Perceiving curvilinear heading in the presence of moving objects

Four experiments were directed at understanding the influence of multiple moving objects on curvilinear (i.e., circular and elliptical) heading perception. Displays simulated observer movement over a ground plane in the presence of moving objects depicted as transparent, opaque, or black cubes. Objects either moved parallel to or intersected the observer's path and either retreated from or approached the moving observer. Heading judgments were accurate and consistent across all conditions. The significance of these results for computational models of heading perception and for information in the global optic flow field about observer and object motion is discussed.     

Perceiving tongue position.

Two experiments on perceiving the tongue position were conducted in which naive human subjects pointed to gingival targets, or to extensions of their fingertip, with their tongue. The aim in experiment 1 was to inquire about the existence and accuracy of the perception of the horizontal position of the tongue inside and outside the mouth, and whether kinesthetic elements other than the skin might contribute to perceiving tongue position. Vertical positioning and the calibration of the sensory map that can be presumed to underlie position sense in the tongue were examined in experiment 2. It was found that position sense is equally good in the presence and absence of anesthesia of the mucosa, suggesting that the muscles, tendons, and corollary discharge contribute to position sense in the tongue. Perception of the tongue position both inside and outside the mouth is accurate, with the error in tongue positioning being about 2 degrees. Feedback improved naive subjects' accuracy very little.     

Perceiving spatially inseparable objects: evidence for feature-based object selection not mediated by location

In 4 experiments, stimulus elements were arranged into an LED-like array, and letters were defined within the array by feature similarity between the elements with respect to color and form. These stimuli allowed the display of a target and a distractor letter simultaneously at the same location. They were spatially inseparable but could be separated in feature space. Participants had to identify the letter on a prespecified feature dimension (color or form). As a result, the distractors produced specific compatibility effects. This showed that nontarget features could not be ignored at an early stage (i.e., that color and form were processed automatically and in parallel up to a high stage). The target was selected from the resulting objects according to the prespecified feature dimension. Results demonstrate that object selection is possible without selecting absolute spatial arrays.     

Perceiving the language of films.

Children appear to be familiar with the language of film makers or at least to perceive and remember films less well when the rules of this cinematic language are broken. In this experiment a simple action sequence filmed from a static viewpoint was made up into two films of four shots. One film was edited according to the rules of directional continuity specified by Hollywood cinema, that is the four shots were presented so as to preserve the subject's direction of movement across cuts. The other film was edited disregarding these rules. Apart from this difference both films were identical. Children aged seven, nine, and thirteen years watched either of these films and reconstructed the action using pictures representing the four shots. The children who saw the conventional version were better able to reconstruct what they had seen than those who saw the unconventional version.     

Perceiving Necessity

In many diagrams one seems to perceive necessity – one sees not only that something is so, but that it must be so. That conflicts with a certain empiricism largely taken for granted in contemporary philosophy, which believes perception is not capable of such feats. The reason for this belief is often thought well‐summarized in Hume's maxim: ‘there are no necessary connections between distinct existences’. It is also thought that even if there were such necessities, perception is too passive or localized a faculty to register them. We defend the perception of necessity against such Humeanism, drawing on examples from mathematics.     

Perceiving affect from arm movement.

We examined the visual perception of affect from point-light displays of arm movements. Two actors were instructed to perform drinking and knocking movements with ten different affects while the three-dimensional positions of their arms were recorded. Point-light animations of these natural movements and phase-scrambled, upside-down versions of the same knocking movements were shown to participants who were asked to categorize the affect of the display. In both cases the resulting confusion matrices were analyzed using multidimensional scaling. For the natural movements the resulting two-dimensional psychological space was similar to a circumplex with the first dimension appearing as activation and the second dimension as pleasantness. For the scrambled displays the first dimension was similar in structure to that obtained for the natural movements but the second dimension was not. With both natural and scrambled movements Dimension 1 of the psychological space was highly correlated to the kinematics of the movement. These results suggest that the corresponding activation of perceived affect is a formless cue that relates directly to the movement kinematics while the pleasantness of the movement appears to be carried in the phase relations between the different limb segments.     

Perceiving pictures

I aim to give a new account of picture perception: of the way our visual system functions when we see something in a picture. My argument relies on the functional distinction between the ventral and dorsal visual subsystems. I propose that it is constitutive of picture perception that our ventral subsystem attributes properties to the depicted scene, whereas our dorsal subsystem attributes properties to the picture surface. This duality elucidates Richard Wollheim’s concept of the “twofoldness” of our experience of pictures: the “visual awareness not only of what is represented but also of the surface qualities of the representation.” I argue for the following four claims: (a) the depicted scene is represented by ventral perception, (b) the depicted scene is not represented by dorsal perception, (c) the picture surface is represented by dorsal perception, and (d) the picture surface is not necessarily represented by ventral perception.     

Perceiving Smellscapes

We perceive smells as perduring complex entities within a distal array. However, odor theories have been recently criticized for their conception of the spatiotemporal nature of olfactory perception and the individuation of distal odors. The paper does not aim to dispute these criticisms. Rather, what will be shown is that molecular structure theory, a refinement of odor theory, can be further developed to handle these challenges. The theory is further refined by focusing on distal perception that requires considering the perceptual object as mereologically complex persisting odor against a background scene conceived of as a smellscape.     

Perceiving geographical slant

People judged the inclination of hills viewed either out-of-doors or in a computer-simulated virtual environment. Angle judgments were obtained by having people (1) provide verbal estimates, (2) adjust a representation of the hill’s cross-section, and (3) adjust a tilt board with their unseen hand. Geographical slant was greatly overestimated according to the first two measures, but not the third. Apparent slant judgments conformed to ratio scales, thereby enhancing sensitivity to the small inclines that must actually be traversed in everyday experience. It is proposed that the perceived exaggeration of geographical slant preserves the relationship between distal inclination and people’s behavioral potential. Hills are harder to traverse as people become tired; hence, apparent slant increased with fatigue. Visually guided actions must be accommodated to the actual distal properties of the environment; consequently, the tilt board adjustments did not reflect apparent slant overestimations, nor were they influenced by fatigue. Consistent with the fact that steep hills are more difficult to descend than to ascend, these hills appeared steeper when viewed from the top.     

Perceiving facial expressions

Three experiments investigated the perception of facial displays of emotions. Using a morphing technique, Experiment 1 (identification task) and Experiment 2 (ABX discrimination task) evaluated the merits of categorical and dimensional models of the representation of these stimuli. We argue that basic emotions—as they are usually defined verbally—do not correspond to primary perceptual categories emerging from the visual analysis of facial expressions. Instead, the results are compatible with the hypothesis that facial expressions are coded in a continuous anisotropic space structured by valence axes. Experiment 3 (identification task) introduces a new technique for generating chimeras to address the debate between feature-based and holistic models of the processing of facial expressions. Contrary to the pure holistic hypothesis, the results suggest that an independent assessment of discrimination features is possible, and may be sufficient for identifying expressions even when the global facial configuration is ambiguous. However, they also suggest that top-down processing may improve identification accuracy by assessing the coherence of local features.     

Visuospatial perspective taking in a dynamic environment: Perceiving moving objects from a first-person-perspective induces a disposition to act

Spatial perspective taking is an everyday cognitive process that is involved in predicting the outcome of goal directed behavior. We used dynamic virtual stimuli and fMRI to investigate at the neural level whether motion perception interacts with spatial perspective taking in a life-like design. Subjects were asked to perform right-left-decisions about the position of either a motionless, hovering (STATic) or a flying ball (DYNamic), either from their own (1PP) or from the perspective of a virtual character (avatar, 3PP). Our results showed a significant interaction of STIMULUS TYPE and PERSPECTIVE with significantly increased activation in right posterior intraparietal sulcus (IPS) for 1PPDYN condition. As the IPS is critically involved in the computation of object-directed action preparation, we suppose that the simple perception of potentially action-relevant dynamic objects induces a ‘readiness for (re)action’, restricted to the 1PP. Results are discussed against the background of current theories on embodiment and enactive perception.     

Perceiving Empirical Objects Directly

The goal of this paper is to defend the claim that there is such a thing as direct perception, where by direct perception I mean perception unmediated by theorizing or concepts. The basis for my defense is a general philosophic perspective which I call empiricist philosophy. In brief, empiricist philosophy (as I have defined it) is untenable without the occurrence of direct perception. It is untenable without direct perception because, otherwise, one can't escape the hermeneutic circle, as this phrase is used in van Fraassen (1980). The bulk of the paper is devoted to defending my belief in direct perception against various objections that can be posed against it. I discuss various anticipations of my view found in the literature, eventually focusing on Ian Hacking's related conception of `entity realism' (Hacking 1983). Hacking has been criticized by a number of philosophers and my plan is to respond to these criticisms on behalf of entity realism (or more precisely on behalf of the claim that direct perception is a reality) and to then respond to other possible criticisms that can be launched against direct perception.     

Perceiving the sweet spot

Many sports involve aligning a hitting implement with a ball trajectory such that contact is made at the implement's center of percussion or 'sweet spot'. This spot is not visibly distinct; its perception must be haptic. Although it is functionally defined with respect to contact--it is the point of impact that produces the least vibration in the hand holding the implement--hitting success requires appreciating the location of the sweet spot prior to contact. Two experiments verified that perceivers (novices as well as expert tennis players) distinguished perception of length from perception of the position of the sweet spot simply on the basis of wielding, both for tennis rackets and for bats contrived from wooden rods with attached masses. Results conformed to previous research on dynamic touch in showing that perceiving the lengths of wielded objects, including selectively perceiving partial lengths, is constrained by inertial properties of the object.