Embodied attention and word learning by toddlers

Many theories of early word learning begin with the uncertainty inherent to learning a word from its co-occurrence with a visual scene. However, the relevant visual scene for infant word learning is neither from the adult theorist's view nor the mature partner's view, but is rather from the learner's personal view. Here we show that when 18-month old infants interacted with objects in play with their parents, they created moments in which a single object was visually dominant. If parents named the object during these moments of bottom-up selectivity, later forced-choice tests showed that infants learned the name, but did not when naming occurred during a less visually selective moment. The momentary visual input for parents and toddlers was captured via head cameras placed low on each participant's forehead as parents played with and named objects for their infant. Frame-by-frame analyses of the head camera images at and around naming moments were conducted to determine the visual properties at input that were associated with learning. The analyses indicated that learning occurred when bottom-up visual information was clean and uncluttered. The sensory-motor behaviors of infants and parents were also analyzed to determine how their actions on the objects may have created these optimal visual moments for learning. The results are discussed with respect to early word learning, embodied attention, and the social role of parents in early word learning.     

Spectral complexity and infant attention

In two experiments, infants selectively attended to auditory stimuli that presented an increasingly complex spectral structure. Using 2- and 4-month-olds as subjects, the first study demonstrated this selectivity in comparison to the rate of acoustic change. The second study demonstrated the increased attention of 4-month-olds in response to an increasingly complex structure. Results are discussed with respect to the neural activity produced by these stimuli along the auditory pathway, and an analogy to the literature on visual attention is drawn.     

The distribution of infant attention during object examination

The distribution of attention during toy play was studied in 6‐, 9‐ and 12‐month‐old infants. Heart rate and behavior measures of attention were collected as the infants interacted with objects. There was a large deceleration of heart rate at the beginning of behaviorally defined focused attention, but little heart rate change for looks that only had behaviorally defined casual attention. Heart‐rate‐defined sustained attention occurred more frequently at the transition from the first instance of casual attention within a look to focused attention and during the cycling between subsequent epochs of casual and focused attention. These results show that heart rate and behavioral measures of attention are closely related in young infants at the beginning and end of object interaction but are inconsistently related within a single look at an object.     

That baby caught my eye... attention capture by infant faces

An alternative to the view that during evolution the human brain became specialized to preferentially attend to threat-related stimuli is to assume that all classes of stimuli that have high biological significance are prioritized by the attention system. Newborns are highly biologically relevant stimuli for members of a species, as their survival is important for reproductive success. The authors examined whether the Kindchenschema (baby schema) as described by Lorenz (1943) captures attention in the dot probe task. The results confirm attentional capture by photos of human infants presented to the left visual field, suggesting right hemisphere advantage. The magnitude of the attentional modulation was highly correlated with subjective arousal ratings of the photos. The findings show that biologically significant positive stimuli are prioritized by the attention system.     

Embodied cognition

Embodied cognition is sweeping the planet. On a non-embodied approach, the sensory system informs the cognitive system and the motor system does the cognitive system’s bidding. There are causal relations between the systems but the sensory and motor systems are not constitutive of cognition. For embodied views, the relation to the sensori-motor system to cognition is constitutive, not just causal. This paper examines some recent empirical evidence used to support the view that cognition is embodied and raises questions about some of the claims being made by supporters.     

Embodied Critical Realism

Christian Smith's What Is a Person? provides an account of the person from the perceptive of critical realism. As a fellow critical realist, I support that philosophical position and in this response I seek to support it by connecting it to the embodied realism developed by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. In order to bring the two forms of realism together, I critique both the relativism of embodied realism and the idea, found in Smith, that the person's awareness of the world is mediated by her experience. The goal of this paper, then, is an embodied critical realism, a more coherent realist position that combines the best parts of each.     

Embodied movement consciousness

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - In two recent papers, I introduced the idea of embodied Rilkean movement knowledge and perception into the current philosophical debate on sports...     

The Embodied Couple

SUMMARY

Herein is described the use of a specific physical posture for couples to assume for the purpose of assessing the dynamics of their relationship. Its careful and artful use creates a microcosm of the couple's interactive style, revealing significant behaviors and feelings in the therapist's presence.     

Dynamic Embodied Cognition

In this article, we investigate the merits of an enactive view of cognition for the contemporary debate about social cognition. If enactivism is to be a genuine alternative to classic cognitivism, it should be able to bridge the ??cognitive gap??, i.e. provide us with a convincing account of those higher forms of cognition that have traditionally been the focus of its cognitivist opponents. We show that, when it comes to social cognition, current articulations of enactivism are??despite their celebrated successes in explaining some cases of social interaction??not yet up to the task. This is because they (1) do not pay sufficient attention to the role of offline processing or ??decoupling??, and (2) obscure the cognitive gap by overemphasizing the role of phenomenology. We argue that the main challenge for the enactive view will be to acknowledge the importance of both coupled (online) and decoupled (offline) processes for basic and advanced forms of (social) cognition. To meet this challenge, we articulate a dynamic embodied view of cognition. We illustrate the fruitfulness of this approach by recourse to recent findings on false belief understanding.     

Embodied task dynamics

Movement science faces the challenge of reconciling parallel sequences of discrete behavioral goals with observed fluid, context-sensitive motion. This challenge arises with a vengeance in the speech domain, in which gestural primitives play the role of discrete goals. The task dynamic framework has proved effective in modeling the manner in which the gestural primitives of articulatory phonology can result in smooth, biologically plausible, movement of model articulators. We present a variant of the task dynamic model with 1 significant innovation: Tasks are not abstract and context free but are embodied and tied to specific effectors. An advantage of this approach is that it allows the definition of a parametric cost function that can be optimized. Optimization generates gestural scores in which the relative timing of gestures is fully specified. We demonstrate that movements generated in an optimal manner are phonetically plausible. Highly nuanced movement trajectories are emergent based on relatively simple optimality criteria. This addresses a long-standing need within this theoretical framework and provides a rich modeling foundation for subsequent work.     

Radical Embodied Cognitive Neuroscience

Abstract

A radical embodied cognitive neuroscience (RECN) based on ecological psychology requires the understanding of the brain, its structure, and its functions to be compatible with the main tenets of the Gibsonian theory. In this paper, we propose neural reuse as a promising candidate to achieve such understanding. We base our proposal on two fundamental ideas. In section two, we review what we take to be the two central requirements for a RECN based on ecological psychology: compatibility with the explanation of perception and action at the ecological scale and the rejection of computation as a paradigm for the explanation of the activity of the brain. In section three, we show how neural reuse meets the two requirements and, furthermore, we evaluate its theoretical parallelism with ecological psychology. Finally, after developing these ideas, in the conclusion we put forward further aspects and research possibilities that follow from the coalition of neural reuse and ecological psychology for a Gibsonian neuroscience.     

梅洛-庞蒂:具身意识的身体

梅洛-庞蒂认为我们是以身体在世.身体是现象的身体而非传统意义上的客观的身体.知觉与行为都内嵌于身体内在的形式中.形式不仅仅是现象身体最初的意向结构,是它内在的秩序原理,而且是物理世界中的跳跃与非连续性系统的存在方式.因此,在形式哲学中,物理秩序、生命秩序与人类秩序实现了统一.     

Embodied Domestics,Embodied Politics: Women,Home, and Agoraphobia

Agoraphobia is commonly considered to be a fear of outside, open, or crowded spaces, and is treated with therapies that work on acclimating the agoraphobic to external places she would otherwise avoid. I argue, however, that existential phenomenology provides the resources for an alternative interpretation and treatment of agoraphobia that locates the problem of the disorder not in something lying beyond home, but rather in a flawed relationship with home itself. More specifically, I demonstrate that agoraphobia is the lived body expression of a person who has developed an inward-turning tendency with respect to being-at-home, and who finds herself, as a result, vulnerable and even incapacitated when attempting to emerge into the public arena as a fully participatory agent. I consider this thesis in light of the fact that since World War I agoraphobia has been diagnosed significantly more in women than in men; indeed, one study found women to be 89% more likely than men to suffer from agoraphobia. I conclude that agoraphobia is a disorder that stands as an emblematic expression of the ongoing pathology of being a woman in contemporary society–a disorder that reflects that even today women belong to a political world in which they are not able to feel properly at-home.