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1.
Using the analogical transfer paradigm, the present study investigated the competing explanations of Girotto and Legrenzi
(Psychological Research 51: 129–135, 1993) and Griggs, Platt, Newstead, and Jackson (Thinking and Reasoning 4: 1–14, 1998) for facilitation on the SARS version of the THOG problem, a hypothetico-deductive reasoning task. Girotto and Legrenzi argue
that facilitation is based on logical analysis of the task [System 2 reasoning in Evans’s (Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7:
454–459, 2003) dual-process account of reasoning] while Griggs et al. maintain that facilitation is due to an attentional heuristic produced
by the wording of the problem (System 1 reasoning). If Girotto and Legrenzi are correct, then System 2 reasoning, which is
volitional and responsible for deductive reasoning, should be elicited, and participants should comprehend the solution principle
of the THOG task and exhibit analogical transfer. However, if Griggs et al. are correct, then System 1 reasoning, which is
responsible for heuristic problem solving strategies such as an attentional heuristic, should occur, and participants should
not abstract the solution principle and transfer should not occur. Significant facilitation (68 and 82% correct) was only
observed for the two SARS source problems, but significant analogical transfer did not occur. This lack of transfer suggests
that System 1 reasoning was responsible for the facilitation observed in the SARS problem, supporting Griggs et al.’s attentional
heuristic explanation. The present results also underscore the explanatory value of using analogical transfer rather than
facilitation as the criterion for problem understanding. 相似文献
2.
Zachary Beckstead 《Integrative psychological & behavioral science》2009,43(3):221-227
Schwarz (IPBS: Integrative Psychology & Behavioral Science 43:3, 2009) cogently demonstrates that in conjunction with scientific conventionalism psychology has developed a rather deficient view
of their subject matter: the human being. Psychology based on an impoverished notion of empirical has rendered subjectivity
or ‘the measuring apparatus man’ invisible. As his story implicitly demonstrates, psychologists supported by a positivistic
view of science (in part to be empirical) and notion of ‘objectivity’ have learned to trust their ‘rigorous’ methods instead
of their participants as capable of revealing important and interesting phenomena. If we are going to take subjectivity and
experience seriously there should be a cultivation of a new attitude or orientation regarding psychology’s subject matter
(i.e., the human being) and science. This commentary discusses Mark Freeman’s (2007) argument that the first requirement of science should be ‘fidelity to the phenomena’ and elaborates on the implications
for psychology grounded in this view of science. 相似文献
3.
The term ‘branching’ refers to processes needed for successful reuptake of a task after interruption by another task. Based
on a model of human prefrontal cognitive architecture, it has been postulated that people cannot branch recursively between
more than two tasks due to a capacity limit built into the cognitive architecture (Koechlin and Hyafil in Science 318:594–598,
2007). As an alternative to a structural limit for recursive branching between more than two tasks we put forward the hypothesis
that working memory capacity is the limiting factor in recursive branching. We tested this hypothesis by independently varying
working memory load and number of recursive branching steps. Successful branching between up to four tasks was observed, as
long as working memory load was kept low. Our data, thus, do not support the proposition of a structural limit to recursive
branching beyond two tasks. Instead, they suggest that working memory capacity limit is the most important factor that limits
the capacity for branching. We further observed that the requirement to retain task sets and task contents additively contributed
to the difficulty of recursive branching. In a broader context, our data thus support working memory models that conceptualize
working memory and executive functions not as separate modules, but as tightly interactive processes. 相似文献
4.
5.
In four experiments, we investigated how people make feature predictions about objects whose category membership is uncertain.
Artificial visual categories were presented and remained in view while a novel instance with a known feature, but uncertain
category membership was presented. All four experiments showed that feature predictions about the test instance were most
often based on feature correlations (referred to as feature conjunction reasoning). Experiment 1 showed that feature conjunction reasoning was generally preferred to category-based induction in
a feature prediction task. Experiment 2 showed that people used all available exemplars to make feature conjunction predictions.
Experiments 3 and 4 showed that the preference for predictions based on feature conjunction persisted even when category-level
information was made more salient and inferences involving a larger number of categories were required. Little evidence of
reasoning based on the consideration of multiple categories (e.g., Anderson, (Psychological Review, 98:409–429, 1991)) or the single, most probable category (e.g., Murphy & Ross, (Cognitive Psychology, 27:148–193, 1994)) was found. 相似文献
6.
Adrian Furnham 《Current psychology (New Brunswick, N.J.)》2009,28(4):225-239
In all, 187 participants completed a new, self-report measure of eight multiple intelligences (Haselbauer 2005), a General Knowledge test (Irwing et al. Personality and Individual Differences 30:857–871, 2001), a measure of Approaches to Learning Styles (Biggs 1987), a measure of the Big Five personality traits (Costa and McCrae 1992), as well as gave their own estimated scores on the Gardner (1999) multiple intelligences. Alpha co-efficients were modest with only three of the eight test-derived, multiple intelligence
scores being over .70. ‘Linguistic’ and Mathematical intelligence alone were correlated with General Knowledge. Five of the
eight ‘intelligences’ were correlated both with Extraversion and Openness. Regressions indicated that ‘Intrapersonal intelligence’
was closely linked with Stability and Conscientiousness; ‘Interpersonal intelligence’ with Extraversion; ‘Linguistic intelligence’
with Openness; ‘Mathematical intelligence’ with Agreeableness and Conscientiousness. Correlations between self-estimated and
test-derived emotional intelligence showed correlations ranging from r = .18 to r = .56 for similar type ‘intelligences’. This study provides modest evidence for the concurrent and construct validity of
this measure. It requires more psychometric evidence of validity before it is used. 相似文献
7.
In two-choice decision tasks, Starns and Ratcliff (Psychology and Aging 25: 377–390, 2010) showed that older adults are farther from the optimal speed–accuracy trade-off than young adults. They suggested that the
age effect resulted from differences in task goals, with young participants focused on balancing speed and accuracy and older
participants focused on minimizing errors. We compared speed–accuracy criteria with a standard procedure (blocks that had
a fixed numbers of trials) to a condition in which blocks lasted a fixed amount of time and participants were instructed to
get as many correct responses as possible within the time limit—a goal that explicitly required balancing speed and accuracy.
Fits of the diffusion model showed that criteria differences persisted in the fixed-time condition, suggesting that age differences
are not solely based on differences in task goals. Also, both groups produced more conservative criteria in difficult conditions
when it would have been optimal to be more liberal. 相似文献
8.
In a recent article in Argumentation, O’Keefe (Argumentation 21:151–163, 2007) observed that the well-known ‘framing effects’ in the social psychological literature on persuasion are akin to traditional
fallacies of argumentation and reasoning and could be exploited for persuasive success in a way that conflicts with principles
of responsible advocacy. Positively framed messages (“if you take aspirin, your heart will be more healthy”) differ in persuasive
effect from negative frames (“if you do not take aspirin, your heart will be less healthy”), despite containing ‘equivalent’
content. This poses a potential problem, because people might be unduly (and unsuspectingly) influenced by mere presentational
differences. By drawing on recent cognitive psychological work on framing effects in choice and decision making paradigms,
however, we show that establishing whether two arguments are substantively equivalent—and hence, whether there is any normative
requirement for them to be equally persuasive—is a difficult task. Even arguments that are logically equivalent may not be
information equivalent. The normative implications of this for both speakers and listeners are discussed. 相似文献
9.
Much recent comparative work has been devoted to exploring what nonhuman primates understand about physical causality. However,
few laboratory experiments have attempted to test what nonhumans understand about what physical acts others are capable of
performing. We tested seven chimpanzees’ ability to predict which of two human experimenters could deliver a tray containing
a food reward. In the ‘floor’ condition, legs were required to push the tray toward the subject. In the ‘lap’ condition, arms
were required to hand the tray to the subject. In Exp. 1, chimpanzees begged (by gesturing) to either an experimenter whose
legs were not visible (LNV) or whose arms were not visible (ANV). Rather than flexibly altering their preferences between
conditions, the chimpanzees preferred the ANV experimenter regardless of the task. In subsequent experiments, we manipulated
various factors that might have controlled the chimpanzees’ preferences, such as (a) distance between experimenter and subject
(Experiment 2), (b) amount of occlusion of experimenters’ body (Experiments 2 and 3), (c) contact with the food tray (Experiments
3 and 4) and (d) positioning of barriers that either impeded the movement of the limbs or not (Experiment 5). The chimpanzees’
performance was best explained by attention to cues such as perceived proximity, contact, and maximal occlusion of body that
although highly predictive in certain tasks, were irrelevant in others. When the discriminative role of such cues was eliminated,
performance fell to chance levels, indicating that chimpanzees do not spontaneously (or after considerable training) use limb
visibility as a cue to predict the ability of a human to perform particular physical tasks. Thus, the current findings suggest
a possible failure of causal reasoning in the context of reasoning about the use of the limbs to perform physical acts. 相似文献
10.
Corine Besson 《Philosophical Studies》2012,158(1):59-82
This paper argues that the prominent accounts of logical knowledge have the consequence that they conflict with ordinary reasoning.
On these accounts knowing a logical principle, for instance, is having a disposition to infer according to it. These accounts
in particular conflict with so-called ‘reasoned change in view’, where someone does not infer according to a logical principle
but revise their views instead. The paper also outlines a propositional account of logical knowledge which does not conflict
with ordinary reasoning. 相似文献
11.
Philippe Schlenker 《Philosophical Studies》2010,151(1):115-142
Stalnaker (1978) made two seminal claims about presuppositions. The most influential one was that presupposition projection is computed by a pragmatic mechanism based on a notion of ‘local context’. Due to conceptual and technical difficulties, however, the latter notion was reinterpreted in purely semantic terms within
‘dynamic semantics’ (Heim 1983). The second claim was that some instances of presupposition generation should also be explained in pragmatic terms. But despite various attempts, the definition of a precise ‘triggering algorithm’ has remained somewhat elusive. We discuss
possible extensions of both claims. First, we offer a reconstruction of ‘local contexts’ which circumvents some of the difficulties
faced by Stalnaker’s original analysis. We preserve the idea that local contexts are computed by a pragmatic mechanism that
aggregates the information that follows from an incomplete sentence given the global context; but we crucially rely on a modified
notion of entailment (‘R-entailment’), whose plausibility should be assessed on independent grounds. Second, we speculate
that local contexts might prove necessary (though by no means sufficient) to understand how some presuppositions are triggered.
In a nutshell, we suggest that a presupposition is triggered when the semantic contribution of an expression to its local
context is in some sense ‘heterogeneous’. Without giving an analysis of the latter notion, we note that this architecture
implies that presuppositions should be triggered on the basis of the meaning that an expression has relative to its local context (what we call its ‘local meaning’); we sketch some possible consequences of this analysis. 相似文献
12.
Rabern and Rabern (Analysis 68:105–112 2) and Uzquiano (Analysis 70:39–44 4) have each presented increasingly harder versions of ‘the hardest logic puzzle ever’ (Boolos The Harvard Review of Philosophy
6:62–65 1), and each has provided a two-question solution to his predecessor’s puzzle. But Uzquiano’s puzzle is different from the
original and different from Rabern and Rabern’s in at least one important respect: it cannot be solved in less than three
questions. In this paper we solve Uzquiano’s puzzle in three questions and show why there is no solution in two. Finally,
to cement a tradition, we introduce a puzzle of our own. 相似文献
13.
14.
We present evidence that a dog (Philip, a 4-year-old tervueren) was able to use different human actions as samples against which to match his own behaviour. First, Philip was trained to repeat nine human-demonstrated actions on command (‘Do it!’). When his performance was markedly over chance in response to demonstration by one person, testing with untrained action sequences and other demonstrators showed some ability to generalise his understanding of copying. In a second study, we presented Philip with a sequence of human actions, again using the ‘Do as I do’ paradigm. All demonstrated actions had basically the same structure: the owner picked up a bottle from one of six places; transferred it to one of the five other places and then commanded the dog (‘Do it!’). We found that Philip duplicated the entire sequence of moving a specific object from one particular place to another more often than expected by chance. Although results point to significant limitations in his imitative abilities, it seems that the dog could have recognized the action sequence, on the basis of observation alone, in terms of the initial state, the means, and the goal. This suggests that dogs might acquire abilities by observation that enhance their success in complex socio-behavioural situations.This contribution is part of the special issue “Animal Logics” (Watanabe and Huber 2006). 相似文献
15.
Numerical quantity seems to affect the response in any task that involves numbers, even in tasks that do not demand access
to quantity (e.g., perceptual tasks). That is, readers seem to activate quantity representations upon the mere presentation
of integers. One important piece of evidence in favor of this view comes from the finding of a distance effect in perceptual
tasks: When one compares two numbers, response times (RTs) are a function of the numerical distance between them. However,
recent studies have suggested that the physical similarity between Arabic numbers is strongly correlated with their numerical
distance, and that the former could be a better predictor of RT data in perceptual tasks in which magnitude processing is
not required (Cohen, 2009a). The present study explored the Persian and Arabic versions of Indian numbers (Exps. 1 and 2, respectively). Na?ve participants
(speakers of Spanish) and users of these notations (Pakistanis and Jordanians) participated in a physical same–different matching
task. The RTs of users of the Indian notations were regressed on perceptual similarity (estimated from the Spanish participants’
RTs) and numerical distance. The results showed that, regardless of the degree of correlation between the perceptual similarity
function and the numerical distance function, the critical predictor for RTs was perceptual similarity. Thus, participants
do not automatically activate Indian integers’ quantity representations, at least not when these numbers are presented in
simple perceptual tasks. 相似文献
16.
Stanley and Williamson (The Journal of Philosophy 98(8), 411–444 2001) reject the fundamental distinction between what Ryle once called ‘knowing-how’ and ‘knowing-that’. They claim that knowledge-how
is just a species of knowledge-that, i.e. propositional knowledge, and try to establish their claim relying on the standard
semantic analysis of ‘knowing-how’ sentences. We will undermine their strategy by arguing that ‘knowing-how’ phrases are under-determined
such that there is not only one semantic analysis and by critically discussing and refuting the positive account of knowing-how
they offer. Furthermore, we argue for an extension of the classical ‘knowing-how’/‘knowing-that’-dichotomy by presenting a
new threefold framework: Using some core-examples of the recent debate, we will show that we can analyze knowledge situations
that are not captured by the Rylean dichotomy and argue that, therefore, the latter has to be displaced by a more fine-grained
theory of knowledge-formats. We will distinguish three different formats of knowledge we can have of our actions, namely (1)
propositional, (2) practical, and (3) image-like formats of knowledge. Furthermore, we will briefly analyze the underlying
representations of each of these knowledge-formats. 相似文献
17.
J. Ritola 《Argumentation》2006,20(2):237-244
In a recent article, D. A. Truncellito (2004, ‘Running in Circles about Begging the Question’, Argumentation
18, 325–329) argues that the discussion between Robinson (1971, ‘Begging the Question’, Analysis
31, 113–117), Sorensen (1996, ‘Unbeggable Questions’, Analysis
56, 51–55) and Teng (1997, ‘Sorensen on Begging the Question’, Analysis
57, 220–222) shows that we need to distinguish between logical fallacies, which are mistakes in the form of the argument, and rhetorical fallacies, which are mistakes committed by the arguer. While I basically agree with Truncellito’s line of thinking, I believe this distinction is not tenable and offer a different view. In addition, I will argue that the conclusion to draw from the abovementioned discussion is that validity is not a sufficient criterion of begging the question, and that we should be wary of the containment-metaphor of a deductive argument. 相似文献
18.
Recent evidence suggests that the conjunction fallacy observed in people’s probabilistic reasoning is also to be found in
their evaluations of inductive argument strength. We presented 130 participants with materials likely to produce a conjunction
fallacy either by virtue of a shared categorical or a causal relationship between the categories in the argument. We also
took a measure of participants’ cognitive ability. We observed conjunction fallacies overall with both sets of materials but
found an association with ability for the categorical materials only. Our results have implications for accounts of individual
differences in reasoning, for the relevance theory of induction, and for the recent claim that causal knowledge is important
in inductive reasoning. 相似文献
19.
Emily J. Oliver David Markland James Hardy Caroline M. Petherick 《Motivation and emotion》2008,32(3):200-212
Based within a self-determination theory framework (SDT: Deci and Ryan, Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in human
behaviour. Plenum Publishing Co., New York, 1985), the present study examined the effects of manipulating social-contextual conditions on the content of individuals’ self-talk.
Seventy student volunteers were randomly assigned to a controlling or autonomy-supportive experimental condition. Participants
were instructed to ‘think-aloud’ throughout a 10-min computerized task during which self-verbalizations were recorded. Audio
recordings were transcribed verbatim, and then analysed using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count Program (LIWC; Pennebaker
et al., LIWC2001; Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (software and manual). Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ, 2001). Inductive content analyses were also conducted. Triangulation of the quantitative and qualitative findings revealed that
in the autonomy-supportive condition, individuals’ self-talk was more informational and less controlling, with participants
using more positive emotional words and assents, and fewer negative emotional words, swear words, and first person references
than in the controlling condition. The findings suggest that social-context can affect cognitive factors such as self-talk
and further support the promotion of autonomy-supportive environments. 相似文献
20.
The current study compared the predictions of two socio-cultural theories, shifting standards and intergroup bias, to predict
sexual double standards that occur in reactions to computer-mediated infidelity. Shifting standards theory (Biernat In The
shifting standards model: Implications of stereotype accuracy for social judgment, APA, Washington DC, 1995) suggests that individuals will judge female targets more harshly than male targets, based on culturally ingrained stereotypes
regarding sexual behavior. On the contrary, intergroup bias theory (Brewer In Psychol Bull 86:307–324, 1979) predicts that individuals will judge outgroup targets, or members of the opposite sex, more harshly than ingroup targets,
or members of the same sex. Participants were shown a hard copy of presumable evidence that extradyadic computer-mediated
behavior had occurred, engaged in by one of two members of a couple. The two groups differed only by the sex of the target,
the female “Colleen” or the male “Bill”. Then participants reported their attitudes toward the target’s behavior, resulting
distress, and likelihood to terminate the relationship. Results showed support for the intergroup bias theory, suggesting
that individuals altered their attitudes toward the behavior based on whether the target was an ingroup or outgroup member. 相似文献