distribution of visuospatial attention

Previous studies have shown that attention is drawn to the location of manipulable objects and is distributed across pairs of objects that are positioned for action. Here, we investigate whether central, action-related objects can cue attention to peripheral targets. Experiment 1 compared the effect of uninformative arrow and object cues on a letter discrimination task. Arrow cues led to spatial-cueing benefits across a range of stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs: 0?ms, 120?ms, 400?ms), but object-cueing benefits were slow to build and were only significant at the 400-ms SOA. Similar results were found in Experiment 2, in which the targets were objects that could be either congruent or incongruent with the cue (e.g., screwdriver and screw versus screwdriver and glass). Cueing benefits were not influenced by the congruence between the cue and target, suggesting that the cueing effects reflected the action implied by the central object, not the interaction between the objects. For Experiment 3 participants decided whether the cue and target objects were related. Here, the interaction between congruent (but not incongruent) targets led to significant cueing/positioning benefits at all three SOAs. Reduced cueing benefits were obtained in all three experiments when the object cue did not portray a legitimate action (e.g., a bottle pointing towards an upper location, since a bottle cannot pour upwards), suggesting that it is the perceived action that is critical, rather than the structural properties of individual objects. The data suggest that affordance for action modulates the allocation of visual attention.     

Extending the notion of affordance

Post-Gibson attempts to set out a definition of affordance generally agree that this notion can be understood as a property of the environment with salience for an organism’s behavior. According to this view, some scholars advocate the idea that affordances are dispositional properties of physical objects that, given suitable circumstances, necessarily actualize related actions. This paper aims at assessing this statement in light of a theory of affordance perception. After years of discontinuity between strands of empirical and theoretical research, the time is ripe for addressing the question of whether the dispositional interpretation of affordance is in accordance with some recent evidence from cognitive science and neuroscience. Following this line, I clarify that there are some cases of affordance-related effects that neither require the actualization of an action, nor the presence of an action-related property bearer in the environment, and that the identification of affordance with physical properties provides only a partial explanation of the wide range of affordance-related effects. Accordingly, I argue in favor of a more general account of affordance perception based on the ability to directly detect perceptual patterns in the environment.     

Action-related objects influence the distribution of visuospatial attention

Previous studies have shown that attention is drawn to the location of manipulable objects and is distributed across pairs of objects that are positioned for action. Here, we investigate whether central, action-related objects can cue attention to peripheral targets. Experiment 1 compared the effect of uninformative arrow and object cues on a letter discrimination task. Arrow cues led to spatial-cueing benefits across a range of stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs: 0 ms, 120 ms, 400 ms), but object-cueing benefits were slow to build and were only significant at the 400-ms SOA. Similar results were found in Experiment 2, in which the targets were objects that could be either congruent or incongruent with the cue (e.g., screwdriver and screw versus screwdriver and glass). Cueing benefits were not influenced by the congruence between the cue and target, suggesting that the cueing effects reflected the action implied by the central object, not the interaction between the objects. For Experiment 3 participants decided whether the cue and target objects were related. Here, the interaction between congruent (but not incongruent) targets led to significant cueing/positioning benefits at all three SOAs. Reduced cueing benefits were obtained in all three experiments when the object cue did not portray a legitimate action (e.g., a bottle pointing towards an upper location, since a bottle cannot pour upwards), suggesting that it is the perceived action that is critical, rather than the structural properties of individual objects. The data suggest that affordance for action modulates the allocation of visual attention.     

Action priming by briefly presented objects

Three experiments investigated how visual objects prime the actions they afford. The principal concern was whether such visuomotor priming depends upon a concurrent visual input--as would be expected if it is mediated by on-line dorsal system processes. Experiment 1 showed there to be essentially identical advantages for making afforded over non-afforded responses when these were made to objects still in view and following brief (30 or 50 ms) object exposures that were backward masked. Experiment 2 showed that affordance effects were also unaffected by stimulus degradation. Finally, Experiment 3 showed there to be statistically equal effects from images of objects and their names. The results suggest that an active object representation is sufficient to generate affordance compatibility effects based on associated actions, whether or not the object is concurrently visible.     

Conflict in object affordance revealed by grip force

Viewing objects can result in automatic, partial activation of motor plans associated with them-"object affordance". Here, we recorded grip force simultaneously from both hands in an object affordance task to investigate the effects of conflict between coactivated responses. Participants classified pictures of objects by squeezing force transducers with their left or right hand. Responses were faster on trials where the object afforded an action with the same hand that was required to make the response (congruent trials) compared to the opposite hand (incongruent trials). In addition, conflict between coactivated responses was reduced if it was experienced on the preceding trial, just like Gratton adaptation effects reported in "conflict" tasks (e.g., Eriksen flanker). This finding suggests that object affordance demonstrates conflict effects similar to those shown in other stimulus-response mapping tasks and thus could be integrated into the wider conceptual framework on overlearnt stimulus-response associations. Corrected erroneous responses occurred more frequently when there was conflict between the afforded response and the response required by the task, providing direct evidence that viewing an object activates motor plans appropriate for interacting with that object. Recording continuous grip force, as here, provides a sensitive way to measure coactivated responses in affordance tasks.     

Separate Pathways for the Processing of Affordance of Neutral and Dangerous Object

Previous studies have shown that observation of object automatically elicits the activation of a reach-to-grasp response specifically directed to interact with the object, which is termed affordance. Recent findings provide evidences that even dangerous objects can evoke aversive affordances. However, these studies only focused on avoidance effect emerged with dangerous objects. It remains unclear whether the neutral object and dangerous object share a common mechanism for the processing of affordance information. The affordance effect is considered to be a type of conflict between the afforded response and the response required by the task. In a symbol judgment task, we simultaneously presented the neutral object and dangerous object to investigate whether the congruency sequence effects (congruency effects following incongruent trials are smaller than those following congruent trials) occurred across the two types of affordance conflict, which is typically assumed that such flexible adjustments can only be observed between the same conflict types. It was found that congruency sequence effects were only generated between the same types of affordance conflict (e.g., neutral object or dangerous object), but not between two different affordance conflict types (e.g., neutral object and dangerous object). These results indicate there may be two different pathways for the processing of affordance of the neutral and dangerous object.     

语境与颜色诊断性对句子理解中物体隐含颜色知觉模拟的影响

具身认知理论的代表知觉符号系统认为知识表征具有知觉特点,并假设语言理解中对于所涉及概念及其隐含属性会即时进行知觉模拟。当前研究采用句图匹配范式,通过三个实验探讨句子理解中是否会对物体隐含颜色属性进行知觉模拟及其具体条件。实验1沿用经典范式验证语言理解中对物体隐含颜色存在知觉模拟过程。实验2通过变化句子前语境考察语境是否支持对于物体隐含颜色知觉模拟的影响。实验3进一步考察当颜色属性与其对应物体存在稳定关联时(即具有高颜色诊断性的物体),在不同语境作用下是否会引起知觉表征的变化。研究结果表明,语言理解中知觉模拟过程是灵活的,语境改变会引起读者所激活的物体颜色知觉表征发生变化,并且对于高颜色诊断物体,即使缺乏支持语境,读者仍然会对句中隐含的物体特定颜色进行知觉模拟。     

Conflict in object affordance revealed by grip force

Viewing objects can result in automatic, partial activation of motor plans associated with them—“object affordance”. Here, we recorded grip force simultaneously from both hands in an object affordance task to investigate the effects of conflict between coactivated responses. Participants classified pictures of objects by squeezing force transducers with their left or right hand. Responses were faster on trials where the object afforded an action with the same hand that was required to make the response (congruent trials) compared to the opposite hand (incongruent trials). In addition, conflict between coactivated responses was reduced if it was experienced on the preceding trial, just like Gratton adaptation effects reported in “conflict” tasks (e.g., Eriksen flanker). This finding suggests that object affordance demonstrates conflict effects similar to those shown in other stimulus–response mapping tasks and thus could be integrated into the wider conceptual framework on overlearnt stimulus–response associations. Corrected erroneous responses occurred more frequently when there was conflict between the afforded response and the response required by the task, providing direct evidence that viewing an object activates motor plans appropriate for interacting with that object. Recording continuous grip force, as here, provides a sensitive way to measure coactivated responses in affordance tasks.     

Gaze cuing and affective judgments of objects: I like what you look at

When we see another person look somewhere, we automatically attend to the same location in space. Thisjoint attention emerges early in life and has a great impact on social interactions in development and in everyday adult life. The direction of another’s gaze indicates what object is of current interest, which may be the target for a subsequent action. In this study, we found that objects that are looked at by other people are liked more than objects that do not receive the attention of other people (Experiment 1). This suggests that observing averted gaze can have an impact on the affective appraisals of objects in the environment. This liking effect was absent when an arrow was used to cue attention (Experiment 2). This underlines the importance of other people’s interactions with objects for generating our own impressions of such stimuli in the world.     

Simon-like and functional affordance effects with tools: The effects of object perceptual discrimination and object action state

In the present study two separate stimulus–response compatibility effects (functional affordance and Simon-like effects) were investigated with centrally presented pictures of an object tool (a torch) characterized by a structural separation between the graspable portion and the goal-directed portion. In Experiment 1, participants were required to decide whether the torch was red or blue, while in Experiment 2 they were required to decide whether the torch was upright or inverted. Our results showed that with the same stimulus two types of compatibility effect emerged: one based on the direction signalled by the goal-directed portion of the tool (a Simon-like effect as observed in Experiment 1), and the other based on the actions associated with an object (a functional affordance effect as observed in Experiment 2). Both effects emerged independently of the person's intention to act on the stimulus, but depended on the stimulus properties that were processed in order to perform the task.     

Rea’s Revenge and the Persistent Problem of Persistence for Realism

Realism about material objects faces a variety of epistemological objections. Recently, however, some realists have offered new accounts in response to these long-standing objections; many of which seem plausible. In this paper, I raise a new objection against realism vis-à-vis how we could empirically come to know mind-independent essential properties for objects. Traditionally, realists hold kind-membership and persistence as bound together for purposes of tracing out an object’s essential existence conditions. But I propose kind-membership and persistence for objects can conceptually come apart and function epistemologically distinctly from one another—in which case the usual reliance by realists on an assumption of persistence to determine kind-membership conditions is unjustified. Thus, present realist attempts to explain how empirical detection of mind-independent essential properties for objects could possibly occur inevitably results in circularity. The charge against the realist is to explain why we don’t have to first discover persistence conditions for an object before we can ascertain kind-membership conditions for an object. If no answer is forthcoming, then it seems the weight of the epistemological objection to realism is back in full force.