Metaphor and minimalism

This paper argues first that, contrary to what one would expect, metaphorical interpretations of utterances pass two of Cappelan and Lepore’s Minimalist tests for semantic context-sensitivity. I then propose how, in light of that result, one might analyze metaphors on the model of indexicals and demonstratives, expressions that (even) Minimalists agree are semantically context-dependent. This analysis builds on David Kaplan’s semantics for demonstratives and refines an earlier proposal in (Stern, Metaphor in context, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2000). In the course of this argument, I also discuss some new examples of linguistic phenomena that motivate a semantic structure underlying metaphorical interpretation, phenomena I argue that neither Minimalists nor Contextualists can explain.     

Logic and Metaphor

In this work, attention is drawn to the abundant use of metaphor and analogy in works of logic. I argue that pervasiveness of figurative language is to be counted among the features that characterize logic and distinguish it from other sciences. This characteristic feature reflects the creativity that is inherent in logic and indeed has been demonstrated to be a necessary part of logic. The goal of this paper, in short, is to provide specific examples of figurative language used in logic that yield insights into the nature of the subject. I encourage the reader to take metaphors seriously, and to accept that they are not mere embellishments but key elements in our understanding of logic.     

隐喻

隐喻在当代哲学各个领域引起了不同程度的关注。对于语言哲学来说，它不仅本身是一种值得分析和解释的语言现象，同时对语言哲学家们持续关注的领域—非比喻的字面语言提出了深层次的问题。本文考察了当代语言哲学刻画隐喻用法与其他语言用法（例如熟语、歧义词、语义扩展）之间的差异与联系的种种尝试，特别是戴维森等人的理论及其引起的争论。进而，本文探讨了比喻性语言既依赖于、又不同于字面语言的方式，以及这样的语义理论或语用理论对整体上的语言哲学有何助益。     

Sense of reality,reality testing and reality processing in borderline patients1

Although borderline patients are suitable for it, they often undergo repeated testing of phantasies against objective reality without success. A reason for these partial failures is that subjects have not been able to build a solid sense of reality and have found many diffi culties for processing reality demands and possibilities. The author puts forward some thoughts on this question, such as the importance of working through the depressive position and the Oedipus complex in the process of building up a solid sense of reality. A sense of reality also favours continuous reality processing. When reality processing becomes as continuous as life itself, the repetition of individual reality tests becomes less frequent and necessary, and more satisfying. The author also presents some recommendations for the psychoanalytic treatment of such patients, stressing the importance and the diffi culties of the introduction of the borderline patient into the triangular situation because primitive defences‐such as disavowal and denial‐are mobilized.     

Metaphor and the violent

During the treatment of violent individuals who were, incidentally, highly verbal, the authors noticed that physical assaults were often preceded by the perpetrator s use of metaphors. It was observed that the linguistic metaphors failed to function as ordinary as if devices and became concretised. When this occurred, the perpetrators resorted to a physical attack. In this paper, the authors argue that the capacity to interconnect (which is considered to be the essence of psychic work) is dependent upon what can be conceptualised as a primary mental frame or warp. Distortion of the warp will, in turn, weaken the weaving, or interconnecting function of the ego, which is considered analogous to the interconnecting in linguistic metaphors. Clinical material from the treatment of three violent men (two in psychotherapy and one in analysis) is used to illustrate the hypothesis that the concretised use of metaphor represents a restitutive, but failed attempt to maintain a psychic coherence in the face of an imminent breakdown.     

How the eye measures reality and virtual reality

If virtual reality systems are to make good on their name, designers must know how people perceive space in natural environments, in photographs, and in cinema. Perceivers understand the layout of a cluttered natural environment through the use of nine or more sources of information, each based on different assumptions—occlusion, height in the visual field, relative size, relative density, aerial perspective, binocular disparities, accommodation, convergence, and motion perspective. The relative utility of these sources at different distances is compared, using their ordinal depth-threshold functions. From these, three classes of space around a moving observer are postulated: personal space, action space, and vista space. Within each, a smaller number of sources act in consort, with different relative strengths. Given the general ordinality of the sources, these spaces are likely to be affine in character, stretching and collapsing with viewing conditions. One of these conditions is controlled by lens length in photography and cinematography or by field-of-view commands in computer graphics. These have striking effects on many of these sources of information and, consequently, on how the layout of a scene is perceived.     

Memory and reality

Although it may be disconcerting to contemplate, true and false memories arise in the same way. Memories are attributions that we make about our mental experiences based on their subjective qualities, our prior knowledge and beliefs, our motives and goals, and the social context. This article describes an approach to studying the nature of these mental experiences and the constructive encoding, revival, and evaluative processes involved (the source monitoring framework). Cognitive behavioral studies using both objective (e.g., recognition, source memory) and subjective (e.g., ratings of memory characteristics) measures and neuroimaging findings are helping to clarify the complex relation between memory and reality. ((c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved).     

Appearance and reality

There is tension between the appealing idea that visual experience puts us in touch with objective reality and the doctrine of perceptual relativity, the claim that experience varies with such factors as distance, lighting, and angle of view. In this paper I present arguments for relativity, and then go on to propose that in view of relativity, we should believe that the properties presented to us in perception are relational and viewpoint‐dependent. I conclude by sketching a theory of how we nonetheless manage to achieve contact with objective properties. According to the theory, such contact is best explained in terms of perceptual representations acting in concert with cognitive and motoric representations, not in terms of perceptual representations alone.     

Countertransference and reality

The psychoanalytic situation provides many opportunities for people to observe their analysts closely. These observations are inevitably woven into the fabric of patients’ transference experience. Because the observations can be uncomfortable for the analyst, there is a constant temptation to ignore or deny the plausibility of patients’ perceptions. They can be, and often are, quickly reinterpreted as derivatives of sexual or aggressive urges. Psychoanalytic drive theory, with its emphasis on impulse rather than observation as the force behind transference experience, can encourage counter‐transferential disclaimers and lead to blind spots. Some technical suggestions are offered to avoid this tendency and are based on a relational understanding of the nature of transference.