RESPONSES TO NUCCETELLI, LEMOS, AND BUENO

Abstract: Susana Nuccetelli discusses critically my account of Moore's Proof of the External World. Noah Lemos takes up my views on skepticism and my distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. Otávio Bueno focuses on my treatment of dream skepticism. In this article I offer replies to my three critics.     

Have PhD, will travel

This autobiography contains some of the clinical and research highlights of my career in the context of my personal odyssey and my appreciation of science as a potential check on political and economic forces in psychology. Typically, my research arose from clinical problems encountered at work and from my disinclination to rely on methods that lacked prior demonstrated validity for the type of problem and client in question. Otherwise, I feared my recommendations were no better than those based on common prejudices and biases, which I encountered throughout my work life as a dark-skinned, outspoken, non-Christian from the Bronx.     

CONFESSIONS OF A PRACTICING NATURALISTIC THEIST: A RESPONSE TO HARDWICK,PEDERSON, AND PETERSON

Abstract. In my response to the comments of Charley Hardwick, Ann Pederson, and Greg Peterson, I continue the narrative, confessional mode of my writing in Dancing with the Sacred. First, I sketch some methodological decisions underlying my naturalistic, evolutionary, practical theology. I then respond to the encouraging suggestions of my commentators by further developing my ideas about naturalism, mystery, creativity as God, the place of ecological responsibility in my thinking, sin, and eschatology. I offer suggestions as to how I might widen the practical applications of my theology beyond environmental and medical ethics to other areas of moral responsibility in relation to the creative process. I do all this with much appreciation for the care and careful critical reflection that my commentators have devoted to my thinking.     

Peace,Self‐Determination and Reckoning with the Past: A Reply to Butt,Lippert‐Rasmussen,Pasternak, Wellman and Stemplowska

In this article, I offer responses to five commentaries on my recently published book, Cosmopolitan Peace. Those articles address my conception of individual and collective agency, my account of self‐determination (and its implication for the problem of annexation during and after the war), and my accounts of, respectively, reparations and remembrance after war. I revise or provide further defences of those accounts in the light of my commentators’ probing remarks.     

Huston Smith Replies to Barbour, Goodenough, and Peterson

Responses and clarifications are given to the three respondents to my recent book, Why Religion Matters , in which I discuss what I see as the drawbacks and inconsistencies of Darwinism. While certain of their criticisms are understandable, others are based on a misreading of my work. Finally, my critics fail to show that my book is mistaken in its central claim that the modern loss of faith in transcendence, basic to the traditional/religious worldview, is unwarranted, because science has not been able to disprove the metaphysical claim that transcendence exists.     

REPLY TO JULIA DRIVER,TIMM TRIPLETT,AND KATHLEEN WALLACE

Abstract: Julia Driver, Timm Triplett, and Kathleen Wallace challenge my account of moral arrogance, and Triplett and Wallace challenge its application to the problem of abortion. I try to show here that Driver's attempt to defend consequentialism from my charge that it promotes moral arrogance is successful only if consequentialism explicitly gives up what has been considered one of its major virtues. I acknowledge that Triplett has uncovered some unclarity in my claim that the moral acceptability of abortion is an unresolvable moral issue. I also acknowledge that Wallace has uncovered some unclarity in my account of moral arrogance. After clarifying that account, I try to meet her challenge to defend my claim that it is not morally arrogant for a state to place some restrictions on abortions.     

Normative realism and ontology: reply to Clarke-Doane,Rosen, and Enoch and McPherson

In response to comments on my book, Being Realistic about Reasons, by Justin Clarke-Doane, David Enoch and Tristram McPherson, and Gideon Rosen, I try to clarify my domain-based view of ontology, my understanding of the epistemology of normative judgments, and my interpretation of the phenomenon of supervenience.     

Creativity,Spontaneity, Impasse,and Leaps of Faith: Reply to Commentaries

In my reply to the commentaries, I address several points of convergence with and divergence from Drs. Danielle Knafo and Philip A. Ringstrom. I clarify my view that while shame can drive the creative process, the thrust of my paper is about ways in which shame can close down access to one's creative potential, as well as creating obstacles to vitality and intimacy in relationships. I expand on how it was indeed a visceral, embodied sense of my own shame which served as an “informant,” as Ringstrom suggests, of Julia's chronic experience of shame, opening a door to our exploration of the repetitive enactments between us. Grounding my understanding of therapeutic action and enactments in a relational perspective, I describe how I view enactments as inevitable and co-created, and reflecting on them collaboratively as a potentially useful opportunity in analytic work. I resonate with Ringstrom and Knafo's belief in the creativity inherent in the psychoanalytic process, and the importance of spontaneity and risk taking, particularly in negotiating impasses in treatment. Finally, I describe Julia's poetic reflections upon reading the paper.     

Blessed are the uncertain,for they will experience excess

In this paper I look at the possibility that uncertainty may not merely be a stage in the research process, but an outcome in itself. Exploring how university education and scholarship collided with my own personal experiences and identity I discuss how a combination of poststructural theory and my encounters with peace, conflict and religion enabled me to value uncertainty, and I make the case that uncertainty can open up the future to the gift of chance. By intertwining discussions of both lived experience and academic work, the organisation of the paper reflects how the two became inextricably linked, continuously folding into each other, so that my sense of self influenced my research, and conversely, my research influenced my sense of self. The outcome is a discussion of how I incorporated uncertainty into my research and personal life, which I explore using the example of religion, and how I lost and gained my faith, rejecting my previous Christianity while reconstructing a kind of faith found in uncertainty, a sense of place and ethical space to come.     

Computers, criminals, an eccentric billionaire, and APA: a brief autobiography

In this invited autobiographical account, I sum up what life has been like for me personally and professionally. For most of the first 50 years of my life, I lived in Alabama. During my years at the University of Alabama, my professional activities included developing a computer-based system to interpret the MMPI (Hathaway & McKinley, 1943), managing a national and international continuing education program for psychologists, involvement in a class action suit that resulted in the deinstitutionalization of Alabama's mental hospitals, organizing a team of professionals to reclassify all of the inmates of Alabama's prison system, and conducting a psychological autopsy on Howard Hughes. I was the American Psychological Association (APA) president in 1988 and served from 1989 to 2003 as APA Chief Executive Officer. Since my time at APA, I have been engaged in work with international psychological organizations.     

Family Traditions,Cultural Values,and the Clinician's Countertransference: Therapeutic Assessment of a Young Sicilian Woman

Despite recent advances in models and instruments to understand the role of a client's cultural background, clinical psychologists are not immune to implicit cultural biases that are potentially damaging to the therapeutic alliance. In this article, I present a Therapeutic Assessment with a young Sicilian woman conducted in a university-based student clinic in Italy. During the assessment, I assumed that because we were both Italians, my client shared my perspective (northern Italian) about family and individual values, which resulted in a therapeutic impasse when I responded on the basis of my individual and culturally shaped view of interpersonal and family relationships without appreciating important differences between my own and my client's microcultures. To overcome the impasse, I had to openly acknowledge such differences and reorient myself to my client's goals. I discuss the core processes involved in such a repair in the context of a cross-cultural psychological assessment.     

Replies to Wallace,Queloz, and Kirwin

In this article, I reply to the comments offered by R. Jay Wallace, Matthieu Queloz, and Claire Kirwin on my book, The Will to Nothingness. An Essay on Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality (OUP, 2021). These comments and my replies cover central features of the book, including my analysis of ressentiment as an expression of the will to power; the concept of self-undermining functionality I introduce to make sense of Nietzsche's critique of the ascetic ideal; and my reasons for omitting to examine the “unconditional will to truth,” which he presents as the latest embodiment of this ideal.     

A REPLY TO ANNE KULL,EDUARDO CRUZ,AND MICHAEL DeLASHMUTT

In my reply to the essays by Anne Kull, Eduardo Cruz, and Michael DeLashmutt, I turn first to Cruz's charge that my use of “the sacred” is at odds with a growing religious studies mainstream that understands religion in secular terms. I suggest that this latter approach has its own problems, deriving partly from its neglect of the political, constructed nature of the category of “religion.” Second, in relation to Cruz's suggestion that my lack of attention to explanation compromises my claim to be social scientific, I defend a broader understanding of the human sciences and explore the relationships between understanding, critique, and history, and between sociology and theology. Third, reflecting on DeLashmutt's suggestion that I neglect the way that technical invention provides a glimpse of divine creativity, and the myth making that goes on around technology in vehicles such as science fiction, I argue that such issues have to be approached in a radically historical way. I conclude by identifying three challenges: to explore more deeply how technological objects form part of human being‐in‐the‐world, to show how my approach might offer practical resources for assessing technological and environmental developments, and to expand my analysis to include non‐Western religious traditions.     

The Dimensions of Consequentialism: Reply to Schmidt,Brown, Howard-Snyder,Crisp, Andric and Tanyi,and Gertken

In this article I respond to comments and objections raised in the special issue on my book The Dimensions of Consequentialism. I defend my multi-dimensional consequentialist theory against a range of challenges articulated by Thomas Schmidt, Campbell Brown, Frances Howard-Snyder, Roger Crisp, Vuko Andric and Attila Tanyi, and Jan Gertken. My aim is to show that multi-dimensional consequentialism is, at least, a coherent and intuitively plausible alternative to one-dimensional theories such as utilitarianism, prioritarianism, and mainstream accounts of egalitarianism. I am very grateful to all contributors for reading my book so closely and for devoting time and intellectual energy to thinking about the pros and cons of multi-dimensional consequentialism.     

On Knowing and Using Myself: Reflections on an Analyst's Subjectivity,Intersubjectivity, and Psychoanalytic Change

In this article I describe my journey to become a psychoanalyst, which includes discovering my resonance with the ideas and clinical approaches of a contemporary self psychological relational approach. I also reflect on a clinical vignette that I see playing a crucial role in my development as a psychoanalyst and consider analytic change processes in both implicit and explicit realms.     

Virtue Ethics, Theory, and Warrant

Are there good grounds for thinking that the moral values of action are to be derived from those of character? This ‘virtue ethical’ claim is sometimes thought of as a kind of normative ethical theory; sometimes as form of opposition to any such theory. However, the best case to be made for it supports neither of these claims. Rather, it leads us to a distinctive view in moral epistemology: the view that my warrant for a particular moral judgement derives from my warrant for believing that I am a good moral judge. This view seems to confront a regress-problem. For the belief that I am a good moral judge is itself a particular moral judgement. So it seems that, on this view, I need to derive my warrant for believing that I am a good moral judge from my warrant for believing that I am a good judge of moral judges; and so on. I show how this worry can be met, and trace the implications of the resulting view for warranted moral judgement.     

The Dream Sense,Emergent Clinical Process,and the Question of Symmetry: Reply to Brown and Colombo

In recent years I have become interested in Bion and neo-Bionian field theory, but the origin of my interest in dreaming does not lie in scholarly or clinical sources. The source of the idea of the dream sense is my own experience. After addressing that point, I reject what appears to be Colombo’s impression (this issue) that detailed inquiry is necessarily the basis of interpersonal and relational clinical practice, and then take issue with Brown’s understanding of expressive participation in relational thinking (this issue). Responding to Brown’s wish that I offer more detail about my own clinical process, I present an overview of my understanding of the way I work. I conclude by addressing the understandings offered by the discussants of symmetry in the analytic relationship, and offering more details of my own.     

Philosophy,writing, and liberation

In responding to the three creative interpretive discussions in the symposium on my book Philosophy and the Art of Writing, this paper explores the different styles of philosophical discourse and their role in the practice of philosophy as a way of life that extends beyond the discursive and that combines self-cultivation with care for others in the ethical-aesthetic pursuit of living beauty. In advocating this aesthetic model of philosophical life over a purely therapeutic model, I suggest how the former can incorporate the latter's concerns for spiritual health and liberation. In developing my response to the symposiasts while elaborating on the themes of my book, I consider issues of ineffability, creative performance, embodiment, truth, heroism, vulnerability, possession, art, spirituality, love, and liberation.     

NATURAL GOODNESS,RIGHTNESS, AND THE INTERSUBJECTIVITY OF REASON: REPLY TO ARROYO,CUMMISKEY, MOLAND,AND BIRD‐POLLAN

Abstract: In response to Arroyo, I explain my position on the concept of “natural goodness” and how my use of that concept compares to that of Geach and Foot. An Aristotelian or functional notion of goodness provides the material for Kantian endorsement in a theory of value that avoids a metaphysical commitment to intrinsic values. In response to Cummiskey, I review reasons for thinking Kantianism and consequentialism incompatible, especially those objections to aggregation that arise from the notion of the natural good previously described. In response to Moland, I explain why I think Hegelian worries about the supposed emptiness of the Kantian self do not apply to my account. And in response to both Moland and Bird‐Pollan, I argue that, contrary to the view of some Hegelians, the intersubjective normativity of reason is not something developed through actual social relations; rather, it is something essential to an individual's relations with himself or herself.     

In search and proof of human beings, not machines

My intentions are twofold in this autobiographical account. On one hand, I hope to present empirical and theoretical evidence for a freely willing human being. On the other, I carefully record the developing stages I lived through to cement my confidence in the image of humanity I would like my readers to accept. I have, in my career development, worked hard to redefine psychological terminology, defend traditional scientific practices, and provide support for all those colleagues who can no longer stand the mechanistic characterization that so many psychology departments insist on. I have spent over 40 years pursuing such goals. It is not likely that I will ever give up my quest for what I take to be a genuine humanity.