论休谟问题及詹姆士的解决

休谟问题是因果关系的必然联系问题,亦是因果关系有没有理性基础的问题。即“我们为什么断言,那样特定的原因必然有那样特定的结果,我们为什么形成由这一推断到那一个的推断呢?”实际上也是提出了科学理论中归纳方法的有效性问题,波普尔最先把归纳问题称作“休谟问题”,即：归纳推理是否得到证明,或在什么条件下得到证明的问题。     

吉拉·谢尔的多重符合真理论CSSCI

领域问题是对传统真理一元论的诘难,为解决领域问题,产生了紧缩论和多元论两种途径。谢尔的真理论就是一种多元真理论,她反对紧缩主义,认为“真”是一种实质属性,其核心属性为“符合”,但符合的方式是多样的,具体的符合方式是由不同领域的情况以及人们的认知能力决定的。谢尔以数学为例展示了一种多重符合的方式。她的理论为实质真理论提供了凭证,又改良了赖特和林奇理论的不足,合理地解释了“真”的统一性和多元性的关系。但也面临着理论依据不足、理论不完善以及很多传统符合论的遗留问题有待解决。     

真理、符合与收缩论

The central claim of this essay is that many deflationary theories of truth are variants of the correspondence theory of truth. Essential to the correspondence theory of truth is the proposal that objective features of the world are the truthmakers of statements. Many advocates of deflationary theories (including F. P. Ramsay, P. F. Strawson and Paul Horwich) remain committed to this proposal. Although T-sentences (statements of the form “s is true iff p”) are presented by advocates of deflationary theories of truth as truisms or analytic truths, T-sentences are often understood as entailing commitment to the central proposal of the correspondence theory.     

别一种真理观：对客观性的颠覆——20世纪背景下的俄罗斯宗教哲学中真理的本质

"真理"这个神圣的称谓一直是传统哲学中的核心概念,也是人类为之奋斗的目标与生命存在之意义所在。然而,近一个多世纪以来,思想家们却从真理存在的前提、内容与运思方式上等,颠覆了传统意义上的客观真理观念,而强调真理的"主观性"、强调作为一种认识方法的真理观。随着真理自身神圣性的丧失,附着其上的意义与价值也失去了。20世纪初,俄罗斯宗教哲学家们提出了一种既有别于传统哲学、又不同于现代哲学的真理观念,即从信仰与主观体验的角度诠释了真理的含义,力图恢复真理自身与人之存在的神圣性,以此抗击虚无主义对现代人精神领域的冲击与损害。     

休谟伦理思想中的普遍观点

普遍观点是休谟伦理思想中的一个重要观点.在面对相互矛盾的道德判断时,需要普遍观点进行有效的调解.经由普遍观点而作出道德判断的赞同与不赞同仍然是一种道德情感.道德概念的正确使用和人们的情感交流需要人们采用普遍观点,而想像和信念的运作与作用则保障了普遍观点的采用.     

塔斯基：语义性真理论与符合论

塔斯基语义性真理论是否为符合论是一个争论的热点。目前有两种观点认为它是符合论,其一是根据对象语言与元语言的区分,到目前为止此观点已受到激烈批评,其二是根据“满足”概念的递归定义,此观点到目前为止还没有被人详细地阐明。本文认为塔斯基的语义性真理论是符合论,为此将首先对第一种观点及其反对意见进行深入分析,并得出结论认为该观点不能成立,继而详细阐明第二种观点,表明它是塔斯基本人的意图。在讨论中本文将对一系列的逻辑哲学问题进行探讨。     

真理：重温一场传统的论战

按照对"真"的结构分析,真理论可分为:内在论、符合论、融贯论和紧缩论。这四种方案各有其适用范围,但经过深入研究发现,除符合论以外的三种方案都存在棘手的难题。融贯论不能证成逻辑上的不矛盾律,不能合理地解决如何选择"支配性"信念系统的问题,并且它和内在论都不能解决偶然真问题。紧缩论的问题则是:若将"真"理解为提供一种认知担保,与其所主张的等值图式相结合,就可推出:信念p没有认知担保当且仅当非p有认知担保,这与实际情形不相符——关于p和非p,我们有可能都没有认知担保。为摆脱传统符合论的困境,可以通过列举"老生常谈"的方式,发展一种多元真理论:"真"在不同领域取决于不同的事物——在一个区域内取决于符合,在另一个领域内取决于融贯。"超可断定性"这一概念可以解释这种多元真理论的可行性。     

视角主义:从詹姆士到米德

作为西方思想的一个独特样本,美国经典实用主义找到了一个重新解读视角主义(perspectivalism)这一思维方式的独特可能性。威廉·詹姆士(William James)与乔治·赫伯特·米德(George Herbert Mead)是美国经典实用主义的两个代表人物。本文通过探讨这两位哲学家对视角主义的思考,展现出视角主义在实用主义语境中的连续性和张力,并希望这种探讨能够带来更多理论之外的洞见。     

论休谟的因果关系思想

休谟把洛克和贝克莱的经验论发展到了逻辑终局,核心内容就是他的因果关系理论。他认为一切知识都是建立在经验基础之上的,经验的推断就是因果关系,这种关系是根源于人的习惯的,习惯是一种心理信念。     

休谟论道德的基础

休谟的道德哲学主要致力于对道德基础的研究。他通过对理性和情感在道德行为中的作用的分析,得出道德决定于情感的结论,这一结论可以看作理性在道德领域的自我限制,它对元伦理和规范伦理的发展都有深远的意义。     

Comparing Fixed-Point and Revision Theories of Truth

In response to the liar’s paradox, Kripke developed the fixed-point semantics for languages expressing their own truth concepts. (Martin and Woodruff independently developed this semantics, but not to the same extent as Kripke.) Kripke’s work suggests a number of related fixed-point theories of truth for such languages. Gupta and Belnap develop their revision theory of truth in contrast to the fixed-point theories. The current paper considers three natural ways to compare the various resulting theories of truth, and establishes the resulting relationships among these theories. The point is to get a sense of the lay of the land amid a variety of options. Our results will also provide technical fodder for the methodological remarks of the companion paper to this one.     

The False Modesty of the Identity Theory of Truth

The identity theory of truth, according to which true thoughts are identical with facts, is very hard to formulate. It oscillates between substantive versions, which are implausible, and a merely truistic version, which is difficult to distinguish from deflationism about truth. This tension is present in the form of identity theory that one can attribute to McDowell from his views on perception, and in the conception defended by Hornsby under that name     

诚信与当代社会文明

诚信是社会三大明发展的共同要求。诚信化对于物质明的意义,一是对信用制度的支持,二是其渗透于经济活动中的诚信理念。社会主义民主政治的本质要求讲“诚”,以诚立信,以信见诚。政治诚信成为当代政治明一块不可缺少的化基石。诚信明是精神明建设的一部分,诚信自身建设如何,关系到精神明的建设。     

Truth table task: Working memory load,latencies, and perceived relevance

The aim of the present study is to uncover the relation between cognitive ability and the answer patterns yielded by the truth table task. According to the Classical Mental Models Theory, people with high working memory capacity answer according to two-valued or “logical” answer patterns. The Suppositional Theory and the Revised Mental Models Theory predict that the answer patterns given by the most intelligent ones are three-valued or “defective”. Correlations are examined, and in three experiments it is tested with a dual task paradigm whether a differential working memory load alters participants' answer patterns. A positive correlation is observed between cognitive ability and three-valued answer patterns, but no effect of the working memory load manipulation is revealed. With an inspection of the classification times we shed light on the processes underlying truth table judgements. We conclude that the Revised Mental Models Theory provides the best account for our results.     

The role of mechanism and covariation information in causal belief updating

The present study is aimed at identifying how prior causal beliefs and covariation information contribute to belief updating when evidence, either compatible or contradictory with those beliefs, is provided. Participants were presented with a cover story with which it was intended to activate or generate a causal belief. Variables related to the prior belief (the type of information, the strength of the cause-effect causal link, and how confident the participant was that the link existed) were assessed. Subsequently, participants were presented with covariational information and were asked to update their beliefs in light of the new evidence. Information reliability, prior belief's causal influence magnitude, and the cause-effect level of contingency portrayed by the new information--but not the type of the prior belief--are shown to directly determine belief updating.     

If I imagine it,then it happened: The Implicit Truth Value of imaginary representations

Imagination sometimes leads people to behave, feel, and think as though imagined events were real even when they know they were not. In this paper, we suggest that some understanding of these phenomena can be achieved by differentiating between Implicit Truth Value (ITV), a spontaneous truth evaluation, and Explicit Truth Value (ETV), a self-reported truth judgment. In three experiments, we measure ITV using the autobiographical Implicit Association Test (Sartori, Agosta, Zogmaister, Ferrara, & Castiello, 2008), which has been used to assess which of two autobiographical events is true. Our findings demonstrate that imagining an event, like experiencing an event, increases its ITV, even when people explicitly acknowledge the imagined event as false (Experiments 1a and 1b). Furthermore, we show that imagined representations generated from a first-person perspective have higher ITV than imagined representations generated from a third-person perspective (Experiment 2). Our findings suggest that implicit and explicit measures of truth differ in their sensitivity to properties underlying truth judgment. We discuss the contribution of characterizing events according to both ITV and ETV to the understanding of various psychological phenomena, such as lying and self-deception.     

God,Truth and Mathematics in Nineteenth-century England

In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, John Locke created a special epistemological category for mathematical and religious knowing. This category of knowledge was quickly brushed to the side in the French Enlightenment, but the English preserved it well into the nineteenth century. This article considers the ways that the neo-Lockian joining of mathematics and theology fundamentally affected both mathematical and theological thinking in the first half of the English nineteenth century. It argues that these developments set the stage for the post-Darwinian conflicts between science—including mathematics—and religion.     

Arguments in the practical reasoning underlying constructed probability responses

Reasoning is an important cognitive activity in probability assessment, and one that has been understudied. This proposition motivates the paper's three general aims. First, based on research in rhetoric, we present a theoretical means of analyzing the arguments constructed during the reasoning that occurs in probability assessment. Second, from verbal protocol data, we establish that subjects constructed arguments in forming beliefs and assessing the associated probabilities. Third, we analyze the data for the structure of subject's arguments, including argument content and form. Subjects used a limited amount of relevant evidence and used a variety of argument forms that could be characterized by the nature of the knowledge that subjects brought to bear in forming the arguments. Subjects predominantly used causal reasoning, but also employed hierarchical category knowledge, resemblance relationships, and arguments from authority. These findings form a basis for expanding our accounts of probability assessment and for improving assessment practice.     

The Chrysippus intuition and contextual theories of truth

Contextual theories of truth are motivated primarily by the resolution they provide to paradoxical reasoning about truth. The principal argument for contextual theories of truth relies on a key intuition about the truth value of the proposition expressed by a particular utterance made during paradoxical reasoning, which Anil Gupta calls “the Chrysippus intuition.” In this paper, I argue that the principal argument for contextual theories of truth is circular, and that the Chrysippus intuition is false. I conclude that the philosophical motivation for contextual theories of truth fails.