Why do children lack the flexibility to innovate tools?

Despite being proficient tool users, young children have surprising difficulty in innovating tools (making novel tools to solve problems). Two experiments found that 4- to 7-year-olds had difficulty on two tool innovation problems and explored reasons for this inflexibility. Experiment 1 (N = 51) showed that children’s performance was unaffected by the need to switch away from previously correct strategies. Experiment 2 (N = 92) suggested that children’s difficulty could not easily be explained by task pragmatics or permission issues. Both experiments found evidence that some children perseverated on a single incorrect strategy, but such perseveration was insufficient to explain children’s tendency not to innovate tools. We suggest that children’s difficulty lies not with switching, task pragmatics, or behavioral perseveration but rather with solving the fundamentally “ill-structured” nature of tool innovation problems.     

What do children learn about biology from factual information? A comparison of interventions to improve understanding of contagious illnesses

Background . Children have been shown to hold misconceptions about illness, and previous work has indicated that their knowledge can be improved through the use of interventions. Aims . This study aims to evaluate interventions based on the provision of factual information for improving understanding of contagious illness. Sample . The participants were 96 children from two age groups: 7 and 11 years. Methods . During the pre‐test, the children were asked about three contagious illnesses and one novel illness. There were three intervention conditions, differing in the level of factual information provided: explanations provided, no explanations provided and scientific factual style. The interventions were focused on contagious illnesses (cold, chickenpox). A post‐test was conducted 6 weeks later. Results . Results from the pre‐test show that the older children have more sophisticated understanding of illness than the younger children. Mean pre‐ to post‐test change was calculated and analyses revealed that there is greater pre‐ to post‐test change in the explanation and scientific fact conditions when compared with that in the no‐explanation condition. The improvements in knowledge generalized to other contagious illnesses, and the older children showed more improvements than the younger children. Conclusions . These findings add to the literature on children's understanding of contagious illnesses and contribute towards discussions on the best approach to health education.     

Why do lie-catchers fail? A lens model meta-analysis of human lie judgments

Decades of research has shown that people are poor at detecting lies. Two explanations for this finding have been proposed. First, it has been suggested that lie detection is inaccurate because people rely on invalid cues when judging deception. Second, it has been suggested that lack of valid cues to deception limits accuracy. A series of 4 meta-analyses tested these hypotheses with the framework of Brunswik's (1952) lens model. Meta-Analysis 1 investigated perceived cues to deception by correlating 66 behavioral cues in 153 samples with deception judgments. People strongly associate deception with impressions of incompetence (r = .59) and ambivalence (r = .49). Contrary to self-reports, eye contact is only weakly correlated with deception judgments (r = -.15). Cues to perceived deception were then compared with cues to actual deception. The results show a substantial covariation between the 2 sets of cues (r = .59 in Meta-Analysis 2, r = .72 in Meta-Analysis 3). Finally, in Meta-Analysis 4, a lens model analysis revealed a very strong matching between behaviorally based predictions of deception and behaviorally based predictions of perceived deception. In conclusion, contrary to previous assumptions, people rarely rely on the wrong cues. Instead, limitations in lie detection accuracy are mainly attributable to weaknesses in behavioral cues to deception. The results suggest that intuitive notions about deception are more accurate than explicit knowledge and that lie detection is more readily improved by increasing behavioral differences between liars and truth tellers than by informing lie-catchers of valid cues to deception.     

Why do the effects of delaying reinforcement in animals and delaying feedback in humans differ? A working-memory analysis

Animal research has shown that reinforcement is substantially less effective when it is delayed, but in studies of human motor learning delays in providing feedback typically have much less effect. One possible explanation is that in human research participants know the response to be learned and can thus focus on it during the delay; that is not the case in experiments on animals. We tested this hypothesis using a task in which participants had minimal information on what movement was correct and found that, as in animal experiments, participants learned only when feedback was immediate. A second experiment confirmed that the effects of the delay depended on how many responses had to be held in working memory: the greater the memory load, the poorer the learning. The results point to the importance of activity during a delay on learning; implications for the teaching of motor skills are discussed.     

Why do the effects of delaying reinforcement in animals and delaying feedback in humans differ? A working-memory analysis

Animal research has shown that reinforcement is substantially less effective when it is delayed, but in studies of human motor learning delays in providing feedback typically have much less effect. One possible explanation is that in human research participants know the response to be learned and can thus focus on it during the delay; that is not the case in experiments on animals. We tested this hypothesis using a task in which participants had minimal information on what movement was correct and found that, as in animal experiments, participants learned only when feedback was immediate. A second experiment confirmed that the effects of the delay depended on how many responses had to be held in working memory: the greater the memory load, the poorer the learning. The results point to the importance of activity during a delay on learning; implications for the teaching of motor skills are discussed.     

Why do you fear the bogeyman? An embodied predictive coding model of perceptual inference

Why are we scared by nonperceptual entities such as the bogeyman, and why does the bogeyman only visit us during the night? Why does hearing a window squeaking in the night suggest to us the unlikely idea of a thief or a killer? And why is this more likely to happen after watching a horror movie? To answer these and similar questions, we need to put mind and body together again and consider the embodied nature of perceptual and cognitive inference. Predictive coding provides a general framework for perceptual inference; I propose to extend it by including interoceptive and bodily information. The resulting embodied predictive coding inference permits one to compare alternative hypotheses (e.g., is the sound I hear generated by a thief or the wind?) using the same inferential scheme as in predictive coding, but using both sensory and interoceptive information as evidence, rather than just considering sensory events. If you hear a window squeaking in the night after watching a horror movie, you may consider plausible a very unlikely hypothesis (e.g., a thief, or even the bogeyman) because it explains both what you sense (e.g., the window squeaking in the night) and how you feel (e.g., your high heart rate). The good news is that the inference that I propose is fully rational and gives minds and bodies equal dignity. The bad news is that it also gives an embodiment to the bogeyman, and a reason to fear it.     

Understanding the mind as an active information processor: do young children have a "copy theory of mind"?

Most 4-, but no 3-year-olds, were able to understand the mind's active role in evaluating the truth of verbal information. They appreciated that a statement, whether true or false, will be disbelieved if the listener has existing beliefs to the contrary and that it will be believed if no such beliefs exist. Four- and 5-year-olds were equally competent in understanding the need for interpretation of pictorial material. They realized that an uninitiated person cannot make sense of a "droodle", which in itself is an uninterpretable section of a larger meaningful drawing. We discuss the impact of our findings on the question of whether children at this age entertain a copy theory of mind.     

Why do adolescents use drugs? A common sense explanatory model from the social actor's perspective

Analysis was made of the common sense explanations of 60 Mexican teenage illicit drug users in rehabilitation to determine their drug use debut. The explanatory model was separated into three blocks, two of which contained common sense aspects: interaction between subject's plane and the collectivity; and relationship between subject's interior (subject-family) and exterior (environment or group-pressure). Based on these data, we propose that drug use debut may be linked to subjects' emotional vulnerability which originates in the family image and renders them more susceptible to the influence of others. This kind of reasoning points to a more passive than active, and more social than personal dynamic in drug use debut, important factors for developing preventative measures.     

What children say when asked “What?”: A study of the use of syntactic knowledge

The present study explores two questions: What is the nature of older children's syntactic knowledge; how is that knowledge used in an everyday speech situation? Six-, eight-, and ten-year-olds repeated grammatical sentences as read by the first experimenter. Half the sentences were syntactically clear, half slightly distorted. Clear versions displayed basic grammatical relations and constituent structure perspicuously. The second experimenter, who sat at the other end of the room, asked “What?” after each sentence. The syntactic changes children might make to accommodate the listener were examined. Although the children made a variety of changes, at all ages they tended to change distorted versions to clear ones, and to repeat clear versions. The results suggest that children's syntactic knowledge is deeper and more accessible than had been supposed.     

Why do some men misperceive women's sexual intentions more frequently than others do? An application of the confluence model

Although many researchers have documented men's tendency to misperceive women's friendliness as a sign of sexual interest, few have examined individual differences in men's attitudes and past experiences that might predict their likelihood of making these types of misjudgments. We applied an expanded version of Malamuth, Sockloskie, Koss, and Tanaka's (1991) Confluence model to predict frequency of misperception of women's sexual intent with a sample of 356 male college students. Using structural equation modeling, hostile masculinity, impersonal sex, and drinking in dating and sexual situations predicted men's frequency of misperception. Furthermore, the more risk factors men possessed, the more times they misperceived women's sexual intentions. Suggestions are made for theory development and future research incorporating situational as well as personality measures in longitudinal studies.     

What do zebra finches learn besides singing? Systematic mapping of the literature and presentation of an efficient associative learning test

Animal Cognition - The process of learning in birds has been extensively studied, with a focus on species such as pigeons, parrots, chickens, and crows. In recent years, the zebra finch has emerged...     

How long do the advantages of learning to read a transparent orthography last? An investigation of the reading skills and reading impairment of Welsh children at 10 years of age

Spencer and Hanley (2003) showed that Welsh-speaking children aged between 5 and 7 years who were learning to read Welsh (a transparent orthography) performed significantly better at reading both real words and nonwords than did English-speaking children living in Wales who were learning to read English (a deep orthography). In this study, the reading skills of these children were reexamined three years later, during their sixth year of formal reading instruction. The children learning to read English continued to perform poorly at reading low- and medium-frequency irregular words but no differences were observed in reading regular words or nonwords. These findings emphasize how long it takes to acquire a large sight vocabulary in English, but indicated that the reading skills of the majority of the English-speaking children had caught up with those of their Welsh-speaking counterparts. However, the poorest 25% of the English readers continued to perform much worse than the lowest performing 25% of Welsh readers on both words and nonwords. An underachieving tail of this kind was not observed in the reading performance of the Welsh-speaking group. Overall, these findings suggest that in the long term the detrimental effects of an opaque orthography are most damaging to the poorest readers.     

Why are you telling me that? A conceptual model of the social function of autobiographical memory

In an effort to stimulate and guide empirical work within a functional framework, this paper provides a conceptual model of the social functions of autobiographical memory (AM) across the lifespan. The model delineates the processes and variables involved when AMs are shared to serve social functions. Components of the model include: lifespan contextual influences, the qualitative characteristics of memory (emotionality and level of detail recalled), the speaker's characteristics (age, gender, and personality), the familiarity and similarity of the listener to the speaker, the level of responsiveness during the memory-sharing process, and the nature of the social relationship in which the memory sharing occurs (valence and length of the relationship). These components are shown to influence the type of social function served and/or, the extent to which social functions are served. Directions for future empirical work to substantiate the model and hypotheses derived from the model are provided.     

Are we "experienced listeners"? A review of the musical capacities that do not depend on formal musical training

The present paper reviews a set of studies designed to investigate different aspects of the capacity for processing Western music. This includes perceiving the relationships between a theme and its variations, perceiving musical tensions and relaxations, generating musical expectancies, integrating local structures in large-scale structures, learning new compositional systems and responding to music in an emotional (affective) way. The main focus of these studies was to evaluate the influence of intensive musical training on these capacities. The overall set of data highlights that some musical capacities are acquired through exposure to music without the help of explicit training. These capacities reach such a degree of sophistication that they enable untrained listeners to respond to music as "musically experienced listeners" do.     

A modular neural-network model of the basal ganglia’s role in learning and selecting motor behaviours

This work presents a modular neural-network model (based on reinforcement-learning actor–critic methods) that tries to capture some of the most relevant known aspects of the role that basal ganglia play in learning and selecting motor behavior related to different goals. The model uses a mixture of experts network for the critic and a hierarchical network with two levels for the actor. Some simulations with the model show that basal ganglia select ‘chunks’ of behavior whose ‘details’ are specified by direct sensory-motor pathways, and how emergent modularity can help to deal with tasks with asynchronous multiple goals. A ‘top-down’ approach is adopted that first analyses some adaptive non-trivial interaction of a whole (simulated) organism with the environment, and its capacity to learn, and then attempts to implement these functions with neural architectures and mechanisms that have an empirical neuroanatomical and neurophysiological foundation.     

Why do people tend to overpredict pain? On the asymmetries between underpredictions and overpredictions of pain

After an underpredicted painful experience people tend to expect increased pain levels for a considerable time, despite disconfirmatory experiences. Underpredictions also tend to raise long-lasting fear and increased physiological responding. Overpredicted pain does not have such dramatic effects. What are the reasons for this asymmetry? Evidence for and against the hypothesis that underpredicted pain hurts more than correctly predicted pain, and that overpredictions result from a tendency to avoid the extra aversiveness of underpredictions, is reviewed. Based on recent experiments this explanation is rejected, and alternative explanations are discussed. It is reasoned that the most plausible explanation is that the organism automatically infers danger from an underprediction, because of the loss of predictability into the dangerous direction (i.e. more pain). Elevated expectancy and fear levels are the result of this. A modified stimulus-comparator model that accounts for the differential effects of both types of incorrect predictions is suggested. In contrast to previous models, such a model hypothesizes: (i) differential processing of under- and overpredictions; and (ii) different processes involved in the influence of expectations on subjective and non-subjective pain responses.     

Why do we take drugs? From the drug-reinforcement theory to a novel concept of drug instrumentalization

The drug-reinforcement theory explains why humans get engaged in drug taking behavior. This theory posits that drugs of abuse serve as biological rewards by activating the reinforcement system. Although from a psychological and neurobiological perspective this theory is extremely helpful, it does not tell us about the drug-taking motives and motivation of an individual. The definition of drug instrumentalization goals will improve our understanding of individual drug-taking profiles.     

Why do aggressive movies make people aggressive? an attempt to explain short-term effects of the depiction of violence on the observer

An explanation-approach within the frame of a universal and integrating theory of aggression is favored for understanding the effects of exposure to violence. Kornadt's Motivation Theory of Aggression is used to generate several hypotheses concerning the effects of aggressive movies on a viewer's expectancy-value-cognitions and these are tested in an experiment. The experiment suggests that aggressive stimulation is able to change aggression-related expectancy-value-cognitions in an aggression-facilitating direction. Based on these results, an attempt is made to explain increases in the aggression of viewers in terms of the Motivation Theory of Aggression. © 1993 Wiley-Liss, Inc.