Power Politics and the Balance of Risk: Hypotheses on Great Power Intervention in the Periphery

Great powers frequently initiate risky diplomatic and military interventions in the periphery—regions that do not directly threaten the security of a great power's homeland. Such risky interventions are driven by leaders' aversion to losses in their state's relative power, international status, or prestige. These leaders often persist in such courses of action even when they incur mounting political, economic, and military costs. More surprisingly, they undertake risky strategies toward other great powers in an effort to continue these failing interventions. Hypotheses concerning such interventions are derived from the prospect theory and defensive realist literatures.     

When the risks are low: the impact of absolute and comparative information on disturbance and understanding in US and UK samples

When Klein, W. M. gave participants absolute and comparative risk information (crossed experimentally) they were more disturbed by being above than below average, but not by being at higher rather than lower risk. The current experiment tests whether Klein's findings extend to situations involving lower risk figures more typical of genuine health risks, assesses participants’ understanding of the information, and directly compares responses of US and UK samples. Participants were presented with hypothetical information about comparative and absolute risks of deep vein thrombosis. There was a main effect of absolute risk information on disturbance and precaution intentions in the US sample, but no effects of comparative information on these measures in either sample. Understanding was poor among participants receiving both pieces of risk information. Future studies should include measures of understanding to establish whether people are failing to understand what they are told or failing to respond systematically to what they understand. Practically, the findings caution against providing comparative risk information when communicating low risk figures.     

The heroic motive: Some experimental demonstrations

The appearance of heroic motives in interpersonal relations is examined. Three experiments were conducted to test the general hypothesis that witnessing the victimization of a partner would impel young men to incur costs in order to confront the transgressor. In each experiment, either the individual, his partner, or an anonymous other was insulted. Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that individuals were most willing to confront the insulter when their female partners (Experiment 1) or their male teammates (Experiment 2) were victimized. That pattern occurred despite evidence indicating that the most negative affective reactions were experienced by individuals who had been directly insulted. Experiment 3 revealed that individuals were also more willing to perform a subsequent altruistic act in response to the victimization of their partners than when they or an anonymous other person had been victimized. Taken together, the results indicated that heroic motivations in response to the victimization of a partner were distinguishable from other more negatively oriented processes that were aroused in response to self-victimization by the insulter.     

Self-Regulating Interest: The Moderating Role of Hardiness and Conscientiousness

Sansone, Weir, Harpster, and Morgan (1992) found that individuals intentionally regulated their interest in an activity when they had both the need (the task was boring) and a reason to exert the effort (an ostensible health benefit). The present study examined Hardiness and Conscientiousness as moderators of this self-regulatory process when individuals had the option of quitting in addition to the options of persisting and of engaging in interest-enhancing strategies. Undergraduates performed a boring copying activity under instructions to stop when they felt they could evaluate the task. Half were told that their evaluations would help researchers develop good jobs for others (Benefit). Results indicated high hardy individuals copied more letters when they were provided the additional Benefit information, and this effect was mediated through their attempt to make the task more interesting. High conscientious individuals persisted longer than individuals lower in conscientiousness independently of the benefit manipulation or strategy use. Implications of individual differences in self-regulation of motivation are discussed.     

The influence of social groups on goal contagion

Goal contagion is the automatic adoption of a goal upon perceiving another’s goal-directed behavior (Aarts, H., Gollwitzer, P. M., & Hassin, R. R. (2004). Goal contagion: Perceiving is for pursuing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87(1), 23-37). This paper tests the hypothesis that goal contagion is more likely between people who belong to the same groups. Because past work on goal contagion has required participants to read about the behavior of others, we also test whether goals are caught when one sees rather than reads about another’s motivated behavior. Across three studies, this ecologically valid methodology reliably produced goal contagion, and this effect was more likely to emerge when participants shared a group membership with those they observed. In Study 1, participants were more likely to take on the goal of individuals who belonged to their same university. Study 2 demonstrated that this effect occurred even when participants were not explicitly focused on the group membership of others. A final study verified that our effects were motivational by demonstrating that failing at a goal relevant task increased negative affect, but only for those who viewed the motivated behavior of someone from their own group.     

Holding your place: Reactions to the prospect of status gains and losses

This paper examines individuals’ reactions to the prospect of gaining or losing status in groups. The results of three experiments provide evidence that individuals attach greater value to status when recalling the risk of status loss than when recalling the potential for status gain (Experiment 1), are willing to pay more to avoid a status loss than to achieve a status gain (Experiment 1), and put forth greater effort when striving to prevent status loss than when striving to gain status (Experiment 2). Finally, individuals who risk losing status allocate more resources toward personal status concerns (and away from group interests and potential monetary gain) than do individuals who have a chance of gaining status (Experiment 3). We discuss the implications of this research both in terms of individuals’ psychological experience of their status, as well as status attainment and maintenance concerns in groups.     

The Enhancing Effect of Overconfidence on Subsequent Learning Performance: Potential Mediation Effects of Dissatisfaction and Effort

Three studies were conducted to investigate whether individuals whose performance on a learning task fell short of their previous overconfident self‐assessment would apply more effort on a subsequent task to resolve their dissatisfaction and thereby achieve better subsequent performance than individuals who made accurate or underconfident self‐assessments. Specifically, Study 1 and Study 2 used overestimation, and Study 3 used overplacement to predict subsequent performance by measuring students' self‐assessments before the first task, their level of dissatisfaction with their actual performance on that task, the effort they applied in learning, and their performance on the subsequent task. Furthermore, Study 3 divided the participants randomly into a false feedback group (the control group) and a real feedback group (the experimental group). The results showed that when controlling for prior performance, participants who were more overconfident tended to express greater dissatisfaction and increase more effort to achieve their desired outcomes when they perceived a gap between their desired performance and their actual performance. Notably, they achieved better subsequent performance, whereas those in the control group who were overconfident neither applied more effort in subsequent learning nor increased their subsequent performance when they received “unbiased feedback.” The implications of these findings for education are discussed. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Between-task competition for intentions and actions

People can switch quickly and flexibly from one task to another, but suffer the effects of between-task competition when they do so: After switching, they tend to be distracted by irrelevant stimulus information and hampered by incorrect actions associated with recently performed tasks. This competition results in performance costs of switching, as well as a bias against switching when there is choice over which task to perform, particularly when switching from a difficult task to an easier one. Two experiments investigated the locus of these between-task competition effects in voluntary task switching. Participants switched between an easy location classification and a harder shape classification, making two responses on each trial: the first to register their task choice, the second to perform the chosen task on a subsequently presented stimulus. The results indicated that participants chose to perform the difficult shape task more often than the easier location task, evidence that between-task competition affects intentions that are expressed independently of task-specific actions. The bias was stronger in participants with faster choice speed, suggesting that these influences are relatively automatic. Moreover, even though participants had unlimited time to choose and prepare a task before stimulus presentation, their subsequent performance was nonetheless sensitive to persisting effects of between-task competition. Altogether these results indicate the pervasive influence of between-task competition, which affects both the expression of global task intentions and the production of task-specific actions.     

Vicarious moral licensing: the influence of others' past moral actions on moral behavior

This article investigates the effect of others' prior nonprejudiced behavior on an individual's subsequent behavior. Five studies supported the hypothesis that people are more willing to express prejudiced attitudes when their group members' past behavior has established nonprejudiced credentials. Study 1a showed that participants who were told that their group was more moral than similar other groups were more willing to describe a job as better suited for Whites than for African Americans. In Study 1b, when given information on group members' prior nondiscriminatory behavior (selecting a Hispanic applicant in a prior task), participants subsequently gave more discriminatory ratings to the Hispanic applicant for a position stereotypically suited for majority members (Whites). In Study 2, moral self-concept mediated the effect of others' prior nonprejudiced actions on a participant's subsequent prejudiced behavior such that others' past nonprejudiced actions enhanced the participant's moral self-concept, and this inflated moral self-concept subsequently drove the participant's prejudiced ratings of a Hispanic applicant. In Study 3, the moderating role of identification with the credentialing group was tested. Results showed that participants expressed more prejudiced attitudes toward a Hispanic applicant when they highly identified with the group members behaving in nonprejudiced manner. In Study 4, the credentialing task was dissociated from the participants' own judgmental task, and, in addition, identification with the credentialing group was manipulated rather than measured. Consistent with prior studies, the results showed that participants who first had the opportunity to view an in-group member's nonprejudiced hiring decision were more likely to reject an African American man for a job stereotypically suited for majority members. These studies suggest a vicarious moral licensing effect.     

Betrayal aversion: When agents of protection become agents of harm

A form of betrayal occurs when agents of protection cause the very harm that they are entrusted to guard against. Examples include the military leader who commits treason and the exploding automobile air bag. We conducted five studies that examined how people respond to criminal betrayals, safety product betrayals, and the risk of future betrayal by safety products. We found that people reacted more strongly (in terms of punishment assigned and negative emotions felt) to acts of betrayal than to identical bad acts that do not violate a duty or promise to protect. We also found that, when faced with a choice among pairs of safety devices (air bags, smoke alarms, and vaccines), most people preferred inferior options (in terms of risk exposure) to options that included a slim (0.01%) risk of betrayal. However, when the betrayal risk was replaced by an equivalent non-betrayal risk, the choice pattern was reversed. Apparently, people are willing to incur greater risks of the very harm they seek protection from to avoid the mere possibility of betrayal.     

Pay attention! Attention to the primes increases attitude assessment accuracy

We demonstrate that an oft-used indirect attitude assessment technique—the attitude activation paradigm—accurately assesses attitudes only when participants attend to the prime stimuli during the attitude activation task. Attitude activation attitudes toward obviously valenced words (e.g., torture, liberty) were more sensitive to attitude valence and extremity when participants were required to attend to the prime words than when they attended to a competing stimulus. As a result, we observed a significantly stronger correlation between attitude activation attitudes and a direct, self-report attitude measure when participants attended to the primes than when they ignored them. We conclude that failing to require participants to attend to the primes during the attitude activation task results in a flawed measurement, which could lead researchers to underestimate relations between the attitude activation measure and direct, self-report attitude measures.     

Preferences for sadness when eliciting help: Instrumental motives in sadness regulation

This investigation tested whether people are more willing to experience and express sadness, the more useful they expect sadness to be. Building on assumptions about the function of sadness, we predicted that people would expect sadness to be more useful when eliciting help to prevent a loss (vs. not). In Study 1, we examined preferences for sadness and its expected usefulness when eliciting donations for the sake of preventing a loss (vs. not). In Study 2, participants expected to elicit help to prevent a loss (vs. attain a benefit). In both studies, participants expected sadness to be more useful and were more willing to experience and express sadness when eliciting help to prevent a loss (vs. other reasons). Furthermore, the more useful participants expected experiencing and expressing sadness to be, the more willing they were to experience and to express sadness, respectively. We discuss the implications for research on emotion regulation.     

Does betrayal aversion really guide trust decisions towards strangers?

Trust is a double-edged sword. When warranted, it leads to positive and rewarding interactions. When not, it leads to disappointment and anger. Therefore, it has been argued that people will display “betrayal aversion” in trust situations (i.e., avoid trusting to avoid betrayal). Yet, people also feel tense and uneasy when they signal distrust to another person and thus show signs of “principled trustfulness” (i.e., choosing to trust others although being skeptical of their trustworthiness). These two theoretical orientations imply directly opposite influences on trust behavior. Thus, we conducted two laboratory studies (with a total of 841 participants) with binary trust games (implying a risk of being betrayed) and extended lottery games (implying no such risk). In both studies, we varied the payoff structures of both games. Further, we made sure that the average perceived likelihood of winning or losing money when choosing the risky option was identical in both games, as was the distribution of these likelihoods. Neither study showed any sign of betrayal aversion. Rather, participants were more willing to risk their money in the trust game than they were to invest their money in a lottery, supporting the principled trustfulness view. We discuss possible explanations why, unlike previous studies, we did not find any indication of betrayal aversion.     

Optimistic metacognitive judgments predict poor performance in relatively complex visual tasks

In some cases, people overestimate how much they can see. This can produce a metacognitive blind spot that may lead participants to devote fewer cognitive resources than a visual task demands. However, little research has tested whether individuals who are particularly optimistic about their visual capabilities are susceptible to poor visual performance. We tested whether optimistic metacognitive judgments would predict poor performance in a visual task, especially when it placed a large attentional load on the participant, and when it required balancing between multiple sources of information. We tested participants in a simplified battle command simulation in which they were asked to detect visual changes. Participants who predicted spatially expansive visual attention performance performed more poorly in the change detection task when the task required tracking larger numbers of aircraft, and when it included a secondary change-list display.     

Individual differences in banknote processing: the role of altruism

We evaluated whether banknotes processing depended on altruism and attitude towards money. In Experiment 1, context effects were examined when participants named banknotes blocked by category or intermixed with pictures from semantic categories. Attitude towards money was assessed by questionnaires and the degree of altruism was evaluated with the dictator game task. In this task, participants received an amount of money and they had to decide whether to donate all, nothing or part of it. A facilitation effect was found in the banknote naming task and this effect increased as the amount of donations decreased. In Experiment 2, we examined whether less altruistic individuals might focus on the relevant information needed to process banknotes in a monetary Stroop task. Only more altruistic individuals showed Stroop effects. These results are interpreted as due to enhanced control while processing relevant information associated to banknotes in less altruistic individuals.     

Responding to negativity: How a risky tactic can serve a vigilant strategy

Regulatory focus theory distinguishes between two motivational systems—a promotion system concerned with nurturance and advancement and a prevention system concerned with security and safety [Higgins, E. T. (1997). Beyond pleasure and pain. American Psychologist, 52, 1280-1300]. In signal detection terms, a preference for eager strategies within the promotion system has been equated with a “risky” bias, whereas a preference for vigilant strategies within the prevention system has been equated with a “conservative” bias. However, we propose that when prevention-focused individuals face negative input, they should be willing to incur false alarms to ensure that negative stimuli are correctly identified. Across six studies, we found for negative stimuli a reversal of the traditional finding that prevention participants show a conservative bias in information processing. In these studies, prevention participants consistently exhibited a risky bias when the input was negative. We suggest that this new tactic—a risky bias in response to negativity—best serves the prevention strategy of vigilance.     

决策者角色及相关变量对风险偏好的影响

采用IAT技术测查被试的内隐自尊, 并引入收益和损失两种任务框架, 综合探讨了内隐自尊水平、任务得失框架对自我决策和为他人决策时风险偏好的影响。结果发现：(1)在收益框架下, 被试为他人决策时更冒险, 而在损失框架下, 为自我和他人决策的风险偏好无显著差异; (2)与为自我决策相比, 低内隐自尊者为他人决策时更冒险, 而高内隐自尊者为自我和他人决策的风险偏好无显著差异; (3)内隐自尊水平与任务框架的交互作用及内隐自尊水平、任务框架和决策者角色之间的三级交互作用均不显著。依据相关的理论和发现对这种结果进行了分析和讨论。     

The fate of completed intentions

The goal of this research was to determine whether and how people deactivate prospective memory (PM) intentions after they have been completed. One view proposes that PM intentions can be deactivated after completion, such that they no longer come to mind and interfere with current tasks. Another view is that now irrelevant completed PM intentions exhibit persisting activation, and continue to be retrieved. In Experiment 1, participants were given a PM intention embedded within the ongoing task during Phase 1, after which participants were told either that the PM task had been completed or suspended until later. During Phase 2, participants were instructed to perform only the ongoing task and were periodically prompted to report their thoughts. Critically, the PM targets from Phase 1 reappeared in Phase 2. All of our measures, including thoughts reported about the PM task, supported the existence of persisting activation. In Experiment 2, we varied conditions that were expected to mitigate persisting activation. Despite our best attempts to promote deactivation, we found evidence for the persistence of spontaneous retrieval in all groups after intentions were completed. The theoretical and practical implications of this potential dark side to spontaneous retrieval are discussed.     

Cyberostracism: effects of being ignored over the Internet

Ostracism is such a widely used and powerful tactic that the authors tested whether people would be affected by it even under remote and artificial circumstances. In Study 1, 1,486 participants from 62 countries accessed the authors' on-line experiment on the Internet. They were asked to use mental visualization while playing a virtual tossing game with two others (who were actually computer generated and controlled). Despite the minimal nature of their experience, the more participants were ostracized, the more they reported feeling bad, having less control, and losing a sense of belonging. In Study 2, ostracized participants were more likely to conform on a subsequent task. The results are discussed in terms of supporting K. D. Williams's (1997) need threat theory of ostracism.     

Power, risk, and the status quo: does power promote riskier or more conservative decision making?

Two experiments suggest that the experience of power can interact with a person's level of power motivation to produce effects on risky decision making. In Study 1, assignment to a position of power increased risk taking among participants with low levels of power motivation but reduced risk taking among participants with high levels of power motivation. In Study 2, participants high in power motivation again made more conservative decisions, but only under circumstances in which the dominance hierarchy was unstable and there was potential for losing their power. When power was irrevocable and participants' choices had no bearing on their ability to retain power, both high and low power-motivated participants responded by making riskier decisions. Findings suggest that although power may generally lead to riskier decisions, power may lead to more conservative decisions among power-motivated individuals, especially when the status quo is perceived to be in jeopardy.