Natural-scene perception requires attention

Is visual attention required for visual consciousness? In the past decade, many researchers have claimed that awareness can arise in the absence of attention. This claim is largely based on the notion that natural scene (or "gist") perception occurs without attention. This article presents evidence against this idea. We show that when observers perform a variety of demanding, sustained-attention tasks, inattentional blindness occurs for natural scenes. In addition, scene perception is impaired under dual-task conditions, but only when the primary task is sufficiently demanding. This finding suggests that previous studies that have been interpreted as demonstrating scene perception without attention failed to fully engage attention and that natural-scene perception does indeed require attention. Thus, natural-scene perception is not a preattentive process and cannot be used to support the idea of awareness without attention.     

Perception without awareness: perspectives from cognitive psychology

Four basic approaches that have been used to demonstrate perception without awareness are described. Each approach reflects one of two types of experimental logic and one of two possible methods for controlling awareness. The experimental logic has been either to demonstrate a dissociation between a measure of perception with awareness and a measure that is sensitive to perception without awareness or to demonstrate a qualitative difference between the consequences of perception with and without awareness. Awareness has been controlled either by manipulating the stimulus conditions or by instructing observers on how to distribute their attention. The experimental findings based on all four approaches lead to the same conclusion; namely, stimuli are perceived even when observers are unaware of the stimuli. This conclusion is supported by results of studies in which awareness has been assessed with either objective measures of forced-choice discriminations or measures based on verbalizations of subjective conscious experiences. Given this solid empirical support for the concept of perception without awareness, a direction for future research studies is to assess the functions of information perceived without awareness in determining what is perceived with awareness. The available evidence suggests that information perceived without awareness both biases what stimuli are perceived with awareness and influences how stimuli perceived with awareness are consciously experienced.     

Exogenous attention to unseen objects?

Attention and awareness are closely related phenomena, but recent evidence has shown that not all attended stimuli give rise to awareness. Controversy still remains over whether, and the extent to which, a dissociation between attention and awareness encompasses all forms of attention. For example, it has been suggested that attention without awareness is more readily demonstrated for voluntary, endogenous attention than its reflexive, exogenous counterpart. Here we examine whether exogenous attentional cueing can have selective behavioural effects on stimuli that nevertheless remain unseen. Using a task in which object-based attention has been shown in the absence of awareness, we remove all possible contingencies between cues and target stimuli to ensure that any cueing effects must be under purely exogenous control, and find evidence of exogenous object-based attention without awareness. In a second experiment we address whether this dissociation crucially depends on the method used to establish that the objects indeed remain unseen. Specifically, to confirm that objects are unseen we adopt appropriate signal detection task procedures, including those that retain parity with the primary attentional task (by requiring participants to discriminate the two types of trial that are used to measure an effect of attention). We show a significant object-based attention effect is apparent under conditions where the selected object indeed remains undetectable.     

错误再认:意识、注意和刺激特性

该研究基于错误再认现象,确立了意识知觉和无意识知觉在行为结果上的质的差异。在决定一个刺激是被有意识知觉还是无意识知觉时,刺激特性和注意之间存在着相互补偿的作用。实验一表明,当一个刺激短暂呈现而被无意识知觉的时候,增强刺激特性或提高注意水平都能使它的知觉变为有意识的;相对应地,实验二表明,一个处于分散注意条件下被无意识知觉的刺激,也可以通过使注意集中或增强刺激特性而使它的知觉变为有意识的。该研究对意识、注意和刺激特性三者间的关系进行了讨论。     

Beliefless Knowing

Orthodox epistemology tells us that knowledge requires belief. While there has been resistance to orthodoxy on this point, the orthodox position has been ably defended and continues to be widely endorsed. In what follows, I aim to undermine the belief requirement on knowledge. I first show that awareness does not require belief. Next, I turn my attention to the relation between knowledge and awareness, showing that awareness entails knowledge in a certain range of cases and thus that the cases of awareness without belief that I discuss are also cases of knowledge without belief. Throughout I draw attention to the fact that these are not isolated cases and that beliefless knowledge is a rather common phenomenon. I conclude by arguing that beliefless knowledge is consistent with the idea that all knowledge is grounded in belief and the idea that knowledge is essentially a representational state.     

无觉知条件下的客体注意效应

采用双矩形范式变式考察在对客体无觉知的条件下的客体注意效应,共包括两个实验：实验一考察对完整矩形客体无觉知的条件下能否出现客体注意效应,发现在完整矩形客体不可见的情况下依然出现了客体注意效应。实验二考察对虚拟矩形客体无觉知的情况下是否能够出现客体注意效应,发现在虚拟矩形客体不可见的情况下也能够出现客体注意效应。研究结果表明客体注意效应在无觉知条件下依然存在,为注意与觉知在功能上相互分离的观点提供了新的证据。     

Unconscious integration: Current evidence for integrative processing under subliminal conditions

Integrative processing is traditionally believed to be dependent on consciousness. While earlier studies within the last decade reported many types of integration under subliminal conditions (i.e. without perceptual awareness), these findings are widely challenged recently. This review evaluates the current evidence for 10 types of subliminal integration that are widely studied: arithmetic processing, object-context integration, multi-word processing, same-different processing, multisensory integration and 5 different types of associative learning. Potential methodological issues concerning awareness measures are also taken into account. It is concluded that while there is currently no reliable evidence for subliminal integration, this does not necessarily refute ‘unconscious’ integration defined through non-subliminal (e.g. implicit) approaches.     

Nonconscious perception, conscious awareness and attention

Because it is unclear how a nonconscious stimulus is cognitively processed, there is uncertainty concerning variables that modulate the processing. In this context recent findings of a set of neuroimaging experiments are important. These findings suggest that conscious and nonconscious stimuli activate same areas of the brain during performance of a similar task. Further, different areas are activated when a task is performed with or without awareness of processing. It appears that the neural network involved in cognitive processing depends on the awareness of processing rather than awareness of perception. Since conscious and nonconscious cognitive processing use separate neural networks, each processing is modulated by different variables. Attention modulates most conscious cognitive processing and most, but not all, nonconscious processing is attention dependent. Nonconscious tasks that require attentional resources, with or without conscious awareness, are processed using the attention dependent system. Further, because attention dependent and attention independent tasks are processed by separate neural networks, the cognitive processing and modulating variables can be understood better if cognitive tasks are defined as attention dependent or attention independent, rather than conscious or nonconscious.     

无觉知条件下的客体注意效应

采用双矩形范式变式考察在对客体无觉知的条件下的客体注意效应,共包括两个实验：实验一考察对完整矩形客体无觉知的条件下能否出现客体注意效应,发现在完整矩形客体不可见的情况下依然出现了客体注意效应。实验二考察对虚拟矩形客体无觉知的情况下是否能够出现客体注意效应,发现在虚拟矩形客体不可见的情况下也能够出现客体注意效应。研究结果表明客体注意效应在无觉知条件下依然存在,为注意与觉知在功能上相互分离的观点提供了新的证据。     

Training phonological awareness with and without explicit attention to articulation

One hundred twenty-two second- to fifth-grade (7- to 11-year-old) children with reading difficulties studied phonological awareness with or without explicit attention to articulation and with or without manipulation of sounds. They all studied identical phonics and read stories on the computer with speech and decoding support for difficult words. Regular-instruction controls received regularly scheduled language-arts or reading activities. After 40 h of training, children in all three trained conditions outperformed controls on all tests except math. Conditions that manipulated sounds showed advantages over the condition without explicit practice manipulating sounds, but only on the two measures of phonological awareness. Articulatory awareness training yielded no unique benefits during this training period. Individual differences in response to treatment related to initial levels of phonological awareness, naming speed, IQ, and grade. The similar outcomes of the three conditions suggest that specific variations in good phonological training may be less important than once thought for most children with reading difficulties.     

Extending a focused attention paradigm to critically test for unconscious congruency effects

ABSTRACT

In a novel integration of research designs, we tested for unconscious perception effects at an unattended stimulus location using a focused attention paradigm (Lachter, J., Forster, K. I., & Ruthruff, E. 2004. Forty-five years after Broadbent (1958): Still no identification without attention. Psychological Review, 111(4), 880–913. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.111.4.880). Target-masked word or nonword prime stimuli were briefly displayed for 14, 28, or 56?ms at an experimentally-defined attended or unattended location, followed by a lexical decision task. At the briefest prime durations (14 and 28?ms), we failed to find any evidence for unattended priming effects, consistent with Lachter et al., but there were some small priming (i.e., congruency) effects at the attended location. The 14?ms primes could not be discriminated above chance, but could be detected. Our results support the claim that perceptual processing is strongest with focal attention. For the 14?ms primes at the attended location, results could support an unconscious perception claim, but the effect was weak and awareness of the primes was unlikely to have been completely eliminated.     

Orthographic influences on phoneme deletion response times

The aim of this paper is to provide further evidence that orthography plays a central role in phonemic awareness, by demonstrating an orthographic congruency effect in phoneme deletion. In four initial phoneme deletion experiments, adult participants produced the correct response more slowly with orthographically mismatched stimulus-response pairs (e.g., worth-earth) than with matched pairs (e.g., wage-age). This orthographic effect occurred with or without specific instructions to ignore spelling and when stimuli were presented with or without the to-be-deleted sound. In a final experiment, participants made more errors on complex than simple onset items, but there was no interaction with orthographic mismatch. The repeated observation of this robust orthographic effect suggests that participants are at least aware of orthography during phonemic awareness tasks, and it supports the view that phonemic awareness is directly subserved by orthography.     

I like it, but I'm not sure why: can evaluative conditioning occur without conscious awareness?

There is good evidence that, in general, autonomic conditioning in humans occurs only when subjects can verbalize the contingencies of conditioning. However, one form of conditioning, evaluative conditioning (EC), seems exceptional in that a growing body of evidence suggests that it can occur without conscious contingency awareness. As such, EC offers a unique insight into what role contingency awareness might play in associative learning. Despite this evidence, there are reasons to doubt that evaluative conditioning can occur without conscious awareness. This paper aims to critically review the EC literature and to draw some parallels to what is known about autonomic conditioning. In doing so, some important general issues about measuring contingency awareness are raised. These issues are illustrated with a brief report of an experiment in which a sensitive measure of contingency awareness is compared against a commonly used measure.     

Longitudinal relationships between speech perception,phonological skills and reading in children at high‐risk of dyslexia

Speech perception deficits are commonly reported in dyslexia but longitudinal evidence that poor speech perception compromises learning to read is scant. We assessed the hypothesis that phonological skills, specifically phoneme awareness and RAN, mediate the relationship between speech perception and reading. We assessed longitudinal predictive relationships between categorical speech perception, phoneme awareness, RAN, language, attention and reading at ages 5½ and 6½ years in 237 children many of whom were at high risk of reading difficulties. Speech perception at 5½ years correlated with language, attention, phoneme awareness and RAN concurrently and was a predictor of reading at 6½ years. There was no significant indirect effect of speech perception on reading via phoneme awareness, suggesting that its effects are separable from those of phoneme awareness. Children classified with dyslexia at 8 years had poorer speech perception than age‐controls at 5½ years and children with language disorders (with or without dyslexia) had more severe difficulties with both speech perception and attention control. Categorical speech perception tasks tap factors extraneous to perception, including decision‐making skills. Further longitudinal studies are needed to unravel the complex relationships between categorical speech perception tasks and measures of reading and language and attention.     

Episodic knowledge and implicit learning

Despite nearly 20 years of controversy, researchers are still divided over the contributions of abstract and episodic knowledge to performance on implicit learning tasks, and whether these types of knowledge exert their effects unintentionally or unconsciously. The present paper reviews the evidence taken to support the episodic account of implicit learning. Although substantial evidence suggests that episodic knowledge influences performance on implicit learning tasks, at present there are no techniques for testing whether these influences occur outside of awareness. It is argued that future research should investigate whether the retrieval of episodic knowledge in implicit learning tasks is insensitive to intentional control, rather than focus on the issue of awareness. Preliminary evidence suggesting that episodic knowledge can exert a nonintentional influence on task performance is reviewed, followed by a discussion of the status of consciousness as an explanatory construct in psychology.     

Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness

Higher-order theories of consciousness argue that conscious awareness crucially depends on higher-order mental representations that represent oneself as being in particular mental states. These theories have featured prominently in recent debates on conscious awareness. We provide new leverage on these debates by reviewing the empirical evidence in support of the higher-order view. We focus on evidence that distinguishes the higher-order view from its alternatives, such as the first-order, global workspace and recurrent visual processing theories. We defend the higher-order view against several major criticisms, such as prefrontal activity reflects attention but not awareness, and prefrontal lesion does not abolish awareness. Although the higher-order approach originated in philosophical discussions, we show that it is testable and has received substantial empirical support.     

Is there a causal link from phonological awareness to success in learning to read?

In this review, we re-assess the evidence that phonological awareness represents a skill specific to spoken language that precedes and directly influences the process of reading acquisition. Longitudinal and experimental training studies are examined in detail, as these are considered most appropriate for exploring a causal hypothesis of this nature. A particular focus of our analysis is the degree to which studies to date have controlled for existing literacy skills in their participants and the influence that these skills might have on performance on phonological awareness tasks. We conclude that no study has provided unequivocal evidence that there is a causal link from competence in phonological awareness to success in reading and spelling acquisition. However, we believe that such a study is possible and outline some ideas for its design and implementation.     

Orthographic influences on phoneme deletion response times

The aim of this paper is to provide further evidence that orthography plays a central role in phonemic awareness, by demonstrating an orthographic congruency effect in phoneme deletion. In four initial phoneme deletion experiments, adult participants produced the correct response more slowly with orthographically mismatched stimulus–response pairs (e.g., worth–earth) than with matched pairs (e.g., wage–age). This orthographic effect occurred with or without specific instructions to ignore spelling and when stimuli were presented with or without the to-be-deleted sound. In a final experiment, participants made more errors on complex than simple onset items, but there was no interaction with orthographic mismatch. The repeated observation of this robust orthographic effect suggests that participants are at least aware of orthography during phonemic awareness tasks, and it supports the view that phonemic awareness is directly subserved by orthography.     

Invisible support and adjustment to stress

Although there is abundant evidence that perceived availability of support buffers the effects of stressors on mental health, the relatively meager research on support transactions has failed to show an association between actual receipt of support and adjustment to stressors. The authors examined a possible explanation for this inconsistency, that awareness of receiving support entails an emotional cost and that the most effective support is unnoticed by the recipient. Using data from a daily diary study of support provision and receipt in couples, the authors show that many transactions reported by supporters are not reported by recipients. They also show that these invisible support transactions promote adjustment to a major stressor.     

Perception without attention: results of a new method.

Having found by the use of a new method for examining perception without attention that grouping and texture segregation do not seem to occur (see Mack, Tang, Tuma, Kahn, & Rock (1992) Cognitive Psychology, 24, we go on to ask what is perceived without attention using this new method. Our subjects receive only one inattention trial in a sequence of trials involving a visual distraction task. In addition to the distraction task in the inattention trial, subjects received a stimulus of which they had no prior knowledge or expectation and were questioned or tested directly afterward for their perception of that stimulus. Two subsequent trials containing test stimuli serve as within-subject controls. The results of a series of experiments indicate that the presence of one or more stimulus objects and their locations are preattentively perceived, as is their color, but shape is not. Because individual items are detected without attention, we conclude that perceptual organization is initially based on a principle in which connected regions of uniform stimulation are inferred to be discrete units (the principle of uniform connectedness). One striking, unexpected finding is that without attention many subjects have no awareness at all of the stimulus object, an effect we call inattentional blindness.