实用主义认识论观点的演变

认识论是实用主义哲学的一个重要方面,内容甚为丰富。本文不准备全面系统地探讨实用主义在认识论方面的各种观点,只着重考察从古典实用主义者到新实用主义者对认识的性质、方法和基础,知识的标准和类型,以及心灵与世界的关系这三个问题的看法,比较这些看法之间的异同,梳理它们的演变线索,分析这些演变由以发生的原因。一、认识的性质、方法和基础关于认识的性质,实用主义者提出几种不同的观点。詹姆斯(又译詹姆士)从他的心理学出发,把认识看作一种意识作用,他说:“认识是一种意识作用;因此,它所包含的第一个因素就是一种能够产生认识的意识…     

自然主义认识论的实用主义承诺

自然主义认识论与实用主义有着天然的联系。作为美国思想大舞台上最著名和最具影响的哲学流派,实用主义奠定了自然主义认识论的理论基调或理论背景。通过分析三种不同的实用主义为自然主义认识论提供的理论承诺,我们可以更好地理解不同类型的自然主义认识论,厘清当前关于自然主义认识论的争论,从而更好地把握自然主义认识论的发展脉络和趋势。一、自然主义认识论的三种纲领对于自然主义认识论,我们很难给出一个简单明了的定义,这主要是因为“自然主义与其说是一个体系或一种学说,不如说是一种态度和方式:它本质上是一种哲学方法和方案”(Ra…     

人类创造中的认知走向——胡适真理观述评

人类创造中的认知走向——胡适真理观述评闻继宁本文旨在运用马克思主义哲学观点,对胡适真理观作全面的考察。胡适关于真理的基本观点来源于美国实用主义哲学,但他在阐释过程中也掺入了一些自己的见解,大致可以概括为：真理是观念同实在的能动的作用的符合,因此人们只...     

实践标准重在科学理解,贵在一贯坚持

1、实践观是马克思主义哲学的首要的、基本的观点。马克思主义哲学所具有的唯物、辩证、发展的种种理论性质,马克思主义哲学所具有的唯物论和辩证法之间、自然观和历史观之间、世界观和方法论之间、真理观和价值观之间、认识世界和改造世界之间的统一的这些理论特点也都导源于实践的观点、导源于对实践的科学理解。传统的斯大林模式把实践仅仅理解为认识论范畴在根本上不符合马克思的《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》的精神实质。马克思的这个提纲并不只是认识论的提纲,而是涉及到马克思主义哲学各个理论论域的提纲。实践观在马克思主义哲学中的这…     

马克思恩格斯思想在认识论上的比较研究

马克思主义哲学把科学的实践现引入认识论,对唯心主义先验论、不可知论、旧唯物主义的直观反映论进行了严肃的反思与批判,建立了真正科学的认识论。但在认识论上,马克思与恩格斯的思想并非完全一致,诺曼莱文尊出,马克思的认识论强调以实践为基础和核心,是反经验主义的认识论;恩格斯的认识论是经验主义的认识论,他忽视了认识的社会性,强调实用主义,强调真理符舍论。     

哈贝马斯论真理与证成

哈贝马斯早期提出了一种"共识论"或"话语理论"的真理观,将西方哲学长期以来以"看"为中心的认识模式转变成了以"说"为中心的模式。然而这一理论完全缺乏实在论的维度,因此面临许多哲学上的困难。这些困难导致哈贝马斯后来提出了一种新的"实用主义"真理观。借助于这种新的真理论,哈贝马斯力图将真理的"看""说""行"三个维度整合在一起。这一整合后的理论尽管仍然存在一些问题,但却极具启发意义。     

现代认识论研讨会概述

现代认识论研讨会于1988年12月20至25日在厦门市举行。会议由中国认识论研究会、武汉大学现代认识论研究中心、福建省社科院、厦门大学哲学系等十多个单位联合发起。与会代表70余人,提供论文40余篇。会议围绕当代认识论发展的趋势、认识论与现代科学的关系、思维的微观机制等问题进行了热烈的讨论。一、当代认识论发展的趋势什么是现代认识论?过去的认识论研究工作有什么缺陷?当代认识论的发展趋势有什么具体的特点?针对这些问题,一些同志发表了意见。有的同志认为,以往认识论研究存在的缺陷,可以概括为六种分离:(1)认识发展规律与社会发展规律分离;(2)主客体相分离(忽视了主体的结构与功能的变化);(3)     

《哲学研究》1989——1990年度选题(第二批)

1.主体—客体问题与本体论的关系。实践活动范围之外的存在的客观性问题。主体性与主观性的关系。2.“哲学无用论”和实用主义“工具论”对哲学功能的错误理解,二者的内在联系。3.机械反映论和任意选择论对思想发展的“源”“流”关系片面理解的认识论根源。4.辩证唯物主义的反映论与皮亚杰的建构说。认识的客观性原则与主体性原     

从思辨认识论到社会认识论

从元认识论的视角看,认识论既是反思认识的理论框架,又是启发认识行为的研究纲领。传统认识论(从古希腊哲学到黑格尔哲学以及某些受传统哲学影响的现代哲学)在本质上是思辨的,它的最大失误在于没有以社会为基点来解释认识问题,其实质是没有看到人的社会本体性及其认识的社会性。“反思辨”是现代认识论的逻辑起点。由于“反思辨”的角度和方式不同,现代认识论又大体可分为四条思路,即马克思主义的、人本主义的、科学主义的和实用主义的。这几种思路有一个重要的立足点是一致的,那就是关心社会、研究社会、参与社会、改造社会,因而本身就是“社会的”。     

实用主义视域下心理学的多元化

心理学的多元化是指多种心理学研究的共存,它包括认识论水平的多元化、方法论水平的多元化和学科水平的多元化。多元化不是相对主义,它与实用主义具有内在的一致性。实用主义为当代多元化的心理学提供了合理的依据。实用主义多元论认为,各种心理学分支理论在没有被强制整合到同一框架之前,它就是统一的整体。促进心理学的多元化发展,更大程度地发挥心理学的实用价值是当代心理学的发展方向。     

A Minimalist Theory of Truth

This article, after briefly discussing Alfred Tarski's influential theory of truth, turns to a more recent theory of truth, a deflationary, or minimalist, theory. One of the chief elements of a deflationary, or minimalist, theory of truth is that it replaces the question of what truth is with the question of what “true” does. After setting out the central features of the minimalist theory of truth, the article explains the motivation for opting for such a position. In addition, it provides some reasons for thinking that such a theory of truth is “minimal” or “deflationary” in the way that contemporary truth theorists have claimed it to be.     

试论语义悖论的弗完全理论

弗完全理论通过限制排中律的使用,弱化经典逻辑,采用非经典的三值语言来处理语义悖论,最终使得形式语言能够一致地包含自身的真谓词。文中我们讨论了弗完全理论的两种基本形式——基础的弗完全理论和高级的弗完全理论。基础的弗完全理论引入了＂真值空缺＂的思想,认为句子除了真假之外还有＂既不真也不假＂的第三值,像说谎者这样的语义悖论语句就落在真假之空缺中,该理论借助于对不动点的归纳构造过程证明了形式语言中真谓词的存在性。高级弗完全理论在前者的基础上引入一个适当的条件句,定义了一个＂更强的真＂,发展出了既满足真的素朴模式又具有不动点解释的、一致的高级弗完全理论。     

Scharp on replacing truth

Kevin Scharp’s ‘Replacing Truth’ is an ambitious and far reaching account of the semantic paradoxes. In this critical discussion we examine one the books central claims: to have provided a theory of truth that avoids the revenge paradoxes. In the first part we assess this claim, and in the second part we investigate some features of Scharp’s preferred theory of truth, ADT, and compare it with existing theories such as the Kripke–Feferman theory. In the appendix a simple model of Scharp’s theory is presented, and some potential consistent ways to strengthen the theory are suggested.     

真理、符合与收缩论

The central claim of this essay is that many deflationary theories of truth are variants of the correspondence theory of truth. Essential to the correspondence theory of truth is the proposal that objective features of the world are the truthmakers of statements. Many advocates of deflationary theories (including F. P. Ramsay, P. F. Strawson and Paul Horwich) remain committed to this proposal. Although T-sentences (statements of the form “s is true iff p”) are presented by advocates of deflationary theories of truth as truisms or analytic truths, T-sentences are often understood as entailing commitment to the central proposal of the correspondence theory.     

塔斯基：语义性真理论与符合论

塔斯基语义性真理论是否为符合论是一个争论的热点。目前有两种观点认为它是符合论,其一是根据对象语言与元语言的区分,到目前为止此观点已受到激烈批评,其二是根据“满足”概念的递归定义,此观点到目前为止还没有被人详细地阐明。本文认为塔斯基的语义性真理论是符合论,为此将首先对第一种观点及其反对意见进行深入分析,并得出结论认为该观点不能成立,继而详细阐明第二种观点,表明它是塔斯基本人的意图。在讨论中本文将对一系列的逻辑哲学问题进行探讨。     

Deflationism beyond arithmetic

The conservativeness argument poses a dilemma to deflationism about truth, according to which a deflationist theory of truth must be conservative but no adequate theory of truth is conservative. The debate on the conservativeness argument has so far been framed in a specific formal setting, where theories of truth are formulated over arithmetical base theories. I will argue that the appropriate formal setting for evaluating the conservativeness argument is provided not by theories of truth over arithmetic but by those over subject matters ‘richer’ than arithmetic, such as set theory. The move to this new formal setting provides deflationists with better defence and brings a broader perspective to the debate.

     

Review

I argue in this paper that anyone who accepts the ontology of scientific realism can only accept a pragmatic theory of truth, i.e., a theory on which truth is what it is epistemically right to believe. But the combination of realism with such a theory of truth is a form of internal realism; therefore, a scientific realist should be an internal realist. The strategy of the paper is to argue that there is no adequate semantic or correspondence theory of truth compatible with a realist ontology, that a redundancy theory cannot account for the value of truth, and that the only kind of truth theory which can account for the value of truth, and is compatible with a realist ontology, is a pragmatic theory. The kind of truth theory I wish to defend is objective and naturalistic, and the ontology is realistic. My position is, therefore, one of objective, naturalistic realism.     

Quine's truth

W. V. Quine has made statements about truth which are not obviously compatible, and his statements have been interpreted in more than one way. For example, Donald Davidson claims that Quine has an epistemic theory of truth, but Quine himself often says that truth is just disquotational. This paper argues that Quine should recognize two different notions of truth. One of these is disquotational, the other is empiricist. There is nothing wrong with recognizing two different notions of truth. Both may be perfectly legitimate, even though, to some extent, they may be applicable in different contexts. Roughly speaking, a sentence is true in the empiricist sense if it belongs to a theory which entails all observation sentences which would be assented to by the speakers of the language in question (and no observation sentences which would be dissented from by these speakers). Various objections to this idea are discussed and rejected.     

Minimalism and Paradoxes

This paper argues against minimalism about truth. It does so by way of acomparison of the theory of truth with the theory of sets, and considerationof where paradoxes may arise in each. The paper proceeds by asking twoseemingly unrelated questions. First, what is the theory of truth about?Answering this question shows that minimalism bears important similaritiesto naive set theory. Second, why is there no strengthened version ofRussell's paradox, as there is a strengthened Liar paradox? Answering thisquestion shows that like naive set theory, minimalism is unable to makeadequate progress in resolving the paradoxes, and must be replaced by adrastically different sort of theory. Such a theory, it is shown, must befundamentally non-minimalist.     

Supervaluation-Style Truth Without Supervaluations

Kripke’s theory of truth is arguably the most influential approach to self-referential truth and the semantic paradoxes. The use of a partial evaluation scheme is crucial to the theory and the most prominent schemes that are adopted are the strong Kleene and the supervaluation scheme. The strong Kleene scheme is attractive because it ensures the compositionality of the notion of truth. But under the strong Kleene scheme classical tautologies do not, in general, turn out to be true and, as a consequence, classical reasoning is no longer admissible once the notion of truth is involved. The supervaluation scheme adheres to classical reasoning but violates compositionality. Moreover, it turns Kripke’s theory into a rather complicated affair: to check whether a sentence is true we have to look at all admissible precisification of the interpretation of the truth predicate we are presented with. One consequence of this complicated evaluation condition is that under the supervaluation scheme a more proof-theoretic characterization of Kripke’s theory becomes inherently difficult, if not impossible. In this paper we explore the middle ground between the strong Kleene and the supervaluation scheme and provide an evaluation scheme that adheres to classical reasoning but retains many of the attractive features of the strong Kleene scheme. We supplement our semantic investigation with a novel axiomatic theory of truth that matches the semantic theory we have put forth.